

Wolf Creek 1

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems



Significance: Oct 11, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Alternative Shutdown Procedure

The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for ensuring the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire in the control room that requires control room evacuation. Procedure OFN RP-17, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 17, was inadequate because certain operator actions specified in Attachment C to the procedure could not be performed within the required time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-2393. This finding was of greater than minor significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. This resulted from the issue's potential to affect the licensee's capability to safely shutdown the reactor in response to a fire in the control room requiring control room evacuation and remote shutdown. For fire protection findings, the Phase 1 screening worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, refers fire protection findings to Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, for significance evaluation. Using the significance determination process described in Appendix F, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, due to the licensee's demonstration that operators would have performed the most time-critical step (to isolate the power-operated relief valves) in time to prevent core damage.

Inspection Report# : [2002008\(pdf\)](#)



Significance: Sep 25, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Implement Appropriate Corrective Actions for Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tubes

The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to: (a) implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation; (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes; and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. These failures were identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This noncited violation closes three unresolved items identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-06. This issue was considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would result in a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the issue affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system.

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)



Significance: Jul 10, 2002

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Procedure While Drawing a Vacuum on the Reactor Coolant system

The inspectors documented a failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system. Although Item 4.6 of Operations Procedure SYS BB-112, "Vacuum Fill of the RCS," Revision 17, stated that residual heat removal pump flow rate during vacuum venting shall be less than 2000 gallons per minute to prevent pump cavitation, operators allowed the flow rate to exceed 2000 gallons per minute. The failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-1247. A risk analyst in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because all other emergency core cooling components were available and inventory remained in the secondary side of the steam generators which would provide for reflux cooling of the reactor.

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: N/A Mar 23, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Fire Protection

A noncited violation of Technical Specifications Section 5.4.1 when the licensee failed to follow Procedure AP 10-102, "Control of Combustible Materials," Revision 6. The inspectors identified that the licensee placed transient combustibles weighing approximately 530 pounds inside the turbine building within 20 feet of the auxiliary building without the required permit. A permit was required in this area if the transient combustibles weight is greater than 100 pounds. This finding was greater than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. This finding did not involve an impairment or degradation of a fire protection feature. The finding was of No Color because the issue was determined to be a violation greater than minor. The placement of the transient combustible material did not affect any installed fire protection features and it would not have impeded access to the area by the licensee's fire brigade

Inspection Report# : [2001006\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A May 17, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The licensee was effective at identifying problems and placing them into the corrective action program. Observations and findings identified by the NRC during the evaluation period (March 1, 2001 to April 1, 2002) were similar those identified in licensee audits and assessments. The licensee effectively prioritized reviews and evaluated issues with few exceptions. The licensee was effective in determining the extent of conditions, and implementation of corrective actions. The depth of the condition evaluations and the rigor applied to cover the actions was appropriate to the significance of the safety issue involved. Based on interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety issues into the problem identification and resolution program.

Inspection Report# : [2002003\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : March 25, 2003