

## Hatch 2

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### Initiating Events



**Significance:** Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Meet Conditions of License for Requalification Examinations**

Green. A non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.2.2.f was identified for allowing the Operations Manager to continue in his normal duties without a current license in that he did not complete a requalification program within the two year training cycle as required by 10 CFR 55.53(h) and 10 CFR 55.59(a). The finding was more than minor because the Operations Manager was permitted to continue his daily duties, including directing day-to-day plant operation by licensed operators. The finding was of very low safety significance because the individual did not actually perform any licensed operator duties. Although not suitable for Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis in the Operator Requalification or Reactor SDP, the issue was determined by management review to be of Green significance. (Section 1R11.2)

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

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### Mitigating Systems



**Significance:** Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Inadequate Corrective Action for Missing Penetration Seals**

The licensee had not taken prompt corrective action for missing RHR Service Water (RHRSW) piping penetration seals at the intake structure. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is more than minor because the lack of penetration seals could have permitted the Plant Service Water (PSW) valve pit to flood and effected the mitigating systems cornerstone. Because flooding of the PSW valve pit had not occurred nor were flooding conditions present, this failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality is of very low safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)



**Significance:** Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Calculation Error Results in Incorrect Steam Line High Flow Setpoints**

An incorrect calculation constant resulted in a non-conservative setpoint for the Unit 1 main steam line flow - high isolation setpoint. A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) table 3.3.6.1-1 was identified. This finding is greater than minor because the actual setpoint exceeded the TS allowable value and the analytical limit, as a result of the error. However, the violation is of very low significance because the increased steam released due to the higher setpoint would not significantly impact offsite radiological dose during a main steam line break accident.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)



**Significance:** Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Inadequate Operability Assessment of Main Steam Safety Relief Valve**

The licensee did not promptly identify the cause of a failed safety relief valve (SRV). An operability evaluation written in response to the failure was not timely and did not adequately support a determination that the remaining SRV's were operable. Consequently, this significant condition adverse to quality was not promptly corrected and adequate measures were not taken to preclude repetition. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is greater than minor because the licensee's operability assessment was not timely and relied primarily on unsupported engineering judgement for a determination of operable for the remaining SRV's. It also required multiple revisions when inconsistencies were identified by the inspectors. This finding was of very low significance because no loss of SRV

function occurred.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

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**Significance:** Oct 24, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Consider Vortexing in the Calculation for CST Level for Automatic Switchover of the HPCI Pump Suction**

Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for inadequate design control of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system suction source from the condensate storage tank (CST). Vortexing in the CST was not accounted for when the licensee calculated the CST level setpoint specified in the Technical Specifications (TS) for automatic HPCI system suction switchover from the CST to the suppression pool. Vortexing could cause air ingestion into the HPCI system suction from the CST and the air could then damage the HPCI pump. This finding was of very low safety significance because licensee use of the non-safety CST as a HPCI pump suction source with the CST at low levels was unlikely since the reactor vessel or suppression pool would generally reach a high level first, where the HPCI pump would be automatically stopped or its suction would be automatically switched to the safety-related suppression pool. In addition, alternate core cooling methods would normally be available, including reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) as well as automatic depressurization system (ADS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI).

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

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**Significance:** Oct 24, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Inadequate RCIC System Operating Procedure**

Green. A non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for an inadequate RCIC system operating procedure. The section of the procedure for local manual operation of RCIC, if followed exactly as written, would have resulted in overspeeding the RCIC pump with no water flow through the pump and with no cooling water to the pump. This finding was of very low safety significance because the likelihood of losing Division I direct current (DC) power was low; consequently the potential need for local manual operation of RCIC was low. In addition, other core cooling methods would normally be available, including HPCI as well as ADS and LPCI.

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

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**Significance:** Jun 29, 2002

Identified By: Licensee

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Loss of Secondary Containment Integrity**

Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 requires that secondary containment be operable during Modes 1, 2, and 3. Secondary containment alignment was established by procedure 34SO-T22-001-0S, Secondary Containment Alignment, Rev. 5.6 and maintained by a clearance established per procedure 30AC-OPS-001-0S, Control of Equipment Clearance and Tags, Rev. 23. On April 11, 2002, secondary containment integrity was lost when valve 1T41-F032A, Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment Suction Damper, which was gagged shut under the clearance, failed open following the transfer of a vital electrical power supply. This violation was entered into licensee's corrective action program as CR 2002003930. This is being treated as a Non Cited Violation.

Inspection Report# : [2002003\(pdf\)](#)

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## **Emergency Preparedness**

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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**Significance:** Jun 29, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Inadequate SCBA Training Procedure**

Green. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) was identified for the failure of the licensee to implement a self-contained breathing apparatus training program that required all designated SCBA users to demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air bottles. This finding was of very low safety significance because it involved a failure to meet a regulatory requirement but did not involve the failure to implement or meet an emergency preparedness planning standard and because no actual event required emergency response workers to change self contained breathing apparatus air bottles. This finding been entered into the licensee corrective action program as CR2002006279.

Inspection Report# : [2002003\(pdf\)](#)

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

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## Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 25, 2003