




Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation


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Background

- **1988—NRC Generic Letter 88-05 requests licensees to monitor, inspect, and prevent boric acid corrosion on pressure boundary surfaces**
- **1991--First cracking of CRDM nozzles identified in an international nuclear plant**
- **1997—NRC Generic Letter 97-01 requests**
 - **Description/plans of CRDM nozzle inspection and results**
 - **Analysis if augmented inspection is not performed**
 - **Description of any resin intrusions that exceeded EPRI primary water chemistry guidelines**





Background

- **February 2001—Oconee Unit 3 CRDM nozzle inspection per NRC Generic Letter 97-01**
 - **Discovers 9 cracked & leaking CRDM nozzles**
 - **Circumferential cracks in 3 of the 9 degraded nozzles**
 - **2 cracks are 165 degrees in circumferential extent and through-wall**
- **April 2001—Oconee Unit 2 CRDM nozzle inspection**
 - **Discovers 4 cracked & leaking CRDM nozzles**
 - **Circumferential crack in 1 of the 4 degraded nozzles**
- **All Oconee cracks were repaired**

Background

- **August 2001--NRC Bulletin 2001-01 requests:**
 - **Susceptibility ranking of vessel head penetration nozzles from all plants**
 - **Inspection plans for vessel head penetration nozzles on the basis of susceptibility ranking**
 - **Description of post-inspection vessel head penetration nozzle leakage and cracking**

Bulletin 2001-01: Susceptibility Criteria

- **Plants with CRDM nozzle cracking or leakage: expected to perform qualified volumetric exam by end of 2001**
- **Plants with High Susceptibility (within 5 EFPY of Oconee 3): expected to perform qualified visual exam by end of 2001**
- **Plant with Moderate Susceptibility (5 to 30 EFPY of Oconee 3): expected to perform effective visual exam at the next refueling outage**
- **Plant with Low susceptibility (more than 30 EFPY of Oconee 3): no additional actions required**

INSPECTION RESULTS: CRACKING/LEAKAGE HISTORY AND HIGH SUSCEPTIBILITY PLANTS (4/24/02) ¶

Plants	Most Recent Inspection					
	Date	Method & Scope	Summary of Cracked or Leaking CRDM Nozzles			
			Leaking	Cracked	Circumferential ¶ Nozzle Cracks	Number Repaired
Oconee 1	11/2000	Qualified Visual - 100%	1★	1★	0	1
Oconee 3	02/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	9	9	3	9
ANO-1	03/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	1	1	0	1
Oconee 2	04/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	4	4	1	4
Robinson	04/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	0	0	0	0
North Anna 1	09/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★	0	8	0	0
Crystal River 3 ★★★	10/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★	1	1	1	1
TMI-1	10/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%	5★	8★	0	6
Surry 1	10/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★	(4)	10	0	6
North Anna 2	10/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★	3	3	0	3
Surry 2	11/2001	Qualified Visual - 100%★★	0	0	0	0
Oconee 3	11/2001	Qual. Visual - 100% (UT of 100%)	5	7	1	7
D. C. Cook 2	1/2002	Qual. Visual, ECT, UT - 100%	0	0	0	0
Millstone 2 ★★★	2/2002	UT Examination - 100%	0	3	0	3
Davis-Besse	2/2002	UT Examination - 100%	3	5	1	3 (5)
Oconee 1	3/2002	Qualified Visual - 100%	1	2	0	2

- ★★ ** Thermocouple nozzles also cracked/leaking: Oconee 1 (5 out of 8), TMI 1 (8 out of 8) ¶
- ★★★ ** Pending acceptability of licensee's supplemental response ¶
- ★★★★ → MODERATE susceptibility plants. ¶
- ** Moderate susceptibility plants with no evidence of boric acid deposits: ANO 2, Beaver Valley 1 & 2, Calvert Cliffs 1, Farley 1, Kewaunee, Palo Verde 2, Point Beach 2, Prairie Island 2, Salem 2, St. Lucie 2, Turkey Point 3 & 4, and Waterford 3

Davis Besse RPV Head Inspection


- **February 2002---**Davis Besse visual inspection of RPV head per NRC Bulletin 2001-01
- **UT inspection of all 69 CRDM nozzles**
 - **5 nozzles with indications (3 with throughwall cracks)**
 - **Cavity found adjacent to nozzle #3**
 - **Degraded area near nozzle #2**
 - **Significant boron and corrosion deposits on the RPV head**







Findings



Framatome ANP Inc. completed UT examination on all 69 CRDM nozzles using the under-head circumferential probe and subsequent confirmatory testing using the top-down UT on suspect nozzles

Nozzle with Axial Indication - ●
Nozzle with Axial and Circumferential Indication - ●

NRC Bulletin 2002-01

- **March 2002---NRC Bulletin 2002-01**
- **Within 15 days--**
 - **Summarize RPV head inspection and maintenance program**
 - **Evaluate potential degradation conditions**
 - **Plan for future inspections**
 - **Justify continued operation**
- **Within 30 days after inspection—submit results of inspection**
- **Within 60-days– submit boric acid corrosion prevention program**

Responses to Bulletin 2002-01

- **General observations:**
 - **Most licensees correct leaks**
 - **Most licensees do inspections under insulation following “significant” leakage**
 - **No one is in same category as Davis-Besse**
 - **Many licensees have performed bare metal inspections**
 - **Almost all licensees have left minor debris and isolated chunks of boron deposit on the RPV head**

NRC Augmented Inspection Team Findings at Davis Besse

- **Containment Air Cooler Clogging**
 - Increase in boron deposit on cooling coils
 - Change in boron deposit color
- **Containment Radiation Monitor Filters**
 - Filters clogged with corrosion products from reactor coolant leakage
- **Boric Acid Corrosion**
 - Nozzle flange leakage
 - RPV head boron and corrosion deposit not removed

Root Cause Investigation

- **Sequence of events leading to 2002**
- **Contributors to degradation**
- **Crack propagation**
- **Leak rates through crack**
- **Boric acid corrosion and corrosion rate**

Contributors to Degradation

- **Degradation caused by primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)**
 - **Susceptible material-- Alloy 600 in nozzles and Alloy 82/182 in J-groove welds**
 - **Affected nozzles fabricated from heat M3935**
 - **High tensile stress adjacent to J-groove weld**
 - **Aggressive environment—high head operating temperature**

NRC's Actions

- **Augmented Inspection Team at Davis Besse**
- **Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force**
- **Inspection Manual Chapter 0350 Panel**
- **Review licensee's root cause analysis**
- **Review responses to NRC Bulletin 2002-01**

Current status of Davis Besse

- **The licensee decided to use RPV head from Midland plant**
- **Certify Midland RPV head per NRC regulation and industry codes**
- **Framatome is studying degraded section of original RPV head**
- **NRC Region III followup inspections**
- **NRC Manual Chapter 0350 Restart panel formed**

Generic Implications

- **Davis Besse root cause evaluation provided qualitative assessment of probable corrosion mechanisms and sequence of events**
- **Did not provide quantitative information regarding when and under what conditions a through-wall leak would lead to vessel head corrosion**

Generic Implications

- **Is there a period of time following initiation of a through-wall leak in which NRC can be assured no unacceptable reactor vessel head corrosion will occur?**
- **Without knowing this, NRC has no assurance that visual inspections for through-wall leaks will prevent unacceptable reactor vessel head corrosion**
- **What is an acceptable amount of reactor vessel head corrosion?**

Generic Implications

- **Industry needs to provide NRC with sufficient information to justify why visual inspection methods and inspection intervals will assure no unacceptable reactor vessel head corrosion**
- **Until that information is received, NRC staff is reevaluating acceptability of visual inspections to detect CRDM nozzle cracking**
- **NRC staff is preparing further guidance**

Website of Presentation Slides

- www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/vessel-head-degradation/public-meetings.html
- Or,
- Go to www.nrc.gov
- Click on Nuclear Reactors (top of the page)
- Click on Operating Reactors (scroll down)
- Click on Operational Experience (scroll down)
- Click on Reactor Vessel Head Degradation
- Click on Public Meetings
- Click on 6/12/02 ANS Meeting