

## Vogtle Unit 4 Findings

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### Design Engineering

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**Identified By:** NRC

**Identification Date:** 03/31/2016

**Significance:** Green

**Item Type:** ITAAC Finding

#### **Failure to Perform AISC N690-94 Required Weld Nondestructive Examination**

Green. The inspectors identified an ITAAC finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, "Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components" for Southern Nuclear Company's (SNC) failure through their contractor Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) to adequately review and accept nonconforming items in accordance with documented procedures. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as condition reports (CR) 10180672 and 10181738.

The finding was associated with the Design / Engineering Cornerstone. The finding was considered more than minor because the performance deficiency represented a substantive failure to adequately implement a quality assurance process that rendered the quality of a structure, system, or component (SSC) indeterminate. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 2519, "Construction Significance Determination Process," and determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding is associated with a portion of a structure (auxiliary building) assigned to the intermediate risk column of the AP1000 construction significance determination matrix and would not reasonably be expected to impact the design function of the auxiliary building. The inspectors determined that the finding represented an ITAAC finding because it was material to the acceptance criteria of VEGP Units 3 and 4 ITAAC 763, in that, if left uncorrected, the licensee may not be able to demonstrate that the acceptance criteria of these ITAAC were met. The acceptance criteria of these ITAAC require that all deviations between the as-built structures and the approved designs be reconciled to verify that the as-built structures will withstand the design basis loads without a loss of structural integrity or other safety-related functions.

The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately review and accept nonconforming items in accordance with documented procedures may have resulted in a deviation from the approved design that would not have been reconciled by the licensee. The inspectors reviewed the finding for a possible cross-cutting aspect in accordance with IMC 0613 Appendix F, "Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects," and determined the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area because the licensee's contractor, WEC, failed to use decision making-practices that emphasized prudent choices over those that were simply allowable. [H.14].

**Identified By:** NRC

**Identification Date:** 06/30/2015

**Significance:** Green

**Item Type:** ITAAC Finding

#### **Weld Allowable Stress Calculation Not in Compliance with Current Licensing Basis**

Green. The inspectors identified an ITAAC finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control." Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC), failed through their contractor Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC), to correctly translate design basis into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions to correctly translate the design basis for welded structural connections into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. The licensee entered this finding in their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 10060139, Corrective Action, Prevention and

Learnings (CAPAL) 100224197, and corrective action report (CAR) 2015-1597.

The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it represented a substantive non-conservative error in a design document that defines the technical requirements for structural welds that are important to safety. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the construction significance determination process and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee was able to demonstrate with reasonable assurance that the design function of the affected components would not be impaired by the deficiency. The finding was determined to be an ITAAC finding because it was material to the acceptance criteria of Units 3 and 4 ITAACs 760, 761, 762, and 763. The acceptance criteria of these ITAAC require that reconciliation reports, concluding the "as-built" construction conforms to the approved design, are completed for the areas associated with each ITAAC. This finding is associated with deviations from design requirements that would not have been reconciled by the licensee as required by the ITAAC. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area Human Performance (Conservative Bias) because the licensee's contractor, WEC, failed to use decision making-practices that emphasized prudent choices over those that were simply allowable [H.14].

**Identified By:** NRC

**Identification Date:** 05/25/2012

**Significance:** Green

**Item Type:** ITAAC Finding

### **Inadequate Design Control of Software Development**

An NRC identified ITAAC finding of very low safety significance (Green) which involved a violation (VIO) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified by the inspectors on May 25, 2012, regarding the licensee's failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and specified in the license application, for the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically:

- The verification and validation (V&V) effort did not adequately perform the minimum V&V tasks including software requirements evaluation, interface analysis, criticality analysis, hazard analysis, and risk analysis;
- The V&V of the System Definition (requirements) phase activities was not performed independently; Reusable software element documents (RSED) did not follow the prescribed life cycle activities;
- A software hazard analysis of the software requirements specification (SRS) was not performed;
- The SRS was ambiguous, incomplete and was not ranked for importance.

At the time of the exit meeting for this report, the planned corrective actions for these issues were being evaluated by the licensee. These issues were entered into a corrective action program as Condition Report 438475.

The inspectors determined this issue is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it represents a failure to implement an adequate process and quality oversight function that could render the quality of the construction activity unacceptable or indeterminate, and it could adversely affect the closing of an ITAAC. The finding affected the objective of the Design/Engineering Cornerstone, which is to ensure that licensee's processes are adequately developed and implemented for design control. The finding was determined to be an ITAAC Finding because examples of this finding are material to the acceptance criteria of ITAAC 2.5.2.12, in that; software requirements were not ranked for importance and the V&V team was not independent of the design team. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the construction SDP and determined that, because there were no issues identified that would reasonably be expected to

impair the design function of the PMS, the finding screened as Green. The finding was cross-cutting in the area of baseline inspection, work practices, because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities associated with the PMS software development such that the construction quality was supported. [A.4(c)].

## Procurement/Fabrication

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## Construction/Installation

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**Identified By:** NRC

**Identification Date:** 03/31/2015

**Significance:** Green

**Item Type:** Construction Finding

### Failure to Perform Routine Quality Control Inspections

The inspectors identified a construction finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to accomplish safety-related, required quality control inspections in accordance with CB&I QC inspection plan FS561-004. The licensee entered the issue in their corrective action program as condition report number 10039935.

The finding was associated with the Construction/Installation Cornerstone. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because the issue represented a substantive failure to implement an adequate quality oversight function, in that these routine welding inspections were not performed by the licensee's contractor for over six months. The finding was determined to be a construction finding because it was not associated with a specific ITAAC. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding could not be directly associated with a system or structure. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Procedure Adherence because the licensee failed to ensure that individuals followed specific procedures [H.8].

**Identified By:** NRC

**Identification Date:** 05/07/2012

**Significance:** Green

**Item Type:** Technical Finding

### Failures to Properly Classify Conditions Adverse to Quality

The inspectors identified a Green technical finding and cited violation (NOV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, with five examples of the licensee's failure to adequately identify conditions adverse to quality (CAQ) due to inadequate evaluation and classification attributes. The licensee issued Condition Report (CR) 441941 to address this issue and to review the classification of the five identified examples and other corrective action documents for inappropriate thresholds.

This performance deficiency had greater than minor safety significance because it identified issues that, if left uncorrected represented failures to implement an adequate program that could render the quality of the construction activity unacceptable or indeterminate. The finding was a technical finding associated with the construction/installation cornerstone and was evaluated under the construction significance determination process as outlined in IMC 2519P Appendix A. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because none of the examples impaired the design function of a system or structure listed in the construction significance determination process risk importance table. This finding was directly related to the construction cross cutting area of baseline inspection and the Corrective Action Program component because the licensee's suppliers failed to adequately evaluate and classify conditions as adverse to quality due to an inappropriately high threshold for classifying conditions adverse to quality. [A.5(c)].

**Identified By:** NRC  
**Identification Date:** 05/07/2012  
**Significance:** Green  
**Item Type:** Technical Finding

### **Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality**

The inspectors identified a Green technical finding and cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for a failure to correct a CAQ. The licensee initiated CR 441949 to document this finding in their corrective action program, and to evaluate the extent of the condition and the areas where corrective action may be needed.

This performance deficiency had greater than minor safety significance because it involved the closure of three corrective action reports that all identified a potential adverse trend (a potential CAQ or significant CAQ) without an evaluation or justification for closure and without any corrective action. The finding was a technical finding associated with the construction/installation cornerstone and was evaluated under the construction significance determination process as outlined in IMC 2519P Appendix A. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the identified condition did not impair the design function of a system or structure listed in the construction significance determination process risk importance table. This finding was directly related to the construction cross cutting area of baseline inspection and the corrective action program component because the licensee's supplier failed to adequately evaluate and correct conditions adverse to quality. [A.5(c)].

### **Inspection/Testing**

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### **Security Programs**

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### **Operational Programs**

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### **Violations Identified Prior to 2012**

**Significance:** Severity Level IV, August 18, 2011  
**Identified by:** NRC  
**Item Type:** Violation

#### **Failure to Assure That Material Qualification Testing Associated With The Waterproof System Simulated Field Conditions.**

Based on the review of documentation and the observation of installation practices associated with site-specific (SS) ITAAC 3.8.5.1.1, the inspectors identified several examples where Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc (SNC) failed to simulate field conditions during qualification testing of the waterproof system. This issue was determined to be an ITAAC- related construction finding and a severity level (SL) IV violation of Criterion III, "Design Control," of Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Program Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."

Inspection Report #: 05200025/2011009

**Significance:** Severity Level IV, December 31, 2010  
**Identified by:** NRC  
**Item Type:** Violation

#### **Failure To Assure That Purchased Services Conform To Procurement Documents**

During the review of records and the observation of a sample of pre-construction activities that could affect the quality of the safety-related containment vessel (CV), the inspectors identified several examples

where Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc (SNC) failed to assure that safety-related services purchased through their contractor and subcontractor conformed to the CV procurement documents. This issue was determined to be a construction finding and a Severity Level IV Violation of Criterion VII, "Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services," of Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Program Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," for SNC's failure to assure that activities which could affect the quality of the safety-related containment vessel for Vogtle Unit 3, conformed to the procurement documents.

Inspection Report #: 05200011/2010-008; 05200025/2010-002; 05200026/2010-001

**Significance:** Severity Level IV, March 6, 2009

**Identified by:** NRC

**Item Type:** Violation

**10 CFR Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55(e) Procedure and Implementation**

The NRC inspectors issued Violations 05200025/2009-201-01 and 05200026/2009-201-01 as a result of SNC ND failure to: (1) accurately reflect the correct definitions of 10 CFR Part 21, (2) address all the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e), and (3) use the correct terminology throughout the procedure.

Inspection Report #: 05200025/2009-201; 05200026/2009-201-01

**Significance:** Severity Level IV, March 6, 2009

**Identified by:** NRC **Item Type:** Violation **Corrective Action Program**

The NRC inspectors issued Violations 05200025/2009-201-02 and 05200026/2009-201-02 because SNC ND NMP-GM-002 does not include guidance to screen new condition reports for potential 10 CFR Part 21 applicability and does not provide a clear link to the SNC ND 10 CFR Part 21 Procedure (ND-ARL-017).

Inspection Report #: 05200025/2009-201; 05200026/2009-201-01