




Counterfeits in GOV and Critical Infrastructure Supply Chain


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Outline


- The Counterfeiting Problems
 - How CFSI became a concern 2007-2011
 - Gov Supply Chain Issues
- Birth of Operation Chain Reaction (OCR)
- Product Focus & Threats
- OCR Strategy
- Detection in Acquisition Process
- Collaboration
 - Current & OCR TF
 - Future Nuclear partner Collaboration
- How LE has responded to combat CFSI issues
 - Case examples

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The Counterfeiting Problem

"...Robert P. Ernst, who heads research into counterfeit parts for the Naval Air Systems Command's Aging Aircraft Program...estimates that as many as **15% of all the spare and replacement microchips the Pentagon buys are counterfeit.** As a result, he says, 'we are having field failures regularly within our weapon systems-and in almost every weapon system.' He declines to provide details."



http://www.businessweek.com/2010/10/10c01_counterfeit_parts.htm



Gov Supply Chain Issues

- Aging technologies and systems
 - Obsolete sustainment parts
 - OEM doesn't manufacture part anymore
- Government Cost savings
 - Websites / brokers that offer parts (not vetted – acquisition training)
 - Companies compete for government contracts as the sub tier suppliers – not the Prime
- Operating/production costs
 - Too high to create new equipment at the speed technology advances
 - Most new projects take 10 yrs to develop / and test operationally
- DOD and USGOV working on methods for early detection processes to ID CFSI



Operation Chain Reaction

- FIRST - Operation Chain Reaction (OCR) targets counterfeit items entering the supply chain of the Department of Defense (DoD), other U.S. government agencies and critical infrastructure
- Sixteen (16) Federal Agencies participate in OCR





Operation Chain Reaction

- Task force partners - initiated numerous cases
 - Involving - Counterfeit (CF) brands - commercial, industrial, and military grade
 - Top commodities are semiconductors, networking equipment, and weapon sights
- From FY2014 to FY2017:
 - **Approximately \$19 million (MSRP) seizures** - CF goods and proceeds
 - **33 arrests**
 - **47 indictments**
 - **34 convictions**



Product Focus – Integrated Circuit

Integrated circuit (aka IC, semiconductor, microcircuit, microchip, silicon chip, or chip) is a **miniaturized electronic circuit that has been manufactured in the surface of a thin substrate of semiconductor material.**

EASY to counterfeit





CFSI - Where Integrated Circuits End Up

1. IC applications - 2. Counterfeit ICs can result in -

- Consumer electronics
 - Automotive
 - Medical
 - Aircraft
 - Spacecraft
 - Military
 - SCADA – (ex) Nuclear Plants
- Product malfunction or product failure, loss of property
 - Serious bodily injury, including electrical shock, electrocution, and/or death
 - Cyber Threat concern

Everything that has an on and off switch.....has an IC in it.

USA – largest exporter of e-waste
China – largest importer of e-waste and largest exporter of counterfeit electronics



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OCR Special Project

-  **234 Chinese/Hong Kong companies involved in counterfeit integrated circuit trafficking**
-  **462 U.S. importers from identified CN/HK companies**
- 70 open investigations identified (ITAR, improper license, CPI groups)
-  **171 DoD prime contractors identified domestically**

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OCR Strategy

The Benefits of Collaboration

- Pursue Criminal Investigations**
 - Develop referral packages (leads and conduct requested trade data analysis)
 - Analyze seizure and import patterns from CBP trade data
 - Deconflict leads with our partners
 - Coordinate with manufacturers to verify authenticity
- Raise Quality Assurance**
 - Demonstrate National Security implications of current methodology of procuring microelectronics within DoD and USGOV
 - Coordinate with USGOV leadership
 - Prevent them entering the supply chain

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Detecting Possible Fraud in the Acquisition Process

Examples:

- Counterfeit parts
- Product Substitution
- Cost Mischarging
- Progress payment fraud



Fraud Indicators:

- Serial numbers missing
- Inspection reports that appear altered by whiteouts
- Requests for payment that are inconsistent with earlier cost history
- History of frequent invoice/voucher errors, poor documentation, & claiming unallowable costs
- Little or no physical progress on the contract even though significant costs have been billed



Process for Information Sharing of CFSI

- Nuclear Plant identifies a part that is counterfeit, fraudulent, and/or suspect item (CFSI)
- Plant sends part and company information to IPR Center OCR Program Manager
 - OperationChainReaction@ice.dhs.gov
- OCR team conducts research to identify preliminary information on the company
- OCR team deconflicts with task force partners and potentially disseminates information as an investigative lead
- OCR team may also share information back with industry

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- **September 2016** – Michael Westcott, owner of Lightning Technology Inc., convicted of manufacturing and selling \$4 million in counterfeit Cisco transceivers from 2006 to 2015
- Cisco transceivers, including several of the long range models counterfeited by Lightning, are used by the **U.S. Navy** in critical communication systems in **nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, ship self-defense systems, and ballistic missile defense systems**
- **November 2017** – Westcott sentenced to 37 months in prison and agreed to pay \$325,000 in damages to Cisco

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- **March-April 2016** – Jiang Guanghou YAN, owner of *HK Potential*, and two other Chinese nationals were convicted of **conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods**
- The counterfeit ICs were knowingly sold to individuals purporting to be U.S. Navy contractors to be used in **nuclear submarines**
- **July-December 2016** – All 3 defendants were sentenced to between 12 to 15 months imprisonment

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Chatsworth Rubber and Gasket Case

- Product Substitution
- The owner of a business supplied substandard O-Rings to NASA that were used on various aircraft
- Individual was sentenced to 30 months in prison, 3 years of supervised release and restitution of \$216,848





Resiliency Strategy

- Infrastructure resilience, as defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2010 is "the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event."
- Infrastructure resilience effectiveness leads to
 - Ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events by:
 - **Anticipate** - Communicating to leadership the support the plants need for sustainment
 - **Adapt** - Avoiding counterfeits entering the supply chain
 - **Recover** - Avoiding operational costs of counterfeit parts upon inspection (aging systems)
 - **Recover** - Avoiding regulation costs of parts found after installation



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