

R.I.C. 2009 - Technical Session

Integrated Response

FBI Perspective on IPCE

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Why is the FBI Involved?

Various Federal laws (Title 18) and Presidential directives give the US Attorney General, acting through the FBI, the primary responsibility for coordinating the LE response to, investigating, and prosecuting Acts of Terrorism occurring in the United States.



Role of FBI in CRs

Assess capabilities of local LE to respond to security incident at nuclear power plant.

- No standard existed for such response
 - Capabilities varied widely by jurisdiction
 - FBI developed baseline for local LE take-back capability in consultation with:
 - FBI/HRT
 - NRC
 - DoD
- This baseline take-back capability is SGI



FBI Focus During IPCE

- Reinforce FBI statutory roles & authorities
- Ensure local, State, Federal tac ops
 - in response to a security incident
 - at a nuclear power generation facility
 - are properly coordinated
- Evaluate the Tactical Take-back Tool (3-D)
- Develop framework for future exercises



FBI Objectives in IPCE

- Enhance effective integration of FBI Field Office assets with State and local Law Enforcement in the region
- Identify & validate current plans & procedures for LE response to LGS
- Exercise the Tactical Take-back Tool



Challenges to LE Response

- Need for detailed plan to respond to security event at commercial nuclear power plant (IPCE)
- Availability of sufficient suitably-trained and equipped LE tactical response resources (varies by jurisdiction)
- Limited take-back capabilities (varies by jurisdiction)
- Requirement for response w/i designated time frame
- Safe and effective integration of arriving LE resources
- Limited familiarity with plant site (3-D Modeling)
- New response paradigm for local LE (IPCE)
- Numerous legal, tactical, training, logistical issues
- Various on-site communication challenges (IPCE)
- If plant under hostile control, adversary force could exploit site characteristics against responding LE (IPCE)

Tactical Take-back Tool

Positives

- Developed to address local LE's "limited familiarity" with plant site
- Available in bound form and on CD-ROM
 - CD-ROM provides 3-D modeling of (most of) plant
 - Detailed photos of interior & exterior of plant
 - Encyclopedic reference for plant and surrounding area
- Designed to be used by arriving LE tactical resources to formulate an Ops Plan
- Is classified SGI
 - Clearance and need-to-know thresholds for access to info
- Four more scheduled in FY '09
- 6 - 8 per year thereafter
- The FBI pays for it

Tactical Take-back Tool

Negatives

- Technology somewhat off-putting to local LE
- Learning curve for effective & efficient utilization
 - Can be effectively mitigated with training
 - Issues re availability of tool for practice
- Is classified SGI
 - Issues re availability of dedicated laptops for local LE use
 - Must be transported, stored, used, destroyed, etc., per SGI
- 103 operating nuke plants at 64 locations in U.S.
- Very expensive and time consuming to produce
 - The FBI pays for it
- Recognized need to periodically update information
 - Currently no budget to do so
- Some reluctance on part of industry to participate

IPCE Program

- Involved months of planning by:
 - Federal partners
 - State & local authorities
 - Industry
 - Exelon / LGS
 - NEI
- Broken down into three parts
 - Workshop - facilitated discussion of issues
 - TTX - stressed use of Tactical Take-back Tool
 - FSE - emphasized integrated LE response

IPCE Program

- Assessed as positive learning experience
 - Great training value derived for all participants
 - Partner agencies' training goals met
 - Lessons learned captured for future exercises
- 1st time for integrated S & L and Fed tac ops
 - Exposed to heat, noise, layout, confusion, etc.
 - Exercise-related communication challenges
 - Allowed tactical response plans to be tweaked
- Different from F-o-F and H-A-B EP Drills
 - Assumes hostile force will penetrate PA
 - Take-back scenario then comes into play

IPCE Program

- Must continue as unified USG effort
- Need to fully integrate S & L and industry
- MILES gear issues
 - “Tactical walk-through” good fall-back option
 - However, FSE more valuable as training for LE
- Plant operators are extremely risk averse
 - Their concerns are appreciated, but ...
 - This led to a very constrained exercise
 - Free play must be broadened in future exercises
- Zion impractical as generic training site
 - Transport, time, costs, accuracy of site, etc.

IPCE Program

- Funding for S & L participation an issue
 - Mechanism exists to address (FEMA/HSEEP)
- Funding for industry an issue
 - Unsure how to resolve
- IPCE needs to be compatible with HSEEP
 - Required for funding of S & L participation
 - HSEEP has ≥1-year planning horizon
 - IPCE was implemented at a more accelerated pace
- ROI needs to be evaluated by:
 - USG -- State & locals -- Industry

Questions?


