

Security Issues for Spent Nuclear Fuel in Transit

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Principal Findings from February 2006 – NAS report “Going the Distance?”

- The committee found no fundamental technical barriers to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel” (+)**
- Malevolent acts against spent fuel shipments are a major technical and societal concern – NAS was unable to perform an in-depth examination because of information constraints. (-)**

NAS report “Going the Distance?” recommendations -

An independent examination of security for spent nuclear fuel including:

- **Evaluation of the threat environment.**
- **Package performance in response to malevolent acts.**
- **Operational security requirements.**

Midwestern Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee (MRMTC) letter to NRC – May 2006

- **Data on package performance under various assault conditions – already exists.**
- **Unclassified versions of the vulnerability assessments should be developed.**
- **Information should be shared with State programs responsible for safety, security and ER during SNF transport.**

NRC response – letter from Chairman Klein dated August 2006

Opened dialog with States through DOE's regional transportation committees (CSG-MW, CSG-NE, SSEB and WGA) regarding:

- **What information is desired.**
- **Who would be receiving security related information.**
- **How information would be used and maintained.**

The Cask Vulnerability Information Sharing (CVIS) Project:

- **Regional groups are developing a matrix of information needs and uses (currently at rev.3).**
- **Information needs focus on threat scenarios and “consequences” of events – necessary for response planning.**
- **The matrix will be shared with NRC senior advisory staff when finalized.**

2006 State Regional Group (SRG) Shipment Security Survey

45 State's were surveyed and 35 responded. Respondents by region were:

- Midwest – 10 out of 10**
- Northeast – 8 out of 10**
- Southeast – 7 out of 15**
- West 10 out of 10**

SRG Security Survey included questions on:

- **Information requirements for moving SNF to Yucca Mt.**
- **Procedures for reporting events involving shipments.**
- **State laws or regulations, roles and responsibilities relative to shipment security.**
- **State's experience handling sensitive or classified information.**

Summary results for the survey indicate that for shipments to a repository:

- **21 states will require point of origin inspections for both truck and rail.**
- **19 states either require or are likely to require enroute inspections for trucks and 14 will require the same for rail.**
- **21 of 35 state's expect to provide physical security for shipments through escorts.**