

RIC 2006

Session W3GH

Safety Culture Initiatives & Implications

Safety Culture & the ROP

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What were the problems?

- Safety culture problems contributed to unacceptable performance levels at nuclear power plants
- ROP's processes for flagging and fixing safety culture problems were ill-defined and ad hoc

What are the solution options?

- Routinely assess safety culture as part of the baseline effort to correct problems before they contribute to unacceptable performance levels
- Explicitly determine whether safety culture problems factored into detected unacceptable performance levels

What are the solution's problems?

- Routinely assess safety culture as part of the baseline effort to correct problems before they contribute to unacceptable performance levels
 - ☹ Diverts resources away from detecting unacceptable performance levels
 - ☹ Lacks regulatory basis and thus represents undue regulatory burden
 - ☹ Leads to pointless, counter-productive debates when safety culture flags are raised absent corresponding performance problems

What are the solution's problems?

- Explicitly determine whether safety culture problems factored into detected unacceptable performance levels
 - ☹️ “Lagging” indicator because unacceptable performance levels must be present
 - ☹️ Hasn't been implemented yet

What are the solution's attractions?

- ☺ If all-Green, no safety culture safaris
 - “Credits” efforts undertaken by industry and NRC in wake of Davis-Besse
- ☺ If not all-Green, questions – not conclusions – about safety culture being a factor in the performance decline
 - Formally raises a flag about a possible safety culture dimension to a detected performance decline
- ☺ If safety culture determined to be factors, timely fixes
 - Formally tracks resolution of identified safety culture problems