

RIC 2003

Reactor Oversight Process


Session W5

Past Insight and Future Challenges

State Perspective

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INTRODUCTION

Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS):

- Favors performance-based and risk-informed processes
- Has been involved in ROP from beginning
- Believes ROP is better focused and more objective than SALP
- Had much experience with SALP process

EVOLUTION OF ROP – YEAR 1

- Adequate protection provided
- SALP added some value to some issues
- Time will tell:
 - Sustained safety performance
 - Cross-cutting issues resolved by PI & R?
 - Need way to trend in SDP process
 - Develop SG tube integrity PI

EVOLUTION OF ROP – YEAR 2

- Process more predictable and objective
- Provided adequate assurance
- No safety events to test process
- No requirements for PRA or standard
- Cross-cutting issues are a concern
- SDP thresholds too high - masks trends
- Efficiency and realism improved
- Effectiveness - needed more time

EVOLUTION OF ROP - YEAR 3 TO PRESENT

- Indian Point and Davis-Besse - both green
- ROP not much help in detection or response
- Slow response in determining red finding at Davis-Besse - subjectivity
- Most root causes at DB were cross-cutting issues
- Public confidence took large hit

CONCLUSIONS

- ROP good for what it does well
- Adds discipline - perhaps too much?
- ROP misses some important aspects of safe operation
- Back to MC 0350 at Davis-Besse
- Some subjectivity may be useful
- More work on cross-cutting issues
- Root causes are ultimately people issues
- Compromise between ROP and MC 0350