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for emergency conditions shall provide for the meeting of safety demands under normal and abnormal conditions. The design of safety-related utility services and distribution shall include redundant systems to the extent necessary to maintain, with adequate capacity, the ability to perform safety functions assuming a single failure.

b. Emergency utility services shall be designed to permit testing of their functional operability and capacity, including the full operational sequence, of each system for transfer between normal and emergency supply sources, and the operation of associated safety systems.

c. Provisions shall be made so that, in the event of a loss of the primary electric power source or circuit, reliable and timely emergency power will be provided to instruments, confinement systems, utility service systems, and process systems in amounts sufficient to allow operations to be shut down safely and to be maintained in a safe shutdown condition with all safety devices essential to safe shutdown functioning. The onsite emergency power sources and the electrical distribution circuits shall have independence, redundancy, and testability to assure performance of their safety functions in the event of a single failure or an accident.

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY

Criterion 16—Safety margins. The design of process and storage systems shall include margins of safety for the nuclear criticality parameters that are commensurate with the uncertainties in the process and storage conditions, in the data and methods used in calculations, and in the nature of the immediate environment under accident conditions. All process and storage systems shall be designed to be maintained subcritical and to assure that no nuclear criticality accident can occur unless at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent or sequential changes have occurred in the conditions essential to nuclear criticality safety.

Criterion 17—Methods of control. a. Favorable geometry, in which equipment or systems are subcritical by virtue of neutron leakage under worst credible conditions, is the preferred method of nuclear criticality control.

b. Where the favorable geometry method of nuclear criticality control is not practical, the use of permanently fixed neutron-absorbing materials (poisons) is the next preferred method of control.

c. Where both the favorable geometry and the permanently fixed neutron-absorbing materials (poisons) methods of nuclear criticality control are not practical, administrative controls of moderation, fissile material concentration, total fissile material, or the use of soluble neutron-absorbing materials (poisons) shall be employed when combined with margins of safety measurements or appropriate analysis and engineered safety features.

Criterion 18—Neutron absorbers. Where solid neutron-absorbing materials (poisons) are used for the prevention of nuclear criticality, the design shall provide for positive means to verify their continued efficacy. Soluble neutron-absorbing materials may be used as a primary nuclear criticality control provided: (1) two independent methods are provided to assure the presence of the required concentration of neutron absorber and (2) the equipment containing the fissile material is located behind sufficient barriers and shielding to reduce the probability and extent of accidental contamination of the environment and accidental radiation exposure to personnel in the event of a criticality accident.

Criterion 19—Ancillary Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety. a. Process and storage systems shall be designed to assure that no

mechanisms that could cause segregation of fissile materials can be present in components whose nuclear criticality safety is dependent on the homogeneous distribution of fissile material.

b. Components whose nuclear criticality safety is dependent on a limiting concentration of fissile material shall be designed so that either (1) mechanisms that could cause critical concentrations of fissile materials are not present or (2) concentration is controlled by positive instrumental means.

c. Process and storage systems shall be designed to assure that the transfer of fissile material from safety systems to unsafe systems is not possible as a consequence of any single failure or operating error.

d. Confinement system components shall be designed to assure that leakage from equipment or from one confinement zone to another confinement zone cannot result in a condition that would result in nuclear criticality.

e. The spacing between discrete accumulations of fissile materials shall be controlled so as to maintain a subcritical state.

RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

Criterion 20—Access control. The design of the facility shall provide for control of access to the facility and to areas of potential contamination or high radiation within the facility. The facility shall be designed so that the spread of contamination can be monitored and controlled.

Criterion 21—Radiation shielding. Shielding shall be designed to assure that dose rates in accessible areas are consistent with the regulations contained in this chapter.

Criterion 22—Radiation alarm systems. Radiation alarm systems shall be provided to warn plant personnel of significant increases in radiation levels in normally accessible spaces and of excessive radioactivity released in plant effluents. Such systems shall be designed with redundancy and with capability to permit testing their efficiency of operation.

Criterion 23—Effluent monitoring. All plant effluent systems shall be designed to include means for measuring and recording the amount of radionuclides in any effluent. In order that the data thus measured and recorded can be used, the flow of environmental diluting media, either air or water, shall be determined.

Criterion 24—Effluent control. The design of the plant shall include means to control the release of radioactive effluents, whether gas, liquid, or solid, during normal operations and under accident conditions. Systems provided to guard against the release of radioactive materials shall be designed to be monitored and tested, and shall be provided with alarms. Capability shall be provided for prompt cessation of the flow of contaminated liquid effluents or for retention of such effluents as is necessary to assure that the concentrations of radioactive materials in liquid effluents are maintained as low as practicable.

FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE

Criterion 25—Fuel and radioactive waste systems. Fuel storage, radioactive waste storage, and other systems that might contain or handle radioactive materials shall be designed to assure adequate safety under normal and accident conditions. These systems shall be designed (1) with a capability to test components important to safety, (2) with suitable shielding for radiation protection under normal and accident conditions, (3) with confinement systems, and (4) with a heat removal capability having testability and reliability that reflects the importance to safety.

Criterion 26—Waste disposal systems. The waste disposal systems shall be designed so that their performance will comply with the regulations in this chapter.

DECOMMISSIONING

Criterion 27—Decommissioning. In accordance with Appendix F, a design objective for fuel reprocessing plants shall be to facilitate decontamination and removal of all significant radioactive wastes at the time the facility is permanent decommissioned.

(Sec. 161, Pub. L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 2201))

Dated at Germantown, Md., this 12th day of July 1974.

For the Atomic Energy Commission.

PAUL C. BENDER,
Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc.74-16504 Filed 7-17-74;8:45 am]

[10 CFR Part 50]

LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

Design Criteria for Protection of Fuel Reprocessing Plants and Licensed Material Therein

The Atomic Energy Commission has under consideration amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," which would require that fuel reprocessing plants licensed under Part 50 include certain design features for the express purpose of enhancing the protection of such plants and the licensed material in the plant. The proposed design criteria are intended to afford protection against acts of industrial sabotage of the plant having radiological consequences and against theft or diversion of the special nuclear material in the plant.

The Atomic Energy Commission has recognized the desirability of specifying design features for new fuel reprocessing plants that would simplify implementation and inspection of procedures required by the Commission for the protection of radioactive material. Accordingly, the AEC has developed design criteria similar to the design criteria in Appendix A of Part 50 for nuclear power plant safety, but for protection of licensed material in fuel reprocessing plants.

The Commission is now proposing to material protection. Amendments to 50 that would specify design criteria germane to fuel reprocessing plant and material protection. Amendment to §§ 50.34 and 50.35 would provide specifically for the submission of information pertaining to, and AEC approval of fuel reprocessing plant design features for the protection of the plant and the licensed material before the issuance of a construction permit.

Persons presently holding construction permits or operating licenses for fuel reprocessing plants would be required to submit within 60 days after the effective date of the amendments, plans for meeting the criteria and would be required, within 120 days after the effective date of the amendments, to comply with the criteria.

To aid in protecting special nuclear material from theft or unlawful diversion by an individual authorized access to the material, the license applicant would be required to consider plant layout; location of process, measurement, and accountability stations; data processing systems; surveillance systems; etc. so that special nuclear material can be maintained under the direct control of designated individuals who are responsible for the protection of the material so assigned. The plant design should include provisions for a demonstrable means of identifying the location, quantity, and custodian of all special nuclear material within the plant.

To further guard against unlawful diversion and to protect the plant from acts of industrial sabotage having radiological consequences, the plant design should permit: (1) Denial to unnecessary personnel, containers, or vehicles of access to areas where special nuclear material is used or stored, (2) controlling and monitoring of access of all personnel, packages and vehicles to the vital areas and material access areas of the plant, (3) maintenance of surveillance and monitoring of plant areas, physical barriers, access points and personnel within special nuclear material access areas, (4) assessment of the impact of abnormal activity, (5) a means of communication for summoning law enforcement personnel, and (6) an effective response by the plant security organization in concert with local law enforcement authorities. Effective response of the plant security organization may be aided by design features (e.g. special barriers, remotely activated psychological or physical deterrents—recorded warning, high intensity lights, sound or smoke, etc.) so that the plant security organization can protect the plant and materials from an individual or several individuals, some of whom may be armed, until law enforcement personnel arrive.

Concurrently with the publication for comments of this notice of proposed rule making, the Commission is making available in its Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. its "Environmental Impact Appraisal of Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Design Criteria for The Protection of Fuel Reprocessing Plants and The Licensed Material Therein."

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Section 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 is contemplated. All interested persons who desire to submit written comments or suggestions should submit them to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545, Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff; by September 16, 1974. Copies of comments on the proposed amendments may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.

1. A new paragraph (d) is added to § 50.34 to read as follows:

§ 50.34 Contents of applications: Technical information.

(d) Protection of fuel reprocessing plants and licensed materials. Each application for a permit to construct a fuel reprocessing plant shall include:

(1) The principal design criteria for protection of the plant and the licensed material, which shall provide for protection equivalent to or greater than the protection provided by the criteria in Appendix Q, Design Criteria for The Protection of Fuel Reprocessing Plants and the Licensed Material Therein.

(2) the design bases and the relation of the design bases to the principal design criteria submitted pursuant to paragraph (d) (1) of this section; and

(3) information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and proposed quality assurance procedures sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final plant will conform to the design bases for the principal design criteria submitted pursuant to paragraph (d) (1) of this section.

§ 50.35 [Amended]

2. Section 50.35 is amended by adding the words "and of the common defense and security" at the end of paragraph (a) (1).

3. A new § 50.55c is added to read as follows:

§ 50.55c Licenses for operation of fuel reprocessing plants: additional requirements.

Each person who, on (effective date of amendment), is licensed under this part to operate a fuel reprocessing plant shall:

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, make modifications to the plant and process as are necessary for the plant to meet the criteria in Appendix Q within 120 days after (effective date of amendment);

(b) If any criterion cannot be met by modification of plant or process, or both, institute measures that will provide, to the maximum practical degree, protection consistent with the objectives of that criterion; and

(c) File with the Deputy Director for Fuels and Materials, Directorate of Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545, within 60 days after (effective date of amendment), a detailed analysis of steps that will be taken to achieve compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.

4. A new Appendix Q is added to read as follows:

APPENDIX Q—DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF FUEL REPROCESSING PLANTS AND THE LICENSED MATERIALS THEREIN

INTRODUCTION

Criteria

A. GENERAL		Number
Assurance of quality	-----	1
Process, components, and material isolation	-----	2

Equipment design and placement	-----	3
Inspection and test capability	-----	4

II. PHYSICAL SECURITY

Physical barriers	-----	5
Plant isolation	-----	6
Protective lighting	-----	7
Personnel, package, and vehicle control	-----	8
Shipping and receiving	-----	9
Surveillance capability	-----	10
Emergency monitoring capability	-----	11
Intrusion alarm systems	-----	12
Communication	-----	13

III. MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING

Material control areas	-----	14
Automatic data processing capability	-----	15
Process and related equipment	-----	16
Measurement capability	-----	17
Waste accountability capability	-----	18
Special nuclear material storage	-----	19

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (d) of § 50.24, each application for a permit to construct a fuel reprocessing plant shall include a description of the plant and process designs pertinent to the protection of the plant and the licensed material therein.

This appendix establishes plant and materials protection criteria for the design of structures, systems, components, and equipment important to the protection of a fuel reprocessing plant and the licensed material therein. The objective of these criteria is to ensure that the plant design includes provisions for systems to protect special nuclear material from unlawful diversion or theft which could result in a threat to the common defense and security and to protect the plant from acts of industrial sabotage which could endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. The criteria included in this Appendix utilize redundancy as a method of assuring reliability of these systems.

It should be noted that the Commission has under continuing review and appraisal the need for improvement in the protection of nuclear materials. As potential threats change with sociological and international trends, the Commission will continue to assess the adequacy of these criteria. Additional plant and materials protection measures currently under consideration by the AEC include nuclear security assistance groups, armed position and property defense, automatic intrusion response measures, collocation of fabrication and reprocessing plants, remotely controlled processing, and material control and accounting systems capable of maintaining continuous material control and closing daily or shift material balances. The plant design should be sufficiently flexible to permit incorporation of additional criteria as conditions arise requiring the need for such additional protection measures.

The general criteria related to physical protection and the physical security criteria in Part II of the appendix do not apply to uranium 235 contained in uranium enriched to less than 20 percent in the isotope U²³⁵.

As used herein terms have the same meaning as defined in Parts 70 and 73 of this chapter.

I. GENERAL

Criterion 1—Assurance of quality. These structures, systems, components, and equipment of fuel reprocessing plants with features important to physical protection against industrial sabotage and theft of radioactive materials and material control and accounting shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to provide adequate assurance that such structures, systems, components, and equipment will perform satisfactorily in service. The requirements for

quality assurance programs in Appendix B "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants" may be utilized for this purpose.

Criterion 2—Process, components, and material isolation. The design shall include provisions for isolation (e.g., controlled access, automation, or remote handling techniques) of vital areas and material access areas to limit the need for access to such areas to individuals authorized access for essential purposes.

Criterion 3—Equipment design and placement. Equipment not identified as process equipment or vital equipment shall, to the maximum extent practicable, not be located in a vital area or in a material access area. When such equipment is located in a vital area or in a material access area, provision shall be made for limiting the necessity for access to such equipment.

Criterion 4—Inspection and test capability. Equipment and systems used in processing, storage, transfer, measurement, or protection of licensed material or protection of the plant shall be designed with provisions to facilitate inspections for verification of licensee compliance with applicable conditions of Commission licenses, rules, regulations, and orders.

Provision shall be made for testing intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, communications equipment, physical barriers, and other security-related devices and equipment in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (f) of § 73.50 and paragraph (d) of § 73.60 of this chapter.

II. PHYSICAL SECURITY

Criterion 5—Physical barriers. (a) The design shall incorporate a double barrier concept consisting of an outer physical barrier encompassing one or more inner physical barriers, passage through each of which is controlled. The outer physical barrier shall be separated from the inner physical barrier or barriers so that the intervening area can be monitored or periodically checked to detect the presence of individuals or vehicles between the barriers approaching either barrier in sufficient time to initiate the necessary guard action or notify the local law enforcement agency or both.

(b) Provision shall be made for vital areas and material access areas as defined in paragraphs (h) and (j) respectively of § 73.2 of this chapter. Functions (e.g., food service and administrative offices) that do not require access to such areas shall be carried on outside the inner barrier(s).

(c) Keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment shall be designed to permit changing.¹

Criterion 6—Plant isolation. The design shall include an isolation zone on both sides of the outer physical barrier. This zone shall be provided with a monitoring system to detect the presence of individuals or vehicles in sufficient time to initiate the necessary guard action or notify the local law enforcement authority or both. Parking facilities inside the outer barrier shall be limited to those for authorized service vehicles.

Criterion 7—Protective lighting. Clear areas between the inner and outer barriers

and the isolation zone around the outer barriers shall be provided with illumination of at least 0.2 foot candles.

Criterion 8—Personnel, package and vehicle control. (a) The design shall include provisions for control of all points in the outer and inner physical barriers used for personnel, package, or vehicle access (including shipping and receiving areas) so that identity and authority for access can be verified. Any unmanned exits in a physical barrier such as emergency doors or gates shall be operable from the inside only. All passage points in each inner physical barrier and all emergency exits in the outer physical barrier shall be provided with tamper-indicating alarm systems.

(b) The design shall include provisions at all access points in the outer barrier to allow search of entering individuals and packages, for items that could be used for industrial sabotage. Any devices, equipment, or procedures utilized shall be capable of detecting the presence of devices such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.

(c) The design shall include provisions to allow search of packages prior to entry into a material access area. The design also shall include provisions to allow search of all exiting individuals (except under emergency conditions), packages, and vehicles, for concealed special nuclear material at all exit points from a material access area except those leading to a contiguous material access area.

Criterion 9—Shipping and receiving. The design shall include provisions to preclude the simultaneous handling, in a single area, of any two of the following: (a) Shipments of special nuclear material; (b) receipts of special nuclear material; and (c) shipments and receipts of materials other than special nuclear materials. This criterion may be met by, for example, providing separate docks for each such activity, or by providing a single dock with separate controlled-access storage for special nuclear material receipts and shipments.

Criterion 10—Surveillance capability. The design shall include provisions (e.g., illumination, line-of-sight, etc.) that would permit continual direct or remote observation of any individual in an area where recovered special nuclear material is used or stored. Provision also shall be made for such areas and all vital areas to be locked and protected by intrusion alarm systems when unoccupied.

Criterion 11—Emergency monitoring capability. The design shall include provisions for back-up systems such as emergency power, redundant hardware, and procedural options so that, in the event of power failure, equipment malfunction, or guard incapacitation, a level of protection consistent with safety requirements can be provided commensurate with that afforded by the provisions of Criteria 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10.

Criterion 12—Intrusion alarm system. All alarms providing monitoring to meet the provisions of Criteria 5, 6, 10 and 11 shall annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station, not necessarily within the protected area, such that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm. All alarms shall be self-checking and tamper-indicating. The annunciation of an alarm at the onsite central alarm station shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarm, emergency exit alarm, etc.) and location. All intrusion alarms, emergency exit alarms, alarm systems, and line supervisory systems shall at minimum meet the performance and reliability levels indicated by GSA Interim Federal Specification W-A-00450B (GSA-FSS).

Criterion 13—Communications. The design shall include provisions for two-way radio voice communication in addition to conventional telephone service between local law enforcement authorities and the plant and shall terminate at a continuously manned central alarm station within the outer barrier. The design also shall include provisions to permit continuous communications between that central alarm station and each guard or watchman on duty at the plant.

III. MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING

Criterion 14—Material control areas. The design shall include provisions for multiple material balance and item control areas to lower the detection threshold of, and to determine the location of, a material loss should it occur. Each such area shall be provided with material transfer stations for the determination and recording of the identity, custodian, and appropriate data for the special nuclear material content of the material entering or leaving that area.

Criterion 15—Automatic data processing capability. The design shall reflect any need for systems to permit automatic data processing for special nuclear material control and accounting and for area access control and records. If an interactive computer is used, data entry terminals shall be isolated functionally from the processing logic of the central processor.

Criterion 16—Process and related equipment. Equipment, including process equipment, storage containers, transport vessels, filters, piping, and ductwork, shall be designed to facilitate the determination of special nuclear material content by *in-situ* measurement (dynamic or static) or by cleanout. Any devices installed for *in-situ* measurements shall be capable of being calibrated *in-situ*. To minimize calibration and volume measurement uncertainties, cooling coils and other items in accountability tanks that disturb the linear character of the tank should be kept to a minimum consistent with plant safety.

Criterion 17—Measurement capability. (a) Measurement capability, including mixing for sampling, sampling, calibration and volume determination, and analytical capability, shall be provided so that:

(1) The special nuclear material content can be determined for all special nuclear material receipts, including the special nuclear material content of any recycle acid used prior to the input measurement vessel, shipments, transfers from shielded process areas, and waste streams as described in Criterion 18; and

(2) Periodic determinations can be made of the special nuclear material content of all special nuclear materials on inventory except stored irradiated fuel but including feed, product, waste, scrap, rework material and material held up in process and measurement systems.

(b) Provision shall be made for quantitative remeasurement or for uniquely identifying and tamper-sealing of items to assure the continued validity of previous quantitative measurement.

Criterion 18—Waste accountability capability. The design shall include provisions for the measurement of the special nuclear material in all process area liquid and solid waste streams including those not ordinarily expected to contain special nuclear material before such wastes are permitted to enter an area that is not protected by an inner barrier.

Criterion 19—Special nuclear material storage. Vault and storage area locations shall be provided with features to expedite identification, inventory, and retrieval of items containing special nuclear material. Such

¹ Guidance with respect to use of locks in plant and materials protection is provided in Regulatory Guide 5.12, "General Use of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilities and Special Nuclear Materials," which is available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. Copies may be obtained by addressing a request to the Director of Regulatory Standards, Regulation, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545.

locations shall provide for access control including identification and recording of ingress and egress of personnel and material. Provisions shall be made in vaults and storage locations for segregation of sources and other material from recovered special nuclear material.

(Sec. 161, Pub. L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2201))

Dated at Germantown, Md., this 12th day of July 1974.

For the Atomic Energy Commission.

PAUL C. BENDER,
Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc.74-16503 Filed 7-17-74; 8:45 am]

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[40 CFR Part 120]

COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM

Notice of Hearing on Salinity Control Policy and Standards Procedures

Notice is hereby given of public hearings to consider amendments to 40 CFR Part 120 proposed by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency on June 13, 1974 (39 FR 20703) and on July 3, 1974 (39 FR 24517).

The proposal sets forth a salinity control policy, procedures, and requirements for establishing water quality standards for salinity and a plan of implementation for salinity control in the Colorado River System. Such action was taken pursuant to section 303(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (33

U.S.C. 1313(b)). The proposal effects that portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming.

Public hearings to consider the above rulemaking will be held as follows:

Las Vegas, Nevada
Monday, August 19, 1974
10:00 a.m.

Administration Bldg. Auditorium
U.S.E.P.A. National Environmental Research Center

944 East Harmon Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada
Denver, Colorado
Wednesday, August 21, 1974
10:00 a.m.

Post Office Auditorium
19th & Stout Streets
Denver, Colorado

Interested private individuals, as well as local, State and Federal agencies are invited to participate. Oral statements will be received and considered. However, for accuracy of the record testimony should be submitted in writing. Oral statements should summarize written material. Persons submitting written statements are encouraged to bring additional copies for the use of the hearing panel. The hearing officer may, at his discretion, exclude oral testimony if it is overly repetitious or not relevant. All comments received by September 3, 1974, will be considered before final action is taken.

Written statements or questions concerning the proceedings should be directed to:

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of the Regional Council
1820 Lincoln Street, Suite 800
Denver, Colorado 80203
(303) 837-3326

Dated: July 15, 1974.

ROBERT V. ZENTU,
*Acting Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement and General
Counsel.*

[FR Doc.74-16433 Filed 7-17-74; 8:45 am]

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

[46 CFR Part 536]

[Docket No. 73-39]

WATER CARRIERS IN FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES

Filing of Tariffs; Enlargement of Time To File Comments

July 12, 1974.

Upon request of interested parties and good cause appearing, time within which comments may be filed in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking in this proceeding (39 FR 24520; July 3, 1974) is enlarged to and including August 30, 1974. Reply of Hearing Counsel shall be filed on or before September 20, 1974 and answers to Hearing Counsel shall be filed on or before October 4, 1974.

FRANCIS C. HURNEY,
Secretary.

[FR Doc.74-16461 Filed 7-17-74; 8:45 am]