



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 8, 2014

Vice President, Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70057-3093

SUBJECT: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0191)

Dear Sir or Madam:

On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tōhoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the methods and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures.


By letter dated November 26, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated April 25, 2013, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy), submitted its Seismic Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. By letter dated November 27, 2013, Entergy provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the staff to complete its assessments.

The NRC staff acknowledges that a supplemental letter will be provided no later than 2 months after refueling outage 19, which is scheduled for the spring of 2014, addressing the remaining inaccessible items consistent with the Regulatory Commitment made in the November 26, 2012, letter. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.

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If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1445 or by e-mail at Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Alan Wang". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Alan B. Wang, Project Manager
Plant Licensing IV-2 and Decommissioning
Transition Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-382

Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic
Walkdown Report

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STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT
NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO
THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT
ENERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3
DOCKET NO. 50-382

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On March 12, 2012,¹ the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter) to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic,"² to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP), verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC.

Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to provide the following:

- a. Information concerning the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.
- b. Information related to the implementation of the walkdown process.
- c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified by the IPEEE [Individual Plant Examination of External Events] program and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them....
- d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions....
- e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features.
- f. Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.

In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the seismic walkdown process. By letter dated May 29, 2012,³ the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff

¹ Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340.

² ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A049.

³ ADAMS Package Accession No. ML121640872.

submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) document 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," (walkdown guidance) to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement. By letter dated May 31, 2012,⁴ the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance.

By letter dated November 26, 2012,⁵ Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), provided a response to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3). In addition to the aforementioned letter, by letter dated April 25, 2013,⁶ the licensee provided an updated submittal to the initial seismic walkdown report. The updated report provides the results for the supplemental seismic walkdowns of components which were inaccessible during the initial walkdowns. The NRC staff reviewed the walkdown reports and determined that additional supplemental information would assist the staff in completing its review. By letter dated November 1, 2013,⁷ the NRC staff requested additional information to gain a better understanding of the processes and procedures used by the licensee in conducting the walkdowns and walk-bys. By letter dated November 27, 2013,⁸ the licensee responded to the NRC staff's request for additional information (RAI)

The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria." GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.

For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions that an SSC of a facility must perform, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design.

The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.

⁴ ADAMS Accession No. ML12145A529.

⁵ ADAMS Accession No. ML123330366.

⁶ ADAMS Accession No. ML131200532.

⁷ ADAMS Accession No. ML13304B418.

⁸ ADAMS Accession No. ML13357A268.

The current licensing basis is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, including the licensee's docketed commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis, including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the facility operating license.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Seismic Licensing Basis Information

The licensee provided information on the plant-specific licensing basis for the Seismic Category I SSCs for Waterford 3 in Section 2.0 of the updated walkdown report. Consistent with the walkdown guidance, the NRC staff noted that the report includes a summary of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and a description of the codes, standards, and methods that were used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements. The NRC staff reviewed Section 2.0 of the walkdown report, focusing on the summary of the SSE and the design codes used in the design.

Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has provided information on the plant-specific seismic licensing basis and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing bases evaluation consistent with Section 8, Submittal Report, of the walkdown guidance.

3.2 Seismic Walkdown Methodology Implementation

Section 2, Personnel Qualifications; Section 3, Selection of SSCs; Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; and Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provide information to licensees regarding the implementation of an appropriate seismic walkdown methodology. By letter dated July 9, 2012,⁹ the licensee confirmed that it would utilize the walkdown guidance in the performance of the seismic walkdowns at Waterford3.

The walkdown report dated November 26, 2012, and updated on April 25, 2013, did not identify deviations from the walkdown guidance.

The NRC staff reviewed the following sections of the walkdown methodology implementation provided in the walkdown report:

- Personnel Qualifications
- Development of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWELs)
- Implementation of the Walkdown Process
- Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results

⁹ ADAMS Accession No. ML12192A208.

3.2.1 Personnel Qualifications

Section 2, Personnel Qualifications, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with qualification information for personnel involved in the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 4.0, and Attachment J of the walkdown report, which includes information on the walkdown personnel and their qualifications. Specifically, the staff reviewed the summary of the background, experience, and level of involvement for the following personnel involved in the seismic walkdown activities: equipment selection personnel, seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs), licensing basis reviewers, IPEEE reviewers, peer review team, and operations staff.

Based on the review of the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that those involved in the seismic walkdown activities have the appropriate seismic background, knowledge and experience, as specified in Section 2 of the walkdown guidance.

3.2.2 Development of the SWELs

Section 3, Selection of SSCs, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees for selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the SWELs, so that they can be walked down by qualified personnel.

The NRC staff reviewed the overall process used by the licensee to develop the Waterford 3 base list, SWEL 1 (sample list of designated safety functions equipment), and SWEL 2 (sample list of spent fuel pool (SFP)-related equipment). The overall equipment selection process followed the screening process shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the walkdown guidance. Based on Attachment B of the walkdown report, Waterford 3 SWELs 1 and 2 meet the inclusion requirements of the walkdown guidance. Specifically, the following attributes were considered in the sample selection:

- A variety of systems, equipment and environments
- IPEEE equipment
- Major new or replacement equipment
- Risk considerations

Due to individual plant configurations and the walkdown guidance screening process followed to select the final SWEL equipment, it is possible that some classes of equipment will not be represented on the SWEL. The walkdown guidance recognizes this is due to the equipment not being present in the plant (e.g., some plants generate direct current power using inverters and therefore do not have motor generators) or the equipment being screened out during the screening process (the screening process is described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance).

The NRC staff also noted that a rapid drain-down list of five items was included as part of the SWEL 2, as described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance. In Attachment B, Table 4 of the

updated walkdown report, the licensee presented a list of components that could, upon failure, result in rapid drain-down of the SFP water level to below 10 feet above the top of the fuel and provided the specific basis for determining which items could or could not cause rapid drain down. After reviewing the information provided in this section, the staff concludes that the licensee followed the appropriate steps, as described in screen 4 of the walkdown guidance, to define and assess items that could lead to rapid drain-down for the SFP for inclusion in the SWEL 2.

After reviewing SWELs 1 and 2, the NRC staff concludes that the sample of SSCs represents a diversity of component types and assures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions, thereby meeting the intent of the walkdown guidance. In addition, the NRC staff notes that the equipment selection personnel were appropriately supported by plant operations staff as described in the walkdown guidance.

3.2.3 Implementation of the Walkdown Process

Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for each site.

The NRC staff reviewed Section 7.0 of the updated walkdown report, which summarizes the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys, including an overview of the number of items walked down and the number of areas walked-by. The walkdown report states that two teams each of which consisted of two qualified SWEs conducted the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. According to the signed seismic walkdown checklists (SWCs) and area walk-by checklists (AWCs), and as stated by the licensee, these activities were conducted over the course of a 3-week period in October 2012. In addition, a subsequent set of walkdowns were performed during the RF18 refueling outage through March 2013 to complete a number of components that were inaccessible during the initial walkdowns. By letter dated April 25, 2013, the licensee submitted a supplemental walkdown report describing the results of these subsequent seismic walkdowns. Attachments C and D, and K and L of the updated walkdown reports provide the completed SWCs and AWCs, respectively, documenting the results for each walked-down item. The equipment and cabinets that remained inaccessible after the subsequent walkdowns are listed Table 6-1 of the updated walkdown report. The licensee used the checklists provided in Appendix C of the walkdown guidance report without modification.

The licensee documented cases of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs) in the checklists for further evaluation. Attachment E of the updated walkdown report lists the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and the area walk-bys. The table describes how each condition was addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP), its resolution and current status. Based on the review of the checklists, the NRC staff was unable to confirm that all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns were included in this table. By letter dated November 1, 2013, the staff issued two questions in an RAI in order to obtain clarification regarding the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions identified in the field during the walkdowns and walk-bys. Specifically, in RAI 1, the staff requested the licensee to provide further explanation regarding how a field observation was determined to be PASC, and to ensure that the basis for determination was addressed using normal plant processes and documented in the walkdown report. In the November 27, 2013, response to RAI 1, the licensee confirmed that the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys were performed in accordance with the walkdown guidance

document. The licensee stated that when an unusual condition was observed in the field, the condition was noted in the SWC or AWCs and briefly discussed between the SWEs to agree upon whether it was a PASC or not. The walkdown checklists were annotated where appropriate with supporting reference or justification for the basis of the conclusion. The licensee addressed each PASC either with a licensing basis evaluation to determine whether it required entry into the CAP, or by entering it into the CAP directly. The licensee further stated that the decision to conduct a licensing basis evaluation or enter the condition directly into the CAP was made on a case-by-case basis, based on the perceived efficiency of each process for eventual resolution of each specific condition. The licensee clarified that unusual conditions that were not seismically significant were entered directly into the CAP. The licensee referred to Attachment E of the updated walkdown report which includes all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns and area walk-bys for Waterford 3. The licensee also confirmed that no new conditions were identified and the plant meets its current licensing basis.

After evaluating the licensee's response the NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to RAI 1 and that PASCs were properly identified and documented.

In addition to the information provided above, the NRC staff notes that anchorage configurations were verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50 percent of the SWEL items, in accordance with Section 4 of the walkdown guidance.

Section 6.3 of the updated walkdown report confirms that additional walkdowns were conducted, during RF18 refueling outage through March 2013, to perform inspections on several inaccessible equipment and internal cabinets that were not completely inspected or were not opened during the initial walkdowns. Table 6-2 of the updated walkdown report, provides a table that summarizes the completed subsequent inspections. The NRC staff reviewed the SWCs in Attachment K of the updated walkdown report and confirmed that cabinets identified in Table 6-2 were opened to determine if any adverse conditions existed of internal equipment and that identified supplemental inspections for inaccessible equipment were also conducted.

In Section 8.3 of the updated walkdown report, the licensee indicated that one item required immediate field work as a result of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Program. A temporary enclosure, providing a contamination barrier when the floor plug is removed from a contaminated pipe chase below the floor, was found to be installed in the "B" Switchgear room. The licensee stated that no calculation or drawings could be found for the enclosure and that it was unanchored with the possibility of moving across the floor and striking two different safety related panels during a seismic event. The licensee initiated a condition report and braced the enclosure at the top and bottom to existing structural members to ensure rigidity of the enclosure.

The equipment and areas that remained inaccessible after the subsequent walkdowns are listed in Table 6-1 of the updated walkdown report. The list of inaccessible items also includes the condition which caused the delay of the walkdown. The licensee stated that one item needs insulation removed and that eight cabinets/panels were inaccessible due to the energized nature of the cabinets. However, the external anchorage conditions and the immediate area surrounding these components were inspected during the initial walkdown. The licensee made a regulatory commitment to complete the walkdowns for all of the remaining inaccessible items during specific system outage windows or during the next scheduled refueling outage (spring

2014). The regulatory commitment also stated that the licensee will provide an updated submittal with the results of these walkdown items no later than 2 months after the completion of the next refueling outage.

Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.

3.2.4 Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results

Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of licensing basis evaluations for items identified during the seismic walkdowns as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed that might have potential seismic significance.

The NRC staff reviewed Section 8.0 of the Waterford 3 walkdown report, which discusses the process for conducting the seismic licensing basis evaluations of the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. The licensee stated that each PASC was addressed either with a licensing basis evaluation to determine whether it required entry into the CAP, or by entering it into the CAP directly. Attachment E of the updated walkdown report provides a complete table listing the potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions, the key licensee findings, and a summary of the licensing basis valuations performed to the associated PASCs. In addition, this table describes the actions taken or planned to address these conditions, including the current status of each of the items the licensee entered into the CAP.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensing basis evaluation and CAP entries and the description of the actions taken or planned to address deficiencies. The staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and entered them into the CAP, which meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.

3.2.5 Conclusion

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance for personnel qualifications, development of SWELs, implementation of the walkdown process, and seismic licensing basis evaluations.

3.3 Peer Review

Section 6, Peer Review, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with information regarding the conduct of peer reviews for the activities performed during the seismic walkdowns. Page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance identifies the following activities to be conducted during the peer review process:

- Review the selection of the SSCs included on the SWELs
- Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys

- Review the licensing basis evaluations
- Review the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP
- Review the walkdown report
- Summarize the results of the peer review process in the walkdown report

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 9.0 of the Waterford 3 walkdown report which describes the conduct of the peer review. In addition, the staff reviewed the response to RAI 2 provided in the licensee's letter dated November 27, 2013. In RAI 2, the staff requested the licensee to provide additional information on the overall peer review process that was followed as part of the walkdown activities. Specifically, the staff requested the licensee to confirm that the activities identified in page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were assessed and documented in the report. The licensee was also requested to confirm that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a peer reviewer for that same activity. In response to RAI 2, the licensee confirmed that all the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were included as part of the peer review process and referred to the summary of the peer review activities provided in Section 9.2 and Attachments G and H of the updated walkdown report. In addition, the licensee provided additional information on the level of involvement of the peer review team and its leader in order to further demonstrate the independence of the peer review process.

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's summary of each of these activities, which included the peer review team members' level of involvement, the peer review findings, and resolution of peer review comments. After reviewing the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee sufficiently documented the results of the peer review activities and how these reviews affected the work described in the walkdown report.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's results of the peer review and subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review meets the intent of Section 6 of the walkdown guidance.

3.4 IPEEE Information

Section 7, IPEEE Vulnerabilities, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the reporting of the evaluations conducted and actions taken in response to seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program. Through the IPEEE program and Generic Letter (GL) 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," dated November 23, 1988,¹⁰ licensees previously had performed a systematic examination to identify any plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents.

The licensee discussed the IPEEE evaluation of Waterford 3 in Section 5.0 of the updated walkdown report. The licensee reviewed the IPEEE final report (February 2012) and supporting documentation to identify seismic vulnerability items determined by the Waterford 3 IPEEE program. Two seismic vulnerabilities were identified by the IPEEE program and are reported in

¹⁰ ADAMS Accession No. ML031150465.

Attachment A, table "IPEEE Vulnerabilities" of the walkdown report. The table includes a description of the action taken to reduce or eliminate the seismic vulnerability, resolution completion date, and status of configuration management program.

Based on its review of Section 5.0 of the walkdown report, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's identification of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including anomalies, outliers, and other findings) identified by the IPEEE program, as well as actions taken to eliminate or reduce them, meets the intent of Section 7 of the walkdown guidance.

3.5 Planned Upgrades

The licensee did not identify any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features in the walkdown report.

3.6 NRC Oversight

3.6.1 Independent Verification by Resident Inspectors

On July 6, 2012,¹¹ the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/188, "Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns." In accordance with the TI, NRC inspectors independently verified that the Waterford 3 licensee implemented the seismic walkdowns in accordance with the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of seismic protection features. The inspection report dated February 14, 2013,¹² documents the results of this inspection. No findings were identified.

4.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS

The equipment and areas that were inaccessible during the 180-day period are listed in Table 6-1 of Section 6.3 in the initial walkdown report. The updated walkdown report includes the walkdown results for all but nine of the items. The equipment and cabinets that remained inaccessible after the subsequent walkdowns are listed Table 6-1 of the updated walkdown report. The list of inaccessible items also includes the condition which caused the delay of the walkdown. The licensee committed to complete the walkdowns for all of the remaining inaccessible items during specific system outage windows or during the next scheduled refueling outage (spring 2014). The licensee committed to provide an updated submittal with the results of these walkdown items no later than 2 months after the completion of the next refueling outage.

The NRC staff concludes that the inaccessible equipment list was developed consistent with the walkdown guidance. The schedule for completion is consistent with the time to the next scheduled outage.

¹¹ ADAMS Accession No. ML12156A052.

¹² ADAMS Accession No. ML13045A582.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The staff concludes that the licensee, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities and, in accordance with plant processes and procedures, verified the plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis; addressed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed seismic conditions; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features. Furthermore, the staff notes that no immediate safety concerns were identified. The staff acknowledges that a supplemental letter will be provided no later than 2 months after refueling outage (RFO) 19, which is scheduled for the spring of 2014, addressing the remaining inaccessible items consistent with the regulatory commitment. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1445 or by e-mail at Alan.Wang@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Alan B. Wang, Project Manager
Plant Licensing IV-2 and Decommissioning
Transition Branch
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-382

Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic
Walkdown Report

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ADAMS Accession No. ML14087A181

*** concurrence by e-mail**

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