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RULES & REGULATIONS

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General Comment

Item 10

Problems with multi unit plant sites, including those with common facilities, are pretty much overlooked in this report. (Ref. p. 34 of 133) For instance, it appears to me that only a non-common control room plant is addressed, yet common control room plants are all that they had at Fukushima Daiichi. Where is the control room noise, alarms, and commotion when both units trip at exactly the same time even identified as an operational concern?

The use of a common ventilation exhaust stack at Fukushima Daiichi allowed explosive gas from Unit 3 to blow up the non-operating Unit 4 plant. (The reference is INPO Report 11-005, pages 33 & 34.) How is this considered?

A more basic problem is that all operating (and non-operating) plants and independent spent fuel storage locations at a site experience an earthquake at the same time. I find it quite unrealistic to assume that a "smart" earthquake attacks only one reactor vessel, and nothing else.

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