

RAS 2492

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INT-BLOC Summary Exh. 3  
12/7/00

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**RELATED CORRESPONDENCE**

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

100 DEC 11 01:53

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

3

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

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In the Matter of

:

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: Docket No.

7

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

: 50-400-LA

8

:

9

(Shearson Harris Nuclear Power

: ASLBP NO.

10

Plant)

: 99-762-02-LA

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Deposition of EDWARD T. BURNS, Ph.D., held at

15

Harmon Curran Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP, 1726 M

16

Street, N.W., Third Floor, Washington, D.C.,

17

20036, commencing at 9:40 a.m., October 20, 2000,

18

before DEBORAH K. WILKINS, RPR and Notary Public.

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**ORIGINAL**

Template = SECY-028

SECY-02

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Docket No. 50-400-LA Official Exh. No. 3  
In the matter of Caroline Power & Light Co.  
Staff \_\_\_\_\_ IDENTIFIED ✓  
Applicant \_\_\_\_\_ RECEIVED \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection BCOC REQUESTED ✓  
Order \_\_\_\_\_ WITHDRAWN \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE 12/7/00 Witness None  
Clerk Paul Ballentine

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
3 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board  
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5 In the Matter of :  
6 : Docket No.  
7 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY : 50-400-LA  
8 :  
9 (Shearson Harris Nuclear Power : ASLBP NO.  
10 Plant) : 99-762-02-LA  
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22

**ORIGINAL**

1     A P P E A R A N C E S   O F   C O U N S E L:

2     FOR THE APPLICANT CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY:

3                     SHAW PITTMAN

4                     BY:       JOHN H. O'NEILL, JR., ESQUIRE

5                                 DOUGLAS J. ROSINSKI, ESQUIRE

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12     FOR THE INTERVENOR ORANGE COUNTY:

13                     HARMON CURRAN SPIELBERG & EISENBERG,

14                     LLP

15                     BY:       DIANE CURRAN, ESQUIRE

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1 APPEARANCES (Cont'd.)

2 FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF:

3 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

4 COMMISSION

5 BY: SUSAN UTTAL, ESQUIRE

6 JENNIFER EUCHNER, ESQUIRE

7 United States Regulatory Commission

8 Washington, D.C. 20555

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16

17 Also Present: Gordon Thompson, Ph.D.

18 Gareth W. Parry, Ph.D.

19 Edward L. Wills, Jr.

20 John R. Caves

21 Stephen LaVie

22

1 involved in the analysis of nuclear power plants  
2 from an overall risk perspective.

3 Q. You consider yourself an expert in  
4 probabilistic risk assessment?

5 A. I have extensive experience in  
6 probabilistic risk assessment, I believe, that  
7 would qualify as an expert in this case, yes.

8 Q. Do you believe it is necessary to have  
9 designed a nuclear plant in order to be an expert  
10 in probabilistic risk assessment?

11 A. No, ma'am.

12 Q. Do you believe it's necessary to have  
13 operated a nuclear plant in order to be an expert  
14 in probabilistic risk assessment?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay.

17 Looking back at your resume' again, I  
18 would like to talk about the bullet here you have  
19 which says manager and lead technical analyst of  
20 the Duane Arnold Level 1 and 2 technical support  
21 for response to the Severe Accident Policy  
22 Statement, 1991 to 1995. Could you describe what

1 relative to that submittal.

2 Q. How many people worked on that PRA?

3 A. Would you like to know the number of  
4 people who contributed or the number of man-years  
5 that were involved?

6 Q. Well, why don't you give me both.

7 A. I would say that there were six  
8 consultant contributors.

9 Q. When you say six consultant  
10 contributors, you mean six individuals?

11 A. Six individuals.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And there were four individuals at Duane  
14 Arnold who were primarily part of the team.

15 Q. So this was a team of people from the  
16 consultant and Duane Arnold?

17 A. Yes, ma'am. Usually probabilistic risk  
18 analysis would require a team of people drawing  
19 from all disciplines to complete the effort.

20 Q. Why is that? Why do you have to draw  
21 from so many disciplines?

22 A. Since the analysis involves an

1 integrated look at the plant, it uses information  
2 associated with the engineering of the plant, the  
3 testing of the plant, the operator interaction  
4 with various pieces of the plant and its control  
5 with the analysts who have done thermal hydraulic  
6 calculations around the plant, so nearly all of  
7 the disciplines that are associated with the  
8 design and operation of the plant are called into  
9 play as part of that analysis.

10 Q. You were going to tell me how many  
11 man-hours. Is it all men?

12 A. The number of engineering person-hours  
13 associated with the Duane Arnold work from the  
14 consultant side was approximately five  
15 person-years.

16 Q. How about from the utility side?

17 A. I wouldn't know the answer to that.

18 Q. And no way of making a reasonable  
19 estimate?

20 A. No, I wouldn't be able to tell.

21 Q. Did the utility members of the team make  
22 a substantial contribution to the effort?

1           A.       Six consultants.

2           Q.       Six consultants.

3                    Did they represent different  
4 disciplines? Can you tell me what they were?

5           A.       Disciplines were the people who set up  
6 the framework for the analysis to identify the  
7 accident scenarios, to identify what the  
8 containment failure probability would be for  
9 different accident conditions, personnel to  
10 identify the human reliability analysis portion of  
11 that, of the Level 2, and then personnel to  
12 perform the thermal hydraulic calculations to  
13 support the radionuclide release calculations, the  
14 thermal hydraulic conditions inside the  
15 containment, the conditions inside the reactor  
16 building if a containment failure occurred, and  
17 then the radionuclide releases for each of the  
18 pathways that could be identified through the  
19 containment and through the reactor building.

20          Q.       So were there four different disciplines  
21 represented on this team, would you say?

22          A.       I don't want to mislead you. The

1 probabilistic risk analysis includes a whole  
2 spectrum of types of analysis that needs to be  
3 performed in order to support any one of these  
4 things. To say there are four disciplines is  
5 probably an oversimplification --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- because we draw on so many different  
8 inputs. In some cases we rely heavily on the  
9 people who are giving us the inputs. In other  
10 cases we require the expertise to be part of the  
11 team.

12 Q. So it might be more fair to say that  
13 there are many disciplines represented in a team  
14 like this?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay.

17 And how many people from the utility  
18 were represented on the team?

19 A. Two.

20 Q. Two?

21 On the consultant's part, how many  
22 person-hours did the effort take? I see it was --

1 it looks like a two-year project?

2 A. It was two years, two units. So in this  
3 particular case the utility took on a substantial  
4 fraction of the analysis, so the consultant time  
5 was approximately six person-months per unit.

6 Q. So that was one person-year for both  
7 units?

8 A. Approximately. Consultant time.

9 Q. You had said that the Limerick Level 2  
10 PRA took your firm about one person-year of time.  
11 Is the difference -- that was for one unit, the  
12 Limerick?

13 A. Limerick is a two-unit site.

14 Q. So you looked at two units for Limerick?

15 A. We performed a calculation for one unit.

16 Q. I see. Okay.

17 It seems like from a total perspective  
18 that Nine Mile Point, if you include the  
19 compensatory time spent by the utility work that  
20 you all weren't doing, took maybe twice as long.  
21 Is that simply because there were twice as many  
22 units being analyzed there or is that fair to say?

1           A.       It would be a comparable amount of time.

2           Q.       Were those amounts of time in addition  
3 to the amount of time that you described for me in  
4 relation to the bullets above for the Peach Bottom  
5 and Limerick studies?

6           A.       Yes.

7           Q.       But they are related in the sense that  
8 that is input into the same study, right?

9           A.       Yes.

10          Q.       The first bullet on your resume' under  
11 work experience says: Led or participated in 11  
12 BWR PSA peer review certifications in '96 to '97.  
13 Could you describe what was involved there?

14          A.       The industry recognized as part of  
15 risk-informing regulation that the ability to  
16 assure the public and the NRC that probabilistic  
17 risk assessments were valid tools to be used in  
18 risk-informing regulation applications that there  
19 needed to be a method, an accepted method by the  
20 NRC, by the industry and by the public that the  
21 probabilistic risk assessments were performed in a  
22 manner that could be considered high quality and

1    be reproducible, and so as a farther part of that  
2    industry effort one of the first steps that was  
3    done was for a peer review process to be  
4    developed.

5                So a peer review process was developed,  
6    and myself and Karl Fleming and Doug True  
7    participated in the development of a peer review  
8    process that could be used in evaluating a PRA to  
9    see whether the principal elements were properly  
10   incorporated, whether the methods used were of  
11   high quality, and whether those methods had been  
12   implemented in a way that produced a risk profile  
13   that was realistic given the plant configuration  
14   and the specific plant features that existed at  
15   the plant.

16               As part of that process, we pilot tested  
17   that at three plants in 1996, we fed back the  
18   results of that pilot test into the guideline  
19   development and then issued the guidelines in  
20   1997, and then at that point we started  
21   implementing the guidelines on the review of PRAs  
22   to ensure that they had an adequate, I will say,

1     quality for use in risk-informing regulation.

2           Q.     You mentioned PRA for risk-informed  
3     regulation which is a term of art for an approach  
4     to safety regulation that's going on within the  
5     NRC right now; is that correct?

6           A.     I am not sure what term of art means.

7           Q.     Well, when you say risk-informed  
8     regulation, I can almost put capital letters on  
9     that because it's an approach that the NRC is  
10    taking to safety regulation, and my ultimate  
11    question is: Do you have a different standard for  
12    PRAs depending on what their purpose is?

13          A.     Are you asking my personal --

14          Q.     Yes, your professional opinion.

15          A.     My professional opinion is that  
16    probabilistic risk assessments can be performed  
17    for a number of different reasons. The  
18    probabilistic risk assessments that were performed  
19    as part of the original individual plant  
20    examination evaluations for response to generic  
21    letter 88-20 were those that were used to identify  
22    whether vulnerabilities existed at the plant that

1     would characterize those uncertainties that most  
2     influence the PRA relative to that specific  
3     application. So there are compensatory measures  
4     that could be taken for using the PRA under  
5     certain circumstances.

6           Q.     Do you consider that the provision for  
7     peer review of a PRA is an important element for  
8     assuring the quality of the PRA?

9           A.     Yes.

10          Q.     And why is that?

11          A.     Because the number of analyses and  
12     inputs that need to be treated and the number of  
13     decisions that need to be made as part of a PRA  
14     can be quite numerous. There is a possibility  
15     that the PRA team themselves do make decisions  
16     that are different than what the core  
17     methodologies might dictate are appropriate, so it  
18     is useful to have a group of experts come in to  
19     examine the methods that have been used and how  
20     they are implemented and to check the  
21     reasonableness of the results to determine whether  
22     the PRA makes good technical sense and is

1     supportable and that the results are traceable to  
2     the inputs that are used as part of the PRA.

3           Q.     And does peer review generally require a  
4     team effort similar to or analogous to the team  
5     effort that is required for a PRA in the sense  
6     that no single discipline is adequate to evaluate  
7     the PRA?

8           A.     I believe that is a fair statement, yes.

9                   MS. CURRAN:   This would be a good time  
10    for me to break for lunch unless you would like  
11    to sit here and skip lunch.

12                   MR. O'NEILL:   Probably not.

13                   (Luncheon recess -- 12:20 p.m.)

14                   Afternoon Session   (1:35 p.m.)

15   BY MS. CURRAN:

16           Q.     Dr. Burns, I would like to ask you about  
17    the work that you are doing on the Harris license  
18    amendment case. I understand that you are  
19    preparing an affidavit or evidentiary presentation  
20    with a Subpart K proceeding for the applicant's  
21    response to contention EC-6; is that correct?

22           A.     I am not familiar with the --

1           A.       Yes.

2           Q.       Do you plan to have the study peer  
3 reviewed?

4           A.       Yes.

5           Q.       By whom will it be peer reviewed?

6           A.       Karl Fleming and Doug True.

7           Q.       Are they employees of the same company  
8 where you work?

9           A.       Yes.

10          Q.       Is it consistent with the peer review  
11 guidance that's referenced in your resume' to have  
12 a peer review done by the same company that  
13 performed the study?

14          A.       I believe I wasn't precise enough in my  
15 terminology when I responded to your question.  
16 First, to answer your second question, is: It  
17 would be inconsistent with peer review methodology  
18 that we developed to have the person who performed  
19 an analysis peer review it. It would not be  
20 inconsistent or it would be consistent to have a  
21 peer review even if it was a member of the same  
22 company. That would be allowed under the peer

1 review process that's being developed by the  
2 industry.

3           The previous question that you had asked  
4 me about peer review, I should say we are  
5 anticipating having an independent review done by  
6 Karl Fleming and Doug True, and that would be our  
7 submittal to the customer, in this case counsel,  
8 and it would be up to the counsel or CP&L to  
9 decide whether a peer review process would be  
10 required, so I'm sorry I wasn't accurate when I  
11 responded to you before.

12       Q.     Okay.

13           And a review done by -- let me scratch  
14 that.

15           Mr. Fleming and Mr. True, will they  
16 participate in any way in the preparation of this  
17 study?

18       A.     They have given me some guidance, and  
19 they have done some preliminary reviews of the  
20 methods that we are going to use to make sure that  
21 we are doing it in a manner consistent with their  
22 technical expertise.

1           Q.       Do you expect to be getting other input  
2 or advice from them as you go along in the study?

3           A.       One specific task has been identified as  
4 part of their review thus far, and that is, that  
5 the interfacing system LOCA frequency that had  
6 been calculated previously as part of the PRA  
7 appeared to be extremely high compared with sister  
8 plants, and so they have identified that as an  
9 analysis that may need to be updated as part of  
10 this effort to make sure that it accurately and  
11 realistically characterizes the plant.

12          Q.       What are Mr. Fleming's and Mr. True's  
13 positions in the company?

14          A.       Mr. True is a senior vice-president and  
15 Mr. Fleming is a vice-president in charge of PWR,  
16 PRA risk -- probabilistic risk assessments.

17          Q.       How much time have you budgeted for them  
18 to do their review?

19          A.       I am not the contractual project  
20 manager, so I am not sure.

21          Q.       So you don't know how much time has been  
22 budgeted for their review?

1           A.       No.

2           Q.       The figure that you gave me of one  
3   person-year for the effort, does that include  
4   their review?

5           A.       Yes.

6           Q.       I believe you indicated to me before  
7   that peer review certification guidelines that you  
8   have participated in developing have a spectrum of  
9   standards or criteria in terms of their rigor,  
10   that there's a variation depending on the purpose;  
11   is that correct?

12          A.       They allow the peer review team the  
13   flexibility to describe the PRA over a spectrum of  
14   level of detail, scope and quality, yes.

15          Q.       So depending on the purpose, the  
16   guidelines might have a choice of what quality  
17   standard would apply?

18          A.       I'm sorry. Could you repeat that or  
19   read it back?

20          Q.       If you don't understand it, let me try  
21   to rephrase it.

22                    There isn't a single standard in the

1 peer review guidelines that you described to me,  
2 right?

3 A. Peer review guidelines are not a  
4 standard.

5 Q. But they express certain criteria or  
6 goals, do they?

7 A. They express criteria upon which the  
8 peer review team would make judgments relative to  
9 the quality of the PRA.

10 Q. Okay.

11 Under these guidelines, will this PRA be  
12 of the highest quality possible?

13 A. This PRA, meaning?

14 Q. The one that you are working on for  
15 CP&L.

16 A. I would like to be a little careful  
17 here.

18 We are doing a probabilistic risk  
19 assessment of the analysis that was requested by  
20 the ASLB in their order, so we are doing an  
21 analysis, but it uses as input the probabilistic  
22 risk assessment of the Shearson Harris plant that

1 the probability of each of these events in the  
2 chain of events?

3 A. No.

4 Q. What have you been asked to do with  
5 respect to this list?

6 A. We have been asked to answer question  
7 number 1 relative to that list.

8 Q. Okay. So what will you be doing in  
9 order to answer question 1 with respect to that  
10 list?

11 MR. O'NEILL: You might want to make  
12 that more specific because he can probably answer  
13 the question for the next three hours. You need  
14 to ask a question he can answer.

15 BY MS. CURRAN:

16 Q. Are you giving a best estimate for the  
17 probability for each of the events listed on page  
18 13?

19 A. We are using the best technical  
20 information that we have available to us and can  
21 develop within the time frame available to answer  
22 the question posed by the Board, that as engineers

1 will do and we will be forced most likely to do in  
2 this case is that some estimates may be  
3 conservative, although we will try to characterize  
4 that level of conservatism in the response so as  
5 not to mislead the Board.

6 Q. So I am trying to -- let me just  
7 articulate what I hear you implying to me, is that  
8 at least for some of these scenarios you don't  
9 feel that there's enough time to prepare a  
10 realistic probability estimate, so that you are  
11 going to give a conservative estimate to somehow  
12 compensate for that? Do I understand that  
13 correctly?

14 A. I can't agree with the premise that you  
15 are giving me. We will give a -- as the question  
16 asks, a best estimate overall probability of the  
17 sequence, that's what we will provide to the  
18 Board, provide to counsel anyway, and that best  
19 estimate will have information in it that is of  
20 course limited by our current state of knowledge.

21 I think the principal example of that is  
22 in step number 7, the initiation of an exothermic

1    oxidation reaction in pool C and D. I currently  
2    don't have all of the technical facts as of this  
3    time, so at this point in time I can't make the  
4    statement that we will be able to provide the best  
5    estimate evaluation of that, and we may have to  
6    provide a sensitivity evaluation along with  
7    characterizing the uncertainties in that so that  
8    those decisionmakers who need to know what effect  
9    that has on the overall sequence evaluation will  
10   be able to understand what we have done, but we  
11   will in fact have a best estimate evaluation  
12   characterized by those uncertainties.

13        Q.     Will your work involve looking at each  
14   of these seven scenarios and making a best  
15   estimate of conditional probability for each one  
16   of them?

17        A.     I don't believe these are seven  
18   scenarios.

19        Q.     Or seven accident steps. Would that be  
20   a better way to describe it?

21        A.     We will look at each of the contributors  
22   to the overall scenario because one of the

1     because I don't believe that there have been  
2     extensive differences associated with the  
3     difference between 1995 and 2000.

4                 MS. CURRAN:   I would like to ask counsel  
5     if these calculations have been produced to us.

6                 MR. O'NEILL:   I can tell you that the  
7     PSA folks, PRA folks at CP&L put every shred of  
8     paper that they could find that supported the PSA,  
9     and that was their instructions, and they have  
10    gone back to check it and they have gone back  
11    again to get all of the peer reviews of even the  
12    early, now outdated, IPE and even a precursor to  
13    it which was presented in the stack that you got  
14    today, so at least the instructions, and I believe  
15    since they are very thorough, careful, precise  
16    engineers, that you have everything that they  
17    could identify, either you have it or you had an  
18    opportunity to elect to have copies made of it.

19    BY MS. CURRAN:

20                Q.     You had said that you intend to have an  
21    independent peer review performed; is that  
22    correct?

1           A.       Of?

2           Q.       Of the PSA? Is that what you said? Of  
3 the latest PRA for the Harris plant?

4           A.       That looks at step number 1 of degraded  
5 core accident? The PSA from 1995 updated by the  
6 calculation?

7           Q.       Is that what you are referring to that  
8 is going to be peer reviewed?

9           A.       Yes.

10          Q.       Okay.

11                 And how, when and by whom is that going  
12 to take place?

13          A.       It's going to be done by a team of PWR  
14 experts as part of this process -- of the process  
15 that we are going through to produce the overall  
16 probability of these seven steps.

17          Q.       Is this the same team of experts that  
18 you referred to me before, Mr. Fleming and Mr.  
19 True?

20          A.       Mr. Fleming is the head of the peer  
21 review process, and he has a team that's working  
22 for him separately.

1           Q.     And this team is in-house, within your  
2 company?

3           A.     Yes, ma'am.

4           Q.     Do you plan to look at any other source  
5 besides the PSA for Harris for the first  
6 contributor in the list?

7           A.     Mr. Fleming is looking at this portion  
8 of the overall development as part of input to the  
9 process, so he will identify to us whether the PRA  
10 meets that, meets the needs of input to this  
11 seven-step process or whether additional pieces of  
12 information will be required to characterize  
13 degraded core accidents.

14                   As I said, he's already identified as  
15 one of those pieces the potential change for the  
16 interfacing system LOCA, there is extensive  
17 documentation available on how that analysis is  
18 supposed to be done, it's been developed by EPRI,  
19 and that he's also performed as part of other PWR  
20 risk analysis, so that information would be part  
21 of -- in addition to the PRA that existed, would  
22 also be an example of things that will be part of

1     that input to characterize step number 1.

2           Q.     Okay. Looking at step number 2, will  
3     you be applying PRA analysis technique to this  
4     step?

5           A.     Step number 2 is characterized by the  
6     existing probabilistic risk assessment of the  
7     Shearson Harris plant, so this information is  
8     available for input into the overall process.  
9     CP&L has already expended a substantial amount of  
10    effort to identify what step 2 is, and that would  
11    be part of Mr. Fleming's review to verify that  
12    that information is usable for us in this process.

13          Q.     If there is no uncertainty analysis  
14    accompanying the results for step 1 and step 2,  
15    how is Mr. Fleming going to deal with that?

16          A.     I am not currently able to answer your  
17    question because I am not sure that I know that  
18    there's no uncertainty analysis.

19          Q.     Assuming hypothetically that there were  
20    none, how would you as a professional approach  
21    that?

22          A.     In step 1 and 2, Mr. Fleming, in

1 addition to being an expert in PWR risk  
2 assessment, is also a recognized expert in the  
3 area of uncertainty analysis and uncertainty  
4 characterization, probably second only to Dr.  
5 Parry who I think you talked to yesterday. I am  
6 relying on Mr. Fleming to provide me with the  
7 characterization of the uncertainty associated  
8 with the degraded core accident container failure  
9 bypass mechanisms.

10 Q. Is that not your area of expertise?

11 A. By comparison with the two gentlemen  
12 that I said, no, I would certainly not be in the  
13 same league with either of those two, but I think  
14 that the main purpose of Mr. Fleming providing  
15 that information is that he is an expert in PWR  
16 parts of the analysis, and we are using the  
17 extensive work that CP&L has already performed  
18 trying to make sure that that is consistent with  
19 the current state of the technology and then using  
20 that as an input to this process.

21 Q. Okay, let's look at step number 3, loss  
22 of all spent fuel cooling and makeup systems.

CERTIFICATE OF DEPONENT

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I hereby certify that I have read and examined the foregoing transcript, and the same is a true and accurate record of the testimony given by me.

Any additions or corrections that I feel are necessary, I will attach on a separate sheet of paper to the original transcript.



Edward T. Burns, Ph.D.

**Date Taken: 10/20/00**

**Witness: Edward T. Burns**

**Case: In the Matter of Carolina Power & Light Co.**

**ERRATA**

I, Edward T. Burns, the witness herein, have read my deposition and request that the following changes be made:

| <b><u>PAGE</u></b> | <b><u>LINE</u></b> | <b><u>CHANGE</u></b>                                      | <b><u>REASON FOR CHANGE</u></b> |
|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1                  | 9                  | Change "Shearson" to "Shearon"                            | Typographical                   |
| 8                  | 19                 | Change "BWR" to "BWRs"                                    | Typographical                   |
| 11                 | 17                 | Change "enterprise" to "Enterprise"                       | Typographical                   |
| 13                 | 9                  | Change "generic letter" to "Generic Letter"               | Typographical                   |
| 13                 | 18                 | Delete comma between "analysis" and "techniques"          | Accuracy                        |
| 15                 | 16                 | Change "generic letter" to "Generic Letter"               | Typographical                   |
| 20                 | 3                  | Delete "were, could and did - -"                          | Clarification                   |
| 31                 | 12                 | Change "was" to "were"                                    | Typographical                   |
| 31                 | 13                 | Change "on" to "in"                                       | Typographical                   |
| 33                 | 15                 | Change "generic letter" to "Generic Letter"               | Typographical                   |
| 37                 | 22                 | Change "area were moved from those locations," to "area," | Clarification                   |
| 56                 | 15                 | Change "area" to "error"                                  | Typographical                   |
| 58                 | 11                 | Change "could take" to "could not take"                   | Accuracy                        |

**Date Taken: 10/20/00**

**Witness: Edward T. Burns**

**Case: In the Matter of Carolina Power & Light Co.**

| <u>PAGE</u> | <u>LINE</u> | <u>CHANGE</u>                                           | <u>REASON FOR CHANGE</u>     |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 69          | 11          | Change "." to "?"                                       | Typographical                |
| 73          | 1           | Change "farther" to "further"                           | Typographical                |
| 77          | 6           | Change "criteria, so" to "criteria. So"                 | Clarification                |
| 81          | 8           | Change "Shearson" to "Shearson"                         | Typographical                |
| 88          | 22          | Change "Shearson" to "Shearson"                         | Typographical                |
| 95          | 1           | Change "Shearson" to "Shearon"                          | Typographical                |
| 102         | 7           | Change "Shearson" to "Shearon"                          | Typographical                |
| 103         | 8           | Change "container failure" to "containment failure and" | Clarification/ Typographical |
| 114         | 9           | Change "Shearson" to "Shearon"                          | Typographical                |
| 119         | 15          | Change "Shearson" to "Shearon"                          | Typographical                |