DPR-66 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

BASES (Continued)

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

PORV REQUIREMENTS

As designed for the OPPS System, each PORV is signaled to open if the RCS pressure approaches a limit determined by the OPPS actuation The OPPS actuation circuit monitors RCS pressure and circuit. determines when a condition not acceptable is approached. If the indicated pressure meets or exceeds the OPPS actuation setpoint, a PORV is signaled to open. Having the setpoints of both valves within the limits ensures that the Appendix G limits will not be exceeded in any analyzed event. When a PORV is opened in an increasing pressure transient, the release of coolant will cause the pressure increase to slow and reverse. As the PORV releases coolant, the RCS pressure decreases until a reset pressure is reached and the valve is signaled to close. The pressure continues to decrease below the reset pressure as the valve closes.

RCS VENT REQUIREMENTS

Once the RCS is depressurized, a vent exposed to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) or containment atmosphere will maintain the RCS pressure in an RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving requirements of the transient do not exceed the capabilities of the Thus, the vent path must be capable of relieving the flow vent. resulting from the limiting OPPS mass or heat input transient, and maintaining pressure below the P/T limits. The required vent capacity may be provided by one or more vent paths.

For an RCS vent to meet the flow capacity requirement, it may be satisfied by removing a pressurizer safety valve or establishing an opening between the RCS and the PRT or containment atmosphere of the required size through any positive means available which cannot be inadvertently defeated. The vent must be above the level of reactor coolant, so as not to drain the RCS when open.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

Safety analyses demonstrate that the reactor vessel is adequately protected against exceeding the P/T limits when low RCS temperature conditions exist. At the enable temperature and below, overpressure prevention is provided by two OPERABLE RCS relief valves or a depressurized RCS and a sufficient sized RCS vent.

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DPR-66 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC) (Continued)

fuel cycle. The surveillance requirement for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of each fuel cycle is adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 541° F. This limitation is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, (3) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT_{NDT} temperature, and (4) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, (5) associated heat tracing systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200°F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

With the RCS average temperature less than 200° F, a low head safety injection pump may be used in lieu of the operable charging pump with a minimum RCS vent of 2.07 square inches open to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) or containment atmosphere. This will provide latitude for maintenance and ISI examinations on the charging system for repair or corrective action and will ensure that boration and makeup are available when the charging pumps are out-of-service. The requirement for an RCS vent ensures that the RCS pressure will not exceed the shutoff head of the low head safety injection pumps.

MOV-1SI-890C is the low head safety injection pump discharge isolation valve to the RCS coldlegs, the valve must be closed prior to reducing RCS pressure below the RWST head pressure to prevent draining into the RCS. Emergency backup power is not required since this valve is outside containment and can be manually operated if required, this will allow the associated diesel generator to be taken out of service for maintenance and testing.

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