



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

February 10, 1999

MEMORANDUM TO: BiWeekly Notice Coordinator

FROM: Daniel S. Collins, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

Daniel S. Collins

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION IN BIWEEKLY FR NOTICE -
NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS
TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES, PROPOSED NO
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION,
AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING (TAC NOS. MA4616 AND
MA4617)

Duquesne Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412, Beaver Valley Power
Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Shippingport, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: January 18, 1999

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would: (1) delete license condition 2.C.(3) from the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1) operating license and delete some references to two-loop operation from BVPS-1 Technical Specifications (TSs); (2) revise BVPS-1 and Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) TS 2.2.1, 3.3.2.1, associated tables 2.2-1 and 3.3.4, and associated bases, to use consistent format and wording between units; (3) revise BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 TS 2.2.1, 3.3.2.1, associated tables 2.2-1 and 3.3.4, and associated bases, to include revised nominal trip setpoints and allowable values which are more conservative than those currently listed; (4) delete or revise TS to reflect the current configuration of Unit 1 plant hardware; and (5) make miscellaneous editorial changes to BVPS-1 and BVPS-2 TS and associated Bases to define terms, revise formatting, modify titles, and add license numbers to pages.

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Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below [as modified by the NRC staff based upon information provided elsewhere in the licensee's submittal].

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

This proposed amendment includes changes to nominal Reactor Trip System (RTS) and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) trip setpoints and allowable values that have been determined with the use of an approved methodology. The new values ensure that all automatic protective actions will be initiated at or before the condition assumed in the safety analysis. This change, which includes modification of the requirements stated in Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS) 2.2.1 and Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.2.1, will allow the nominal trip setpoints to be adjusted within the calibration tolerance band allowed by the setpoint methodology. There will be no adverse effect on the ability of the channels to perform their safety functions as assumed in the safety analyses. Since there will be no adverse effect on the trip setpoints or the instrumentation associated with the trip setpoints, there will be no significant increase in the probability of any accident previously evaluated.

Other changes in trip system function, content and format are proposed based on the current configuration of the trip system hardware at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 1. Similarly, since the ability of the instrumentation to perform its safety function is not adversely affected, there will be no significant increase in the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Since the safety analysis is unaffected by this change there is no change in the consequences of any previously evaluated accident.

The editorial changes do not affect plant safety. The administrative change, for BVPS Unit 1 only, pertaining to two loop operation and Reactor Coolant System isolation valve position, does not affect plant safety. The Technical Specification requirements in LCOs 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.4.1 will continue to [prohibit two-loop operation and] ensure safe plant operation by properly controlling the operation and position of the reactor coolant loops and Reactor Coolant System isolation valves.

[The administrative change to delete line item 7.d, pertaining to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Auto-start on Emergency Bus Undervoltage, from BVPS-1 TS Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, and 4.3-2 will not affect plant safety because this function is not directly initiated by bus undervoltage. Rather, the automatic start of the motor-driven AFW pumps is accomplished by the combination of 1) Emergency Bus feed breaker opening 2) valid start signal from ESFAS, and 3)

Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) sequencer actuation. Requirements for these items are included in the ESFAS related TS, Table 3.3-3 and 3.3-4 items 7.a, 7.c, 7.e, and EDG related TS 4.8.1.1.2.b.3 (b). Therefore, since there is no change made to the plant hardware or its operation and requirements related to the AFW pump auto-start function are maintained elsewhere in the BVPS-1 TS, deleting line item 7.d from BVPS-1 TS Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, and 4.3-2 will not change the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.]

Therefore, this change does not involve any significant increase in the probability of occurrence of any accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed amendment includes changes to the format and magnitudes of nominal trip setpoints and allowable values that preserve all safety analysis assumptions related to accident mitigation. The protection system will continue to initiate the protective actions as assumed in the safety analysis. The proposed changes to LSSS 2.2.1 and LCO 3.3.2.1 will continue to ensure that the trip setpoints are maintained consistent with the setpoint methodology and the plant safety analysis. This proposed amendment does not involve additional hardware changes. Plant operation will not be changed.

Other proposed changes are made so that the Technical Specifications more accurately reflect the plant-specific trip system hardware in BVPS Unit No. 1.

Furthermore, the proposed changes do not alter the functioning of the RTS and ESFAS. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The proposed RTS and ESFAS trip setpoints are calculated with an approved methodology. The proposed changes to LSSS 2.2.1 and LCO 3.3.2.1 will continue to ensure that the trip setpoints are maintained consistent with the setpoint methodology and the plant safety analysis. Therefore, the response of the RTS and ESFAS to accident transients reported in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report is unaffected by this change. No additional hardware changes are involved. Therefore, accident analysis acceptance criteria are not affected. Other proposed changes are made so that the protection system Technical Specifications more accurately reflect the plant-specific trip system hardware in BVPS Unit No. 1.

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Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, PA 15001

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: S. Singh Bajwa

Original signed by:
D. Collins, PM

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