

Mr. C. Lance Terry
Senior Vice President &
Principal Nuclear Officer
TXU Electric Company
Attn: Regulatory Affairs Department
P. O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043

November 27, 2000

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES), UNITS 1 AND 2 -
CORRECTION OF SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) FOR AMENDMENT NO. 79 TO
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE (FOL) NOS. NFP-87 AND NFP-89
(TAC NOS. MA5566, MA5567, MA9071 AND MA9072)

Dear Mr. Terry:

On September 5, 2000, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment No. 79 to FOL Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89 for CPSES, Units 1 and 2, respectively. This letter is to clarify the wording on page 3 of the SE that was enclosed with those Amendments. The wording relates to the designation of individuals to be readily available to promptly isolate open flow paths in the event of a Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment.

The last paragraph in Section 3.0, "Evaluation," of the SE incorrectly states that compensatory measures for prompt closing of containment flow paths will involve "dedicated individuals." To be compatible with CPSES's amendment request and the rest of wording in the SE, the wording in the last paragraph of Section 3.0 should refer to use of "designated" individuals rather than the use of "dedicated" individuals. In this regard, as indicated in your May 25, 2000, submittal, the "designated" individual would be "...a designated operator having continuous communication with the Control Room who can isolate the open valve in the event of an accident." A replacement page has been enclosed with the correction identified by a marginal line, to be inserted in your copy of the CPSES SE.

In an unrelated matter, CPSES Amendment No. 67 to FOL Nos. NFP-87 and NPF-89, issued on August 30, 1999, contained a Technical Specification (TS) page that was inadvertently misnumbered; TS page 3.3-21 should have been numbered page 3.3-20. Accordingly, we have enclosed corrected pages 3.3-20 and 3.3-21 to be inserted in your copy of the CPSES TSs.

We regret any inconvenience that these matters may have caused.

Sincerely, /RA/
David H. Jaffe, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate IV & Decommissioning
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

DISTRIBUTION

Enclosures: As stated

cc w/encls: See next page

PUBLIC
PDIV-1 Reading
RidsNrrDlpmLpdiv (SRichards)
RidsNrrDlpmLpdiv1 (RGramm)
RidsNrrPMDJaffe
RidsNrrPMRMoody
RidsNrrPMJDonohew
RidsNrrLADJohnson
RidsOgcRp
RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter
RidsNrrDripRtsb (WBeckner)
GHill(4)
NLe
RidsRgn4MailCenter (KBrockman)

ACCESSION NUMBER: ML

OFFICE	PDIV-1/PM	PDIV-1/PM	PDIV-1/LA	TSB/BC	OGC	PDIV-1/SC
NAME	RMoody	DJaffe	DJohnson	WBeckner		RGramm
DATE	11/21/00	11/21/00	11/20/00	11/21/00		11/21/00

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\PDIV-1\ComanchePeak\lrrma9071.wpd

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station

cc:

Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P. O. Box 2159
Glen Rose, TX 76403-2159

Regional Administrator, Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President
Citizens Association for Sound Energy
1426 South Polk
Dallas, TX 75224

Mr. Roger D. Walker
Regulatory Affairs Manager
TXU Electric
P. O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043

George L. Edgar, Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5869

Honorable Dale McPherson
County Judge
P. O. Box 851
Glen Rose, TX 76043

Office of the Governor
ATTN: John Howard, Director
Environmental and Natural
Resources Policy
P. O. Box 12428
Austin, TX 78711

Arthur C. Tate, Director
Division of Compliance & Inspection
Bureau of Radiation Control
Texas Department of Health
1100 West 49th Street
Austin, TX 78756-3189

Jim Calloway
Public Utility Commission of Texas
Electric Industry Analysis
P. O. Box 13326
Austin, TX 78711-3326

In its submittal, the licensee inserted a Note (denoted by a NOTE after TS 3.9.4.c.2) that allows penetration flow paths that travel outside the containment, to be temporarily open (or unisolated) provided specific administrative controls are utilized. The Note reads as follows:

Penetration flow path(s) providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere may be unisolated under administrative controls.

This Note is consistent with Insert 1 of the staff-approved TSTF-312, Revision 1.

The licensee's May 25, 2000, application contains commitments concerning the development of appropriate station procedures for the administrative control of unisolated penetration flow path(s). The details of the administrative controls that are to be added to the TS Bases discussion for this TS change, and the station procedures, include awareness of appropriate personnel of the open status of the flow paths during core alterations, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the containment, and the designation of individuals to be readily available to promptly isolate the open flow path in the event of a FHAIC. This information is consistent with the Insert 2 of the staff-approved TSTF-312, Revision 1.

The NRC staff finds the TS change and the availability of compensatory measures for a prompt closure of the containment penetration flow paths using designated individuals to be consistent with General Design Criteria 61 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, for assuring adequate safety and minimizing the potential spread of radioactive isotopes from the containment to the outside environment during an event, and therefore, the change is acceptable and is in conformance with TSTF-312, Revision 1 to the Standard TS.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (65 FR 43053 dated July 12, 2000). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 6)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation

Note 1: Overtemperature N-16

The Overtemperature N-16 Function Allowable Value shall not exceed the following setpoint by more than 1.72% of span for Unit 1, or 2.82% of span for Unit 2.

$$Q_{\text{setpoint}} = K_1 - K_2 \left[\frac{(1 + \tau_1 s)}{(1 + \tau_2 s)} T_C - T_C^\circ \right] + K_3 (P - P^1) - f_1(\Delta q)$$

Where:

Q_{setpoint} = Overtemperature N-16 trip setpoint,

K_1 = *

K_2 = */°F

K_3 = */psig

T_C = Cold leg temperature

T_C° = Reference T_C at RATED THERMAL POWER, °F

P = Measured pressurizer pressure, psig

P^1 ≥ * psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure)

s = the Laplace transform operator, sec⁻¹.

τ_1, τ_2 = Time constants utilized in lead-lag controller for T_C ,
 $\tau_1 \geq$ * sec, and $\tau_2 \leq$ * sec

$f_1(\Delta q) =$

*·{(q _t - q _b) + *%}	when (q _t - q _b) ≤ *% RTP
0%	when *% RTP < (q _t - q _b) < *% RTP
*·{(q _t - q _b) - *%}	when (q _t - q _b) ≥ *% RTP

Note 2: Not Used.

* as specified in the COLR

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation

LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more Functions with one or more required channels or trains inoperable.	A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.2-1 for the channel(s) or train(s).	Immediately
B. One channel or train inoperable.	B.1 Restore channel or train to OPERABLE status.	48 hours
	<u>OR</u>	
	B.2.1 Be in MODE 3.	54 hours
	<u>AND</u>	
	B.2.2 Be in MODE 5.	84 hours

(continued)