UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 28, 1995

Mr. J. E. Cross
Senior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Nuclear Power Division
Duquesne Light Company
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, PA 15077

SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
(TAC NOS. M82880 AND M82881)

Dear Mr. Cross:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.185 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 and Amendment No.66 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. These amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated April 23, 1990, as supplemented January 21, 1992, and March 17, 1995.

These amendments revise the Appendix A TSs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 by (a) deleting TS Table 3.6-1, "Containment Penetrations," (b) rewording TS Definition 1.8, "Containment Integrity," and TSs 3.6.1.1, 3.6.1.2, 3.6.3.1, and 3.9.4 relating to containment integrity, containment leakage, containment isolation valves, and containment building penetrations respectively to account for the deletion of TS Table 3.6-1, and (c) correcting terminology by replacing the word "door" with "hatch" in TS 3.9.4.a.

The Unit 1 amendment also modifies TS Table 3.3-5, "Engineered Safety Features Response Times," by changing the feedwater isolation response time to reflect total isolation times for the main feedwater regulating valve and bypass feedwater regulating valve. Minor editorial changes were also incorporated in TS Table 3.3-5.

050012

D01

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
/S/
Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-334/412

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 185 to License No. DPR-66
2. Amendment No. 66 to License No. NPF-73
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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DATE	3/22/95	3/22/95	3/28/95	3/22/95	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
DOCUMENT NAME: BV82880.AMD

A copy of our Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Donald S. Brinkman

Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-334/412

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 185 to License No. DPR-66
2. Amendment No. 66 to License No. NPF-73
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

cc:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-334

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 185
License No. DPR-66

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee) dated April 23, 1990, as supplemented January 21, 1992, and March 17, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 185 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 28, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 185

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Replace the following pages of Appendix A Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
1-2	1-2
3/4 3-25	3/4 3-25
3/4 3-26	3/4 3-26
3/4 3-27	3/4 3-27
3/4 3-28	3/4 3-28
3/4 6-1	3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2	3/4 6-2
3/4 6-17	3/4 6-17
3/4 6-18	3/4 6-18
3/4 6-19a	----
3/4 6-19b	----
3/4 6-19c	----
3/4 6-19d	----
3/4 6-19e	----
3/4 6-19f	----
3/4 6-19g	----
3/4 6-19h	----
3/4 6-19i	----
3/4 6-19j	----
3/4 6-19k	----
3/4 6-22	3/4 6-22
3/4 6-25	----
3/4 9-4	3/4 9-4
B3/4 6-3	B3/4 6-3

REPORTABLE EVENT

1.7 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

1.8.1 All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

a. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

b. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1.

1.8.2 All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

1.8.3 Each air lock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3, and

1.8.4 The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

TABLE 3.3-5

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION		RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
1. Manual		
a.	Safety Injection (ECCS)	Not Applicable
	Feedwater Isolation	Not Applicable
	Reactor Trip (SI)	Not Applicable
	Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	Not Applicable
	Containment Vent and Purge Isolation	Not Applicable
	Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	Not Applicable
	Rx Plant River Water System	Not Applicable
b.	Containment Quench Spray Pumps	Not Applicable
	Containment Quench Spray Valves	Not Applicable
	Containment Isolation-Phase "B"	Not Applicable
c.	Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	Not Applicable
d.	Control Room Ventilation Isolation	Not Applicable
2. Containment Pressure-High		
a.	Safety Injection (ECCS)	≤ 27.0*
b.	Reactor Trip (from SI)	≤ 3.0
c.	Feedwater Isolation	
	1) Feedwater Regulating Valves	≤ 10.0(1)
	2) Feedwater Bypass Valves	≤ 30.0(1)
d.	Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	≤ 22.0(3)/33.0(2)
e.	Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	Not Applicable
f.	Rx Plant River Water System	≤ 77.0(3)/110.0(2)

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION	RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
3. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	≤ 27.0*/27.0#
b. Reactor Trip (from SI)	≤ 3.0
c. Feedwater Isolation	
1) Feedwater Regulating Valves	≤ 10.0(1)
2) Feedwater Bypass Valves	≤ 30.0(1)
d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	≤ 22.0(3)
e. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	Not Applicable
f. Rx Plant River Water System	≤ 77.0(3)/110.0(2)

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION	RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
4. Steam Line Pressure-Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	≤ 27.0#/37.0##
b. Reactor Trip (from SI)	≤ 3.0
c. Feedwater Isolation	
1) Feedwater Regulating Valves	≤ 10.0(1)
2) Feedwater Bypass Valves	≤ 30.0(1)
d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"	≤ 22.0(3)/33.0(2)
e. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	Not Applicable
f. Rx Plant River Water System	≤ 77.0(3)/110.0(2)
g. Steam Line Isolation	≤ 8.0
5. Containment Pressure--High-High	
a. Containment Quench Spray	≤ 85.0(2)
b. Containment Isolation-Phase "B"	Not Applicable
c. Control Room Ventilation Isolation	≤ 22.0(3)/77.0(2)
6. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High	
a. Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip (Above P-9)	≤ 2.5
b. Feedwater Isolation	
1) Feedwater Regulating Valves	≤ 10.0(1)
2) Feedwater Bypass Valves	≤ 30.0(1)
7. Containment Pressure--Intermediate High-High	
a. Steam Line Isolation	≤ 8.0
8. Steamline Pressure Rate--High Negative	
a. Steamline Isolation	≤ 8.0
9. Loss of Power	
a. 4.16kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)	≤ 1.3
b. 4.16kv and 480v Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded voltage)	≤ 95

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

* Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps and Low Head Safety Injection pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is not included.

\# Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite power available. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.

\## Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.

(1) Feedwater isolation includes signal response and valve closure time.

(2) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

(3) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included.

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that:

1. All penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1.

2. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3.

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* Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:

1. $< L_a$, 0.10 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a, (40.0 psig), or

b. A combined leakage rate of $\leq 0.60\ L_a$ for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests when pressurized to P_a.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding $0.75\ L_a$, or (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding $0.60\ L_a$, restore the leakage rate(s) to within the limit(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in accordance with Appendix J of 10 CFR 50*:

a. A Type-A test (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 ± 10-month intervals during shutdown at P_a (40.0 psig).

* Exemption to Appendix J of 10 CFR 50, Section III.D.1(a), granted on December 5, 1984.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE* status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate the affected penetration within 6 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE*:

a. At least once per 92 days by:

1. Cycling each OPERABLE power operated or automatic valve testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

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* Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens, when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is > 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid.

b. Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above, and verification of isolation time.

4.6.3.1.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE* during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal, each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test signal, each Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation signal, each Purge and Exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

d. Cycling each power operated or automatic valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time.

e. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve not testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is ≥ 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid.

f. Cycling each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

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* Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4. Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a continuity and resistance to ground test immediately following the above required functional test. The resistance to ground for any heater phase shall be $\geq$ 10,000 ohms.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,

b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, manual valve, or approved functional equivalent, or

2. Exhausting at less than or equal to 7500 cfm through OPERABLE Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Valves to OPERABLE HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS).

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.4.1 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be in its above required condition within 150 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment.

4.9.4.2 The containment purge and exhaust system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying the flow rate through the SLCRS at least once per 24 hours when the system is in operation.

b. Testing the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.1.2, and

c. Testing the SLCRS per Specification 4.7.8.1.

3/4.6.2.3 CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the chemical addition system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the iodine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis for a LOCA.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water 3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA."

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-412

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No.66
License No. NPF-73

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee) dated April 23, 1990, as supplemented January 21, 1992, and March 17, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 66 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. DLCO shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate I-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 28, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 66

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73

DOCKET NO. 50-412

Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove	Insert
1-2	1-2
3/4 3-32	3/4 3-32
3/4 6-1	3/4 6-1
3/4 6-2	3/4 6-2
3/4 6-15	3/4 6-15
3/4 6-16	3/4 6-16
3/4 6-17	----
3/4 6-18	----
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3/4 6-30	----
3/4 6-34	----
3/4 9-4	3/4 9-4
B 3/4 6-3	B 3/4 6-3

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (Continued)

b. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1.

1.8.2 All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

1.8.3 Each air lock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3, and

1.8.4 The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.

1.8.5 The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST

1.11 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

CORE ALTERATION

1.12 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN

1.13 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all full length rod cluster assemblies (shutdown and control) are fully inserted except for the single rod cluster assembly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

* Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps and Low Head Safety Injection pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is not included.

\# Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite power available. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.

\## Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps. Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.

(1) Feedwater system overall response time shall include verification of valve stroke times applicable to the feedwater containment isolation valves for Train A and the main feedwater regulating valves and bypass valves for Train B.

(2) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes attainment of discharge pressure for service water pumps.

(3) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Response time limit only includes opening of valves to establish the flowpath to the diesel coolers.

(4) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite power available. Response time limit includes operation of valves/dampers.

(5) Diesel generator starting, and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit includes operation of valves/dampers.

(6) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Response time limit includes operation of dampers.

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that:

1. All penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1.

2. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3.

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* Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of $\leq L_a$, 0.10 percent by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a, (44.7 psig).

b. A combined leakage rate of $< 0.60\ L_a$ for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests when pressurized to P_a (44.7 psig).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding $0.75\ L_a$, or (b) with the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding $0.60\ L_a$, restore the leakage rate(s) to within the limit(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in accordance with Appendix J of 10 CFR 50:

a. A Type-A test (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 $\pm$ 10-month intervals during shutdown at P_a (44.7 psig).

b. If any Periodic Type A test fails to meet $0.75\ L_a$, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet $0.75\ L_a$, a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet $0.75\ L_a$ at which time the above test schedule may be resumed.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE*.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate the affected penetration within 6 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE*:

a. At least once per 92 days by:

1. Cycling each OPERABLE power operated or automatic valve testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

2. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is ≥ 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid.

b. Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above, and verification of isolation time.

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* Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.1.2 Each containment isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE* during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test signal, each Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

c. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation signal, each Purge and Exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

d. Cycling each power operated or automatic valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

e. Cycling each weight or spring loaded check valve not testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and verifying that each check valve remains closed when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is < 1.2 psid and opens when the differential pressure in the direction of flow is ≥ 1.2 psid but less than 6.0 psid.

f. Cycling each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

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* Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,

b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, manual valve, or approved functional equivalent, or

2. Exhausting at less than or equal to 7500 cfm through OPERABLE Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Valves to OPERABLE HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS).

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.4.1 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be in its above required condition within 150 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment.

4.9.4.2 The containment purge and exhaust system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying the flow rate through the SLCRS at least once per 24 hours when the system is in operation.

b. Testing the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.1.2, and

c. Testing the SLCRS per Specification 4.7.8.1 with the exception of item 4.7.8.1.c.2.

3/4.6.2.3 CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the chemical addition system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the iodine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for both a LOCA and major secondary system breaks.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and 3) corrosion of metals within containment. These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA."

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 185 AND 66 TO FACILITY OPERATING

LICENSE NOS. DPR-66 AND NPF-33

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-334 AND 50-412

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 23, 1990, as supplemented January 21, 1992, and March 17, 1995, the Duquesne Light Company (DLC or the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (BV-1 and BV-2) Technical Specifications (TSs). These requested changes would modify BV-1 TS Table 3.3-5 concerning feedwater isolation time and correct administrative errors, revise BV-1 TS Table 3.6-1 for applicable valve stroke times to less than 60 seconds, add radiation monitor containment isolation valves, add note (1) to instrument air containment isolation valves, and revise note (6) for both units. The licensee also proposed to delete TS Table 3.6-1 for both units in accordance with Generic Letter 91-08 and revise TSs 1.8, 3.6.1.1, 3.6.1.2, 3.6.3.1, 3.9.4 and Bases 3/4.6.3. Also, TS 3.9.4.a, for both units would be revised to replace the word "door" with "hatch". TS 3.6.5.1 and associated Bases for the steam jet air ejector isolation valves for both units would be deleted because the requirements would no longer be needed as these manual valves would be locked shut in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. The proposed changes are described in the January 21, 1992, submittal, except TS 3.6.5.1 which was described in the April 23, 1990, submittal. The March 17, 1995, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published on June 27, 1990 (55 FR 26283) and as supplemented on April 1, 1992 (57 FR 11107).

2.0 EVALUATION

1. Revise BV-1 TS Table 3.3-5 concerning feedwater isolation response time and correction of editorial errors.

The licensee has proposed to change the feedwater isolation response time to less than or equal to 10 seconds for feedwater regulating valves and to less than or equal to 30 seconds for the feedwater bypass valves. Feedwater isolation time includes signal response and valve closure time.

The licensee indicated that the BV-1 main steamline break event has been re-analyzed to resolve inconsistencies identified during preparation of a design basis document and to address plant changes made since the analysis was last performed. The plant changes were qualitatively justified at the time of installation based on available margin and sensitivities. To ensure the containment pressure and temperature design criteria are satisfied, the main feedwater regulating valves were assumed to be closed within 10 seconds and the feedwater regulating bypass valves were assumed to be closed within 30 seconds. These isolation times are total actuation times consisting of signal response time and valve stroke time. TS Table 3.3-5 has been revised to specify these limiting feedwater isolation times with note (1) defining these times as total actuation time.

The NRC staff finds the proposed change to TS Table 3.3-5 acceptable as the feedwater isolation response times are based on the limiting accident analysis requirements for the main steamline break event which assumes the minimum time for isolation of the feedwater to ensure the containment design criteria are satisfied.

The licensee has also proposed editorial changes to BV-1 TS Table 3.3-5 on TS pages 3/4 3-36 and 3-27 correcting the item number and changing the word "containment" to "pressurizer." The NRC staff finds the proposed editorial changes administrative in nature and, therefore, acceptable.

2. Revise BV-1 TS Table 3.6-1 applicable valve stroke times to less than 60 seconds, add radiation monitor containment isolation valves, add note (1) to instrument air containment isolation valves, and revise note (6) to include reference to TS 3/4.6.1 for both units. The licensee states that these changes to TS Tables 3.6-1 are provided for documentation purposes only since the tables are being deleted. The NRC staff finds the proposed changes to be acceptable as indicated below.

Change Valve Stroke Times - The licensee indicated that a review of the BV-1 accident analysis calculations and NSSS correspondence was conducted to determine those containment isolation valves where specific containment isolation valve stroke times are required. The valves applicable to penetrations 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 78-SGD were identified, therefore, these valve stroke times have not been changed. Also valves applicable to penetrations 15-A, 53-C, 90-SGD, 91-SGD, 113-1-A, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, and 71-SGD are not changed because BV-2

isolation valves are required to have similar stroke times or these valves stroke open on a CIB signal and Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.2.4 refers to valve closure times to satisfy containment isolation requirements. The licensee has proposed to change the remaining valve stroke times to less than 60 seconds to be consistent with the BV-2 TSs and the guidance provided in SRP 6.2.4 which states that "in general, valve closure times should be less than one minute." The current stroke times for these valves are based on the vendor expected stroke time within which the valve is expected to operate. Based on the above, the NRC staff finds the proposed change in valve stroke time to be acceptable.

Add Radiation Monitor Containment Isolation Valves - The licensee has proposed to add four manual valves RW-615, 621, 627, and 633 to BV-1 penetrations 83, 85, 84, and 86-SGD in accordance with the exemption from General Design Criterion 57 issued by the NRC dated June 26, 1991. These valves isolate the river water radiation monitor sample lines and are located outside containment, upstream of the river water containment isolation valves. Since TS Table 3.6-1 is being deleted, these valves will be included in the plant procedure which lists all containment isolation valves. The NRC staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

Add Note (1) to Instrument Air Containment Isolation Valves - The licensee has proposed to add Note (1) [May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control] to TS Table 3.6-1 isolation valves for BV-1 penetrations 42-C and 47-B and BV-2 penetration 42 to provide the plants with the option to open these valves under administrative control to supply air to systems inside containment. This will allow the operators to cross-connect the air supply header to the containment air system. This is consistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.8.1 which states that the station air system can supply air to components within containment for service air requirements and as a backup to the containment air system. This will allow use of air powered tools inside containment during plant maintenance activities. The NRC staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

Revise Note (6) to include Reference to TS 3/4.6.1 - The licensee has proposed to revise note (6) in TS Table 3.6-1 for both units to include reference to TS 3/4.6.1, in addition to TS 3/4.6.3 now referenced, since the valves with the note are only listed to document that they are not containment isolation valves. Note (6) currently exempts these valves from the requirements of TS 3/4.6.3 which specifically addresses containment isolation valves. TS 3/4.6.1 also addresses containment isolation valves, therefore, exemption from this specification is consistent with the exemption from TS 3/4.6.3. Furthermore, since TS Table 3.6-1 is being deleted, these valves will be included in the plant procedure which lists all containment isolation valves. Based on the above, the NRC staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

3. Delete BV-1 and BV-2 TS Table 3.6-1 including related modification of the following:

   a. TS Definition 1.8, Containment Integrity
   b. TS 3.6.1.1, Containment Integrity
   c. TS 3.6.1.2, Containment Leakage
   d. TS 3.6.3.1, Containment Isolation Valves
   e. TS 3.9.4, Containment Building Penetrations
   f. TS Bases 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves

   The licensee has proposed to delete TS Table 3.6-1 from the TSs in accordance with the recommendations provided in Generic Letter 91-08. The generic letter provides a modification to the requirements of TS 3.6.3.1 to address operable containment isolation valves. This modification is addressed in the limiting condition for operation, action statement, and surveillance requirements. In addition, a footnote has been added to the word operable to address note (1) in TS Table 3.6-1, "Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control." The concept of this note has been incorporated into TS Definition 1.8, Containment Integrity, and TS 4.6.1.1.a to provide the operators with the capability to open those valves required for necessary plant operations and is consistent with the current use of note (1) in TS Table 3.6-1. TSs 3.6.1.2.b and 3.9.4.c.2 have been modified by removing reference to TS Table 3.6-1. TS Bases 3/4.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, has been revised by including the considerations that constitute an acceptable administrative control for opening locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves as per Generic Letter 91-08.

   The other informational notes listed in TS Tables 3.6-1 may be deleted, or included in the plant procedure which will list the containment isolation valves, since these notes do not alter any TS applicability requirements. The inservice testing (IST) requirements referenced by TS 4.0.5 include verification of valve stroke times; therefore, removal of valve closure time included in TS Table 3.6-1 will not alter the TS requirements to verify that valve stroke times are within their limits.

   Removal of TS Table 3.6-1 and related changes do not change the TS applicability or requirements, only the formal location of the valve list is changed from the TSs to a plant operating procedure that is controlled in accordance with the requirements of TS 6.8, Procedures. The NRC staff finds the deletion of TS Table 3.6-1 and related changes are consistent with the guidance in Generic Letter 91-08 and are, therefore, acceptable.

4. Revise TS 3.9.4.a, for both units to replace the word "door" with "hatch".

   The NRC staff finds the proposed change administrative in nature and therefore, acceptable.

5. Delete TS 3.6.5.1 and associated Bases for steam jet air ejector.

   TS 3.6.5.1 requires that the inside and outside manual isolation valves in the steam jet air ejector suction line shall be closed in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. This requirement is no longer needed as these valves shall be locked shut in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 according to plant operating procedures related to these isolation valves. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that TS 3.6.5.1 and associated Bases are no longer required and can be deleted.

Based on the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's proposed changes to BV-1 TS Table 3.3-5, and TSs 1.8, 3.6.1, 3.6.3, 3.6.5 and 3.9.4 and associated Bases and deletion of TS Table 3.6-1 as per Generic Letter 91-08 for both units are acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Pennsylvania State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (55 FR 26283 and 57 FR 11107). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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