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Docket No. 50-334

FEBRUARY 29 1980

Mr. C. N. Dunn, Vice President
Operations Division
Duquesne Light Company
435 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Dear Mr. Dunn:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 26 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 for the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letters dated September 28, 1979 and December 5, 1979.

The amendment 1) adds a license condition requiring a secondary water chemistry monitoring program, 2) deletes Technical Specifications on secondary water chemistry monitoring now covered by a license condition, and 3) changes Technical Specifications to prohibit containment purge by the steam jet air ejector system during Hot Shutdown.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By

AS 2/29/80

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 26 to DPR-66
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

CP
3

GD
Concur as to
form of amendment
+ FR 2/29/80
only

12188/10473

OFFICE	ORB#1: DOR	ORB#1: DOR	C-ORB#1: DOR	A-AD-ORP: DOR	STSD: DOR	OELD
DWigginton/cb	CParrish	ASchwencer	WGammill	J. WEIMORE		
2/25/80	2/ /80	2/25/80	2/25/80	2/25/80	2/25/80	2/25/80



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

February 29, 1980

Docket No. 50-334

Mr. C. N. Dunn, Vice President
Operations Division
Duquesne Light Company
435 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

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Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. Schwencer", is written over the typed name.

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 26 to DPR-66
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

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Mr. C. N. Dunn
Duquesne Light Company

- 2 -

February 29, 1980

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Mr. C. N. Dunn
Duquesne Light Company

- 3 -

February 29, 1980

cc: Mr. Joseph H. Mills, Acting Commissioner
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-334

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 26
License No. DPR-66

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The applications for amendment by Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Pennsylvania Power Company (the licensees) dated September 28, 1979 and December 5, 1979, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the applications, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 26, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. In addition, the licensee is hereby amended to include the following paragraph:

2.C.(9) The licensee shall implement a secondary water chemistry monitoring program to inhibit steam generator tube degradation. This program shall be described in the station chemistry manual and shall include:

1. Identification of sampling schedule for the critical parameters and control points for these parameters;
2. Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical parameters;
3. Identification for process sampling points;
4. Procedure for the recording and management of data;
5. Procedures defining corrective actions for off control point chemistry conditions; and
6. A procedure identifying (a) the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data, and (b) the sequence and timing of administrative events required to initiate corrective action.

4. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance; February 29, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 26

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed page. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

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3/4 7-10b
B 3/4 7-3
B 3/4 7-4

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TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

			TESTABLE DURING PLANT OPERATION	ISOLATION TIME (Sec)		
VALVE NUMBER INSIDE/OUTSIDE				INSIDE	OUTSIDE	
FUNCTION						
C. <u>Containment Purge and Exhaust</u>						
1.	VS-D-5-3B	VS-D-5-3A	Containment Purge Exhaust	No	8	8
2.	VS-D-5-5B	VS-D-5-5A	Containment Purge Supply	No	11	8
3.		VS-D-5-6	Containment Purge Vacuum Breaker	No	N/A	N/A
D. <u>Manual</u>						
1.	ICH-181	MOV-CH308A	Seal Injection Water to RC Pump	No	N/A	N/A
2.	ICH-182	MOV-CH308B	Seal Injection Water to RC Pump	No	N/A	N/A
3.	ICH-183	MOV-CH308C	Seal Injection Water to RC Pump	No	N/A	N/A
*4.	MOV-CH142		Reactor Coolant System Letdown	Yes	N/A	N/A
*5.	MOV-CC112B3	1CCR-252	CCW from RHR Hx & RHR Pump Seal Coolers	Yes	N/A	N/A
*6.	MOV-CC112A3	1CCR-251	CCW from RHR Hx & RHR Pump Seal Coolers	Yes	N/A	N/A
*7.	MOV-CC112A2	1CCR-247	CCW to RHR Hx & RHR Pump Seal Coolers	Yes	N/A	N/A
*8.	MOV-CC112B2	1CCR-248	CCW to RHR Hx & RHP Pump Seal Coolers	Yes	N/A	N/A
#9.		MOV-FW-151A	Auxiliary Feedwater	Yes	N/A	N/A
#10.		MOV-FW-151B	Auxiliary Feedwater	Yes	N/A	N/A
#11.		MOV-FW-151C	Auxiliary Feedwater	Yes	N/A	N/A
#12.		MOV-FW-151D	Auxiliary Feedwater	Yes	N/A	N/A
#13.		MOV-FW-151E	Auxiliary Feedwater	Yes	N/A	N/A
#14.		MOV-FW-151F	Auxiliary Feedwater	Yes	N/A	N/A
#15.		MOV-RW104A	Riverwater to Recirc. Spray Hx	Yes	N/A	N/A
#16.		MOV-RW104C	Riverwater to Recirc. Spray Hx	Yes	N/A	N/A
#17.		MOV-RW104B	Riverwater to Recirc. Spray HX	Yes	N/A	N/A
#18.		MOV-RW104D	Riverwater to Recirc. Spray Hx	Yes	N/A	N/A

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

VALVE NUMBER INSIDE/OUTSIDE		FUNCTION	TESTABLE DURING PLANT OPERATION	ISOLATION TIME (Sec) INSIDE/OUTSIDE	
#19.	MOV-RW105A	Riverwater from Recirc. Spray Hx	Yes	N/A	N/A
#20.	MOV-RW105C	Riverwater from Recirc. Spray Hx	Yes	N/A	N/A
#21.	MOV-RW105B	Riverwater from Recirc. Spray Hx	Yes	N/A	N/A
#22.	MOV-RW105D	Riverwater from Recirc. Spray Hx	Yes	N/A	N/A
23.	1SI-83	High Head SI to Hot Leg	No	N/A	N/A
24.	1SI-84	High Head SI to Hot Leg	No	N/A	N/A
25.	MOV-SI890A	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
26.	MOV-SI890C	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
27.	MOV-SI890B	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
28.	1SI-95	High Head SI to Cold Legs	No	N/A	N/A
29.	MOV-SI860A	Low Head SI Pump Suction from Cont. Sump	Yes	N/A	N/A
30.	MOV-SI860B	Low Head SI Pump Suction from Cont. Sump	Yes	N/A	N/A
*31.	1CH-170	RCS Fill	No	N/A	N/A
*32.	1SI-41	SI Accumulator Makeup	Yes	N/A	N/A
33.	1RH-14	RHR to RWST	Yes	N/A	N/A
34.	HCV-CV-151	Containment Vacuum Fiector Suction	Yes	N/A	N/A
35.	1PC-9	Reactor Cavity Purification - Inlet	Yes	N/A	N/A
36.	1PC-37	Reactor Cavity Purification - Outlet	Yes	N/A	N/A
37.	1SA-14	Compressed Air to Fuel Handling Equipment	Yes	N/A	N/A
38.	1IA-90	Instrument Air	No	N/A	N/A
*39.	1-RC277	Press Dead Weight Calibrator	Yes	N/A	N/A
	1-RC278FM(2)1				
40.	1HY-111	H ₂ Recombiner Discharge to Containment	Yes	N/A	N/A
41.	1HY-110	H ₂ Recombiner Discharge to Containment	Yes	N/A	N/A
42.		Deleted			
#43.	MOV-MS-105	Steam to Aux. Feed Pump	Yes	N/A	N/A
44.		Deleted			
45.		Deleted			
46.	1CV-36	Containment Leakage Monitoring - Sealed System	Yes	N/A	N/A
47.	1HY-102	Cont. Vacuum Pump & H Recomb. Suct.	Yes	N/A	N/A
	1HY-104				
48.	1HY-101	Cont. Vacuum Pump & H Recomb. Suct.	Yes	N/A	N/A
	1HY-103				

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

	VALVE NUMBER INSIDE/OUTSIDE	FUNCTION	TESTABLE DURING PLANT OPERATION	ISOLATION TIME (Sec) INSIDE/OUTSIDE	
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-19e	49. 1CV-35	Containment Leak. Monit. - Sealed Sys.	Yes	N/A	N/A
	50. 1AS-278	Main Condenser Ejector Vent	No	N/A	N/A
	51. 1QS-4	Quench Spray Pump - Discharge	No	N/A	N/A
	52. 1QS-3	Quench Spray Pump - Discharge	No	N/A	N/A
	53. 1RS-101	Outside Recirc. Spray - Discharge	No	N/A	N/A
	54. 1RS-100	Outside Recirc. Spray - Discharge	No	N/A	N/A
	55. 1CH-31	Reactor Coolant System Charging	No	N/A	N/A
	56. 1SI-10	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
	57. 1SI-11	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
	58. 1SI-12	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
	59. 1SI-13	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
	60. 1SI-14	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
	61. 1SI-452	Low Head SI	No	N/A	N/A
	62. 1HY-119	H ₂ Recombiner Discharge To Containment	No	N/A	N/A
	63. 1HY-120	H ₂ Recombiner Discharge To Containment	No	N/A	N/A
	64. 1SI-42	SI Accumulator Makeup	No	N/A	N/A
	65. 1SA-15	Compressed Air to Fuel Handling Equipment	No	N/A	N/A
	66. 1IA-91	Instrument Air	No	N/A	N/A
	67. 1RC-68	Nitrogen to Pressurizer Relief Tank	No	N/A	N/A
	68. 1CH-369	Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Water Return	No	N/A	N/A
	69. 1RC-72	Primary Grade Water to Pressurizer Relief Tank	No	N/A	N/A
	70. 1SI-94	Boron Injection (High Head SI to Cold Leg)	No	N/A	N/A
		Boron Injection (High Head SI to Cold Leg)	Yes	N/A	N/A
	*71. 1SI-91	Low Head Safety Injection System From Containment Sump	No	N/A	N/A
	72. 1SI-447	Low Head Safety Injection System From Containment Sump	No	N/A	N/A
	73. 1SI-448	Low Head Safety Injection System From Containment Sump	No	N/A	N/A
	74. 1RH-16	Return to Pool Purification Pumps	No	N/A	N/A
	75. RV-CH-203	Letdown Relief to Pressurizer Relief Tank	No	N/A	N/A
Amendment No. 1	E. <u>Safety Injection (SIS)</u>				
	1. MOV-CH289	Reactor Coolant System Charging	Yes	N/A	15
	2. MOV-SI867C	Boron Injection - High Head SI to Cold Legs	Yes	N/A	15
	MOV-SI8670				

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

VALVE NUMBER		FUNCTION	TESTABLE DURING PLANT OPERATION	ISOLATION TIME (Sec)	
INSIDE/OUTSIDE				INSIDE	OUTSIDE
F. <u>Steam Line Isolation (SLI)</u>					
#1.	TV-MS101A	Main Steam	No	N/A	5
#2.	TV-MS101B	Main Steam	No	N/A	5
#3.	TV-MS-101C	Main Steam	No	N/A	5
#4.	TV-MS-111A	Main Steam Line Drain	Yes	N/A	10
#5.	TV-MS-111B	Main Steam Line Drain	Yes	N/A	10
#6.	TV-MS-111C	Main Steam Line Drain	Yes	N/A	10
G. <u>Feedwater Isolation</u>					
#1.	MOV-FW156A	Feedwater	No	N/A	75
#2.	MOV-FW156B	Feedwater	No	N/A	75
#3.	MOV-FW156C	Feedwater	No	N/A	75
#4.	FCV-FW478	Feedwater Flow Control	No	N/A	10
#5.	FCV-FW488	Feedwater Flow Control	No	N/A	10
#6.	FCV-FW498	Feedwater Flow Control	No	N/A	10
H. <u>Containment Air Lock (Manual)</u>					
*1.	SOV-1VS-1	Equalization Valve	Yes	N/A	
*2.	SOV-1VS-2	Equalization Valve	Yes	N/A	
*#3.	SOV-1VS-5	Equalization Valve	Yes		N/A
*#4.	SOV-1VS-6	Equalization Valve	Yes		N/A
*#5.	1VS-151	Manual Equalization Block	Yes		N/A

*May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

#Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.5 SUBATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM

STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.1 The inside and outside manual isolation valves in the steam jet air ejector suction line shall be closed.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the inside or outside manual isolation valve in the steam jet air ejector suction line not closed, restore the valve to the closed position within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.1.1 The steam jet air ejector suction line outside manual isolation valve shall be determined to be in the closed position by a visual inspection prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 350°F and at least once per 31 days thereafter.

4.6.5.1.2 The steam jet air ejector suction line inside manual isolation valve shall be determined to be sealed or locked in the closed position by a visual inspection prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 350°F.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMPS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5.2 Two mechanical vacuum pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one mechanical vacuum pump inoperable, restore the inoperable pump to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5.2 Each mechanical vacuum pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

- a. Starting (unless already operating) each pump from the control room,
- b. Verifying that each pump develops a pumping capacity of ≥ 4 SCFM and discharges to the gaseous radwaste disposal system,
- c. Verifying that each pump operates for at least 15 minutes.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY

The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

PLANT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70°F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator average impact values taken at 10°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.4 RIVER WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the river water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions.

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available to either 1) provide normal cooldown of the facility, or 2) to mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants."

3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION

The limitation on flood level ensures that facility operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 695 Mean Sea Level was selected on an arbitrary basis as an appropriate flood level at which to terminate further operation and initiate flood protection measures for safety related equipment.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 26 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Introduction

By letter dated September 28, 1979, the Duquesne Light Company, the licensee, submitted an application for license amendment which would incorporate a license condition in its Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 that would require the implementation of a secondary water chemistry monitoring program to inhibit steam generator tube degradation. On December 5, 1979, the licensee submitted another application for license amendment which would prevent the use of the steam jet air ejector for containment purging during Mode 4 (hot shutdown) operations. This safety evaluation addresses these two applications.

Addition of a license condition in place of existing Secondary Water Chemistry Specifications 3/4 7.1.6, Table 3.7-3

The NRC staff recognizes that different utilities use different secondary water treatment methods to limit steam generator tube corrosion. Moreover, we recognize that a licensee's choice of a particular water treatment method, including specific values of operating limits for chemistry parameters, is governed by plant and site characteristics that are unique to each facility. In addition, we do not believe at this time that sufficient service experience exists to conclude that any particular method is superior to another for controlling impurities that may be introduced into the secondary coolant. Such experience would be necessary before prescriptive Technical Specifications on secondary water chemistry could, with assurance, minimize tube degradation.

Restricting the amount of chemical additions to control the water chemistry parameters would not ensure the desired steam generator operating conditions. Realizing that meeting the secondary coolant water quality criteria would not be possible during all periods of operation, it is necessary that the most effective procedure for reestablishing out-of-specification chemistry parameters be available without unduly restricting plant operations. This can be accomplished most rapidly by continuing to operate the unit so that chemical additives to the secondary water can be made to achieve a balanced chemistry.

In particular, we have concluded that Technical Specification 3.7.1.6 and Table 3.7-3 for secondary water chemistry does not provide adequate flexibility to allow desired water conditions to be achieved gradually or ensure long term tube inte-

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grity. In addition, these specifications may not limit specific types of severe tube degradation, particularly "denting". Furthermore, the possible adverse effects of any secondary water parameter limits on the steam purity that could lead to potential failure of rotating turbine components must also be considered before specific limits are required.

We believe that other methods for reducing the impurity concentration in the steam generator such as periodic chemical cleaning for long term solution, fluxing or free surface boiling for an intermediate term solution, or the use of chelating agents for the control of secondary water purity are more practical. These methods are likely to be more effective in limiting corrosion than specific Technical Specifications that may lack the flexibility needed for proper control of secondary water chemistry. The NSSS vendors are now considering these alternate methods in lieu of restrictive secondary water chemistry limits for assuring steam generator tube integrity. We proposed that the licensee implement a secondary water chemistry monitoring program to inhibit steam generator tube degradation. By letter dated September 28, 1979, the licensee agreed to the program and applied for a license amendment to so condition the license.

In addition, other existing Technical Specification limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for secondary water monitoring requirements provide assurance that steam generator tube integrity will not be reduced below an acceptable level for adequate margins of safety. These specifications are:

1. Technical Specification 3.7.1.4 - Secondary Water Activity Monitoring Requirements
2. Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 - Primary to Secondary Leakage Rates
3. Technical Specification 3.4.5 - Steam Generator Tube Surveillance and Plugging Criterion

Based on the above, we conclude that a license condition requiring a secondary water chemistry monitoring program is an acceptable replacement for Paragraph 3.7.1.6 and Table 3.7-3 of the existing Technical Specifications.

Steam Jet Air Ejection - Revision to Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 and Table 3.6-1

On November 28, 1978 in a letter to the licensee, the NRC identified a number of concerns with containment purging during normal plant operation. These concerns were categorized as override of containment isolation signals to containment isolation valves and the lack of demonstrated capability of isolation valves to close against the dynamic forces of a design basis loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA). These concerns and information gained from past licensing actions had raised questions relative to potential failures affecting the purge and venting penetration valves which could lead to a degradation in containment integrity and a degradation in ECCS performance. In light of this uncertainty, the licensee was requested to commit to cease all containment purge and venting operations during operation (hot shutdown, hot standby, startup, and power operation) or to provide a justification for containment purging and venting. The licensee was further requested to review all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate a manual override

feature to assure that overriding of one safety actuation signal does not also cause the bypass of any other safety actuation signal, that sufficient physical features are provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls, and that the use of each such manual override is annunciated at the system level for each system impacted.

By letter dated February 8, 1979, the licensee addressed our concerns and noted that the Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 was required by Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 to be maintained at subatmospheric conditions within the containment whenever the average reactor coolant system temperature is at or above 200°F. This requirement prevents the purging of the containment during normal operation. In its February 8, letter, the licensee also addressed its review of the safety actuation signals which incorporate a manual override feature, conducted to assure that overriding of one safety actuation signal does not bypass or inhibit another safety actuation signal.

On October 29, 1979, the NRC issued a second letter to the licensee on containment purging and venting during normal operation. In this letter we restated our position on the concerns previously identified, provided an interim position for containment purge and vent valve operation pending resolution of vent valve operability, and requested an interim commitment from the licensee to limit purging and venting during normal operation. This was necessary since Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 on Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) allowed the manual inside and outside containment valves in this system to be open and administratively controlled during hot shutdown.

On December 5, 1979 the licensee submitted an application for license amendment in response to our October 29th letter. The licensee proposed to add MODE 4 to the action statement. This would require the manual inside and outside containment isolation valves in the SJAE system to be closed during hot shutdown, as well as during hot standby, startup, and power operation (MODES 3, 2 and 1) in the present action statement. Operation of the SJAE system during MODE 4 (hot shutdown) allows removal of large amounts of air from the containment during heatup operation. The licensee has determined that this SJAE system is not required in MODE 4 if it is used long enough in MODE 5 (cold shutdown) to achieve subatmospheric conditions that can be maintained by the normal mechanical vacuum pumps during operation. These pumps are rated at five CFM and used periodically during operation to maintain subatmospheric conditions. Furthermore, these pumps are automatically isolated from containment by two series 2" valves upon receipt of a containment isolation signal.

In our evaluation, we considered only the proposed addition of MODE 4 to the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 and the deletion of references to administrative controls in Table 3.6-1 to the SJAE system. The deletion of operation of this SJAE system during MODE 4 will remove a potential path of containment leakage in the unlikely event of a LOCA. We agree with the deletion of operation of this SJAE system in MODE 4 (hot shutdown) and we find the proposed change to the Technical Specifications acceptable.

The staff has not completed its evaluation of the manual override of safety actuation events as they apply to the Beaver Valley Unit No. 1. This issue will be further addressed in the ongoing Lessons Learned efforts and may require additional licensing actions as appropriate.

Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: February 29, 1980

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-334DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANYOHIO EDISON COMPANYPENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 26 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-66 issued to Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Pennsylvania Power Company (the licensees), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 (the facility) located in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. The amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

The amendment 1) adds a license condition requiring a secondary water chemistry monitoring program, 2) deletes Technical Specifications on secondary water chemistry monitoring now covered by a license condition, and 3) changes Technical Specifications to prohibit containment purge by the steam jet air ejector system during Hot Shutdown.

The applications for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since this amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the applications for amendments dated September 28, 1979 and December 5, 1979, (2) Amendment No. 26 to License No. DPR-66 and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. and at the B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 29th day of February, 1980.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors