



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064**

October 27, 2000

William A. Eaton, Vice President
Operations - Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 756
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

**SUBJECT: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
NO. 50-416/00-10**

Dear Mr. Eaton:

On September 30, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on September 15 and October 3, 2000, with Mr. Jerry Roberts and yourself along with other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Specifically, this report focused on reactor safety, emergency preparedness, and physical protection.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green). This issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a noncited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this noncited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Grand Gulf facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Read Rooming).

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Joseph I. Tapia, Chief
Project Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-416
License No.: NPF-29

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-416/00-10

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Only inspection reports to the following:

A. McMurtray (**ACM**)

NRR Event Tracking System (**IPAS**)

GG Site Secretary (**MJS**)

Dale Thatcher (**DFT**)

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-416
License No.: NPF-29
Report No.: 50-416/00-10
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Location: Waterloo Road
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150
Dates: August 13 through September 30, 2000
Inspectors: Jennifer Dixon-Herrity, Senior Resident Inspector
Donald Allen, Project Engineer
Peter Alter, Resident Inspector
Bill Maier, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
John Russell, Resident Inspector
Dennis Schaefer, Senior Physical Security Inspector
Approved By: Joseph I. Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A

ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information
Attachment 2: NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station NRC Inspection Report No. 50-416/00-10

IR 05000416-00-10, on 08/13-09/30/2000, Entergy Operations, Inc., Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Integrated Resident & Regional Report; Postmaintenance Test.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, an emergency preparedness inspector, and a physical security inspector. The inspection identified one green finding which was a noncited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) and is determined by the Significance Determination Process in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609. Findings for which the Significant Determination Process does not apply are indicated by "no color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. The relay that caused the high pressure core spray diesel generator outside air fan to automatically switch the fan from low to high speed was found to be inoperable since May 2000. A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI was identified for the failure to conduct testing of the high pressure core spray diesel generator ventilation system. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-GGN-2000-1115 and 1121.

Using the Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the issue was of very low safety significance because the diesel was able to perform its safety function with the fan in slow speed and because, once the room temperature exceeded 120° F (a temperature measured every shift), operators would have the opportunity to identify that the outside air fan had not automatically shifted and would manually shift the fan to high speed.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status: The plant operated at 100 percent power from the beginning of the inspection period until August 31, 2000, when power was reduced to 90 percent power to maintain condenser hotwell temperatures within the operating limits. The plant was returned to 100 percent power on September 6, 2000. The reactor automatically scrambled on September 15, 2000, in response to a severe transient on the local electrical power grid. The plant was started up on September 17, 2000, and returned to full power on September 22, 2000. On September 29, 2000, the licensee lowered power to 83 percent to allow replacement of the pump seal on Condensate Pump C. The plant was returned to 100 percent power on September 30, 2000.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the Division I standby diesel generator while the Division II standby diesel generator was out of service, of residual heat removal Train C while low pressure core spray was out of service, and of low pressure core spray while residual heat removal Train C was out of service. The inspectors reviewed System Operating Instruction 04-1-01-P75-1, "Standby Diesel Generator System," Revision 55, and Drawings M-1070A, "Standby Diesel Generator System Unit 1," Revision 32; M-1070B, "Standby Diesel Generator System Unit 1," Revision 29; M-1070C, "Standby Diesel Generator System," Revision 16; and M-1070D, "Standby Diesel Generator System," Revision 14.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed walkdowns to assess the material condition of fire protection equipment and control of transient combustibles. Specific risk significant areas covered included the residual heat removal Train C, standby service water Train B, and low pressure core spray pump rooms, and all three fire pump rooms.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the test data documented during the performance of Procedure 04-1-03-T46-1, "A' ESF Switchgear Room Coolers Flow Test," Revision 15, on September 19, 2000. The inspectors reviewed the history of the performance of Train A room coolers available in the licensee's database and all of the condition reports that documented concerns with the system. The inspectors discussed the methods of trending system performance and the current status of the system with the system engineer.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator requalification activities in the simulator on September 27, 2000, in order to assess the licensee's effectiveness in evaluating the requalification program and in ensuring that licensed individuals received the appropriate level of training required to maintain their licenses.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four failures that were evaluated under the maintenance rule to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the maintenance rule. Specifically, the inspectors evaluated: the failure of a reactor core isolation cooling Trip Unit E51N656E, the failure of high pressure core spray (HPCS) Diesel Generator Outside Air Fan 1X77C002 to automatically shift from low to high speed, and two separate incidents where the standby service water trains did not deliver the required flow at several points as a result of a misaligned valve and line fouling.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed weekly and daily work schedules to determine when risk significant activities were scheduled. The inspectors discussed selected activities with operations and work control personnel regarding risk evaluations and overall plant configuration control. The inspectors discussed emergent work issues with work control center personnel and reviewed the prioritization of scheduled activities when scheduling conflicts occurred. Specific items reviewed during this period included:

- Calibration of a time delay relay in the reactor core isolation cooling system isolation circuitry during a Division II work week
- Retest of the main turbine stop and control valves following an automatic test program failure during normal monthly surveillance testing
- Furmanite repairs to reactor water cleanup Outboard Return Isolation Valve 1G33F039 during recovery from an automatic reactor scram
- Rescheduling of the HPCS diesel generator 24-hour load test during a Division II work week

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Nonroutine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed operator response to a reactor scram that occurred at 6:30 a.m. on September 15, 2000. The reactor protection system tripped the reactor after sensing a main generator load reject. The load reject signal occurred momentarily while the grid and the plant responded to the loss of the Baxter Wilson 500 kV line after a breaker at Baxter Wilson Station failed. All plant equipment responded as expected. The inspectors verified that the operators entered the required off-normal procedures and placed the plant in a stable condition.

The inspectors observed operator actions taken to maintain plant equipment operable during sustained temperatures in excess of design assumptions for outside air temperature (95°F). Operators reduced power to approximately 90 percent to maintain condenser hotwell temperatures within operating limits and took compensatory measures to maintain engineered safety features 4160 V switchgear room temperatures within technical requirements manual limits.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations for technical adequacy, applicable compensatory measures, and impact on continued plant operation:

- Condition Report CR-GGN-2000-1213, the operability of both trains of diesel-driven fire pumps after finding that seal water lines had never been installed on the shaft stuffing boxes
- Condition Report CR-GGN-2000-1402, the operability of the standby liquid control system with low pump oil levels following system surveillance testing
- Condition Report CR-GGN-2000-1352, the operability of the end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed an operator workaround dealing with the temperature control valve for the control room air conditioning system failing open upon loss of instrument air or during a loss of offsite power coincident with a loss-of-coolant accident. The inspectors reviewed the current list of significant operator workarounds, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and held discussions with the operations superintendent and licensing engineers.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed or evaluated the postmaintenance tests of the following systems or equipment to determine whether the tests confirmed equipment operability:

- Division II standby diesel generator
- Low pressure core spray system
- HPCS diesel generator
- Containment isolation for service air, Valve P52F122

b. Findings

On August 4, 2000, the licensee replaced the speed control governor and motor-operated potentiometer on the HPCS diesel generator. These components were replaced because the HPCS diesel generator had exhibited load swings of 500 to 600 kW while paralleled with the grid during a previous monthly surveillance test. Procedure 06-OP-P18-M-0002, "HPCS Diesel Generator 13 Functional Test," Revision 107, directed that the diesel generator be operated paralleled with the grid for at least one hour at greater than or equal to 3300 kW. The load swings prevented successful completion of this test.

The postmaintenance test for the governor and motor-operated potentiometer replacement consisted of a 110 percent load run for 2 hours, a hot restart of the diesel generator, and a full load reject test. The licensee informed the inspectors that this testing was completed satisfactorily, and the HPCS diesel generator was turned over to operations. On August 8, 2000, the inspectors observed operation's acceptance testing, which consisted of a monthly diesel surveillance start and a 1-hour run. During the first 2 hours of diesel generator operation, the operators were unable to maintain greater than 3300 kW load. The load consistently drifted down to approximately 3000 kW and oscillated 300 to 400 kW. The licensee lowered demanded diesel generator load and began to take data in order to troubleshoot the cause of the load swings and drift. At approximately 5:00 p.m., the licensee noticed that the HPCS diesel generator room outside air fan was operating at slow speed. The room temperature had been less than 120° F, the Technical Specification limit; however, Outside Air Fan 1X77C002 was supposed to automatically shift from slow to fast speed when intake air temperature was greater than 70° F. Intake air temperature was greater than 70° F throughout the test. Operators manually shifted the fan to fast speed. The licensee later found that the fan failed to automatically shift to fast speed because of a relay failure. The operators were able to achieve greater than 3300 kW for an hour and shut down the diesel generator.

The licensee determined that the cause of the load swings and drift was high Woodward governor temperature. On August 8, 2000, the governor temperature was 251° F, with an outside ambient temperature of approximately 97° F, the diesel generator 100 percent loaded, and a room temperature of approximately 115° F. When the outside air fan was shifted to fast speed, governor temperature decreased by approximately 40° F, room temperature decreased by about 10° F, and the diesel performance improved, because the outside air fan pumped cooler air directly on the governor. On August 9, 2000, the diesel was declared operable after changing the governor oil, replacing the relay, and completing another monthly surveillance run.

Further discussions with the oil manufacturer indicated that the oil was operating at the limit of the governor's requirements and that high viscosity at the high temperature caused the erratic governor behavior while the diesel generator was operating on the grid. The successful load reject tests conducted while the fan was in low speed indicated that the governor's response would be acceptable while the diesel was operating in isochronous mode, the actual safety mode for the system.

Upon researching the failure of Fan 1X77C002, the licensee found that the fan relay could have failed as early as November 1999. Further, they found that the fan should

have shifted to high speed during runs in May 2000, but failed to automatically make this shift. Erratic behavior of the diesel generator was observed and documented in Condition Report CR-GGN-1999-1831 in November 1999 and in Condition Report CR-GGN-2000-973 in July 2000. The licensee indicated that they did not conduct testing to verify that the relay would cause the fan to shift to high speed when the intake air temperature exceeded 70° F. Further, there was no procedural requirement to verify that the fan shifted to high speed.

The equipment in the diesel generator room was qualified to function properly with area temperature maintained below 120° F. The outside air fan was designed to maintain room temperature at less than 120° F by pumping outside air into the room at different speeds, depending on intake air temperature. Additionally, as required by procedure, the licensee verified that the fan started when the diesel started, but did not verify the fan speed. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, states, in part, that "a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. The test program shall include operational tests during nuclear power plant operation. Test procedures shall include provisions for assuring that all prerequisites for the given test have been met and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions. Test results shall be documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied." Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.4.5.4 requires that standby components in the ventilation and cooling system be periodically tested to ensure system operability. Contrary to this requirement, as of August 4, 2000, tests to ensure the ventilation system's operability were not established. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation (50-416/0010-01), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-GGN-2000-1115 and 1121.

Using the Significant Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the issue was of very low safety significance because the diesel was able to perform its safety function with the fan in slow speed and because, once the room temperature exceeded 120° F (a temperature measured every shift), operators would have the opportunity to identify that the outside air fan had not automatically shifted and would manually shift it to high speed.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed or reviewed the following surveillance tests:

- 06-OP-1P41-Q-0005, "Standby Service Water Loop B Valve and Pump Operability Test," Revision 109
- 06-OP-1P41-Q-0004, "Standby Service Water Loop A Valve and Pump Operability Test," Revision 107

- 06-OP-1C71-Q0001-TEMP2, "Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure RPS Functional Special Test," Revision 1
- 06-EL-1L11-Q-0001-03, "Division III 125-Volt Battery All Cell Check," Revision 102
- 06-OP-1P81-M-0002, "HPCS Diesel Generator 13 Functional Test," Revision 107

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed ER-2000-0770-01, "Temporary Reactor Protection System Setpoint Change for Reactor Scram and Reactor Recirculation Pump Setback for Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (Load Reject)," dated September 20, 2000. This change was made as a compensatory measure until the licensee completes an evaluation of a possible unanalyzed function in the electro-hydraulic control system. The NRC was made aware of this potential concern in a notification from the licensee on September 18, 2000.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Revision 107 to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 10-S-01-1, "Activation of the Emergency Plan," transmitted by the licensee on June 29, 2000, to determine if the revision decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed one shift of licensee personnel performance in the control room simulator and technical support center during the third quarter emergency plan training drill on September 6, 2000. The inspectors observed a separate shift during

simulator based training on September 27, 2000. The inspectors verified the licensee's critique of the classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development during the drill.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3 SAFEGUARDS
Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP1 Access Authorization

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector:

- Reviewed licensee event reports and safeguards event logs to identify problems in the access authorization program
- Reviewed procedures, audits, and self assessments of the following programs/areas: behavior observation, access authorization, fitness-for-duty, supervisor and escort training, and requalification training
- Interviewed six supervisors/managers and six individuals who had escorted visitors into the protected or vital areas to determine their knowledge and understanding of their responsibilities in the behavior observation program

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector:

- Reviewed licensee event reports and safeguards event logs to identify problems with access control equipment
- Reviewed procedures and audits for testing and maintenance of access control equipment and for granting and revoking unescorted access to protected and vital areas
- Interviewed security personnel concerning the proper operation of the explosive and metal detectors, X-ray devices, and key card readers

- Observed licensee testing of access control equipment and the ability of security personnel to control personnel, packages, and vehicles entering the protected area
- Reviewed procedures to verify that a program was in place for controlling and accounting for hard keys to vital areas
- Reviewed the licensee's process for granting access to vital equipment and vital areas to authorized personnel having a need for access
- Reviewed condition reports, licensee event reports, safeguards event logs, audits, selected security event reports, and self assessment for the licensee's access control program in order to identify the licensee's ability to identify and resolve problems with the access control program
- Interviewed key security department and plant support personnel to determine their knowledge and use of the corrective action reports and resolution of problems regarding repair of security equipment

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP3 Security Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed:

- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, to determine if requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) had been met. This revision made administrative changes and added Chapter 11 which delineated measures taken during upgrade of a security system
- Safeguards event logs and interviewed security personnel to determine their knowledge and use of the corrective action program and resolution of problems as it related to making changes to the licensing documents

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4 OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy and completeness of the data used to calculate and report the following performance indicators for the first 2 quarters of 2000:

- Safety system unavailability, residual heat removal systems
- Safety system unavailability, emergency AC power system
- Safety system functional failures
- Protected area equipment
- Personnel screening program
- Fitness-for-duty/personnel reliability program

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program records, operations department logs, performance indicator technique sheets, and NRC inspection reports to complete the verification of the performance indicators. The inspectors reviewed the program for collection and submittal of performance indicator data. Specifically, a random sampling of security event logs and corrective action reports were reviewed for the following program areas:

- Fitness-for-duty program performance
- Access Authorization program performance
- Perimeter detection system performance
- Assessment aids system performance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup

a. (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-416/00-001

Failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.0.3. This LER addressed a violation of Technical Specifications in that the operators did not recognize that an alarm out of service placed them in Technical Specification 3.0.3. The violation was minor because the necessary actions were taken to return the required equipment to service before any action was required by the Technical Specifications. Although this issue should be corrected, it constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The event is documented in the licensee's corrective action program under Condition Report CR-GGN-2000-0931.

b. (Closed) LER 50-416/00-003

Use of inaccurate meteorological data units. This LER was a minor issue and was closed.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results for the physical security portion of the inspection to Mr. Jerry Roberts and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 15, 2000, and on October 3, 2000, the inspectors conducted a meeting with Mr. William Eaton and other members of plant management and presented the remainder of the inspection results. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT 1

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

C. Bottemiller, Manager, Plant Licensing
W. Deck, Security Superintendent
J. Graise, Senior Security Coordinator, Entergy
J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety and Assurance
W. Eaton, Vice President, Operations
B. Edwards, Manager, Maintenance
C. Ellsaesser, Manager, Corrective Action and Assessment
E. Harris, Manager, Systems Engineer
W. Shelly, Manager, Training
G. Sparks, Manager, Operations
J. Venable, General Manager, Plant Operations

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-416/0010-01	NCV	Failure of the licensee to conduct testing to ensure the continued operability of the high pressure core spray diesel generator ventilation system.
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Closed

50-416/0010-01	NCV	Failure of the licensee to conduct testing to ensure the continued operability of the high pressure core spray diesel generator ventilation system.
50-416/00-001	LER	Failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.0.3.
50-416/00-003	LER	Use of inaccurate meteorological data units.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures:

Corporate Security Site Instruction CS-GI-AA-102, "Withdrawal of Unescorted Access and Unescorted Access Authorization," Revision 1
CS-GI-AA-108, "Access Determination," Revision 1
Entergy Company Procedure OM-105, "Fitness-for-Duty," Revision 4
OM-110, "Continual Behavioral Observation Program," Revision 1
Plant Operations Manual Procedure 01-S-11-10, "GGNS Employees' Security Responsibilities," Revision 30
06-OP-1E21-Q-0002, "LPCS MOV Functional Test," Revision 101
06-OP-1E21-Q-0006, "LPCS Quarterly Functional Test," Revision 105
06-OP-1N32-V-001, "Turbine Stop and Control Valve Operability," Revision 107
07-S-23-C83-2, "Preventive Maintenance Instruction for Portal Explosive Detector," Revision 7
07-S-23-C83-3, "Preventive Maintenance Instruction for Security X-Ray System," Revision 3

07-S-23-C83-4, "Preventive Maintenance Instruction for Portal Metal Detection System,"
Revision 4
07-S-23-C83-7, "Preventive Maintenance Instruction for Warehouse Security X-Ray System,"
Revision 3
07-1-34-T46-B001A-2, "ESF Switchgear Header and Room Cooler Q1T46B001A Acid Flush,"
Revision 4
07-1-34-T46-B002A-2, "ESF Switchgear Header and Room Cooler Q1T46B002A Acid Flush,"
Revision 5
07-1-34-T46-B003A-2, "ESF Switchgear Header and Room Cooler Q1T46B003A Acid Flush,"
Revision 4
07-1-34-T46-B004A-2, "ESF Switchgear Header and Room Cooler Q1T46B004A Acid Flush,"
Revision 5
07-1-34-T46-B005A-2, "ESF Switchgear Header and Room Cooler Q1T46B005A Acid Flush,"
Revision 5
10-S-01-1, "Activation of the Emergency Plan," Revision 107
11-S-01-8, "Reportable Security Safeguards Events," Revision 15
11-S-01-9, "Fitness for Duty," Revision 11
11-S-11-2, "Security Lock and Key Program," Revision 8
11-S-21-4, "Intrusion Detection, Surveillance, and Access Control Equipment," Revision 4
11-S-21-5, "Operation and Use of Search Equipment," Revision 6
11-S-21-8, "Security Equipment Testing, Inspection and Maintenance," Revision 14
11-S-51-3, "Personnel, Packages and Vehicle Searches," Revision 11
11-S-51-4, "Duties of Personnel at the Primary Access Point," Revision 9

Condition Reports:

MNCR-0036-96	CR-GGN-2000-1284
CR-GGN-1998-0981	CR-GGN-2000-1334
CR-GGN-1999-1954	CR-GGN-2000-1344
CR-GGN-2000-847	CR-GGN-2000-1352
CR-GGN-2000-990	CR-GGN-2000-1377
CR-GGN-2000-1108	

Condition Reports for T46 system

Miscellaneous:

Safeguards Event Logs from July 11, 1999 - September 9, 2000, and event trending data
Fitness-for-Duty 6-Month Reports dated February 10 and August 10, 2000
Security Quarterly Performance Reports dated April 7, August 8, and November 8, 1999, and
February 24 and April 17, 2000
Grand Gulf Physical Security Plan, Revision 32, dated July 24, 2000
Installation/Operation (Manufacturer) Manual 460001775 for Metal/Weapon Detection System,
EG&G Astrophysics, Inc.
Entergy Memorandum, "Modification to NWT, Inc., Collection Container," dated
September 14, 2000
Plant Access Training Examinations, Versions 1-4
ER 2000-0246-00, Furmanite Repairs to 1G33F039, dated August 21, 2000

CN 2000-0023 to ER 2000-246-00, dated September 19, 2000

MAI 279046

MAI 281518

MAIs for T46 equipment

Plant Safety Review Committee meeting minutes, September 2, 2000

Maintenance Rule Database for diesel generator building ventilation system, standby service water and reactor core isolation systems

Post Trip Report for Trip on 9/15/00

Safety Evaluation CFRMNCR0251/89R00, ability of CRAC system to meet established design criteria considering potential design deficiency.

Audits and Assessment Reports:

Grand Gulf Security Assessment Report dated February 23, 2000

Grand Gulf Quality Audit Report QPA-08.01-99 of Physical Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and Security Training and Qualification Plan

QPA 29.01-98 of Access Authorization Program dated September 21, 1998

QPA 40.01-99 of Fitness for Duty Program dated September 2, 1999

Entergy Audit SA99-015 of Choice Point Services dated December 19, 1999. Completed as part of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) audit program.

South Texas Audit Report of NUMANCO dated July 15, 1999. Completed as part of NEI audit program.

Ameren/UE-Callaway Audit Report of Framatome Technologies, Inc., dated September 10, 1999. Completed as part of NEI audit program.

First Energy Audit Report of General Electric dated September 22, 1999. Completed as part of NEI audit program.

Florida Power and Light Audit Report of Westinghouse Electric Company dated September 24, 1999. Completed as part of NEI audit program.

San Onofre Audit Report of US Investigative Services dated February 9, 2000. Audit was completed as part of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) audit program.

Wolf Creek Audit Report of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) dated March 9, 2000. Audit was completed as part of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) audit program.

Northeast Utilities Systems Audit Report of ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc., dated April 19, 2000. Audit was completed as part of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) audit program.

ATTACHMENT 2

NRC'S REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
•Initiating Events •Mitigating Systems •Barrier Integrity •Emergency Preparedness	•Occupational •Public	•Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC used two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plan, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.