



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

September 5, 2000

Gregg R. Overbeck, Senior Vice
President, Nuclear
Arizona Public Service Company
P.O. Box 52034
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034

SUBJECT: PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION--NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-528/00-08; 50-529/00-08; 50-530/00-08

Dear Mr. Overbeck:

On August 26, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. The results of this inspection were discussed on July 21, August 17, and August 25 with you and members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

P. H. Harrell, Chief
Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-528
50-529
50-530

License Nos.: NPF-41
NPF-51
NPF-74

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NRC Inspection Report No.
50-528/00-08; 50-529/00-08; 50-530/00-08

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NRR Event Tracking System (**IPAS**)

PV Site Secretary (**TLB4**)

Dale Thatcher (**DFT**)

DOCUMENT NAME: R:\ PV\2000\PV2000-08RP-JHM.wpd

RIV:RI:DRP/D	SRI:DRP/D	OE:DRS/OLB	SOE:DRS/OLB	BC:DRS/OLB
NLSalgado	JHMoorman	RELantz	TFStetka	JLPellet
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09/05/00	09/05/00	09/05/00	09/05/00	09/05/00

HPS:DRS/PSB	BC:DRS/PSD	BC:DRP/D
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09/05/00	09/05/00	09/05/00

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-528
50-529
50-530

License Nos.: NPF-41
NPF-51
NPF-74

Report No.: 50-528/00-08
50-529/00-08
50-530/00-08

Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company

Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3

Location: 5951 S. Wintersburg Road
Tonopah, Arizona

Dates: July 9 through August 26, 2000

Inspectors: J. H. Moorman, III, Senior Resident Inspector
N. L. Salgado, Resident Inspector
D. E. Corporandy, Resident Inspector
J. S. Dodson, Health Physicist
T. F. Stetka, Senior Operations Engineer
R. E. Lantz, Operations Engineer

Approved By: P. H. Harrell, Chief, Project Branch D, Division of Reactor Projects

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information

Attachment 2: NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Palo Verde Nuclear Power Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-528/00-08; 50-529/00-08; 50-530/00-08

IR 05000-528-00-08, IR 05000-529-00-08, IR 05000-530-00-08, on 07/09-08/26/00; Palo Verde Nuclear Power Station; Units 1, 2, and 3. Integrated Resident & Regional Report. No findings identified.

The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and two regional operations inspectors. In the Reactor Safety area, the cornerstones inspected included Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity. In the Radiation Safety area, the cornerstone inspected was Occupational Radiation Safety.

There were no inspection findings identified in these areas.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Units 1, 2, and 3 operated at essentially 100 percent power for the duration of this inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection - Routine Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and other plant documents to determine if the refueling water tank and essential spray pond systems were designed to remain functional during adverse weather related risks identified for the site. The documents reviewed are listed at the end of this report.

2. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection

1R04 Equipment Alignment - Routine Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed equipment alignment verifications for portions of the following systems:

- Essential Spray Pond Train A (Unit 1)
- Essential Cooling Water Train A (Unit 1)

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Monthly Routine Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed fire protection walkdowns to assess the material condition of plant fire protection equipment and proper control of transient combustibles. The following risk significant areas were inspected:

- c Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms (Unit 3)

C Control Building 140-foot elevation (Unit 1)

C High Pressure Safety Injection Trains A and B (Unit 2)

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

.1 Fire Drill Observation - Routine Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

On August 21, 2000, the inspectors observed a fire drill conducted in the Unit 2 Operations Support Building to assess fire team performance. The inspectors also reviewed documentation of the drill evaluation.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification

a. Inspection Scope

Examination security measures and procedures were evaluated for compliance with 10 CFR 55.49. Each of the five examination weeks' written examinations was evaluated for adherence to the sample plan and compliance with 10 CFR 55.59 and NUREG 1021, as referenced in facility regualification program procedures. Maintenance of license conditions was evaluated for compliance with 10 CFR 55.53 by review of facility records, procedures, and tracking systems for licensed operator training, qualification, and watchstanding. Remedial training and examinations for Week 1 examination failures were reviewed for compliance with facility procedures and responsiveness to address areas failed.

In addition, the inspectors: (1) interviewed five personnel (an operator, three instructors/evaluators, and a training supervisor) regarding the policies and practices for administering examinations; (2) observed the administration of four dynamic simulator scenarios to two regualification crews by eight facility evaluators, including two operations department management observers who participated in the crew and individual evaluations; and (3) observed six facility evaluators administer five job performance measures, including three in the control room simulator in a dynamic mode and two in the plant under simulated conditions. Each job performance measure was observed being conducted by an average of three regualification candidates.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three equipment failures to verify that licensee personnel properly implemented the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." The specific failures reviewed were:

- C Inverter 3EPKDN44, which supplies power to Valve 3JSIDUV654, the Train B suction valve for shutdown cooling (Unit 3)
- C Inverter, 2EPKCN43, which supplies power to Valve 2JSICUV653 shutdown cooling suction valve (Unit 2)
- C Emergency Lighting Battery Bank, 2-E-QDN-F02 (Unit 2)

The inspectors used the maintenance rule field flow chart to determine if the licensee properly dispositioned the failures.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed daily and weekly work schedules to determine when risk significant activities were scheduled. The inspectors also reviewed selected activities regarding risk evaluations and overall plant configuration control. The inspectors discussed emergent work issues with work control personnel and reviewed the potential risk impact to verify that the work was adequately planned, controlled, and executed. The specific activities reviewed were:

- d. Repair oil leakage from outboard bearing end cap on High Pressure Safety Injection Pump A (Unit 3)
- e. Troubleshoot and repair failed Inverter 3EPKDN44, which supplies power to Valve 3JSIDUV654, the B Train suction valve for shutdown cooling (Unit 3)
- C Emergency Diesel Generator Train A, Essential Cooling Water Train A, Essential Chilled Water Train A, and Containment Spray Train A (Unit 2)

- C Gas Turbine Generator 2
- C Reactor Protection System - Variable Overpower Trip, Channel C (Unit 1)
- C Clean/Repair Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, RCN-PIC-100 (Unit 3)

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R14 Nonroutine Plant Evolutions

.1 Failed Incore Detector (Unit 1)

a. Inspection Scope

On July 14, 2000, at 11:05 a.m., Unit 1 received an alarm for azimuthal tilt exceeding the alarm setpoint value. The inspectors observed and reviewed the actions of the operations crew and reactor engineering in addressing the Technical Specification requirements, troubleshooting the cause of the alarm, and restoring the plant and core monitoring computers to their prealarm status.

b. Observations and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

.2 Blowdown Demineralizer Vessel A Spill (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

On July 16, 2000, at approximately 2 a.m., following a low level alarm on the blowdown flash tank, Blowdown Demineralizer Vessel A was observed to have a leak due to a failed gasket on its upper site glass. The inspectors reviewed the response of operations and radiation protection personnel to contain and isolate the leak, to quantify and clean up the resulting spill, and to assess the spill for potential radiological hazards.

b. Observations and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

.3 Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

On August 23, 2000, at 6:28 p.m., Unit 3 received alarms on low pressurizer pressure. The pressurizer pressure master controller had failed, resulting in a reactor coolant

system pressure perturbation (lowest observed reactor coolant system pressure was approximately 2195 psia). Operators observed both main pressurizer spray valves cycle open, then closed. The master controller was taken to manual and the pressurizer backup heaters were energized to stabilize pressure. Reactor coolant system pressure was returned to normal at 7:15 p.m. A reactor operator was dedicated to control pressure. The inspectors reviewed the actions of the operations crew, troubleshooting the cause of the failure and restoring the pressure controller to its normal state. The pressurizer pressure remained within Technical Specification 3.4.1 limits throughout the transient.

b. Observations and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R15 Operability Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluation for technical adequacy and impact on continued plant operation:

- Operability Determination 181, Revision 1 - reactor coolant system leakage into the reactor and pressurizer head vent system

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed or evaluated the following postmaintenance test to determine whether the test adequately confirmed equipment operability:

- 32MT-9ZZ56, "Motor Operated Valve Testing Using MOVATS 3500 System," Revision 20 (Postmaintenance Test of Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Feedwater Isolation Valve to Steam Generator #2, AFB-UV-35) (Unit 2)

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed or reviewed the following surveillance tests to verify that the tested systems and components were capable of performing their intended safety functions and to assess their operational readiness.

- 41ST-1SM01, "Seismic Instrumentation Channel Checks," Revision 6 (Unit 1)
- 32MT-9ZZ56, "Motor Operated Valve Testing Using MOVATS 3500 System," Revision 20 (Test of Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Feedwater Isolation Valve to Steam Generator #2, AFB-UV-35) (Unit 2)
- 73ST-9AF01, "AFN-P01 - Inservice Test," Revision 5 (Unit 3)
- 40ST-9DG02, "Diesel Generator "B" Test," Revision 15 (Unit 3)

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS2 ALARA (as-low-as-reasonably-achievable) Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector interviewed radiation workers and radiation protection personnel involved in on-line maintenance in the radiologically controlled areas during routine operations, conducted independent radiation surveys of selected work areas, and reviewed the following items to determine whether the licensee has an adequate program to maintain occupational exposure ALARA.

- ALARA program procedures
- Processes used to estimate and track exposures
- Plant collective exposure history for the past 3 years, current exposure trends, and 3-year rolling average dose information
- Eight radiation exposure permit packages from the outage and on-line work activities that resulted in the highest personnel collective exposures during the inspection period
- Use of engineering controls to achieve dose reductions

- Individual exposures of selected work groups (health physics, operations, and mechanical maintenance)
- Hot spot tracking and reduction program
- Plant related source term data, including source term control strategy
- Radiological work planning
- Nuclear Assurance audit of the ALARA program
- Selected corrective action documentation involving higher than planned exposures and radiation worker practice deficiencies since the last inspection in this area
- Declared pregnant worker dose monitoring controls

b. Findings

There were no findings identified.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results of the ALARA inspection to Mr. G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President - Nuclear, and other members of licensee management on July 21, 2000.

The inspectors presented the inspection results of the licensed operator requalification inspection to Mr. G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President - Nuclear, and other members of licensee management on August 17, 2000.

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President - Nuclear, and other members of licensee management on August 25, 2000.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. Allison, Continuing Training Instructor/Evaluator
S. Bauer, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs
J. Bungard, Technical Management Assistant, Radiation Protection
S. Burns, Department Leader, Systems Engineering
R. Buzard, Senior Consultant, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
D. Edmunds, Supervisor, Licensed Operator Continuing Training
M. Fladager, Department Leader, Radiation Protection Operations
R. Fullmer, Director, Nuclear Assurance
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D. Marks, Section Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J. McDonnell, Section Leader, ALARA Planning
G. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear
F. Riedel, Training Department Leader
M. Sanchez, Shift Manager
D. Smith, Director, Operations
O. Triolo, Continuing Training Instructor/Evaluator

NRC

G. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

40AO-9ZZ21, "Acts of Nature," Revision 6
40OP-9SP01, "Essential Spray Pond (SP) Train A," Revision 25
41OP-1EW01, "Essential Cooling Water System (EW) Train A," Revision 24
PD-OAP01, "Administrative Control Program," Revision 2
75DP-0RP01, "RP Program Overview," Revision 2
75DP-0RP03, "ALARA Program Overview," Revision 1
75DP-0RP06, "ALARA Committee," Revision 1
75DP-9RP01, "Radiation Exposure and Access Control," Revision 3
75RP-0RP01, "Radiological Posting," Revision 17
75RP-9RP02, "Radiation Exposure Permits," Revision 14
75RP-9RP12, "ALARA Reports," Revision 1

75RP-9RP25, "Temporary Shielding," Revision 3
15DP-0TR69, "Training and Qualification Administration," Revision 5
"Licensed Operator Continuing Training, Training Program Description," Revision 12, 8/9/00
"EOP Operations Expectations," Revision 7
15DP-OLC01, "Operator License Application Process," Revision 3

Other documents

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 10
Section 3.2, Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components
Section 3.3, Wind and Tornado Loading
Section 3.5, Missile Protection
Section 7.4, Flood Protection

NUREG 0857, Supplement 5, "Safety Evaluation Report related to the Operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station," November 1983
Section 9.2, Water Systems
Section 9.2.6, Condensate Storage Facility

PVNGS Pre-fire Strategy Manual, Revision 12

14DP-0FP02, "Fire System Impairments and Notifications," Revision 8

Condition Report/Disposition Request 2308926 - Inverter, 2EPKCN43, supplying shutdown cooling suction valve SICUV653, lost power

Condition Report/Disposition Request 118577 - Unit 2 Emergency Lighting Battery Bank (2-E-QDN-F02) in conjunction with its associated UPS unit (2-E-QDN-N02) failed its annual discharge test being performed under STWO 00906667

List of Condition Reports involving ALARA and radiation worker practices (1/1 - 7/15/2000)

Condition Report packages: CRDR-110302, CRDR-111830, CRDR-115507, CRDR-115664, CRDR-116416, CRDR-116653, CRDR-117667, CRDR-117874, CRDR-117970, CRDR-118362

Design Basis Manual - SI System, Revision 14

Exposure goal for 2000

Radiation exposure permit exposure summaries (1/1 - 7/15/2000)

Hot spot tracking and trending tables and survey maps

PVNGS Source term reduction summary

Temporary and long term shielding logs and temporary shielding packages, 1-00-001, 1-00-002, 1-00-012, 3-00-003, 3-00-086

Palo Verde 2000 - 2004 Business Plan

U3R8 ALARA Committee Challenge Goal Proposal

U3R8 ALARA Outage Report

REP Job History Summaries

U3R8 Radiation Exposure Permits, 3-3002, 3-3306, 3-3502

Online Maintenance Radiation Exposure Permits, 2-208A, 2-241A, 2-242A, 3-0007C

Nuclear Assurance Audit Report 99-008, 6/8 - 6/18/1999

Radiation Protection Department, Radiation Protection Program Review, 7/20/2000

Radiation Protection Self Assessment, ALARA Planning and Controls, 6/6 - 6/29/2000

Summary of exposures by departments

Source term and dose reduction tables, charts, and graphs

ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes for: 12/16/1999, 3/23/2000, 6/22/2000

ALARA Coordinator Meeting Minutes for: 12/15/1999, 6/20/2000

Unit 2 Refueling Outage U2R9 Status Meeting, 7/19/2000

PVNGS NRC Examination Security Policy

Requalification Annual Examination Development Guidelines

Licensed Operator "Reactivation Job Qualification Card"

Current List of Licensed Operators, Units 1, 2, and 3, as of 8/15/00

Crew 35 Licensed Operator Qualification Maintenance Records, Site Work Management System

Licensed Operator Continuing Training (LOCT) weekly schedule, week 2, annual exam cycle, starting 8/15/00

NUA00-00, 2000 Annual Examinations and Biennial Written Examinations, weeks 1-5, starting 8/8/2000

2000 Annual Examination Results, weeks 1 and 2

Remediation Examinations and Results, week 1

Operations Performance Assessment Report, Cycle 00-01, 3/16/2000 and Cycle 00-02, 7/14/2000

Cycle Pedigree Document for Cycle NLR9903, "LOCT Requal Cycle 9903," dated 11/24/99

Cycle Pedigree Document for Cycle NLR0004, "LOCT Requal Cycle 0004," no date

Classroom Lesson "RC003 Electrical Disturbance," dated 3/15/00

Classroom Lecture "Industry Events," dated 6/15/99

NRC'S REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
•Initiating Events •Mitigating Systems •Barrier Integrity •Emergency Preparedness	•Occupational •Public	•Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC used two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the significance determination process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.