May 11, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations

FROM: J. E. Dyer, Regional Administrator ***/RA/***

SUBJECT: COMMISSION STAFF REQUIREMENTS MEMORANDA (SRM) M000110B - D. C. COOK SIGNIFICANT EMERGENT SAFETY ISSUES

The attachment to this memorandum provides an update to the significant emergent safety issues at D. C. Cook. In the subject SRM, the Commission requested to be informed of these issues. No new emerging issues have been identified. The issue involving employment discrimination against a contract employee has been resolved and will no longer be reported. Progress is being made towards resolving the other issues. Changes to existing issues are provided in ***bold italics***.

Attachment: As stated
(Contains 2.790 information)

cc w/att: F. Miraglia, OEDO
S. Collins, NRR
M. Satorius, NRR
J. Zwolinski, NRR
S. Bajwa, NRR
C. Craig, NRR
J. Stang, NRR
A. Vegel, RIII
G. Shear, RIII
B. Bartlett, SRI D. C. Cook
M. Holmberg, RIII

CONTACT: D. Passehl, DRP
(630) 829-9872

Not for Public Disclosure

Not for Public Disclosure

May 11, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations

FROM: J. E. Dyer, Regional Administrator ***/RA/***

SUBJECT: COMMISSION STAFF REQUIREMENTS MEMORANDA (SRM) M000110B - D. C. COOK SIGNIFICANT EMERGENT SAFETY ISSUES

The attachment to this memorandum provides an update to the significant emergent safety issues at D. C. Cook. In the subject SRM, the Commission requested to be informed of these issues. No new emerging issues have been identified. The issue involving employment discrimination against a contract employee has been resolved and will no longer be reported. Progress is being made towards resolving the other issues. Changes to existing issues are provided in ***bold italics***.

Attachment: As stated
(Contains 2.790 information)

cc w/att: F. Miraglia, OEDO
S. Collins, NRR
M. Satorius, NRR
J. Zwolinski, NRR
S. Bajwa, NRR
C. Craig, NRR
J. Stang, NRR
A. Vegel, RIII
G. Shear, RIII
B. Bartlett, SRI D. C. Cook
M. Holmberg, RIII

CONTACT: D. Passehl, DRP
(630) 829-9872

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\Cook\05-08-00 SRM reply.wpd

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:"C" = Copy without enclosure "**E**"= Copy with enclosure"**N**"= No copy

OFFICE	RIII	E	RIII	E	RIII	E	RIII	
NAME	Vegel:trn		Grobe		Zwolinski		Dyer	
DATE	05/ 10/00		05/ 10/00		05/ 10/00		05/ /00	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Not for Public Disclosure

Issue Is Resolved and Will No Longer Be Included in this Report

Attachment

Not for Public Disclosure

****CONTAINS PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION****

Current or Emerging Safety Issues

Issue	Employment Discrimination Involving Cataract, Inc. (OI-3-1998-041) On November 16, 1998, the Office of Investigations opened a case file to determine whether discrimination occurred in October 1998 against a contract employee who was on site for approximately 1 week before being terminated. The individual claims discrimination because he was identified as a troublemaker at other plants by a licensee employee. The licensee contends that the individual was dismissed for legitimate business reasons. The Office of Investigations confirmed discrimination did occur (report issued November 23, 1999).
Licensee Action	The licensee presented the results of their review of this issue during the predecisional enforcement conference.
NRC Action	A predecisional enforcement conference was held on February 24, 2000. ***On May 5, 2000, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Violation against American Electric Power (AEP) for discriminating against the contract employee. No enforcement action was taken against the supervisor involved in the discriminatory act based on the agency conclusion that the supervisor's actions did not represent a deliberate violation of NRC requirements. A copy of the Notice of Violation was provided to the contract employee.***
Safety Significance	The affected individual did not raise any safety issues regarding the D. C. Cook plant.
Impact on Schedule	None.

Not for Public Disclosure

****CONTAINS PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION****

Issue Is Resolved and Will No Longer Be Included in this Report

Current Emerging Safety Issues

Issue	The current accident analysis for the essential service water (ESW) system requires each train of ESW to include a Unit 1 pump cross-connected with a Unit 2 pump. To facilitate concurrent operation of Unit 2 and work on Unit 1 that may impact the ESW system, the licensee is trying to demonstrate that the Unit 2 pumps alone can supply sufficient accident mitigation flow.
Licensee Action	***On May 1, 2000, the licensee completed a safety review of separating the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESW systems and concluded that no Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQs) exist. The licensee is continuing with their evaluation of test and calculation results to affirm that the Unit 2 pumps alone can supply sufficient flow.***
NRC Action	***Preliminary review of this issue by NRC staff on May 5, 2000, determined that separating the Unit 1 and 2 ESW systems represents a USQ (configuration of the ESW pumps that does not meet the current licensing basis as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report). NRR and Region III staff continue to review this matter with licensee personnel.***
Safety Significance	***Unit 2 cannot be operated safely without sufficient flow from the ESW system to mitigate analyzed accidents.***
Impact on Schedule	***The licensee must resolve this issue prior to Mode 4. If the NRC's preliminary conclusion is sustained, the licensee will be required to submit revisions to the Unit 2 licensing basis for review and approval by the staff or find an alternative solution that does not involve a licensing action. The staff's review and approval of a licensing action could impact the licensee's current schedule for entry into Mode 4.***

Current Emerging Safety Issues

Issue	The licensee identified multiple examples where large-bore piping supports were not installed according to the design and licensing basis. Systems affected include Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal, Containment Spray, and Safety Injection, along with multiple nonsafety-systems.
Licensee Action	The licensee has issued a design change package to repair, replace, or install approximately seventy piping supports in the affected safety related systems. Physical work on the piping supports has started. Also, the licensee has identified the need to repair, replace, or install several hundred additional supports in other systems. Supports needing work on systems necessary to support fuel load have been completed.
NRC Action	Resident Inspectors continue to perform follow up inspection of related piping support modifications. Pipe support modifications needed for fuel load were confirmed to be completed.
Safety Significance	The affected piping systems may not have been adequately designed to sustain a seismic event.
Impact on Schedule	None anticipated. The licensee is on schedule to repair, replace, or install the three remaining supports prior to Mode 4.

Current Emerging Safety Issues

Issue	A postulated worst case offsite degraded grid voltage during a design basis accident may result in terminal voltages at some safety related electrical equipment being below that required for the equipment to function.
Licensee Action	The licensee plans to implement several modifications to improve terminal voltage prior to Unit 2 restart. These include installing a breaker to split electrical load between two 34.5 kV transformers, changing transformer tap settings, installing voltage regulating transformers, and replacing undersized motor cables on some equipment. The licensee also plans to establish administrative controls with the American Electric Power System Operations group to monitor grid voltages. The licensee is evaluating the installation of automatic load tap changing transformers for the long term and plans to re-review their responses to applicable Generic Letters within one year of restart of Unit 1 and initiate any required licensing actions. ***On May 4, 2000, the licensee submitted a letter describing the short term actions and long term commitments to ensure operability of the electrical distribution system.***
NRC Action	The NRC conducted a public meeting with the licensee to discuss this issue on April 17, 2000. ***NRC is reviewing the licensee's commitment letter.***
Safety Significance	Safety related equipment needed to mitigate the effects of a design basis accident may not function.
Impact on Schedule	None anticipated. The licensee plans to implement the Unit 2 restart modifications prior to entry into Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown).

Current Emerging Safety Issues

Issue	On November 22, 1999, the licensee identified a concrete wall in containment where segments of concrete and several reinforcing bars had been removed from the upper portion of the wall during initial construction. This wall forms part of the boundary between upper and lower containment which is designed to force the steam blowdown during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a main steam line break (MSLB) through the ice condenser to reduce containment pressure buildup. The missing concrete and reinforcing bars may affect the ability of containment to perform its function.
Licensee Action	The licensee evaluated the condition of the wall and determined that the wall does not meet specified design margins. The licensee determined that replacement of the missing concrete with grout would restore the wall to an operable but degraded condition. The licensee initiated a design change package to add grout to the wall and completed calculations on April 14, 2000, concluding that the wall would not fail under the worst case postulated loading. The licensee has prepared an operability evaluation of this condition. ***The licensee is pursuing additional questions resulting from a May 4, 2000, public technical meeting regarding the as-built configuration of this wall and the adequacy of their calculations.***
NRC Action	Region III is in the process of reviewing the design change package and supporting calculations for this issue. The Region is evaluating the reduction in design margin for this degraded wall under the postulated accident conditions. ***A public technical meeting was held on May 4, 2000, in Region III, to discuss the results of the licensee's evaluation of this issue and planned corrective actions. NRC staff continues to review and evaluate the licensee's actions.***
Safety Significance	Failure of this wall during a LOCA or MSLB would create a steam bypass of the ice condenser resulting in over-pressurization of the containment and potential containment breach.
Impact on Schedule	Unknown at this time.