GPU NUCLEAR

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May 2, 2000
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS)
Docket No. 50-219
Facility License No. DPR-16
Response to Request for Additional Information

Reference: NRC Letter dated 4/12/2000, "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Request for Additional Information re: Expansion of Spent Fuel Pool Storage Capacity (TAC No. MA5965)"

The attachment to this letter provides a response to the NRC staff request for additional information contained in the referenced NRC letter.

If there are any questions or additional information is needed, please contact Mr. Paul Czaya of our Nuclear Safety and Licensing Department at 609-971-4139.

Very truly yours,

Mr. Sander Levin
Acting Director
Oyster Creek

c: Administrator, USNRC Region I
USNRC Oyster Creek Project Manager
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector – Oyster Creek

A001

Attachment
GPU Nuclear Response to NRC Request for Additional Information dated 4/12/2000

NRC Request

1. Describe the capability to isolate a loss of inventory from the SFP.

GPU Nuclear Response

The spent fuel pool (SFP) drainage system is comprised of channels imbedded in the concrete slab below the liner. These channels lead to four 2-inch diameter telltale drain lines, which are routed to the equipment drain system. Each drain line contains a manual isolation valve, which is normally open. The installation of the manual isolation valves was completed in December 1998.

Operators regularly tour the area where the drains are located and inspect them for leakage. In the event of significant leakage from the telltale drains, the isolation valves can be closed to prevent reduction in SFP water volume. If a leak occurs, an alarm will warn operators of low SFP water level. The alarm response procedure includes checking the telltale drains and closing the valves if they are the source of leakage.

The procedure for the installation of the four new fuel racks contains a prerequisite that requires the telltale drain valves to be closed prior to moving the racks into the SFP. If a postulated rack drop occurs, the closed valves would prevent SFP inventory loss.

NRC Request

2. What is the estimated rate of inventory loss into the drainage system for the postulated rack drop discussed above?

GPU Nuclear Response

The rate of inventory loss cannot be determined with any degree of accuracy due to the complex geometry of the drainage system. However, as stated in the GPU Nuclear response to NRC Request No. 1 above, the telltale drain valves will be closed prior to moving the new fuel storage racks over the SFP. This will prevent SFP inventory loss.

NRC Request

3. What is the maximum rate of inventory loss that the makeup system can accommodate?

GPU Nuclear Response

As stated in Oyster Creek Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.1.2.2.1, the normal makeup to the SFP is from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) via the Condensate Transfer System, which can supply 250 gallons per minute (gpm) with one pump running or 420 gpm with two pumps running. The Demineralized Water Transfer System can provide 150 gpm from the Demineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST). Additional makeup can be obtained from the Fire Protection System.

NRC Request

4. Is the makeup rate of 420 gpm from the CST and 150 gpm from the DWST sufficient to replace the inventory loss through the pierced SFP liner?

GPU Nuclear Response

As stated in the GPU Nuclear response to NRC Request Nos. 1 and 2 above, the SFP telltale drain valves will be closed prior to moving the new racks into the SFP. In the unlikely event a rack is dropped it will not result in SFP inventory loss.