

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region III
KEWAUNEE

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	MISC	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The licensee did not identify any equipment or computer related problems during or following the Year 2000 The inspectors conducted direct observations of control room activities during the Year 2000 transition period. The licensee did not identify any equipment or computer related problems during or following the rollover due to Year 2000 related anomalies. The inspectors performed independent reviews of various equipment and plant parameters and did not identify any concerns.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The plant was outside of its design basis when both control room air conditioning units were rendered simult On December 20, 1999, the plant was outside of its design basis when both control room air conditioning units were rendered simultaneously out-of-service for about 12 seconds due to an inadequate procedure. The licensee appropriately made a 1-hour non-emergency report to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(ii)(B). The inspectors did not identify any concerns with the licensee's evaluation of the event.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Overall, the licensee's facility was adequately prepared for adverse cold weather conditions. Overall, the licensee's facility was adequately prepared for adverse cold weather conditions. However, the inspectors identified that operators were not routinely notified when the turbine building roll-up door was open to prompt closer monitoring of plant parameters to identify any adverse cold temperature effects.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	A non-cited violation was identified for failure to perform a surveillance test procedure associated with the st A non-cited violation was identified against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for failure to perform a surveillance test procedure associated with the steam exclusion system. The procedure had not been performed since August 27, 1992. The licensee's corrective actions to address the missed surveillance were appropriate.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
11/30/1999	1999012	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5B Sec: Ter:	Operability Determinations for Degraded Systems The inspectors identified inconsistencies in the level of technical basis provided to support component and system operability. While some corrective action documents provided a documented operability determination with a good supporting basis, others lacked sufficient details to support system operability.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
11/30/1999	1999012-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	Technical Specifications interpretation for pressure isolation valves The inspectors noted that the licensee's identification of possible non-compliance with the Technical Specifications requirements was evidence of a good technical review of planned surveillance test activities. (Section O2.2)
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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11/30/1999	1999012-02	Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: 2A Ter:	Failure to follow procedures for installation of temporary jumpers The licensee failed to follow established procedures when installing temporary jumpers for the steam generator blowdown valves. A work request was used to install the jumpers, whereas administrative procedures required the use of an approved procedure or the temporary change process. The installation of the jumpers was controlled through the use of danger cards and a jumper control log. This was identified as a non-cited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/16/1999	1999010-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Inadequate surveillance procedure regarding seismic monitoring system The licensee appropriately declared the seismic monitor out-of-service after identifying that although seismic events could be detected, the alarm function was unreliable. Additionally, the system calibration procedure was inadequate in that it did not ensure Technical Specification operability requirements were met. The licensee implemented appropriate compensatory actions.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
09/18/1999	1999010	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The performance of the power reduction on September 18, 1999 was conducted in a controlled manner. Ope The licensee reduced power on September 18, 1999, to perform main turbine stop and control valve testing. The Shift Supervisor conducted a pre-task briefing and discussed personnel roles and responsibilities, contingency actions, and lessons learned. The performance of the power reduction was conducted in a controlled manner. Operations personnel response to a turbine stop valve failure to open was appropriate. Senior reactor operators provided appropriate oversight of reactivity changes.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
09/10/1999	1999009	Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT	Licensee	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 5B Ter:	Corrective actions and trouble shooting efforts of potential service water intrusion into the turbine driven and Corrective actions and trouble shooting efforts of potential service water intrusion into the turbine driven and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were of sufficient scope and were taken in a timely manner.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
08/10/1999	1999009	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 5B Ter:	The licensee's root cause analysis of the inadvertent overloading of the A Diesel Generator was timely and of The A Diesel Generator was inadvertently overloaded during a surveillance procedure due to an operator error. The overloading was momentary and did not have detrimental effects on the operability of the unit. The licensee's root cause analysis was timely and of sufficient scope to ensure adequate analysis of human performance factors.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
08/04/1999	1999009	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5B Sec: 5C Ter:	The licensee has documented repeat failures of the shroud cooling bypass valves to fully open or not meet st The licensee has documented repeat failures of the shroud cooling bypass valves to fully open or not meet stroke time requirements. The failure mechanisms of the valve failures continue to be investigated by the licensee. However, the inspectors determined that the licensee's operability determinations as documented in various corrective action documents were based on incorrect information and therefore lacked basis.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
07/19/1999	1999008	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	Following a loss of load transient, the licensee did not perform a thorough post-transient review. A loss of load transient occurred when one of the main turbine control valves failed to open during surveillance testing. The pre-test briefing was concise and included discussion of the roles and responsibilities of all involved individuals; however, contingencies or test abort criteria were not discussed. Initial communications between shift members during the transient did not follow the licensee's operations standards but generally improved once the cause for the transient was recognized. The operator on the reactor panel maintained good awareness of the reactor and rod control system status. Throughout the surveillance testing and transient, the shift supervisor maintained good overall awareness of plant conditions. The licensee did not perform a thorough post-transient review to verify that plant equipment and personnel responded appropriately and that procedures provided necessary guidance until questioned by the inspectors.
	Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee					
07/19/1999	1999008	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	An operator performed a panel walkdown in-between surveillance testing and noted increasing auxiliary buil The inspectors observed shift turnover meetings and observed discussions regarding the status of plant equipment, planned testing, and maintenance. Operators exhibited good working knowledge of plant equipment and instruments. One such example was observed when an operator performed a panel walkdown in-between surveillance testing and noted increasing auxiliary building temperatures indicative of an inoperative ventilation system. The inspectors observed that assignments and responsibilities were clearly defined during pre-task briefings such as prior to testing a pressurizer power operated relief block valve.
	Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee					
07/19/1999	1999008	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Communications between control room operators and shift management generally followed the licensee's co During the unit power reduction and reactivity changes, communications between control room operators and shift management generally followed the licensee's communications standard and operators appropriately monitored plant parameters. Effective oversight was provided by the control room supervisor during the power reduction and the shift supervisor maintained overall awareness of the plant status.
	Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee					
06/07/1999	1999006	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Operators exhibited good working knowledge of plant equipment and instruments. Operators exhibited good working knowledge of plant equipment and instruments. During shift briefings, the inspectors observed that in general the briefings were concise and covered pertinent plant information including equipment status and planned activities. Side discussions and distractions were minimized. Good operator performance during normal plant operations was noted as evidenced by attentiveness to control room alarms and awareness of plant indications.
	Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee					
06/07/1999	1999006	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5B Sec: Ter:	The licensee evaluated three abnormal plant indications regarding boron concentration differences and appi The licensee evaluated three abnormal plant indications regarding boron concentration differences between the reactor coolant system and pressurizer, in-leakage into the pressurizer relief tank, and possible leakage past a pressurizer safety valve. Corrective action documents were written to document these issues and the licensee appropriately put a team together to provide focus and recommend corrective actions.
	Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee					
06/07/1999	1999006	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	The inspectors did not identify any operability concerns during reviews and walkdowns of the diesel generat The inspectors did not identify any operability concerns during reviews and walkdowns of the diesel generator air start and auxiliary feedwater systems
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06/07/1999	1999006-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Inoperable wide range containment water level instrument channels Control room operators identified an invalid signal output on the plant process computer for the wide range containment water level instruments. This condition was subsequently determined to be indicative of both instrument channels of containment water level being inoperable due to an inadequate calibration procedure. This was identified as a Non-Cited Violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/26/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The operators' actions in response to the failure of a volume control tank level transmitter. The operators' actions in response to the failure of a volume control tank level transmitter were consistent with the alarm response and abnormal operating procedure instructions. Contingency actions as detailed in an operator work-around were determined to be appropriate. (Section O2.2)
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/26/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: Ter:	The performance of the power reduction was conducted in a conservative and controlled manner. The licensee reduced power on April 10, 1999, to perform main turbine stop valve testing. The pre-job briefing for the evolution provided appropriate information and significant points were re-enforced by the Shift Supervisor. The performance of the power reduction was conducted in a conservative and controlled manner. Consistent three-way communications were used and senior reactor operators provided appropriate oversight of reactivity changes. (Section O1.2)
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/26/1999	1999004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Plant Operations Review Committee was effective in approving and establishing procedural guidance. The inspectors concluded that the Plant Operations Review Committee was effective in approving and establishing procedural guidance that would address previously identified problems involving the use of partial procedures and temporary procedure changes. (Section O7.1)
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/26/1999	1999004-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Tavg lower limits and allowable time for operator action. The inspectors identified that one annunciator response procedure contained operator actions which were based on references to standardized Technical Specifications. The procedure did not contain bounding references to ensure that the plant was not operated outside of analyzed conditions. An unresolved item was initiated to further review the adequacy of the procedure.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
03/15/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Field verification of the component cooling water system and valve positions as required by the licensee's su Field verification of the component cooling water system and valve positions as required by the licensee's surveillance procedures indicated good control of configuration. The inspectors noted acceptable material condition and did not identify any operability concerns.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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02/28/1999	1999001	Pri: OPS Sec: ENG	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	The plant was placed in an unanalyzed condition when a valve required to remain open during power ops w The plant was placed in an unanalyzed condition when a valve required to remain open during power operations was closed resulting in the potential for overpressurizing the system piping during post-accident operations. This had been a condition previously identified in the licensee's evaluation of Generic Letter 96-06. This condition resulted from a lack of procedural guidance for proper valve stroke timing of air operated valves and unavailability of information for control room operators to recognize the potential for overpressurizing piping when select valves are closed.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Some areas of the OWA instruction needed improvement. Areas of the OWA instruction with room for improvement included: (1) the use of an instruction versus a formal procedure to establish the OWA program; (2) the lack of guidance concerning resolution of OWAs; and (3) lack of pertinent information on the OWA form, such as the date of the OWA and how the OWA was closed.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The licensee's definition of OWA was limiting. The licensee's definition of OWA was limiting; compensatory actions associated with the deficiency had to adversely affect operator response during a transient condition. The definition excluded adverse impact on operators during normal operation. The licensee did not declare a non-conforming condition as an OWA until the condition was considered "longstanding." Operators provided a broader definition of an OWA than licensee's OWA instruction.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The licensee's line organization did not perform a true aggregate assessment of the cumulative effects of all The licensee's line organization, including the operations department, did not perform a true aggregate assessment of the cumulative effects of all OWAs and other plant deficiencies on safe plant operation. The inspectors determined that there were no specific procedures or guidance on how to document and perform such an assessment to more closely link together all the programs where non-conforming plant conditions were documented.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The licensee's OWA instructions would allow OWAs to be closed by procedure changes without correcting the The inspectors concluded that obtaining OWA resolution information was difficult due to deficiencies in documenting OWA resolution. The inspectors also determined that the licensee's OWA instructions would allow OWAs to be closed by procedure changes without correcting the underlying deficiency causing burden on the operators.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: 2A Ter:	The licensee did not conduct an aggregate review of all non-conforming plant conditions. The licensee did not conduct an aggregate review of all non-conforming plant conditions (tagouts, maintenance backlog, Kewaunee Assessment Program (KAP) items, temporary change requests (TCR), etc.) for potential OWAs. The inspectors identified five non-conforming conditions that appeared to be OWAs that were not identified by the licensee as OWAs. These five non-conforming conditions appeared to meet both the licensee's and the NRC's definitions for OWAs.
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02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: 3B Ter:	The licensee's OWA program did not require that the licensee assess the potential for operator error involving The licensee's OWA program did not require that the licensee assess the potential for operator error involving OWAs and the impact on probability of causing abnormal or emergency plant conditions. The licensee also did not provide specific guidance for the training department to systematically review and incorporate OWAs and other plant deficiencies into the simulator, and as a result the modeling of OWAs on the simulator was not consistently applied.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The control room operators were aware of plant conditions. Operations personnel conducted control room shift turnovers and shift briefings satisfactorily with good participation by licensed and non-licensed operators. The control room operators were aware of plant conditions and took actions to acknowledge control room alarms. The inspectors determined that the licensee's post-shift briefing was a good tool to assess the shift's activities and a good opportunity for licensee management to provide feedback and to reinforce management's expectations.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Overall, the licensee had established a program with instructional guidance that appeared to adequately addr Overall, the licensee had established a program with instructional guidance that appeared to adequately address the pertinent issues concerning OWAs. Strengths of the OWA instruction included: (1) the three-priority system; (2) use of on-shift personnel to screen OWAs and develop OWA compensatory actions; (3) the inclusion of all personnel in OWA identification; and (4) the establishment of a Multidisciplinary Team review of OWAs.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	In general, the licensee was adequately identifying, tracking, and emphasizing timely resolution of OWAs. In general, the licensee was adequately identifying, tracking, and emphasizing timely resolution of OWAs. Based on the licensee's definition of an OWA, only three OWAs were open (active). After reviewing the active OWAs and other select deficiency items, the inspectors concluded that the existing discrepancies identified and tracked by the licensee would not have prevented the safe operation of the plant.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The licensee adequately assessed deficient plant conditions as either an OWA per its program definition or as In general, the licensee adequately assessed deficient plant conditions as either an OWA per its program definition or as plant deficiencies noted in other tracking methods. The inspectors did not identify any plant deficiencies that were not already identified and adequately monitored by the licensee.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 3B Ter:	Operator knowledge of the OWA process and the status and compensatory actions of active OWAs was good. Operator knowledge of the OWA process and the status and compensatory actions of active OWAs was good.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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02/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 5C Ter:	The licensee's decisions concerning resolution of OWAs appeared to be satisfactory. The licensee's decisions concerning resolution of OWAs appeared to be satisfactory. The inspectors did not identify any examples of improper resolution of OWAs.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/01/1999	1998019	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Plant management attempted to highlight the need to address longstanding OE open items; however, the fu The licensee effectively managed the operating experience (OE) screening process. However, management oversight of the program was marginally effective in ensuring timely evaluation and closure of OE items. Plant management attempted to highlight the need to address longstanding OE open items; however, the full effectiveness of this action has yet to be realized.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/01/1999	1998019	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Routine operations performance The inspectors observed shift turnover meetings and observed discussions regarding the status of plant equipment, planned testing, and maintenance. Operators exhibited good working knowledge of plant equipment and instruments.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/01/1999	1998019-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Failure to perform adequate and timely corrective actions. The inspectors identified deficiencies with the licensee's review of an industry notification regarding the potential to overpressurize the safety injection (SI) system piping. Specifically, the licensee did not evaluate and adequately resolve the issue in a timely manner. The inspectors characterized the issue as an EEI pending the licensee's development of corrective actions and subsequent NRC review. The licensee's failure to complete the corrective actions to address the potential to overpressurize the SI piping in a timely manner was a non-cited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	During motor-operated valve testing, the pressure of isolated service water piping exceeded the piping desig During motor-operated valve testing, the pressure of isolated service water piping exceeded the piping design pressure. The overpressure condition was the result of a spring check valve that was stuck closed. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's engineering evaluation and administrative controls and did not identify any deficiencies.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The licensee performed work in accordance with prescribed work instructions. The licensee performed work in accordance with prescribed work instructions. In addition, technicians were knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and work document requirements. No deficiencies were identified.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Additionally, the inspectors noted that the licensee adequately evaluated other similar spring check valves for Additionally, the inspectors noted that the licensee adequately evaluated other similar spring check valves for potential common mode failure mechanisms.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: MAINT Sec: ENG	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The service water flow to the spent fuel pool heat exchanger degraded unexpectedly. The service water flow to the spent fuel pool heat exchanger degraded unexpectedly. The licensee adequately evaluated the operability of the spent fuel pool heat exchanger, which was not included in the licensee's program for monitoring the performance of service water-cooled components. The reduced service water flow resulted from zebra mussel shell intrusion and other fouling located in the shell side of the heat exchanger. Additionally, the licensee questioned and evaluated the possibility of zebra mussel intrusion in other service water system heat exchangers. The licensee's long-term corrective action plans to replace the spent fuel pool heat exchanger tube bundle were appropriate.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/06/1999	1999010-03	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Operation of containment isolation valves contrary to TS. The licensee identified that a quarterly surveillance procedure was technically inadequate in that it required operation of specific containment isolation valves while at power. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and identified no deficiencies. Operation of these valves resulted in a violation of Technical Specification Section 3.6.a which provided requirements for maintaining containment integrity while at power.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
08/28/1999	1999009	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	The licensee plans to review this issue and develop generic guidance on allowing individuals to climb on plant The inspectors questioned the licensee's lack of guidance for protection of personnel and plant equipment when using plant equipment, such as electrical conduit, to support workers during the performance of maintenance activities. The licensee plans to review this issue and develop generic guidance on allowing individuals to climb on plant equipment.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
07/19/1999	1999008-01	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Inadequate instructions in a maintenance procedure used to verify the location of fire suppression backup equipment The inspectors identified inadequate instructions in a maintenance procedure used to verify the location of fire suppression backup equipment during testing associated with the carbon dioxide system. This example of an inadequate procedure was identified as a non-cited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/26/1999	1999004	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	The conduct and content of pre-job briefings for the surveillance tests observed ranged from acceptable to excellent The licensee generally performed work associated with surveillance testing activities in accordance with the prescribed work instructions. The conduct and content of pre-job briefings for the surveillance tests observed ranged from acceptable to excellent. The inspectors observed good use of three-way communications between the workers involved with the testing. Control room supervisors periodically challenged the workers when communications did not meet the operations communications standard.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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04/26/1999	1999004-03	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Failure to follow procedures for battery surveillance. While performing maintenance on the plant's A-train safeguard battery, inspectors observed that maintenance technicians failed to perform battery resistance measurements as required by a surveillance procedure. Although the battery was operable, personnel performance issues were of significance based on an inadequate pre-task briefing and both technicians only gave the procedure a cursory review prior to commencing the task. Proposed corrective actions to address the performance issues were deemed appropriate. This personnel error was identified as a Non-Cited Violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
03/09/1999	1999001	Pri: MAINT Sec: OPS	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2B Sec: 3B Ter:	An example of improper use of partial procedures was identified during the performance of a surveillance test. The licensee generally performed work in accordance with the prescribed work instructions. In addition, the technicians were knowledgeable of assigned tasks and work document requirements. However, an example of improper use of partial procedures was identified during the performance of a surveillance test involving the A diesel generator. This was an additional example to previously identified deficiencies in this area.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/22/1999	1999001	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	The licensee adequately controlled maintenance activities during the 8 days that the Technical Support Center diesel generator was unavailable. The licensee adequately controlled maintenance activities during the 8 days that the Technical Support Center diesel generator was unavailable. The work controls utilized guidance prescribed in administrative procedures and incorporated configuration risk.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/01/1999	1998019-03	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Failure to follow procedures for quality control inspections The licensee effectively identified an occurrence where a quality control (QC) inspector did not perform a procedurally required QC inspection, which is a non-cited violation. Licensee interviews of personnel involved indicated the QC inspector and the electrician did not understand the procedural requirements of the work involved. The licensee's corrective actions to the problem were acceptable.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	Engineering support to plant operations and maintenance organizations was observed. No deficiencies were identified. Engineering support to plant operations and maintenance organizations was observed during the course of plant work activities. Observations were made in the areas of Kewaunee Assessment Processes, plant surveillance testing, and various design and degraded equipment issues. Two specific degraded equipment issues included a stuck check valve and reduced service water flow to the spent fuel pool heat exchanger. No deficiencies were identified.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/19/1999	1999010	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	In general, the engineering safety evaluations and technical support to other departments were technically sound. Good engineering support to plant operations and maintenance organizations was observed during the course of plant work activities. This was evident through inspectors' reviews of various design and degraded equipment issues such as the seismic monitoring system. In general, the engineering safety evaluations and technical support to other departments were technically sound. However, there was one example identified where a relief valve setpoint did not account for back-pressure from the relief path.
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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
09/10/1999	1999009-01	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	URI	Pri: 4B Sec: 5C Ter:	Service water design basis and applicable bounding accident analysis. An internal licensee SSFI identified deficiencies in the plant's design control for evaluating changes to the SW system. The licensee recognized the validity and significance of this issue in 1990. However, the licensee had not resolved the design control deficiency at the completion of this inspection period.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
07/28/1999	1999009	Pri: ENG Sec: OPS	NRC	NEG	Pri: 4B Sec: 5C Ter:	Two circuits with total loads apparently in excess of the fuse ratings were not reviewed and documented for The licensee initiated a review of circuit loadings on safety-related fuses in 1993. Additional work was performed on this review in 1997 and 1998. Two circuits with total loads apparently in excess of the fuse ratings were not reviewed and documented for operability until questioned by the inspectors.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/26/1999	1999004	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The inspectors noted that the lack of clear operability determination procedural guidance allowed for varying Several operability determinations were reviewed to determine if adequate bases existed for operability decisions. No operability determinations were identified that called into question the operability of safety-related components. However, the inspectors noted that the lack of clear operability determination procedural guidance allowed for varying degrees of thoroughness in the operability determinations reviewed.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/18/1999	1999001-01	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Failure to perform timely operability determination The licensee did not perform a timely operability determination in accordance with site administrative procedures when a degraded condition was identified. The degraded condition pertained to the sodium hydroxide vacuum breakers not having been inspected since original installation. The vacuum breakers were located in an area inaccessible for preventive maintenance. Also, the design and original procurement records for the vacuum breakers could not be located. The operability determination was completed 7 days after identification which exceeded the 72-hour requirement.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/01/1999	1998019	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: Sec: Ter:	The number of open corrective actions and lack of prioritization indicated that management attention may be The Kewaunee Assessment Process (KAP) was identifying and resolving identified issues appropriately and plant personnel were initiating KAP documents at a sufficiently low threshold. However, several hundred KAP corrective action items remained open and the licensee did not prioritize the issues in the KAP documents. The number of open corrective actions and lack of prioritization indicated that management attention may be warranted to ensure timely resolution of KAP issues.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/01/1999	1998019	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	With the exception of a few work groups, most station work groups had not implemented the proceduralized The licensee had established a program to have individual work groups perform self-assessments. However, with the exception of a few work groups, most station work groups had not implemented the proceduralized self-assessment program. Although plant management did not subsequently reestablish the expectation that the reviews be performed as recommended by the procedure, the licensee acknowledged that some work groups were not meeting the recommendations of the General Nuclear Procedure (GNP).
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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By Primary Functional Area

Region III
KEWAUNEE

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
02/01/1999	1998019	Pri: ENG Sec: MAINT	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	The licensee effectively implemented a design change to remove overvoltage relays on the 125 Volt battery s The licensee effectively implemented a design change to remove overvoltage relays on the 125 Volt battery system. The modification safety evaluation screening was acceptable and the licensee completed the work in an acceptable manner.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The licensee appropriately made a 1-hour non-emergency notification to the NRC Operations Center in accorc The licensee appropriately made a 1-hour non-emergency notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(v) following a 59 percent loss of the emergency siren system to the population within the emergency planning zone. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the event and did not identify any concerns.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/18/2000	1999013-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	The licensee failed to ensure that unauthorized personnel remained outside of a posted radiography area wh The licensee failed to ensure that unauthorized personnel remained outside of a posted radiography area while radiography was in progress. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's immediate corrective actions and did not identify any deficiencies. A Non-Cited Violation was identified.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
01/14/2000	2000001-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3C Sec: Ter:	Inadequate vehicle search The inspector identified a non-cited violation in which a security officer failed to search four easily accessible compartments on one vehicle. Licensee review determined the failure resulted from a lack of attention to detail by the search officer. Corrective actions were implemented. (Section S1.1)
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
12/16/1999	1999014	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Posting, Labeling and Housekeeping Radiological postings and container labeling were well maintained and appropriately informed workers of radiological conditions. Housekeeping and material condition of radiation protection equipment was good.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
12/16/1999	1999014	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 3B Ter:	External Dose Control Overall, the external exposure control program was effectively implemented in accordance with station procedures and regulatory requirements. The radiation protection staff was knowledgeable of procedures and processes to evaluate exposures.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
12/16/1999	1999014	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 3B Ter:	Internal Exposure Control The internal exposure control program was effectively implemented. In-vitro and In-vivo analyses were performed properly and consistent with industry standards.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
12/16/1999	1999014	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 3B Ter:	Respiratory Protection The respiratory protection program was effectively implemented. Cognizant personnel were knowledgeable of procedures and regulatory requirements. The program was being revised to incorporate the upcoming changes to the respiratory protection requirements in 10 CFR Part 20.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
12/16/1999	1999014	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5A Sec: 5B Ter: 5C	Radiation Protection Audit The audit of the radiological environmental monitoring program was of sufficient scope and depth to identify deficiencies and areas where improvements were warranted. The radiation protection staff was effectively evaluating audit findings and implementing corrective actions/improvements.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/19/1999	01013-99183	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	VIO III	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Wackenhut Corporation Training Manager failed to ensure that the annual shotgun tests and verifications were performed. Wackenhut Corporation Training Manager failed to ensure that the annual shotgun tests and verifications were performed, and falsified records of the annual tests and verifications.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/12/1999	1999010-04	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Failure to control safeguards information The inspectors identified a failure to control a safeguards drawing. The licensee took prompt actions to control the information.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/08/1999	1999011-01	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	IFI	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Exercise weakness, late notification of offsite authorities of declaration of a general emergency An Exercise Weakness was identified relating to delay of offsite notifications and protective action recommendations for the General Emergency.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
10/07/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Exercise communications were not always clear and concise, resulting in some confusion among exercise re: Exercise communications were not always clear and concise, resulting in some confusion among exercise responders.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/07/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Overall licensee performance during the 1999 Emergency Plan exercise was good. Overall licensee performance during the 1999 Emergency Plan exercise was good.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/07/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Staff performance in the Control Room Simulator was good. Staff performance in the Control Room Simulator was good.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/07/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: Sec: Ter:	The Technical Support Center staff's overall performance was good. The Technical Support Center staff's overall performance was good.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/07/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Overall performance of Operational Support Facility management and staff was very good. Overall performance of Operational Support Facility management and staff was very good.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
10/07/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Facility critiques following termination of the exercise were self-critical and detailed. Facility critiques following termination of the exercise were self-critical and detailed. An excellent consolidated critique meeting provided participants with a detailed discussion of licensee-identified strengths, weaknesses, and concerns. Overall licensee critique findings were consistent with the NRC evaluation team's findings.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
09/02/1999	1999009	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: MAINT	NRC	NEG	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	The inspectors were concerned with the lack of knowledge of maintenance personnel for the control of flamr The inspectors observed a maintenance mechanic fail to adhere to a Fire Protection Plan during grinding activities by placing a bottle of isopropyl alcohol within 35 feet of the hot work area. This was a violation of minor significance. The inspectors were concerned with the lack of knowledge of maintenance personnel for the control of flammable material during grinding activities.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
07/19/1999	1999008-02	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Chemistry technicians were not following the approved procedure for the determination of dissolved oxygen While observing the sampling of secondary water, the inspectors identified that chemistry technicians were not following the approved procedure for the determination of dissolved oxygen by color comparison. The licensee identified this condition applied to the primary system sampling as well. This example of inadequate procedure compliance was identified as a non-cited violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
06/07/1999	1999006-02	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	LACK OF ACCESS CONTROLS FOR HIGH RADIATION AREA The licensee failed to provide immediate compensatory measures to control access into the containment, a high radiation area, upon identifying that the normal access door had been unlocked. Subsequently, positive controls were placed to prevent unauthorized access into the high radiation area. This was identified as a Non-Cited Violation.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
05/13/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The inspector identified that a portion of the vehicle barrier system did not meet design specifications. The inspector identified that a portion of the vehicle barrier system did not meet design specifications. This fact was not identified by the security organization because of a deficiency in the barrier inspection procedure. The safety significance was minimal because the effectiveness of the barrier was not significantly reduced or compromised.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
05/13/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The site security program provided an appropriate level of safety and protection to the public. Security personnel conducted their duties in accordance with security plan requirements. Security equipment performed as designed. Overall, the site security program provided an appropriate level of safety and protection to the public.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/26/1999	1999004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	Radiation and high radiation areas were posted and controlled in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspectors performed frequent walkdowns of safety-related equipment located within the radiologically controlled area. Additionally, the inspectors accompanied plant personnel during the monthly containment inspection. Radiation protection personnel provided effective support during the inspection as evidenced by continuously monitoring radiological conditions and providing instructions to personnel as to low dose areas. Radiation and high radiation areas were posted and controlled in accordance with NRC requirements. (Section R1)
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title Item Description
04/01/1999	1999005	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The licensee's solid radioactive waste processing program was effective. The licensee's solid radioactive waste processing program was effective, well implemented, and was as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the Process Control Program. The program was technically sound and implemented in accordance with station procedures and regulatory requirements. Radioactive waste staff were knowledgeable regarding regulations, station procedures, and industry standards.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/01/1999	1999005	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The radioactive material transportation program was technically sound and implemented consistent with regulatory requirements. The radioactive material transportation program was technically sound and implemented consistent with regulatory requirements. Required shipping documentation was complete, accessible, and maintained in accordance with regulatory requirements. Personnel involved with shipping radioactive material were effectively trained as hazardous material workers in accordance with Department of Transportation requirements
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/01/1999	1999005	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	The liquid and gaseous effluent monitoring program was effectively implemented. The liquid and gaseous effluent monitoring program was effectively implemented. Effluent monitor operability was good, with calibrations and checks performed in accordance with procedures and at the required frequencies. Annual effluent release data indicated that releases were well below regulatory limits
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
04/01/1999	1999005	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	Area radiation monitor calibration, testing, and maintenance were well implemented. Area radiation monitor calibration, testing, and maintenance were well implemented. Monitor operability was good, with calibrations and checks performed in accordance with procedures. Material condition of radiation monitors and associated equipment was good.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						
02/01/1999	1998019	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	Contaminated areas were kept to a minimum thus allowing for operator access to equipment without the need for protective clothing. Radiation and high radiation areas were posted and controlled in accordance with regulatory requirements. Contaminated areas were kept to a minimum thus allowing for operator access to equipment without the need for protective clothing.
Dockets Discussed: 05000305 Kewaunee						

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Legend

Type Codes:

BU	Bulletin
CDR	Construction
DEV	Deviation
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
IFI	Inspector follow-up item
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIC	Licensing Issue
MISC	Miscellaneous
MV	Minor Violation
NCV	NonCited Violation
NEG	Negative
NOED	Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NON	Notice of Non-Conformance
OTHR	Other
P21	Part 21
POS	Positive
SGI	Safeguard Event Report
STR	Strength
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation
WK	Weakness

Template Codes:

1A	Normal Operations
1B	Operations During Transients
1C	Programs and Processes
2A	Equipment Condition
2B	Programs and Processes
3A	Work Performance
3B	KSA
3C	Work Environment
4A	Design
4B	Engineering Support
4C	Programs and Processes
5A	Identification
5B	Analysis
5C	Resolution

ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

Functional Areas:

OPS	Operations
MAINT	Maintenance
ENG	Engineering
PLTSUP	Plant Support
OTHER	Other

EEIs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.