




**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 21, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: Docket File

FROM: Peter S. Tam, Senior Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

SUBJECT: CATAWBA AND MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION –
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION, ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED
IN AN UPCOMING TELEPHONE CONFERENCE REGARDING
AMENDMENT REQUEST DATED 11/3/99
(TAC MA6962, MA6963, MA7004 AND MA7005)

The attached questions were transmitted by email today to Messrs. L. J. Rudy and P. T. Vu of Duke Energy Corporation (DEC) to prepare them and others for an upcoming telephone conference. This memorandum and the attachment do not currently convey a formal request for information or represent an NRC staff position.

Docket Numbers 50-413 and 50-414
50-369 and 50-370

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE RELATED TO DIESEL GENERATOR TESTING

CATAWBA AND MCGUIRE UNITS 1 & 2

Reference: Letter, M. S. Tuckman to NRC, 11/3/99

- You have not demonstrated that performing Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 3.8.1.10, 13 and 14 during power operation does not create any perturbation on the electrical distribution system. We believe performing these surveillance during power operation could create a perturbation on the electrical distribution system and could impact the operation of the normally connected loads. Provide justification for the proposed request to perform these surveillance at any operational level and the reason why you do not want to perform them at shutdown.
- Indicate if you intend to propose any administrative controls to be imposed during the on-line performance of SRs 3.8.1.10, 13 and 14, such as plans to preclude performing these surveillance during unstable grid conditions or during other maintenance and test conditions that could have adverse effects on the offsite power system or plans for restricting additional maintenance or testing of required safety systems that depend on the remaining diesel generator as source of emergency power.

In addition, please indicate if any probabilistic risk assessment was made to support this request, and if so, provide the results of such study.

- Provide a description of offsite power line-up to safety-related buses that will be used during 24-hour endurance testing. Discuss whether the potential exists for perturbations during the test to affect the operability of both safety buses.
- Proposed request to perform SR 3.8.1.9 and SR 3.8.1.14 at a unity or lagging power factor within the DG unit capability. We realize that if the bus voltage during testing is already high due to high grid voltage, increasing the DG VAR output may cause the bus voltage to exceed allowable limits. We have previously accepted the following wording in the technical specification with clarification in the Basis that these surveillance will be performed under inductive load conditions that are as close to design-basis conditions as possible subject to offsite power conditions:

“Verify each DG, when connected to its bus in parallel with offsite power and operating with maximum kVAR loading that offsite power conditions permit, operates for ≥ 24 hours....”

Please indicate your intention to perform these SRs as close to design conditions as possible.