

December 7, 1999

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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ULNRC-4153



Gentlemen:

**DOCKET NUMBER 50-483
CALLAWAY PLANT UNIT 1
UNION ELECTRIC CO.
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-30
SECURITY EVENT REPORT 99-007-00
UNCOMPENSATED SECURITY MEASURE
Reference: (1) ULNRC-3994 dated March 25, 1999**

The enclosed security event report is resubmitted in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b) to include NRC Form 366, Licensee Event Report (LER). The original submittal of this report did not include NRC Form 366.


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Manager, Callaway Plant

RDA/mib

Enclosure

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March 25, 1999

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ULNRC-3994



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UNION ELECTRIC CO.
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-30
SECURITY EVENT REPORT
UNCOMPENSATED SECURITY MEASURE**

The enclosed security event report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b) to report safeguard event described in 10 CFR 73, Appendix G.


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Enclosure

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March 25, 1999
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ULNRC-3994
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SECURITY EVENT REPORT
UNCOMPENSATED SECURITY MEASURES

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On March 4, 1999 a failure to properly compensate for a loss of safeguards equipment that could have resulted in an undetected intrusion into the protected or vital area was discovered by the Security Department.

At the time of the event a modification to the plant security computer was in progress which resulted in a portion of the perimeter intrusion detection equipment being inoperable. This modification was preplanned and compensatory measures were in place. Subsequently, unplanned equipment failures occurred, at which time full compensatory measures were properly initiated. Partial equipment restoration allowed compensatory measures for that equipment to be discontinued. Due to miscommunication, compensatory measures for some inoperable equipment were mistakenly terminated for a period of approximately 44 minutes. Full compensatory measures were re-instituted following the event.

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

- Early 1999 .. The need for compensatory measures in support of MP 97-1021, new security computer installation, was identified in the planning phase
- March 1, 1999
through
March 3, 1999
1. On March 1, 1999 MSK326 cabinet removal began allowing installation of the multiplexer for the new system.
 2. The new multiplexer was installed March 2, 1999. Upon installation of the new unit all affected components were tested to ensure it would alarm on every system.
 3. By 0900 hrs on March 3, 1999, testing of the new multiplexer was complete. CAS and SAS were receiving alarms on the new system, however compensatory measures were still in place pending completion of acceptance testing.
- March 3, 1999 .. The second multiplexer, MSK327, was taken off line. The
1132 hrs multiplexer was removed from the cabinet to allow installation of the new multiplexer. Two of the microwaves driven by MSK327 were affected by this event.
- 2105 hrs MSK325 failed on line. This failure caused the Security computer to exceed its capacity limit of alarms. When the computer exceeds its alarm capacity, it begins resetting alarms. This failure was unrelated to the modification in progress.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Callaway Plant Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 8 3	PAGE (3) 1 OF 1
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TITLE (4)

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV. NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	0 4	9 9	9 9	- 0 0 7	- 0 0	1 2	0 7	9 9			0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR : (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 73.71	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below or in Text, NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)									
NAME J.D. Schnack, Supervising Engineer, QA Regulatory Support								TELEPHONE NUMBER	
								AREA CODE	
								5 7 3 6 7 6 - 4 3 1 9	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO								

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines)(16)

At 1325 CST on March 4, 1999, a failure to properly compensate for a loss of safeguards equipment was discovered by Callaway Plant contract security personnel. The failure could have resulted in an undetected intrusion into the protected or vital area. The Plant was operating at mode one, 100 percent reactor power.

At 1154 CST on March 4, 1999, full compensatory measures were secured due to resolution of a security system multiplexer failure. Partial compensatory measures in place prior to the multiplexer failure compensating for Security system computer upgrades were required to continue at this time. Due to incomplete communication and administrative controls, contract security personnel discontinued the partial compensatory measures at this time. At 1238 CST of the same day, the Central Alarm Station contract security supervisor became aware of the failure to perform compensatory measures and directed that compensatory measures of affected zones be resumed. At 1325 CST of the same day, the contract Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) was made aware of this event. The SSS advised the Utility Shift Supervisor of the event.

A search of the protected area boundary and buildings was immediately conducted. No deficiencies were identified. Corrective action included revision of logs and checklists. Security personnel training on this incident was performed.

SECURITY EVENT REPORT
UNCOMPENSATED SECURITY MEASURES

March 3, 1999
2115 hrs Full compensatory measures to cover this failure were in place within 10 minutes of the event. This action was logged.

March 4, 1999
0000 - 0100 hrs It was determined the MUX 325 problem could not be isolated and the multiplexer (MUX) would be replaced.

0930 hrs The Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) and CAS Supervisor decided to secure from full compensatory (comp) measures and comp only the equipment affected by three multiplexers that were off line (MSK326, MSK327, MSK325) after required testing was completed.

0900 - 1130 hrs Before securing full compensatory measures, a test is performed on all doors and microwave zones operable on the old system. This test was completed satisfactorily. The degraded areas are not included in this test and were to remain under full compensatory measures.

1100 - 1154 hrs

1. During conversations between the SSS and CAS Supervisor, it was reiterated that Security would continue to comp the equipment affected by MSK325, MSK326 and MSK327.
2. Dedicated observers in Security Response Centers (SRC) SRC 2 and SRC 3 monitored the microwave zones. Each SRC has video camera monitors.
3. The CAS Supervisor contacted SRC 2 and SRC 3 to check which zones the dedicated observer's were monitoring. They relayed the zones verbally to the CAS Supervisor.

1154 hrs

1. The CAS Supervisor announced via radio to all Security force members that full compensatory measures were being secured
2. The officer in SRC 2 attempted to confirm message receipt by stating her badge number via radio. This message was not received or acknowledged by the Assistant CAS Supervisor.
3. The officer stationed in SRC 2 perceived the message to include SRC 2 zones and terminated dedicated observations.
4. The security officer in SRC 2 logged that compensatory measures were terminated.

1200 hrs Security Officer in SRC 2 relief logged in. The officers in SRC 3 were relieved at approximately the same time.

SECURITY EVENT REPORT
UNCOMPENSATED SECURITY MEASURES

March 4, 1999
1238 hrs

1. SRC 3 called the CAS supervisor to verify that his zones still required dedicated observation. This phone call prompted the CAS supervisor to verify the same information with the officer stationed at SRC 2.
2. The CAS Supervisor phoned the officer at SRC 2 to verify that he was still dedicated to the zones. At this time, the CAS Supervisor was advised by the officer stationed in SRC 2 that dedicated observation post had been secured at 1154 hrs.
3. Dedicated Observer (DO) compensatory measures were immediately reinstated in SRC 2.

1325 hrs

The CAS Supervisor contacted the Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) and informed him of the event. The CAS Supervisor stated that he was aware of the vulnerability but was not aware that this was a one-hour reportable event. In the normal course of business, a Security Officer has until the end of their shift to write up and report an event.

1325 - 1340 hrs

Upon notification, the SSS:

- Phoned SRC 2 and confirmed that dedicated observations were in place.
- Requested the log from SRC 2 be brought to MAF for his review.
- Reviewed a copy of the reporting matrix to review reportability obligations.
- Further discussed details of event with CAS Supervisor.

1340 hrs

1. The SSS contacted the Security Training Supervisor.
2. The Security Training Supervisor assessed the situation with the SSS prior to reporting the event to the Security Operations Supervisor.

1350 hrs -

The Security Operations Supervisor reported the event to the Control Room at 1350 hrs.

1355 hrs

1. A search of the protected area perimeter for evidence of tampering, intrusion or discovery of contraband was initiated.
2. A badge check of all personnel inside the protected areas was initiated.
3. A search of all buildings and areas inside the protected area was initiated.

SECURITY EVENT REPORT
UNCOMPENSATED SECURITY MEASURES

- March 4, 1999
1400 hrs The SSS notified the Manager, Operations Support and advised him of the incident and the remedial actions taken (the Acting Superintendent, Security was out of the office at the time).
- 1423 hrs The event was reported to the NRC by a phone call on the ENS line.
- 1450 As a further precautionary Measure, full compensatory actions were re-instituted at the direction of the Manager, Operations Support.
- 1500 An Event Review Team meeting on the incident was convened. Attendees at the meeting included: the Assistant Plant Manager; Manager, Operations Support; and representatives from the Security; Engineering; Training; Quality Assurance and Operations Departments.
- 1555 The perimeter inspection was completed with no discrepancies found.
- 1643
 1. The badge check was completed with no discrepancies found.
 2. The building/area search was completed with no discrepancies found.
- March 12, 1999 Returned to partial compensatory measures after briefing the Manager, Operations Support regarding the implementation of corrective actions for this event.

BASIS FOR REPORTABILITY

This event is reportable per 10CFR73.71(b) as a safeguard event described in 10CFR73 Appendix G.

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF EVENT

Mode 1, Power Operations – 100% power

ROOT CAUSE

1. MSK 325 Failure
2. Incomplete communication resulted in the unintended termination of required compensatory measures in SRC 2.

SECURITY EVENT REPORT
UNCOMPENSATED SECURITY MEASURES

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

MSK 325 Failure

- Cause of MSK 325 failure was undeterminable.
- Replaced MSK 325.
- New MSK 325 tested, accepted and placed in service

Incomplete Communications/Termination of Compensatory Measure

- A search of the protected area perimeter for evidence of tampering, intrusion, or possible contraband was conducted with no discrepancies found.
- A badge check of all personnel inside the protected area was conducted with no discrepancies found.
- A search of all buildings and areas inside the protected area was conducted with no discrepancies found.
- Implemented checklists for planned/unplanned starting and ending for full system and multiplexer compensatory measures. These checklists also cover transitioning from full to partial compensatory measures. Preplanned announcements are included on the checklists.
- Revised the Dedicated Observer Log form to require the Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) or Shift Security Assistant Supervisor (SSAS) to respond to the dedicated observers location, to review the log, and sign off on any additions or deletions to the log.
- Conducted a training session with each Security crew. This training included a review of the reported incident and a review of "three way communications" principles.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The duration the failed compensatory measure was of a relatively short time (44 minutes). The plant's protected area perimeter remained in tact during this period. The failure of the compensatory measure was unplanned, unpredictable, and as a result, the uncompensated perimeter zones were not readily apparent to any person outside the protected area. The monitors in the area of the dedicated observer were still operating and, although the observer was not giving the monitor screens full attention, unusual activity in the zones in question would likely have been observed from that station.

Therefore, based on these facts and subsequent badge checks, and perimeter, building and area searches this occurrence had no impact on plant safety and did not pose a threat to public health and safety.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review of the SOS database revealed no historical events of this nature.