

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-461
License No: NPF-62

Report No: 50-461/99020(DRS)

Licensee: Illinois Power Company

Facility: Clinton Nuclear Power Station

Location: Route 54 West
Clinton, IL 61727

Dates: October 4 - 8 and November 15 - 17, 1999

Inspectors: M. Bielby, Reactor Inspector
H. Peterson, Reactor Inspector
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Approved by: David E. Hills, Chief, Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Clinton Nuclear Power Station NRC Inspection Report 50-461/99020(DRS)

This inspection report contains the findings and conclusions from the licensed reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) requalification training program inspection. The inspection included a review of training administrative procedures, and written and operating examination material; observation and evaluation of licensed operators and licensee evaluators during a requalification operating examination; an assessment of simulator fidelity; an evaluation of program controls to assure a systems approach to training; and a review of requalification training records. In addition, the inspectors observed a period of control room operations. The inspectors used the guidance in inspection procedure (IP) 71001.

Operations

The control room operators were professional and control room decorum was businesslike during full power operations. The control room turnovers and shift briefing were formal and well managed. (Section O1.1)

During performance of an operability surveillance test, a licensed RO demonstrated a good safety focus and prevented needless entry into Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation by identifying that low pressure core spray piping would be unnecessarily filled and vented. (Section O1.1)

Operations Training

The overall crew and individual operator performance demonstrated during the annual licensed operator requalification examinations was satisfactory. The inspectors considered the few instances of observed performance deficiencies to be isolated. (Section O4.1)

The licensee continued to address through the licensed operator requalification program operator performance issues observed in the plant and improve the rigor and quality of operator performance evaluations. The licensee satisfactorily administered the annual requalification examinations and evaluated operator performance according to program guidance and consistent with regulatory guidelines. (Sections O5.1 and O5.3)

The overall quality and content of the annual requalification examination material was satisfactory. (Section O5.2)

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation involving the failure of the licensee to notify the NRC in five separate instances of permanent changes in licensed operators' medical conditions regarding hypertension contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 55.21. Therefore, the NRC was not given the opportunity to evaluate the medical status and condition of the licensees if appropriate. The safety significance was low because the affected licensed operators would normally be on shift with other licensed operators and solo operation was of low probability. (Section O5.6)

Report Details

I. OPERATIONS

01 **Conduct of Operations**

01.1 Control Room Observation

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed routine control room activities during full power operation including performance of a surveillance test. The inspectors also observed turnover between control room supervisors (CRS) and a shift briefing by the CRS. The inspectors also reviewed the following procedures:

- Clinton Power Station (CPS) No. 9052.02, "Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Valve Operability Checks," Revision 30
- CPS No. 9052.04, "LPCS/Residual Heat Removal (RHR) A Header Fill And Flow Path Verification," Revision 25
- CPS No. 9052.01, "LPCS/RHR A PUMPS & LPCS/RHR A Water Leg Pump Operability," Revision 39

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors observed that control room personnel were professional and the environment was businesslike. Control room operators remained attentive to their panels and promptly responded to control panel alarms. The inspectors observed that both control room and remote communications were 3-way and consistent with management expectations. The off-going and oncoming CRSs conducted their turnover in part by performing a control room panel walk-down, reviewing logs, and discussing upcoming surveillance tests and plant evolutions. The control panel reactor operators (ROs) conducted the same type of turnover. The inspectors observed that the shift briefing was facilitated by the CRS and conducted in a formal manner with shift personnel standing in the control room behind the main control panel to allow control room operators unobstructed view of their indications.

The inspectors observed the shift complete a partial LPCS valve operability surveillance test in accordance with CPS No. 9052.02. Prior to completion, the procedure directed operators to fill and vent the LPCS system in accordance with CPS No. 9052.04. The licensed RO overseeing the surveillance reviewed ahead and identified that CPS No. 9052.04 required filling and venting unaffected portions of the LPCS system, and would require shutdown of the common water leg pump for LPCS and RHR System "A," which would result in needless entry into applicable Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. The operator informed the CRS who halted the evolution until the surveillance procedure could be revised accordingly.

c. Conclusions

The control room operators were professional and control room decorum was businesslike during full power operations. The control room turnovers and shift briefing were formal and well managed. During performance of an operability surveillance test, a licensed RO demonstrated a good safety focus and prevented needles entry into Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation by identifying that LPCS piping would be unnecessarily filled and vented.

O4 Operator Knowledge and Performance

O4.1 Annual Evaluation Performance Review (Operator Requalification)

a. Inspection Scope (71001)

To better facilitate resource scheduling with respect to a refuel outage, the facility licensee administered the various parts of the annual licensed operator requalification (LOR) examinations during different time periods. The inspectors observed dynamic scenario performance of one shift operating crew during Week 3 of the first part of the LOR annual examination. The inspectors also observed the licensee administer job performance measures (JPMs) and a written examination to each licensed operator of one shift operating crew during Week 2 of the second part of the LOR annual examination.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors observed the licensee administer four dynamic scenarios to one shift operating crew consisting of three senior reactor operators (SROs) and three ROs. Throughout the scenarios, the inspectors noted that both the shift manager (SM) and CRS maintained their position of oversight and ensured follow-up to directed actions. The CRS generally provided informative briefings and crew updates at appropriate times. As a whole, the crew clearly announced abnormal, alarm response, and emergency operating procedure (EOP) entry conditions and transitions. Entry into "transient annunciator response mode" was also announced.

The inspectors and licensee evaluators observed one instance during a simulator scenario in which the CRS and one control room operator demonstrated performance deficiencies. The scenario involved a loss of coolant accident with main steam line (MSL) isolation, reactor coolant system leakage, and loss of high pressure core spray. During the scenario, the resulting reactor water level (RWL) and pressure transients caused RWL to approach the location of the MSLs in the reactor pressure vessel and the temperature decrease approached the maximum allowed cooldown rate. Although reactor core isolation cooling could have been used to restore RWL in a more timely manner and hence limit the transient, the CRS and "A" control room operator (ACRO) chose a more complicated and time consuming option to align condensate and feedwater. In addition, the CRS and ACRO demonstrated a lack of appropriate

interaction, communication, and command and control during the scenario. The facility licensee took appropriate actions for the observed performance deficiencies.

During the JPM walkthrough examination, the inspectors observed two SROs incorrectly perform one JPM. In both instances, the procedure was verified to be correct; however, both SROs failed to perform the same procedural step. The licensee evaluators determined the individual JPM performance to be unsatisfactory and attributed the deficiencies to a lack of attention to detail. The inspectors determined that all seven licensed operators (three SROs and four ROs) observed during the inspection period passed the JPM walkthrough examination.

The inspectors graded written examinations of seven licensed operators (three SROs and four ROs) during the inspection period. The inspectors determined that all seven licensed operators passed the written examination.

c. Conclusions

The overall crew and individual operator performance during the annual licensed operator requalification examinations was satisfactory. The inspectors considered the few instances of observed performance deficiencies to be isolated.

O5 Operator Training and Qualification

O5.1 Operating History

a. Inspection Scope (71001)

The inspectors reviewed the following documents to assess the LOR training program's effectiveness regarding operator performance:

- Initial license operator retake examination and requalification program inspection report 50-461/98301
- Special LOR program inspection report 50-461/98029
- Operational readiness team inspection report 50-461/99004
- Select resident inspector observations and reports during 1999
- Select licensee event reports during 1999
- Plant Performance Review, March 26, 1999

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector's review of the above documents indicated that prior to plant restart from an extended shutdown operator performance continued to be one of three main areas of concern. The licensee's September 1998 annual LOR examination identified unsatisfactory operator performance for 4 of 7 crews and 35 of 56 operators. The licensee identified operator performance deficiencies for EOP usage, communications, command and control, and teamwork. The licensee's root cause analysis also identified deficiencies in the LOR training program. The licensee identified corrective actions for the LOR training program and included retraining and re-evaluation of all licensed

operators. The NRC operational readiness inspection noted short term improvements in operator performance, and observed that the licensee continued to emphasize and consistently clarify and reinforce performance standards and management expectations during LOR training and in the plant.

During this LOR training inspection, the inspectors observed that operator performance had improved when compared to the extended shutdown period. Although some deficiencies pertaining to communications, command and control, crew interaction, and procedure usage were identified during the annual operating examination, the inspectors determined that operator performance was generally improved and satisfactory. Furthermore, the inspectors noted that the licensee's evaluators were more objective regarding operator performance during dynamic scenario evaluations and that the overall LOR training program continued to show improvement.

c. Conclusions

The licensee continued to address through the LOR program operator performance issues observed in the plant and improve the rigor and quality of operator performance evaluations.

O5.2 Requalification Examination Material

a. Inspection Scope (71001)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's annual requalification written and operating examination material using IP 71001, Appendix A checklists to assess the quality and content. The following documents were reviewed:

- First three weeks of the 1999 annual requalification examination dynamic scenarios
- First two weeks of the 1999 annual requalification examination JPMs
- First two weeks of the 1999 biennial written examination
- The 1998 annual requalification operating examination material
- The previous 1997 biennial written examination material
- Selected 1999 training cycle evaluation scenarios and written examinations
- Operations Continuing Training Program Description, TF-019, Revision 7
- Conduct of Licensed Operator Continuing Training, Nuclear Training Manual (NTM) 11.40.2, Revision 0
- License Operator Requalification Examinations, NTM 11.40.6, Revision 0
- NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 8

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the written and operating examination material administered during the current annual requalification examination and compared it to previously administered examinations and quizzes.

Operating Examination

The inspectors determined that the operating examination material contained the necessary quantitative and qualitative attributes to provide a satisfactory evaluation of operator skills based on identified critical tasks and crew and individual competencies. Both the JPMs and dynamic scenarios had appropriate steps identified as critical based on the initial verification of expected operator actions. The annual dynamic scenario examination consisted of four scenarios administered to each plant operating crew. Each operating crew was subdivided into two simulator crews to ensure that each licensed operator participated in at least two scenarios. The annual JPM examination consisted of three simulator control room JPMs and two in-plant JPMs. Different sets of five JPMs were administered to the ROs versus the SROs.

The inspectors determined that, overall, the dynamic scenarios were of good quality and reasonable complexity. Major transients and malfunctions after EOP entry provided a good evaluation tool of operator performance. In addition, the licensee had incorporated probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) elements.

In general, the inspectors considered the JPM examination material satisfactory. The inspectors identified for future consideration opportunities for a few additional enhancements to improve the JPMs. For example, a few JPMs had only one or two critical steps and were straight forward in complexity. As such, while highly safety significant, they did not provide a good evaluation of operator performance. The inspectors noted that the evaluation potential could be improved by expanding the task or including an alternate path event. The inspectors also observed that PRA insights had not been incorporated into the development of JPM examination material.

The inspectors determined the week to week annual operating examination material overlap was satisfactory. The licensee did not repeat any JPMs and only four of 24 dynamic scenarios were repeated during the 1999 annual examination.

The inspectors identified that the licensee did not verify overlap from the previous annual operating examination or from the recent training cycle evaluation scenarios. The inspectors verified that at least five scenarios had been repeated from the 1998 annual examination; however, they had been significantly revised such that they remained discriminating and weren't predictable. The inspectors also verified that none of the JPMs had been repeated from the 1998 annual operating examination. However, the inspectors were concerned that a lack of methodology to control duplication of examination material from the previous annual operating examination and recent training cycle evaluation scenarios had the potential to make the examination more predictable and therefore less discriminating with regard to operator performance.

Written Examination

The inspectors reviewed the content and discriminatory value of the written examination questions, and identified that, overall, they provided a satisfactory evaluation of operator knowledge and abilities. However, the inspectors did identify several questions that

were direct look-up questions and therefore were of low discriminatory value. The inspectors noted that the licensee had not incorporated PRA insights into the written examinations.

The inspectors determined the week to week overlap of the annual written examination material was satisfactory. The inspectors identified that as much as 26% of the written examination questions were duplicated from week one to week two during the current annual examination. The licensee noted their procedural guidance allowed no more than 30% of the written examination questions to be duplicated from week to week.

The inspectors noted that the licensee did not verify overlap from one annual written examination to the next or from the recent training cycle quizzes to the current annual written examination. The inspectors roughly estimated that at least 40% of the previous annual written examination questions overlapped the current annual written examination. Although this amount of overlap was on the high side, it was within an acceptable range. However, the inspectors were concerned that a lack of a methodology to control duplication of examination material from the previous annual written examination and training cycle quizzes had the potential to make the examination more predictable and therefore less discriminating with regard to operator performance.

c. Conclusions

The overall quality and content of the annual requalification examination material was satisfactory.

O5.3 Requalification Examination Administration Practices

a. Inspection Scope (71001)

The inspectors performed the following to assess the licensee's policies and practices regarding the annual LOR examination administration, simulator fidelity, and examination security:

- Observed and evaluated the performance of one operating shift crew and individuals during Week 3 dynamic scenarios
- Observed and evaluated the performance of one operating shift crew and individuals during Week 2 job performance measures and written examination
- Observed and reviewed the licensee's documentation of operator performance
- Observed simulator performance
- Observed and reviewed the licensee's examination security practices

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors observed the licensee evaluate the performance of one shift operating crew during four dynamic simulator scenarios with all crew members participating in at least two scenarios. Although licensee evaluators and the inspectors identified deficiencies in performance, they appeared to be isolated. The inspectors' overall assessments of crew and individual operator performance agreed with the licensee's. The inspectors observed that the number of evaluators was adequate and included at

least one member from operations and training management. Furthermore, the inspectors observed that, overall, the licensee's evaluators were objective regarding operator performance and based grading on meeting the licensee's expected performance standards. At the conclusion of the dynamic scenarios, the licensee determined that all crews, and all but three individuals, had demonstrated satisfactory performance.

The inspectors observed the licensee evaluate the individual operator performance of one shift operating crew during a set of five JPMs during week two. The inspectors noted no undue prompting by the evaluators during the performance of the JPM walkthrough examination. The inspectors observed that licensee evaluators asked appropriate follow-up questions when necessary. Although some JPMs were unsatisfactorily performed, the licensee evaluated all individuals as satisfactory overall. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's overall operator JPM performance evaluations.

The inspectors did not identify any examination security problems during the annual examination administration. The inspectors observed a heightened sensitivity displayed by operation and training staffs for examination material and operator control during the annual examination administration.

The inspectors did not identify any new simulator or fidelity issues during the operating portion of the annual LOR examination (Enclosure 2, "Simulation Facility Report"). The inspectors observed that, in general, the licensee tracked and addressed simulator deficiency requests within a reasonable time period. The simulator down time was coordinated to ensure that licensed operator training was not significantly affected.

c. Conclusions

The licensee satisfactorily administered the annual requalification examinations and evaluated operator performance according to program guidance and consistent with regulatory guidelines. Examination security and simulator fidelity was satisfactory throughout the examination period.

O5.4 Requalification Training Program Feedback System

a. Inspection Scope (71001)

The inspectors performed the following to assess the licensee's training program feedback system effectiveness:

- Interviewed licensee personnel (operators, instructors, and training management)
- Reviewed a sampling of January - September 1999 trainee and instructor feedback forms
- Reviewed January - September 1999 Cycle Closeout Reports
- Reviewed Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) Observation No. 99-14, "Operator Requalification Training Cycle 99.2; Prestartup Training"
- Reviewed Quality Assurance Assessment Report 1999-02-10-34, March 9, 1999,

- “Simulator Performance for Emergency and Off-Normal Procedures”
- Reviewed Quarterly Training Program Evaluation, September 1999, “NTD (Nuclear Training Department) Self Assessment - Operations Training Programs”
- Reviewed various Lesson Plans used in Training Cycle 99

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors determined the licensee’s feedback process was effectively implemented. The inspectors observed that the licensee had adequate controls in place to revise the LOR training program based on audits and self assessments, industry and plant events, emergent needs, and operator and instructor feedback. The inspectors also observed that Cycle Closeout Reports satisfactorily summarized operator and instructor feedback, identified training strengths and weaknesses, and addressed questions and comments. The inspectors identified that ISEG, Quality Assurance, and NTD self assessment reports were sufficiently critical to cause necessary changes to improve the LOR program.

c. Conclusions

The licensed operator requalification training program had adequate controls in place to provide an effective systematic approach for incorporating necessary changes to improve training based on various sources of feedback.

O5.5 Remedial Training Program

a. Inspection Scope (71001)

The inspectors reviewed the following LOR annual examination documents to assess the licensee’s remedial training program effectiveness:

- Licensee’s unsatisfactory dynamic scenario performance evaluations for three individuals
- Licensee’s remediation training and re-evaluation plan for three individuals
- Operations Continuing Training Program Description, TF-019, Revision 7
- Conduct of Licensed Operator Continuing Training, NTM 11.40.2, Revision 0
- License Operator Requalification Examinations, NTM 11.40.6, Revision 0
- NUREG-1021, “Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,” Revision 8

b. Observations and Findings

The licensee identified unsatisfactory performance for three individuals during the dynamic scenario portion of the annual operating examination. The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s process for remediation. The inspectors noted that the individuals were promptly removed from standing watch, names entered in the SM log, operation’s and training management notified, and a condition report prepared. Training personnel prepared a tailored remediation package that focused on the area of weakness demonstrated during the examination. The inspectors reviewed the remediation training

plans and noted that they included instructor facilitated reviews of applicable procedures, unsatisfactory performance evaluation and associated scenario, and simulator exercises related to deficient performance areas. The operator also participated in a training management review of remedial training. After completion of re-training, the operator was re-evaluated in a scenario that required successful demonstration of deficiencies identified in the original evaluation scenario.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's remediation training plan preparation, and administration and re-evaluation processes were sufficient to correct identified performance deficiencies and to assure that operators could safely resume licensed duties.

O5.6 Conformance With Operator License Conditions

a. Inspection Scope (71001)

The inspectors reviewed the biennial medical history for 10 individuals maintaining RO and SRO licenses in accordance with 10 CFR 55.21.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors identified that all of the licensed operators were current with their biennial medical examination. Of the ten sampled medical records none had exceeded the 24 months time requirement.

The inspectors identified through review of past operator medical records that the licensee had failed to notify the NRC within the required 30 day time limit of finding a licensed operator's medical condition exceeding the requirements of ANSI Standard 3.4 - 1983. The medical condition of concern was high blood pressure or hypertension. The inspectors found that at least one licensed operator was diagnosed as having hypertension and was on medication, circa 1996, but that the NRC had not been notified. The licensee was informed of this finding and the licensee subsequently reviewed the remainder of the operator medical records. The licensee found four other licensed operators who were diagnosed and under medication for hypertension. These additional examples had also not been reported to the NRC.

On April 14, 1997, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 94-14, Supplement 1, "Failure to Implement Requirements for Biennial Medical Examinations and Notification to the NRC of Changes in Licensed Operator Medical Conditions." This IN reminded all licensees to notify the NRC of changes in a licensed operator's physical or mental condition, as determined by a physician. The IN specifically addressed the case of hypertension and clarified the need to report to the NRC even if the condition was controlled by medication or diet. The licensee was aware of IN 94-14; however, the licensee incorrectly interpreted the requirements and determined that NRC notification was not necessary.

Title 10 CFR 55.25, "Incapacitation because of a disability or illness," states in part, if during the term of the license, the licensee develops a permanent physical or mental

condition that causes the licensee to fail to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.21, the facility licensee shall notify the NRC within 30 days of learning of the diagnosis. Title 10 CFR 55.21, "Medical examination," requires that a physician shall determine that NRC-licensed operators meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.33(a)(1) with respect to medical condition and general health which in turn references 10 CFR 55.23 for specific certification requirements. Further, 10 CFR 55.23 specifies that an authorized facility licensee shall complete and sign NRC Form 396, "Certification of Medical Examination by Facility Licensee," to certify the medical fitness of the individual. By signing NRC Form 396, the facility licensee certifies that the guidance in American Nuclear Standards Institute ANSI 3.4-1983, "Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," or alternate method to which the facility licensee may be committed, was followed in determining the medical fitness of an operator for power reactors.

The intent of 10 CFR 55.25 is to ensure the NRC is notified when a licensed operator's medical condition no longer meets the original licensing standard and to ensure that a conditional license to accommodate the change in the operator's physical or mental condition is issued if appropriate. The failures to notify the NRC within 30 days of learning of the diagnosis of hypertension is a violation of 10 CFR 55.25 (50-461/99020-01(DRS)). This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report No. 1-99-11-114.

The inspectors determined that the safety significance was low because the affected licensed operators would normally be on shift with other licensed operators and the risk of solo operation was of low probability. The licensee subsequently imposed no-solo operation for these five operators pending notification to the NRC.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation involving the failure of the licensee to notify the NRC in five separate instances of permanent changes in licensed operators' medical conditions regarding hypertension contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 55.21. Therefore, the NRC was not given the opportunity to evaluate the medical status and condition of the licensees if appropriate. The safety significance was low because the affected licensed operators would normally be on shift with other licensed operators and solo operation was of low probability.

O5.7 Conformance With Operator License Conditions: Maintenance of Active Operator Licenses

a. Inspection Scope (71001)

The inspectors interviewed operations and training department personnel and reviewed the following documents to assess the facility and operator licensees' compliance with 10 CFR Part 55.53 license condition requirements:

- Operations Continuing Training Program Description, TF-019, Revision 7
- Conduct of Licensed Operator Continuing Training, NTM 11.40.2, Revision 0

- License Operator Requalification Examinations, NTM 11.40.6, Revision 0
- NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 8
- Technical Specifications Administrative Section
- Control room proficiency watch list for licensed operators

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed and determined that the licensee's program for maintaining RO and SRO licenses active, and for reactivating licenses, was in accordance with 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). The inspectors identified that the program accounted for licensed individuals assigned to control room duties as well as individuals assigned to work support activities. The inspectors did not identify any examples of individuals who had not maintained their SRO or RO licenses active in accordance with 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). The inspectors also verified that control room manning agreed with the technical specification required control room licensed positions.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's program effectively maintained operator licenses active in accordance with 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f).

V. Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to members of licensee management and staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on November 17, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented and did not identify any of the information reviewed as proprietary.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

V. Cz, Manager Training
B. Derbort, Medical
M. Lyons, Supervisor - Operations Training
B. Maguire, Director - Operations
J. Neuschwanger, Lead Instructor - Operations Training Requal
M. Stickney, Supervisor - Licensing

NRC

K. Stoedter , Resident Inspector

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 71001: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation
IP 71707: Plant Operations

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-461-99020-01(DRS) NCV Failure to notify the NRC within 30 days of learning of the diagnoses of a medical condition not meeting requirements of 10 CFR 55.21. (Section O5.6)

Closed

50-461-99020-01(DRS) NCV Failure to notify the NRC within 30 days of learning of the diagnoses of a medical condition not meeting requirements of 10 CFR 55.21. (Section O5.6)

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ACRO	"A" Control Room Operator
ANSI	American Nuclear Standard Institute
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CPS	Clinton Power Station
CRS	Control Room Supervisor
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedure
IN	Information Notice
IP	Inspection Procedure
ISEG	Independent Safety Engineering Group
JPM	Job Performance Measure
LOR	Licensed Operator Requalification
LORT	Licensed Operator Requalification Training
LPCS	Low Pressure Core Spray
MSL	Main Steam Line
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTD	Nuclear Training Department
NTM	Nuclear Training Manual
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Analysis
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RO	Reactor Operator
RWL	Reactor Water Level
SM	Shift Manager
SRO	Senior Reactor Operator

SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT

Facility Licensee: Clinton Power Station Unit 1

Facility Licensee Dockets No: 50-461

Operating Tests Administered: October 4 - 6 and November 15 - 16, 1999

This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.

While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed (if none, so state):

ITEM

DESCRIPTION

NONE OBSERVED