



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

November 30, 1999

Charles M. Dugger, Vice President
Operations - Waterford 3
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box B
Killona, Louisiana 70066

SUBJECT: LICENSEE MEETING - NOVEMBER 10, 1999

Dear Mr. Dugger:

This refers to the meeting conducted in the Region IV office on November 10, 1999. This meeting related to the results of NRC Inspection Report 99-17.

Your presentation contained commitments to initiate broader and deeper corrective actions to address issues in the intrusion detection system, assessment aids system, access control, training and qualification program, organization performance, and table top exercises. The specifics are contained in your presentation which, along with the attendance list, is enclosed with this summary. Your presentation was well received by the NRC staff attending the meeting. Region IV staff will monitor the progress of your corrective actions.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Gail M. Good, Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No.: 50-382
License No.: NPF-38

Enclosures:

1. Attendance List
2. Licensee Presentation

PDR ADOCK

Entergy Operations, Inc.

-2-

cc:

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-3-

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Entergy Operations, Inc.

-4-

DISTRIBUTION:

DMB (IE45)

Regional Administrator

WAT Resident Inspector

DRP Director

DRS Director

Branch Chief (DRP/D)

Project Engineer (DRP/D)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

RIV File

RITS Coordinator

DOCUMENT NAME: R:_WATWTMS1110.ABE.WPD

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DISTRIBUTION:


- DMB (IE45)
- Regional Administrator
- WAT Resident Inspector
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
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
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Waterford 3
Security Operations Performance Review
November 10, 1999
Arlington, Texas



Security Operations Performance Review

AGENDA


- **Introduction/Overview** **Chuck Dugger**
- **Assessment** **Ray Burski**
- **Issues and Corrective Actions** **Ray Burski/Al Wrape**
- **Summary/Conclusion** **Everett Perkins**



Security Operations Performance Review

Introduction/Overview

Chuck Dugger




Security Operations Performance Review

OVERVIEW

- **Committed to actions to enhance security program**


- **Improving security's performance is a top priority**



Security Operations Performance Review

Assessment

Ray Burski



Security Operations Performance Review

Assessment


- **Multiple Reports from 1996 to 1999 indicated problems in Security :**
 - ◆ **OSRE Report**
 - ◆ **NRC Inspection Reports**
 - ◆ **QA Audits/Surveillances**
 - ◆ **EOI Assessments**
 - ◆ **Internal Security Department Observations**
 - ◆ **Condition Reports**



Security Operations Performance Review

Assessment


- **Past Initiatives**
 - ◆ **Rebuilt Security Tactical and Contingency Training (STACT) Center**
 - ◆ **Replaced all metal detectors**
 - ◆ **Upgraded range**
 - ◆ **Upgraded procedures**
 - ◆ **Replaced Security computer**
 - ◆ **Second X-ray machine purchased**
 - ◆ **Upgraded approximately 50% of perimeter microwave heads**
 - ◆ **Additional lighting being installed - to be completed by 6/30/00**
 - ◆ **New radios**
 - ◆ **Tactical defense positions installed**
 - ◆ **Total Quality Training**
 - ◆ **Corrective Action Program Training**
 - ◆ **Human Error Reduction Training**
- **More initiatives planned to achieve long term success**



Security Operations Performance Review

Assessment


- **Based on historical review, we have determined:**
 - ◆ **Follow-up to Westside vulnerability weak**
 - ◆ **Morale an issue**
 - + extended periods on 2 shift rotation
 - + supervision
 - + training on overtime
 - ◆ **Access control periodic problems**
 - ◆ **Some equipment issues**
 - + lighting
 - + derailer
 - ◆ **Lack of Professionalism**



Security Operations Performance Review

Issues


- **We have concluded that broader and deeper corrective actions are necessary**
- **Security problems and resolution plans are organized into five discreet categories/issues**
 - ◆ **Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Assessment Equipment**
 - ◆ **Access Control**
 - ◆ **Training and Qualification**
 - ◆ **Organizational Performance**
 - ◆ **Table Tops**



Security Operations Performance Review

Issues and Corrective Actions

Ray Burski/Al Wrape



Security Operations Performance Review

IDS and Assessment Equipment

● System Adequate But Aging

◆ Issues


- ✦ High maintenance
- ✦ Undesirable security posting hours - Performance Indicators (PI) "White" for last three quarters
- ✦ Problems with placements and integrated alignment of cameras
- ✦ Failure of one zone during inspection

◆ Interim Corrective Actions

- ✦ Added additional razor ribbons
- ✦ Upgraded approximately 50% of perimeter zone detector heads since 1996

◆ Long Term Corrective Actions


- ✦ Changed maintenance/posting philosophy
- ✦ Independent review of perimeter complete
- ✦ Independent review of defensive barriers to commence week of 11/8/99
- ✦ Adjusted failed zone - tested satisfactorily



Security Operations Performance Review

IDS and Assessment Equipment

- **Entergy Operations Peer Assessment performed**
- **Independent study of security perimeter performed by James Gilbert (S&L)**
 - ◆ **Recommendations include:**
 - ✦ Install nuisance fence
 - ✦ Optimize camera placement
 - ✦ Cover shells in isolation zone with coarse stone
 - ✦ Optimize IDS design
 - ✦ Maintenance recommendations
- **Independent study of defensive barriers to be performed by James Gilbert (S&L) week of 11/8/99**
- **Recommendations being reviewed - will identify actions and implementation plan by 1/31/2000**



Security Operations Performance Review

Access Control

● Metal Detectors

◆ Issue


- ✦ Testing showed that detectors did not meet 85% test criteria

◆ Interim Corrective Actions

- ✦ Installed ramps in metal detectors
- ✦ Tested satisfactory

◆ Long Term Corrective Actions

- ✦ Reviewing alternate solutions by 3/31/00
- ✦ Perform review of testing criteria/methodology by 3/31/00



Security Operations Performance Review

Access Control

● X-ray Machines

◆ Issue


- ✦ Vulnerable to tossing items

◆ Interim Corrective Action

- ✦ Security Officers have been briefed on the potential vulnerability and are cognizant of appropriate actions
- ✦ Additional QA surveillances being performed through 3/31/00

◆ Long Term Corrective Actions

- ✦ Reconfigure X-ray machine entrance portals - to be completed by 11/19/99
- ✦ Relocate monitors to exit end of x-ray lanes by 12/3/99



Security Operations Performance Review

Access Control

● Turnstiles

◆ Issue


- ✦ Existing design can potentially allow unauthorized or undetected access to the Protected Area

◆ Interim Corrective Actions

- ✦ Instructions placed on hand geometry/card reader to require personnel to proceed quickly through turnstiles
- ✦ Time out for alarm/annunciator reduced by 50%
- ✦ Turnstiles alarms are broadcast on the security radio
- ✦ Ring down telephone from CAS/SAS placed in FASCO office
- ✦ Only one lane open majority of time

◆ Long Term Corrective Action (Turnstiles)

- ✦ Firmware changes will be made by 2/8/00 to preclude future occurrences
- ✦ Third alarm station installed in FASCO - complete



Security Operations Performance Review

Access Control


● Key Control

◆ Issue

- ✦ During inventory of key control, discovered one core key missing
- ✦ Failure to replace lock and key system after lost core key and failure to log or report

◆ Interim Corrective Actions 8/98

- ✦ Removed key set from inventory
 - Lost key was 1 of 7 sets
 - Set not used since June 1997
- ✦ Initially Determined not to be reportable based on understanding of key system design



Security Operations Performance Review

Access Control


● Key Control (cont.)

◆ Interim Corrective Actions 1/99

- ✦ Additional investigation performed
 - Based on URI from regional inspection
 - Determined all core keys identical
- ✦ Immediately compensated and made 1 hour report
- ✦ Removed remaining 6 sets from inventory

◆ Long Term Corrective Actions

- ✦ Built and installed new key set and built back-up
- ✦ Procedure revised to require all systems independent



Security Operations Performance Review

Access Control

● Badge Inactivation

◆ Issue


- ✦ Failure of Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) to place access badge on security hold upon notification of termination

◆ Interim Corrective Actions

- ✦ Unescorted access terminated and badge destroyed upon discovery
- ✦ Ran card history - badge not used

◆ Long Term Corrective Actions

- ✦ Issued Required Reading to armed Security personnel to reinforce expectations for inactivating or placing badges on hold



Security Operations Performance Review

Access Control

● Authorization Verification

◆ Issues


- ✦ Failure to use access authorization list to verify status upon computer failure
- ✦ Manually logged but not verified against list
- ✦ Verification was made with access database
- ✦ 11 individuals over 6 minute period

◆ Interim Corrective Actions

- ✦ Ran key card history to determine if any unauthorized entries - none found

◆ Long Term Corrective Actions

- ✦ Issued Required Reading to armed Security personnel to reinforce expectations for verifying authorization status



Security Operations Performance Review

Training and Qualification


- **Security officer ability to load shotgun was restricted**

- ◆ **Issue**

- ✦ Officer had cosmetic nails applied to her finger nails

- ◆ **Corrective Actions**

- ✦ Officer removed the nail which restricted her motion
- ✦ All subsequent nails were removed as directed by Security Supervision
- ✦ All Security Personnel were checked for extended nails (no problems were identified)
- ✦ Establish standards to address this issue and reviewed with all security personnel



Security Operations Performance Review

Training and Qualification


● Firing Range

◆ Issue

- ✦ Three of ten randomly selected security officer failed to qualify at the range

◆ Corrective Actions

- ✦ Unqualified officers relieved of duty; Two qualified subsequent to the initial firing; The third received remedial training and qualified the following day.
- ✦ All armed security personnel sent to the weapon range to qualify with handguns
- ✦ Three of forty-nine additional armed security officers failed to qualify during first attempt. Unqualified officers relieved of duty; Two qualified during the next qualifying round. The third qualified following remedial instruction.
- ✦ Will modify shift schedule after the first of the year to allow additional range time (once per quarter) to provide armed security personnel with a structured format for weapons familiarization at the range




Security Operations Performance Review

Organizational Performance

- **Supervision Is Not Establishing and Consistently Reinforcing Standards and Expectation**

- ◆ **Chronology**

- ✦ New Director of Site Support and Wackenhut Project Manager - 8/98
- ✦ Performed a review of Security Organization - 8/98
- ✦ Performance improvements for Security Shift Supervisors incorporated into SSS's performance appraisal - 9/98
- ✦ Wackenhut submitted additional plans for improving Supervisor performance - 11/98
- ✦ Mid cycle performance review with SSS's showed minimal improvements - 2/99
- ✦ SSS's performance did not improve and subsequently were terminated - 9/99



Security Operations Performance Review


Organizational Performance

◆ Chronology (cont.)

- + Selected four new SSS's - 9/99
- + All SSS's have participated in EOI's Supervisory Training - 10/99

◆ Other Initiatives

- + Developed a Security Operations Performance Team - 6/99
- + Team building for all SSS's by 12/31/99
- + Increased EOI Management oversight - 8/99




Security Operations Performance Review

Table Tops

● Lessons Learned

- ◆ Weapons deployment needs improvement
- ◆ Strategies need improvement
 - ✦ Additional equipment to delay adversaries
- ◆ Hardened Barriers need improvement
 - ✦ More Barriers are needed
 - ✦ Existing Barriers need firing slits
- ◆ Vulnerability to gas attacks
- ◆ Additional training needed



Security Operations Performance Review


Table Tops

● Interim Corrective Actions

- ◆ Westside Access and Reactor Auxiliary Bldg. patrols are armed with shotguns
- ◆ The number of available weapons has been increased
- ◆ Respirators distributed to satellite weapon lockers

● Long Term Corrective Actions


- ◆ Additional gun cabinets and weaponry by 12/15/99
- ◆ Independent assessment to review defensive barriers by 01/31/00
- ◆ Modify shift schedule after the first of the year to address training issues



Security Operations Performance Review

Summary and Conclusions

Everett Perkins



Security Operations Performance Review

Summary and Conclusions

- **Indicators of Performance Problems - Post OSRE**
 - ◆ OSRE Report
 - ◆ Internal Auditing Assessment
 - ◆ Inspection Reports
 - ◆ Personnel Observations (including residents)
 - ◆ Security Assist Inspection Report

- **Actions have been taken and have not been comprehensive**
 - ◆ More broad reaching changes are necessary
 - ◆ Need to address poor leadership/professionalism
 - ◆ Engineering is performing a comprehensive review of security equipment problems

- **Actions to resolve issues will be closely monitored by EOI**