

NEI 99-07 [Draft1]

Nuclear Energy Institute

**Integrated Response
Self-Assessment Program**

September 1999

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

[Click here and type Executive Summary.]

APPENDICES

A. TARGET SET DEVELOPMENT PROCESS	A-1
B. DETAILED EVALUATION CRITERIA	B-1
C. PHYSICAL PROTECTION EFFECTIVENESS.....	C-1

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Integrated Response—

Other Elements—

Radiological sabotage—

Structures, systems and components (SSCs)—

Tabletop—

Target set—

Timeline—

Weapons Proficiency—

4 SELF ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

A clear set of performance objectives must be identified for use in evaluating a licensee's contingency response strategy. These should be the same objectives used by a licensee in developing its security program. The rule provides two overarching criteria, protection of public health and safety and the design basis threat that must be planned for.

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Periodic drills and exercises are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the contingency response program. To be effective, it must be clear what program elements are being evaluated in each drill or exercise. The following critical element will be evaluated using drills or exercises:

- Contingency Response Strategy
- Timelines
- Target set denial
- Integrated plant response
- Weapons proficiency

Other program elements, which may contribute to the successful demonstration of a critical element, should be evaluated over the three-year review cycle. These include:

- Planning
- Coordination
- Command and Control
- Communications
- Alarm Station Response
- Individual Responder Tactics
- Team Response Tactics
- Use of Deadly Force

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- Advanced notification of required personnel

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In planning the drill or exercise, personnel should be identified to fill the following roles if required by the scenario.

- **Controllers—**
- **Evaluators—**
- **Adversaries—**
- **Security Force Players—**
- **Security Shadow Force—**
 - **Plant Operations Personnel—**

8.3 CONDUCT OF DRILLS AND EXERCISES

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8.4 ASSESSMENT OF A DRILL OR EXERCISE

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8.5 FREQUENCY

- Triennial Force on Force NRC observed exercise will be announced in advance and used to demonstrate the on-site response capability of the licensee against the DBT--

9 CORRECTIVE ACTION

APPENDIX B

Detailed Evaluation Criteria

- 1 EXERCISE CONTROL AND EVALUATION**
- 2 EXERCISE ADMINISTRATION**
- 3 PLANNING**
- 4 COORDINATION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL**
- 5 EVALUATE DEFENSIVE STRATEGY**
- 6 COMMUNICATIONS**
- 7 ALARM STATION RESPONSE**
- 8 INDIVIDUAL TACTICS**
- 9 TEAM TACTICS**
- 10 USE OF DEADLY FORCE /APPLICATION OF FORCE**
- 11 RESPONSE TO INTRUDER(S) WITHOUT IDENTIFIED WEAPONS**
- 12 PHYSICAL SECURITY AND EQUIPMENT**
- 13 CONTROLLER PARTICIPATION**
- 14 POST DRILL/EXERCISE BRIEFING**

Security Working Group

**Integrated Response Self
Assessment Program**

October 14, 1999



Areas of Industry Effort

- Develop a self-assessment program guide
- Drafting a safety-focused security rule
- Defining target set analysis criteria
- Achieving consistency in current industry commitments



Public Health and Safety

- Prevent release exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 criteria
- Same approach as Design Basis Accidents
- Target sets developed independent of threat
 - Considers full plant response
 - Must lose all elements of a target set



Design Basis Threat

- Must have clearly defined characteristics
 - Essential to industry program
- Adversary Characteristics Document
 - Safeguards document
 - Detailed description
 - Provides a basis for evaluation



Philosophical Points

- Exercises and drills may involve more than security forces
 - Integrated plant response capability
 - Do not need to test full ACD in any individual exercise
 - Full range of ACD tested over cycle
- Safety is paramount
 - Do not run exercises during adverse conditions



Guidance Document

- Main document sets program goals
 - Introduction
 - Purpose and Scope
 - Definitions
 - Self-Assessment Program
 - Target Set Development
 - Adversary Characteristics
 - Contingency Response Strategy



Status

- Draft guide being reviewed by Security Working Group
- Goal is to provide working copy to NRC staff in November
- Meet to discuss details first week in December



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