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ENCLOSURE

**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV**

Docket No.: 50-382
License No.: NPF-38
Report No.: 50-382/99-17
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location: Hwy. 18
Killona, Louisiana
Dates: October 4-7, 1999
Inspector(s): A. Bruce Earnest, Physical Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch
David Orrik, Reactor Safeguards Specialist,
Reactor Safeguards Section, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Approved: Gail M. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Attachment: Supplemental Information

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-382/99-01

This routine, announced regional assist inspection focused on the licensee's physical security program. The areas inspected included review of access control of personnel and packages, protected area detection aids, assessment aids, performance assessment of site security, lock and key control, security event logs, training and qualifications, onsite review of event reports, and followup of previously identified items.

Plant Support

- Four violations of the physical security plan and licensee procedures were identified in the area of personnel access control. The four violations involved: (1) allowing a terminated contractor employee to retain unescorted access for 20 days after termination of employment, (2) failing to verify access authorization during a computer outage, (3) failing on two occasions to verify access authorization and identification prior to granting access on the wrong badge/keycards, and (4) failing to detect the test weapon during NRC testing. These Severity Level IV violations are being treated as noncited violations, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The Severity Level IV violations were entered into the licensee's corrective action system as Condition Reports CR-WF3-1999-0025, CR-WF3-1999-0214, CR-WF3-1999-0716, and CR-WF3-1999-1057, respectively. A vulnerability in the X-ray machines was identified (Section S1.1).
- During testing of the protected area detection system, one zone failed to detect the test person. Overall, the protected area detection system was adequate in that vulnerabilities in the system could not be tested or defeated because of the application of razor tape barriers (Section S2.1).
- The assessment aids system provided minimally adequate assessment of the perimeter detection zones and was vulnerable to defeat (Section S2.2).
- Based on the results of time line and table top exercises, the NRC staff and contractors concluded that the demonstrated defensive strategy appeared weak in that insufficient numbers of armed responders would have arrived in interdicting/interposing positions in sufficient time to prevent radiological sabotage to vital equipment (Section S2.3).
- A violation of Security Procedure PS-011-108 was identified for failure to install a new key system to compensate for the loss of a core key. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-1999-0097 (Section S2.4).

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- A violation of Security Procedure PS-010-104 was identified for failure to log a lost core key with the potential to unlock every security door in the plant. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-1999-0097 (Section S3.1).
- A violation of the physical security plan and the training and qualification plan was identified for failure to demonstrate proficiency with the required weapons. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-1999-1058 (Section S5.1).

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ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

C. Dugger, Vice President, Operations
E. Beckendorf, Superintendent, Plant Security
M. Brandon, Supervisor, Licensing
R. Burski, Director, Site Support
E. Causey, River Bend Training Instructor
D. Childress, Supervisor, Security Access Authorization and Fitness-for-Duty
B. Donnand, Security Shift Supervisor
E. Ewing, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
R. File, Quality Assurance Manager
C. Fugate, Operations Superintendent
R. Killian, Audits Supervisor, Quality Assurance
T. Leonard, Plant Manager
K Mathews, Grand Gulf Security Shift Supervisor
J. Morgan, Quality Assurance
E. Perkins, Manager, Licensing
B. Phillips, Plant Engineer
G. Scott, Licensing Engineer
D. Shipman, Superintendent, Maintenance
K. Wilson, Civil Design Engineer

Contractor

R. Amato, The Wackenhut Corporation
T. Duet, Training/KeyControl Coordinator, The Wackenhut Corporation
K. Hayes, Project Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation
M. Power, Fire Watch Coordinator, The Wackenhut Corporation
A. Smith, Project Supervisor, The Wackenhut Corporation

NRC

T. Farnholtz, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Good, Chief, Plant Support Branch, RIV

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81700	Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
IP 92700	Onsite Review of Event Reports
IP 92904	Followup

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-382/9917-01	NCV	Inadequate Access Control
50-382/9917-02	NCV	Inadequate Access Control
50-382/9917-03	NCV	Inadequate Access Control
50-382/9917-04	NCV	Inadequate Access Control
50-382/9917-05	NCV	Inadequate Lock and Key Control
50-382/9917-06	NCV	Failure to Report
50-382/9917-07	NCV	Inadequate Training and Qualifications

Closed

50-382/9917-01	NCV	Inadequate Access Control
50-382/9917-02	NCV	Inadequate Access Control
50-382/9917-03	NCV	Inadequate Access Control
50-382/9917-04	NCV	Inadequate Access Control
50-382/9917-05	NCV	Inadequate Lock and Key Control
50-382/9917-06	NCV	Failure to Report
50-382/9917-07	NCV	Inadequate Training and Qualifications
50-382/9816-03	IFI	Assessment Aids
50-382/9816-01	IFI	Access Control Metal Detectors
50-382/9816-04	EEI	Protection of Safeguards Information
50-382/9901-02	URI	Lock and Key Control
50-382/9901-03	URI	Vehicle Barrier System
50-382/9901-04	IFI	Security Organization
50-382/9908-01	EEI	Inadequate Access Authorization
50-382/1999S001	LER	Contraband in the Protected Area
50-382/1999S002	LER	Improperly Authorized Access to the Plant Protected Area.

PARTIAL LIST OF LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Waterford 3 Physical Security Plan, Revision 18

Waterford 3 Training and Qualification Plan, Revision 6

Security Event Reports A-009-99 and B-063-99

Security Guideline 11-102J, Revision 0

Entergy Departmental Procedure CS-DP-102, "Personnel Access Control," Revision 17

Entergy Departmental Procedure CS-DP-104, "Unescorted Access Authorization," Revision 0

Entergy Departmental Procedure CS-DP-108, "Lock and Key Control," Revision 12

Security Procedure PS-010-104, "Security Reporting Requirements," Revision 13

Security Procedure OM-106, "Unescorted Access Authorization Program," Revision 3

First through Fourth Quarter, 1999 Safeguards Event Logs

Four Access Authorization Files

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