

MEMORANDUM TO: Ronald D. Hauber, Director
Division of Nonproliferation,
Exports and Multilateral Relations
Office of International Programs

FROM: Theodore S. Sherr, Chief
Licensing and International
Safeguards Branch
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
and Safeguards, NMSS

SUBJECT: XSNM-3113, EXPORT OF LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM TO
AUSTRALIA

We have reviewed the subject export application and provide the following international safeguards and foreign physical protection information for your consideration. This case involves the export of low-enriched uranium to Australia for use in experimentation in R&D facilities evaluating the SILEX uranium enrichment process in Australia.

International Safeguards

Australia is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, as such, accepts IAEA safeguards on all source and special nuclear material in its nuclear activities. The IAEA Annual Report for 1998 shows that an IAEA Facility Attachment has been negotiated and is in force for the Lucas Heights Research Laboratory.

We note that the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report for 1998 states that, with the exception of the DPRK situation, "...the Secretariat did not find any indication that nuclear material which had been declared and placed under safeguards had been diverted for any military purpose or for purposes unknown, or that facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards were being misused. All the information available to the Agency supports the conclusion that the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for."

Physical Protection

A physical protection evaluation was performed during a visit to Australia in March 1997. The conclusion of this review was that Australia's physical protection program was consistent with the then-current version of INFCIRC/225 (i.e., Rev. 3). Staff has reviewed subsequent information received to date, and has determined that there is no indication that the physical protection program has degraded in this country. In addition, staff has determined, on the basis of currently available information, that physical protection measures to protect against proliferation of nuclear weapons are in conformance with the current version of INFCIRC/225 (i.e., Rev.4).

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