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Log # TXX-99261  
File # 10035  
Ref. # GL-96-06

November 12, 1999

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

**SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)**  
**DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446**  
**SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REGARDING GENERIC**  
**LETTER 96-06 "ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY**  
**AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN BASIS**  
**ACCIDENT CONDITIONS"**  
**(TAC NOS. M96797 and M96798)**

- REF: 1) TXU Electric Letter, logged TXX-97019, from C. L. Terry to the NRC dated January 27, 1997,
- 2) TXU Electric Letter, logged TXX-97240, from C. L. Terry to the NRC dated November 7, 1997,
- 3) TXU Electric Letter, logged TXX-98164, from C. L. Terry to the NRC dated June 30, 1998,

Gentlemen:

On October 1, 1996, the NRC issued Generic Letter 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity during Design Basis Accident Conditions." TXU Electric provided information responding to Generic Letter 96-06 per the referenced letters. This letter provides an update to the implementation of actions regarding the above subject Generic Letter.

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A design change was issued to administratively lock open the manual isolation valves of the component cooling water loop to two heat exchangers in containment to ensure a relief path is available in Modes 1 through 4. The design change was implemented for Units 1 and 2 during previous refueling outages. FSAR Figure 9.2-3 (M1-0231 for Unit 1 and M2-0231-A for Unit 2) shows the the locked open status of the intervening manual isolation valves.


The Unit 1 personnel airlock hydraulic system penetrates the containment boundary and has been classified as a closed system inside containment. Design change documentation was initiated to add thermal overpressure protection to the Unit 1 personnel airlock hydraulic system. The design change was implemented in a previous refueling outage of Unit 1 (spring 1998). FSAR Figure 3.8-22 (M1-0245) shows the thermal overpressure protection devices.

Restoration of ventilation chilled water to the containment fan coolers is not required after an accident. TXU Electric has made provisions for plant staff to evaluate the conditions prior to chill water restoration. Emergency operating procedure (EOP-0.0A/B) has been revised to clarify that the plant staff will assess the potential of flashing and waterhammer prior to aligning the ventilation chilled water to containment.


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This communication contains no new licensing basis commitments regarding CPSES Units 1 and 2.

Sincerely,



C. L. Terry

By:   
Roger D. Walker  
Regulatory Affairs Manager

JDS/js

Attachment

c - E. W. Merschoff, Region IV  
J. I. Tapia, Region IV  
D. H. Jaffe, NRR  
Resident Inspectors, CPSES

