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Rick J. King
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October 28, 1999

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: River Bend Station
Docket No. 50-458
License No. NPF-47
Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 99-013-00

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

RBG-45156
RBF1-99-0299

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report. The commitments contained in this document are identified on the attached Commitment Identification Form.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Rick J. King".

RJK/dhw
attachment
enclosure

IE22

PDR ADOCK

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cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
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Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
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Mr. Prosanta Chowdhury
Program Manager – Surveillance Division
Louisiana DEQ
Office of Radiological Emergency Planning and Response
P. O. Box 82215
Baton Rouge, LA 70884-2215

Attachment
Commitment Identification Form
Subject: LER 99-013-00
RBF1-99-0299
RBG-45156
October 28, 1999

COMMITMENT	ONE-TIME ACTION	CONTINUING COMPLIANCE
During the investigation, a complete review of the modification design package for the controls on the containment isolation valve was performed to determine whether similar deficiencies existed. Other similar errors were found, and these will be corrected.	X	
Affected PM procedures will be revised to incorporate the completed document changes.	X	

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1)

River Bend Station

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000-458

PAGE (3)

1 of 3

TITLE (4)

Unplanned Automatic Actuation of Primary Containment Isolation Valve During Maintenance Due to Inadequate Procedure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	28	1999	1999	13	00	10	28	1999	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)			
1	100%	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)
		20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME
D. N. Lorfing, Supervisor - Licensing

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
225-381-4157

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	NO	EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	✓ NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 28, 1999, with the plant operating at 100 percent power, an unplanned automatic isolation of a primary containment isolation valve in the suppression pool cleanup (SPC) system occurred during the scheduled performance of a preventive maintenance (PM) procedure. The purpose of the PM was to calibrate a containment fuel pool level transmitter. When the transmitter was removed from service using the PM procedure, an unexpected isolation signal was generated which caused the closure of the Division II SPC system suction valve. The isolation valve responded to the closure signal as designed.

The root cause of this event was that the responsible design engineers did not revise the loop calibration reports affected by the design of the controls for the containment isolation valve. These reports are used to revise the PM procedure. The lack of relevant information caused the omission of procedural guidance with respect to the expected effects of removing the level transmitter from service.

The normal operation of the SPC system is not a safety related function. The safety function of the containment isolation valve is to close in response to predetermined actuation signals, and the valve responded to one of these signals as designed. This event was of no consequence to the health and safety of the public.

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NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)

REPORTED CONDITION

On September 28, 1999, with the plant operating at 100 percent power, an unplanned automatic isolation of a primary containment isolation valve (**ISV**) in the suppression pool cleanup (SPC) system occurred during the scheduled performance of a preventive maintenance (PM) procedure. The purpose of the PM was to calibrate a containment fuel pool level transmitter (**LT**). This was the first performance of this PM since the installation of the SPC system in 1996. When the transmitter was removed from service using the PM procedure, an unexpected isolation signal was generated which caused the closure of the Division II SPC system suction valve. The safety function of the containment isolation valve is to close in response to predetermined actuation signals, and the valve responded to one of these signals as designed.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event which resulted in the automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature.

ROOT CAUSE AND IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The root cause of this event was that the responsible design engineers did not revise the loop calibration reports affected by the design of the controls for the containment isolation valve. This condition occurred in 1995 during implementation of a design change to install the instrumentation of the SPC system. These reports are used to revise the PM procedure. The lack of relevant information caused the omission of procedural guidance with respect to the expected effects of removing the level transmitter from service.

Operators responded to the event using the appropriate procedures, and secured the SPC system.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

During the investigation, a complete review of the modification design package for the controls on the containment isolation valve was performed to determine whether similar deficiencies existed. Other similar errors were found, and these will be corrected. Affected PM procedures will be revised to incorporate the completed document changes.

Modification design packages that had been developed under similar circumstances were reviewed to determine whether similar errors had occurred. No other discrepancies were found.

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PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE EVALUATION

As reported in LER 50-458 / 99-004-00, an unplanned automatic closure of the Division II SPC system suction valve occurred on March 25, 1999. That event was caused by an actual low level condition in the containment fuel pool resulting from the inadvertent movement of water during preparations for pool cleaning. The March 25 event did not involve the calibration procedures being used on September 28, 1999, and thus did not present an opportunity to prevent the latter event.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The normal operation of the SPC system is not a safety related function. The safety function of the containment isolation valve is to close in response to predetermined actuation signals, and the valve responded to one of these signals as designed. This event was of no consequence to the health and safety of the public.

(Note: Energy Industry Component Identification Codes are annotated as (**XX**).)