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ATTACHMENT IV

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

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3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves

LCO 3.4.10

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Three pressurizer safety values shall be OPERABLE with lift settings ≥ 2461 psig and ≤ 2509 psig. 2411

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The lift settings are not required to be within the LCO limits during MODE 3 for the purpose of setting the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot) conditions. This exception is allowed for 54 hours following entry into MODE 3 provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup.

ACTIONS

	CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
А.	One pressurizer safety valve inoperable.	A.1	Restore valve to OPERABLE status.	15 minutes
В.	Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	B.1 <u>AND</u>	Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
	OR	B.2	Be in MODE 4.	12 hours
	Two or more pressurizer safety valves inoperable.			

Amendment No. 123

Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

	SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.10.1	Verify each pressurizer safety value is OPERABLE in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing, lift settings shall be within \pm 1% of 2495 psig.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program

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Amendment No. 123

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves

BASES

BACKGROUND	The pressurizer safety valves provide, in conjunction with the Reactor Protection System, overpressure protection for the RCS. The pressurizer safety valves are of the pop type. The valves are spring loaded and self actuated by direct fluid pressure with backpressure compensation. The safety valves are designed to prevent the system pressure from exceeding the system Safety Limit (SL), 2735 psig, which is 110% of the design pressure.
415, 764 16/4r at 2960 posig	Because the safety valves are self actuating, they are considered independent components. The relief capacity for each valve, 420,000 lb/hr at 2485 psig plus 3% accumulation, is based on postulated overpressure transient conditions resulting from a complete loss of steam flow to the turbine. This event results in the maximum surge rate into the pressurizer, which specifies the minimum relief capacity for the safety valves which is divided equally between the three valves. The discharge flow from the pressurizer safety valves is directed to the pressurizer relief tank. This discharge flow is indicated by an increase in temperature downstream of the pressurizer safety valves or increase in the pressurizer relief tank temperature or level.
	Overpressure protection is required in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head on; however, in MODE 3, with one or more RCS cold leg temperatures \leq 368°F, MODE 4, 5 and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on, overpressure protection is provided by operating procedures and by meeting the requirements of LCO 3.4.12, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System."
tolerAnce regarinement assumed in the safety analysis	The upper and lower pressure limits are based on the $\pm 1\%$ tolerance - requirement (Ref. 1) for lifting pressures above 1000 psig. The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, and 3. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation between hot and cold settings be established.
Survey and a	The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary success path and mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety

mitigate the effects of postulated accidents. OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that the RCS pressure will be limited to 110% of design pressure.

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BASES			
BACKGROUND (continued)	The consequences of exceeding the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) pressure limit (Ref. 1) could include damage to RCS components, increased leakage, or a requirement to perform additional stress analyses prior to resumption of reactor operation.		
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSE	All accident and safety analyses in the USAR (Ref. 2) that require safety S valve actuation assume operation of three pressurizer safety valves to limit increases in RCS pressure. The overpressure protection analysis (Ref. 3) is also based on operation of three safety valves. Accidents that could result in overpressurization if not properly terminated include:		
	a. Uncontrolled rod withdrawal from full power;		
	b. Loss of reactor coolant flow;		
	c. Loss of external electrical load/turbine trip;		
	d. Loss of normal feedwater;		
	e. Loss of all non-emergency AC power to station auxiliaries;		
	f. Locked rotor;		
	g. Feedwater line break; and		
	h. Rod cluster control assembly ejection.		
	Detailed analyses of the above transients are contained in Reference 2. Safety valve actuation is required in the above events to limit the pressure increase. Compliance with this LCO is consistent with the design bases and accident analyses assumptions.		
	Pressurizer safety valves satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).		
LCO	of The three pressurizer safety values are set to open at the RCS design pressure \$2485 psig), and within the ASME specified tolerance, to avoid exceeding the maximum design pressure SL, to maintain accident analyses assumptions, and to comply with ASME requirements. The upper and lower pressure tolerance limits are based on the $\pm 1\%$ tolerance requirements (Ref. 1) for lifting pressures above 1000 psig. a stamed in the Safety angly site.		
	The limit protected by this Specification is the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) SL of 110% of design pressure. Inoperability of one or		
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BASES	
LCO (continued)	more valves could result in exceeding the SL if a transient were to occur. The consequences of exceeding the ASME pressure limit could include damage to one or more RCS components, increased leakage, or additional stress analysis being required prior to resumption of reactor operation.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, OPERABILITY of three valves is required because the combined capacity is required to keep reactor coolant pressure below 110% of its design value during certain accidents. MODE 3 is conservatively included, although the listed accidents may not require the safety valves for protection.
	The LCO is not applicable in MODE 4, MODE 5, or MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on because LTOP is in service. Overpressure protection is not required in MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head removed (vent path \geq 2.0 square inches).
	The Note allows entry into MODE 3 with the lift settings outside the LCO limits. This method permits the inplace testing and examination of the safety valves at high pressure and temperature near their normal operating range, but only after the valves have had a preliminary cold setting. The cold setting gives assurance that the valves are OPERABLE near their design condition. Only one valve at a time will be removed from service for testing. The 54 hour exception is based on 18 hour outage time for each of the three valves. The 18 hour period is derived from operating experience that hot testing can be performed in this timeframe.
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>
	With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration must take place within 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS Overpressure Protection System. An inoperable safety valve coincident with an RCS overpressure event could challenge the integrity of the pressure boundary.
	B.1 and B.2
	If the Required Action of A.1 cannot be met within the required Completion Time or if two or more pressurizer safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within

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BASES			
ACTIONS	B.1 and B.2 (continued)		
	12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. With any RCS cold leg temperatures at or below 368°F, overpressure protection is provided by the LTOP System. The change from MODE 1, 2, or 3 to MODE 4 reduces the RCS energy (core power and pressure), lowers the potential for large pressurizer insurges, and thereby removes the need for overpressure protection by three pressurizer safety valves.		
	Addition to the RCS of borated water with a concentration greater than or equal to the minimum required RWST concentration shall not be considered a positive reactivity change. Cooldown of the RCS for restoration of OPERABILITY of a pressurizer code safety valve, with a negative moderator temperature coefficient, shall not be considered a positive reactivity change provided the RCS is borated to the COLD SHUTDOWN, xenon-free condition per Specification 3.1.1 (Ref. 5).		
SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.4.10.1</u>		
REQUIREMENTS	SRs are specified in the Inservice Testing Program. Pressurizer safety valves are to be tested in accordance with the requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref. 4), which provides the activities and Frequencies necessary to satisfy the SRs. No additional requirements are specified.		
REFERENCES	1. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III.		
	2. USAR, Chapter 15.		
	3. WCAP-7769, Rev. 1, June 1972.		
	4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.		
	 NRC letter (W. Reckley to N. Carns) dated November 22, 1993: "Wolf Creek Generating Station - Positive Reactivity Addition; Technical Specification Bases Change." 		

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The following table identifies those actions committed to by Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. Michael J. Angus, Manager Licensing and Corrective Action, at Wolf Creek Generating Station, (316) 364-4077.

	COMMITMENT	Due Date/Event
	The requested amendment will be implemented within 60	Within 60 days of
i	days of NRC approval.	NRC approval.