UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 09, 2026

Shawn Hafen
Site Vice President
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
2807 West County Road 75
Monticello, MN 55362–9637

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2026003

Dear Shawn Hafen:

On September 30, 2026, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. On October 15, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; 2056 Westings Avenue, Suite 400, Naperville, IL, 60563-2657, the Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting area assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; 2056 Westings Avenue, Suite 400, Naperville, IL, 60563-2657, the Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Bob Orlikowski on 11/09/26

Bob J. Orlikowski, Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
Reactor Projects Branch C
Region III

Docket No. 05000263
License No. DPR–22

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ enclosure: distribution via digital
communications platform

Letter to Shawn Hafen from Bob Orlikowski dated November 9, 2026.

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2026003

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ADAMS Accession No.(s): ML26313A061
PKG.: ML26306A079
e-Concurrence Case: 20261106-03268

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Number:	05000263
License Number:	DPR–22
Report Number:	05000263/2026003
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2026-003-0065
Licensee:	Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
Facility:	Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Location:	Monticello, MN
Inspection Dates:	July 01, 2026, to September 30, 2026
Inspectors:	Jeremy Heimke, Senior Resident Inspector Thomas Briley, Senior Reactor Inspector Ashley Demeter, Senior Resident Inspector Matthew Edwin, Health Physicist Thomas Hartman, Senior Reactor Analyst Timothy Hooker, Health Physicist Benny Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector Kevin Pusateri, Resident Inspector Jakob Steffes, Senior Project Engineer
Approved By:	Bob J. Orlikowski, Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report Section: 71153.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Correct Leakage into the Safety-Related Reactor Building Plenum Room Leads to Reactor Scram			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Area	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000263/2026003-01 Open/Closed	Human Performance	71153
A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was revealed when the reactor at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was manually scrammed. The cause of the scram was the licensee's failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, safety-related reactor building plenum room roof degradation (roof leaks from rainwater), a condition adverse to quality, was previously identified and not promptly corrected. Over many years, roof repair work orders were closed or cancelled with no work being performed to correct the condition adverse to quality. This eventually resulted in rainwater intrusion that wetted a safety-related electrical contactor that powered Reactor Building Ventilation equipment and ultimately led to a reactor scram.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 12, 2026, through July 28, 2026, the site maintained between 85-95 percent power to maintain average discharge canal temperatures below environmental permit limits. On July 28, the site lowered power to 50 percent to isolate a string of feedwater heaters. The site remained at 50 percent power until the site shutdown on August 10,2026, to perform corrective maintenance on a feedwater heater. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on August 30, 2026, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 – Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems:
- division 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) on July 15, 2026
- division 1 and 2 EDG ventilation systems on July 15, 2026
- division 1 and 2 EDG emergency service water pumps on July 16, 2026
- circulating water system on July 21, 2026

71111.04 – Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) division 1 reactor building closed loop cooling water on July 13, 2026

71111.05 – Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) fire zone (FZ) 15-B, 11 diesel generator room and day tank rooms on July 13, 2026
(2) FZ 15-A, 12 diesel generator room on July 14, 2026

Fire Brigade Drill Performance (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on August 14, 2026.

71111.13 – Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) emergent risk of condensate and feedwater flow mismatch on July 9, 2026

71111.15 – Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) 12 residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump vent valve leak
(2) partial loss of computer affecting ability to monitor thermal limits
(3) reactor core isolation cooling pump discharge inboard valve as-found

Temporary and Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) 12 residual heat removal (RHR) pump motor change (600 Hp to 700 Hp)

71111.20 – Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the condensate drain cooler leakage forced outage activities from August 10 to August 24, 2026.

71111.24 – Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance and Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

(1) 11 EDG diesel oil pump 'A' post-maintenance testing following pump replacement, on July 17, 2026
(2) 14 emergency filtration train emergency service water surveillance on July 23, 2026
(3) 0328, cable spreading room halon system surveillance test, on August 6, 2026
(4) 0253-1, standby gas treatment 'A' train quarterly test on August 7, 2026
(5) 0255-04-IA-2, RHR system cold shutdown valve operability tests on August 10, 2026
(6) OSP-NIS-0047, source range monitor functional test on August 10, 2026
(7) 0002, reactor high pressure scram instrument test and calibration procedure on September 8, 2026

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) MO-2373 backseating on September 11, 2026

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) increase in unidentified drywell leakage during plant startup on August 27, 2026

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) quality assurance program adherence in work orders on September 16, 2026

71114.06 – NRC Resident--Evaluation of Emergency Preparedness Program

Emergency Preparedness Plan Activity (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) tabletop 26D with drill and exercise performance

SAFEGUARDS

71130.15 – Security Operations

Security Operations (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated security operations during observations of the following activity:

(1) security training evolution on July 22, 2026

Security Equipment Condition (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the ability of security equipment to perform its intended function through a walkdown of the following:

(1) security back-up power supply testing on July 6, 2026

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71125.04 – Public Radiation Safety Onsite Inspection

Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:

(1) unit 1, reactor building ventilation and effluent monitor
(2) unit 1, offgas stack and monitors

Radiological Effluent Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:

(1) water storage ponds

Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.

Radioactive Material Storage and Control (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance in controlling, labeling and securing the following radioactive materials:

(1) radioactive materials stored outside of the protected area

Solid Radioactive Waste System Walk-Down (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)

The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:

(1) self-engaging rapid dewatering system

Shipment Preparation and Records (IP Section 03.06) (2 Samples)

The inspectors observed preparation of, or reviewed records for the following shipments:

(1) radioactive waste shipment 25-120 containing dewatered resins of Class B waste in a type B(U) package
(2) radioactive waste shipment 25-143 containing dewatered resin of Class A waste in a general design package

71152A – Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) RHRSW basket strainer degradation due to water accumulation under the strainer base

71153 – Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000263/2025-004-00, Rainwater Intrusion Caused Failure of Reactor Building Ventilation and Rise in Steam Chase Temperatures (ADAMS Accession No. ML25268A050).

The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.

(2) LER 05000263/2025-003-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications for not implementing setpoint change of Primary Containment Isolation Valve (ADAMS Accession No. ML25169A246).

The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Correct Leakage into the Safety-Related Reactor Building Plenum Room Leads to Reactor Scram			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Area	Report Section
Initiating Events	Green NCV 05000263/2026003-01 Open/Closed	Human Performance	71153
A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was revealed when the reactor at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was manually			

scrammed. The cause of the scram was the licensee's failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, safety-related reactor building plenum room roof degradation (roof leaks from rainwater), a condition adverse to quality, was previously identified and not promptly corrected. Over many years, roof repair work orders were closed or cancelled with no work being performed to correct the condition adverse to quality. This eventually resulted in rainwater intrusion that wetted a safety-related electrical contactor that powered Reactor Building Ventilation equipment and ultimately led to a reactor scram.

Description:

On July 28, 2025, while MNGP was operating at full power, rainwater from a passing thunderstorm infiltrated the reactor building plenum room through degraded roofing. Water intrusion reached electrical cabinet N1131 and caused a short in the V-EF-24 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan contactor. This led to a blown fuse in breaker B1131 and a loss of both main exhaust fans. As designed, the reactor building supply fans subsequently tripped on low exhaust flow.

Loss of Reactor Building Ventilation caused reactor building differential pressure to degrade, and secondary containment was declared inoperable at 22:00. Steam chase temperature continued rising, and at 22:34 operators manually scrammed the reactor at 41 percent power in accordance with procedural limits.

The plenum room is part of the reactor building structure. The reactor building is a seismic Class 1 structure as described in MNGP's Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Section 12.2.2.1. The USAR states, in part, that the Reactor Building has the principal function to support and protect enclosed systems and components.

The plenum room is also scoped in the MNGP's Maintenance Rule Program as part of the reactor building structure. The Monticello Maintenance Rule Bases Document states that safety-related structures have the safety-related function to provide structural support, safe enclosure, and protection to the safety-related equipment housed by that structure.

In the aftermath of the reactor scram, MNGP performed a Cause Evaluation and identified a history of leaks into the plenum room. Specifically, in 2013 a 5–year structures monitoring walkdown identified evidence of past leaks inside the plenum room. In 2015, Corrective Action Program (CAP) entry 1506276 identified evidence of a past leak in the plenum room. Work Order (WO) 537398 was created to address the leak but was later cancelled prior to work being performed. In 2019, rainwater was identified as leaking into the plenum room per CAP entry 501000027088. WO 700055684 was created to repair the plenum room roof leak but was later cancelled in 2021 prior to work being performed. In April 2023, CAP entry 501000072608 identified rainwater intrusion in the plenum room. WO 700122931 was generated to repair the leak but was not executed. In November 2024, CAP entry 50100009183 documented a leak into the plenum room onto the V-EF-21 Main Exhaust Fan platform. WO 700146272 was generated to repair the leak onto the V-EF-21 platform and was executed in April 2025, but it was not bundled for additional repair locations beyond the V-EF-21 leak location.

Inspectors noted that licensee procedure FP-PA-ARP-01 "CAP Process," Revision 69, stated that a CAQ is an all-inclusive term used in reference to any of the following conditions: failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, abnormal occurrences, non-conformances and out-of-control processes, including the failure to follow

procedures, when the condition could affect the quality of the structures, systems, components, and activities within the scope of the Quality Assurance Program as defined in the Quality Assurance Topical Report. Additionally, FP-PA-ARP-01 Attachment 5, "CAP Classification Examples" stated, "A condition adversely affecting performance in Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems or Barrier Integrity. This includes issues involving adverse weather protection," should be classified as CAQ.

Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated corrective action program entries and completed a Cause Evaluation. The affected electrical box was weather-sealed, the structure was placed in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) status, and the event was reported as LER 05000263/2025-04-00. Long-term corrective action included a complete replacement of the plenum room roof, executed under WO 70015826.

Corrective Action References: CAPs 501000101306, 5010000101308, and 501000101411 WO 70015826

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to correct a condition adverse to quality was contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the safety-related reactor building plenum room roof developed leaks that allowed rainwater to infiltrate and wet safety-related electrical components. The licensee had previously identified these leaks over many years and initiated work orders to correct them; however, work orders were cancelled or closed without repairs being performed. On July 28, 2025, the uncorrected degraded roof condition resulted in water intrusion that wetted electrical cabinet N1131, causing a loss of Reactor Building Ventilation and necessitating a manual reactor scram.

Screening and Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power" The inspectors screened and assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The At-Power Significance Determination Process." Using exhibit 1, "Initiating Events Screening Questions," Section B, "Transient Initiators," screening question 2 was answered "Yes," the performance deficiency did cause a reactor scram. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Area: Human Performance

The finding reflected a cross-cutting area of Human Performance because the licensee did not effectively prioritize and evaluate the significance of recurring roof leakage into the safety-related plenum room. Over more than a decade, the organization initiated work orders to repair leaks but cancelled or closed them without ensuring the condition was corrected, allowing the degradation to the plenum room to persist. This ineffective decision-making contributed to the failure to correct the condition adverse to quality, ultimately leading to water intrusion and the reactor scram.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as

failures, deficiencies, and defective material and equipment, are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, from approximately 2013 to July 28, 2025, the licensee failed to correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the safety-related reactor building plenum room roof developed leaks that allowed rainwater to infiltrate and wet safety-related electrical components. On July 28, 2025, leaks wetted electrical cabinet N1131, causing an electrical short which resulted in a loss of Reactor Building Ventilation and secondary containment to become inoperable. The licensee had previously identified these leaks over many years and initiated work orders to correct them; however, work orders were cancelled or closed without repairs being performed.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation	71153
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program (CAP) and is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.	
Violation: Technical Specifications 3.6.1.3, “Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs),” condition A required the penetration for CV-2384 to be isolated within 4 hours, and if condition A was not completed, condition F required the unit to be in mode 3 in 12 hours. Contrary to the above, from 2001 to April 2025, the licensee did not isolate the penetration within 4 hours nor place the unit in mode 3 within 12 hours. Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors used Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The At-Power Significance Determination Process, exhibit 3: Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, Section C, Reactor Containment, and answered no to questions 1 and 2 and yes to question 3. Corrective Action References: AR 501000097497	

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On October 15, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to S. Hafen, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 7, 2026, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to M. Neal, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.01	Procedures	A.6	Acts of Nature	64
		B.06.04-05	Circulating Water System - System Operation	101
71111.04	Procedures	2154-24	Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Prestart Valve Checklist	20
71111.05	Fire Plans	A.3-11	FZ-11 Admin Bldg HVAC Room	13
		A.3-15-A	No. 12 DG Room Strategy	13
		A.3-15-B	No. 11 DG Room and Day Tank Rooms Strategy	15
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	501000201441	Condensate Flow Step Change Increases	06/26/2026
		AR 501000202363	Unexpected High Level Alarm on E-11A	07/27/2026
		AR 501000202364	Condensate ACMP Threshold Met	07/27/2026
	Procedures	B.06.05-05	Condensate and Reactor Feedwater - System Operation	68
71111.15	Corrective Action Documents	AR 501000201576	12 RHRSW Air Vent Leak	07/01/2026
		AR 501000201954	Loss of PPCS DAS - RTP Node B	07/14/2026
	Engineering Changes	QF 2705	7157-FCR-001	09/25/2026
	Engineering Evaluations	601000007157	Procedure 8039 Attachment 1	0
	Operability Evaluations	QF1146	CAP 501000203300 Past Operability Review	09/11/2026
71111.20	Procedures	C.3	Shutdown Procedure	85
71111.24	Corrective Action Documents	501000203397	Drywell Leak Indications	08/28/2026
	Engineering Evaluations	608000002076	Acceptance Review for Backseating MO-2373, Main Steam Line Drain - Inboard	0
	Procedures	0002	Reactor High Pressure SCRAM Instrument Test and Calibration Procedure	36
		0253-1	SBGT A Train Quarterly Test	62
		0255-04-IA-2	RHR System - Cold Shutdown Valve Operability Tests	38
		0255-11-III-4	14 ESW Quarterly Pump and Valve Tests	72

		0328	Cable Spreading Room Halon System Surveillance Test	30
		B.04.01-05	Primary Containment - System Operation	51
		OSP-NIS-0047	SRM Functional Test	5
	Work Orders	700159756-0020	P-160A, PMT	0
		700166815	MO-2034, Repair Valve	2
		700175193-00	Main Steam Line Drain - Inboard Electrically Backseat Valve	09/01/2026
71125.04	Calibration Records	700116980-0010	Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor Calibration	03/05/2025
		700124210-0430	RM-7859A Perform 0248 PMT/RTS	10/29/2025
	Corrective Action Documents	501000091757	Leakage when Filling 15 OG Storage Tank	11/04/2024
		501000097923	Pond 2b Interstitial Level Change	04/28/2025
		501000097931	A RBV WRGM Tripped During 0356	02/16/2026
		501000098378	Upward Trend at MW-26B	05/07/2025
		50100010148	Pond Level Detectors Non-functional	08/01/2025
		501000102650	Partial/Missed REMP Air Sample at M-3	09/03/2025
		501000106960	Pond 2 ‘A’ Interstitial Level Rise	01/20/2026
	Miscellaneous		2026 Calculation of 10 CFR 37 Category 2 Activity Fraction in the Barrel Aisles	07/31/2026
			Land Use Census Report and Critical Receptor Report	09/23/2025
		L-MT-26-020	2025 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report	05/13/2026
		L-MT-26-021	2025 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report	05/13/2026
	Procedures	4958-PM	Water Storage Pond Transfer System Radiation Monitor Functional Test	2
		4959-PM	Water Storage Pond Transfer System Radiation Monitor Check	2
		I.03.34	Lower Limit of Detection Determination	16
		ISP-WSP-0001	Water Storage Pond Instrumentation Functional Checks	3
		ISP-WSP-0002	Water Storage Pond Instrument Calibration	0
		ODCM-01.01	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual	10

		PCP-01	Process Control Program for Wet Radioactive Wastes	2
	Self-Assessments		Environmental Dosimetry Company Annual Quality Assurance Status Report January - December 2025	02/25/2026
		600001360999	Snapshot Assessment (600001360999) for NRC Inspection Attachments: 71125.04	07/2026
		A-REMP/RW-FLT-2025-1	2025 Nuclear Oversight Fleet Audit of REMP and RW	11/24/2025
		NUPIC Audit/Survey Number: 25659	Entergy Audit #WT-WTHQN-2024-00304 (NUPIC #35659) - Audit Report	03/26/2025
	Shipping Records	25-120	Shipping Papers for Dewatered Resins	09/19/2025
		25-143	Shipping Papers for Dewatered Resins	12/08/2025
71130.15	Miscellaneous	2026 Annual Drill Packet	2026 Annual Drill Packet	0
	Work Orders	700171484-0020	PMT of Diesel Engine Emergency Security Power	0
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	501000203528	BS-1952 Base As-Found Condition	09/02/2026
71153	Corrective Action Documents	501000097497	CV-2384 Setpoint Control	04/21/2025
		Cause Evaluation	Reactor Scram No. 147; Ventilation Trip	04/15/2026
	Engineering Evaluations	602000024617	Equipment Cause Evaluation for CV-2384 Setpoint Control	06/27/2025
	Procedures	1385	Periodic Structural Inspection	17
		EWI-11.01.07	Structures Monitoring Program	2