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November 4, 2026

GO2-26-128 10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: **COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397**
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2026-001-01

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is Revision 01 to Licensee Event Report No. 2026-001-00 for Columbia Generating Station. This supplemental report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

There are no commitments being made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. T. M. Collis, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at (509) 377-8395.

Executed on this 4 day of November, 2026.

Respectfully,

Signed by:
Michael Kennedy
11EDADB2D2694A2...

Michael J. Kennedy
Vice President Engineering

Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2026-001-01

cc: NRC Region IV Regional Admin
NRC Region IV Project Manager
NRC Senior Resident Inspector/988C
JW Hayes – BPA
CD Sonoda – BPA

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NRC FORM 366 (06-16-2026) **U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 3 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

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APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 **EXPIRES: 04/30/2027**

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by email to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

1. Facility Name		2. Docket Number	3. Page
Columbia Generation Station	■ 050 ☐ 052 ☐ 053	397	1 OF 4

4. Title

Manual Reactor Scram due to loss of both Reactor Recirculation Pumps

5. Event Date			6. LER Number			7. Report Date		
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision No.	Month	Day	Year
02	12	2026	2026	- 001 -	01	11	04	2026

8. Other Facilities Involved

Facility Name		Docket Number
	☐ 050	
	☐ 052	
	☐ 053	

9. Operating Mode	10. Power Level
Mode 1	100

11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: *(Check all that apply)*

10 CFR Part 20	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☐ 50.69(g)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 73.77(a)(1)(ii)
☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☑ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 73.77(a)(2)(i)(A)
☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 73.77(a)(2)(i)(B)
☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	**10 CFR Part 21**	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 73.1200(a)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 21.2(c)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(v)	☐ 73.1200(b)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	**10 CFR Part 50**	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(vii)(A)	☐ 73.1200(c)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(viii)(A)	☐ 73.1200(d)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☑ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	**10 CFR Part 53**	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(viii)(B)	☐ 73.1200(e)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(A)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ix)	☐ 73.1200(f)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(B)	**10 CFR Part 73**	☐ 73.1200(g)
			☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 73.77(a)(1)(i)	☐ 73.1200(h)

☐ **OTHER** (Specify here, in abstract, or NRC 366A).

12. Licensee Contact for this LER

Licensee Contact	Phone Number (Include area code)
Nils Sjoren	509-377-4295

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13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report

Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to IRIS		Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to IRIS

14. Supplemental Report Expected		15. Expected Submission Date	Month	Day	Year
☑ No	☐ Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date)				

16. Abstract

On February 12, 2026, at 0249 PST, Columbia Generating Station manually scrammed the reactor due to loss of both reactor recirculation pumps. All rods fully inserted as expected and no Emergency Core Cooling Systems were actuated or injected into the core. Following the reactor scram reset, reactor water level decreased to less than plus 13 inches twice causing additional reactor scram signals. Reactor feed pumps were controlled manually and reactor water level was recovered and maintained above plus 13 inches.

The direct cause of the event was a cleared fuse in the chiller control panel. The fuse failed after prolonged overheating, resulting in a loss of power to the communication hardware and leaving the chillers without command functionality. As a result, the adjustable speed drives tripped on high temperature, which subsequently caused the reactor recirculation pumps to trip. An engineering design change installed a new fuse holder and fuses, and removed a power filter from the adjustable speed drive cooling system.

This event did not pose a threat to the health and safety of the public. This event was reported via Event Notification #58163 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) for plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications and 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) that resulted in actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor was critical.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

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1. FACILITY NAME		2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER		
			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
Columbia Generating Station	■ 050 ☐ 052 ☐ 053	397	2026	- 001	- 01

NARRATIVE

Plant Conditions

At the time of the event, the plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. There were no safety related structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

Description of Events

On February 12, 2026, at 02:44 PST, with the unit in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, reactor recirculation [AD] pump [P] 1B tripped and Operators followed plant procedures to address the tripped pump. At 02:49 reactor recirculation pump 1A tripped and resulted in operators performing a manual reactor [RCT] scram.

All rods inserted and the Main Steam Isolation Valves [SB][V] stayed open. Operators reset the scram at 03:05 PST using plant procedures. Following reset of the reactor scram signal, reactor feedwater [SJ] pump 1A was observed operating erratically in automatic control. Operators took manual control of the reactor feedwater pumps to maintain reactor water level. During this evolution reactor vessel water level dipped below the plus 13 inches at 03:06:29 PST resulting in an additional scram signal and then returned above the plus 13 inches. At 03:06:43 PST, operators took manual control of the reactor feedwater pumps to maintain reactor water level and again reactor vessel water level dipped below the plus 13 inches, resulting in another scram signal. Operators recovered reactor water level, stabilizing water level at above plus 13 inches. The second reactor scram signal was reset at 03:10 PST, and reactor water level was raised to support decay heat removal using natural circulation flow in the reactor with steam to the main condenser [COND].

Initial investigation revealed that both adjustable speed drives [DRIV] experienced a loss of cooling causing their associated reactor recirculation pumps to trip. Further investigation revealed that the fuses associated with power supplies to the adjustable speed drive cooling system had cleared.

This event is reportable as an event that resulted in a plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) and manual reactor scram when the reactor was critical per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). This event was reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(i),10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72 b)(3)(iv)(A) via Event Notification #58163.

Cause of Event

A root cause was conducted in order to determine causes for the loss of the recirculation pumps which led to the manual plant scram. The following root causes were identified:

Loss of power to the chiller [CHU] control panel [PL] for the adjustable speed drive chillers requires manual action to restore chiller function, a failure mode not incorporated into station procedures, system books, knowledge bases, or pre-operation training sessions, limiting plant personnel's ability to diagnose and respond to equipment challenges.

The adjustable speed drive chiller trouble alarm was non-functional, leaving the main control room personnel unable to detect conditions adversely affecting the operation of the adjustable speed drive chiller system and possible loss of adjustable speed drive cooling.

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Columbia Generating Station	■ 050 ☐ 052 ☐ 053	397	2026	- 001	- 01

NARRATIVE

Cause of Event (Continued)
A separate investigation was performed in order to understand the additional reactor pressure vessel level dips below the scram setpoint of plus 13 inches. The investigation determined the direct cause to be the reactor feedwater drive pump's ability to maintain reactor water level was hindered by the rate of reactor pressure vessel depressurization. A contributing cause identified that there was no guidance in plant procedures for overriding the reactor feed water high-level isolation interlock. As a result, operators initiated a controlled depressurization of the reactor vessel to bring the condensate booster pumps online to control reactor water level.

Corrective Actions
Installed a new fuse holder [FUG] and fuses [FU] and removed unnecessary power filter from the adjustable speed drive cooling system via an engineering change. Stroked Reactor feedwater drive turbine [TRB] governor valve [V] 1A and found no mechanical linkage for binding or abnormal behavior.

Develop and implement procedural guidance for loss of adjustable speed drive chillers function and update system description training material to include the adjustable speed drive chiller system including associated failure mode functions.

Evaluate the adjustable speed drive chiller for additional manufacturing defects that inhibit alarm function.

Revise plant procedures to provide direction necessary to override the reactor pressure vessel level interlock for the reactor feed water system.

Assessment of Safety Consequences
This event did not challenge the ability of Columbia Generating Station to safely shut down. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems were available to perform their intended safety functions. This event did not involve an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of any safety function described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). This event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

Previous Similar Events
Columbia Generating Station has not previously experienced a loss of cooling to the adjustable speed drives for the reactor recirculation pumps resulting in a manual scram. A review of the Corrective Action Program condition report database found no other occurrences of an event with the same or similar occurrences in the last 10 years. Columbia Generating Station previously experienced reactor feedwater issues in controlling reactor water level in 2017 which was documented in a Licensee Event Report No. 2017-004-00.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Information codes from IEEE Standards 805-1984 and 803-1983 are represented in brackets as [XX] and [XXX] throughout the body of the narrative.