



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 14, 2026

Robert Coffey, Executive Vice President
Nuclear Division and Chief Nuclear Officer
Florida Power & Light Company
700 Universe Blvd
Mail Stop: EX/JB
Juno Beach FL 33408

**SUBJECT: TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING, UNITS 3 AND 4 - INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000250/2026003 and 05000251/2026003**

Dear Robert Coffey:

On September 30, 2026, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4. On October 6, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Michael Durbin, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low security significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting area assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. "

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'SS' with a flourish, enclosed in an oval shape.

Signed by Steven Smith on 10/14/26

Steven P. Smith, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
RII Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 05000250 and 05000251
License Nos.: DPR-31 and DPR-41

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: GovDelivery Subscriber

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000250 and 05000251

License Numbers: DPR-31 and DPR-41

Report Numbers: 05000250/2026003 and 05000251/2026003

Enterprise Identifier: I-2026-003-0041

Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company

Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4

Location: Homestead, FL 33035

Inspection Dates: July 1, 2026 to September 30, 2026

Inspectors: James Baptist, Senior Resident Inspector
Amber Donley, Senior Resident Inspector
Arthur Knotts, Resident Inspector
Steven Roberts, Resident Inspector

Approved By: Steven P. Smith, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Maintain Functional Fire Penetration in Unit 3 South Electrical Penetration Room			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Area	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000250/2026003-01 Open/Closed	Problem Identification and Resolution	71111.05
An NRC-identified Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Turkey Point Unit 3 Subsequent Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-31, License Condition 3.D, "Fire Protection", was identified when the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c). Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain a fire penetration in the Unit 3 south electrical penetration room, a Group 2 fire barrier, in accordance with design parameters and licensee procedure 0-ADM-016, "Fire Protection Program," for a functional fire barrier.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 3 began the inspection period at rated thermal power (RTP). On July 18, 2026, the unit experienced a turbine runback to 87 percent RTP due to a loss of the 3B heater drain pump (HDP). Power was restored to the 3B HDP and the unit returned to RTP on July 23, 2026, and remained at or near RTP power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 4 operated at or near RTP for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk-significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) 4A emergency diesel generator (EDG) during 4B EDG major maintenance window on August 26, 2026

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Fire zones 138, 140, 4A EDG and EDG control room on August 19, 2026
- (2) Fire zones 133, 135, 4B EDG and EDG control room on September 9, 2026
- (3) Fire zone 20, Unit 3 south electrical penetration room on September 25, 2026

Fire Brigade Drill Performance (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on September 25, 2026

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) High risk work to repair 3B heater drain pump (HDP) cabling, on July 21, 2026
- (2) High risk work associated with the heavy lift to remove Unit 3 supplemental chillers from the auxiliary building roof on August 5-6, 2026
Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2007-03, "Crane and Heavy Lift Inspection, Supplemental Guidance to IP 71111.20 and 71111.13," was used to inform this sample, specifically activities that could cause loss of power, compressed air, or cooling water
- (3) Elevated risk during 4B EDG maintenance window due to out-of-service time being greater than 72 hours on August 26-27, 2026

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Action Request (AR) 2548719, flood protection device, stoplogs in the radiologically controlled area, installed in reverse direction
- (2) AR 2557910, 3A2 battery charger control board (X302) overheating

Temporary and Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

- (1) Engineering change (EC) 301826, temporary Unit 3 supplemental cooling chiller installation on the auxiliary building roof
- (2) EC 297358, barrels installed inside containment to maintain 3A reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal 2 leak-off standpipe level

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance and Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

- (1) Work Order (WO) 41024565, Unit 3 diesel oil storage tank (DOST) level indicator (LI-3-3400) test after repair
- (2) WO 41070118, 3B residual heat removal (RHR) pump operational test after control cable splice repair
- (3) WO 41016167, 4B EDG operability test following major maintenance window

- (4) 0-SMM-102.01, "Flood Protection Stoplog and Penetration Seal Inspection," Revision 3, on July 20, 2026
- (5) Implementation of "Risk Management Technical Specifications Initiative 5b Surveillance Frequency Control Program," for a change in frequency associated with emergency containment cooler monthly testing on August 25, 2026
- (6) 4-OSP-023.2, "4A Diesel Generator 24 Hour Full Load Test and Load Rejection," Revision 33, on September 16, 2026
- (7) 0-OSP-025.8, "Control Room Positive Pressure Test," Revision 5, on September 21, 2026

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 4 reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage verification following identification of dried boric acid in containment on August 27, 2026

71114.06 - NRC Resident--Evaluation of Emergency Preparedness Program

Emergency Preparedness Plan Activity (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Emergency response organization training drill on September 15, 2026

SAFEGUARDS

71130.15 - Security Operations

Security Equipment Condition (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the ability of security equipment to perform its intended function through a walkdown of the following:

- (1) North protected area (PA) equipment operability test, on September 9, 2026

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) AR 2547178, intermediate range nuclear instrument (N-3-36) declared inoperable

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Maintain Functional Fire Penetration in Unit 3 South Electrical Penetration Room			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Area	Report Section
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An NRC-identified Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Turkey Point Unit 3 Subsequent Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-31, License Condition 3.D, "Fire Protection", was identified when the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c). Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain a fire penetration in the Unit 3 south electrical penetration room, a Group 2 fire barrier, in accordance with design parameters and licensee procedure 0-ADM-016, "Fire Protection Program," for a functional fire barrier.			
<u>Description:</u> On August 21, 2026, inspectors identified foreign material (FM) inside a 4-inch fire penetration (020W-E058) leading into the Unit 3 south electrical penetration room (Fire Zone 20). Because the material was not an approved fire-rated plug, the penetration was non-functional at the time it was first identified. On August 27, 2026, inspectors again observed FM present in the penetration, indicating that timely corrective action had not been taken. During a subsequent walkdown on September 16, 2026, inspectors found the FM had been removed; however, the penetration remained open and uncapped, with no approved fire-rated penetration seal installed between Fire Zone 20 and the Unit 3 personnel hatch access area (Fire Zone 84). There was no active fire impairment or required shiftly fire rove in place for the non-functional fire barrier. After inspectors identified the open penetration, the licensee entered the condition into the Corrective Action Program (CAP), initiated a fire impairment, a shiftly fire watch rove, and installed approved fire seals to restore full fire barrier functionality. The licensee also confirmed the material originally found in the opening was not an approved fire-safe plug. The penetration is located on the west wall of the penetration room and is classified as a Group 2 Fire Barrier per licensee procedure 0-ADM-016, "Fire Protection Program." Section 5.6.5, Step 3.a states "the required actions for a non-functional Group 2 barrier is to establish a shiftly fire watch within 8 hours." The licensee failed to identify the nonfunctional fire penetration when initially notified by the inspectors. The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetration ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. The fire barrier did not meet all its required parameters for a functional barrier for a design basis fire. Corrective Actions: On September 16, 2026, the licensee declared the penetration nonfunctional, created fire protection impairment 2026-240, initiated a shiftly fire watch rove, and entered the issue into their CAP. Approved fire-rated penetration seals were installed on September 17, 2026, under work request 94298989, which restored full barrier functionality. Corrective Action References: Action Request (AR) 2557599			

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to ensure that all fire barriers protecting safety-related areas are maintained functional as required by Section 5.6.5, Fire Rated Assemblies, of licensee procedure 0-ADM-016, "Fire Protection Program," Revision 047, was a performance deficiency. The penetration was nonfunctional beginning August 21, 2026, when inspectors first identified FM in the opening, and the licensee failed to take the appropriate compensatory measures for a non-functional barrier until September 16, 2026, when a fire impairment and fire watch rove were initiated. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone.

Screening and Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process." Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," the inspectors determined that the affected cornerstone was the Mitigating Systems. The inspectors screened and assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process." The finding was assigned to category 1.4.4, "Fire Confinement," with a High Degradation rating because the FM and unsealed/uncapped penetration could reasonably be expected to prevent a fire barrier from performing its function. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), when Question 1.4.4-C, was answered NO, as the spread of a fire from one fire area to another due to the degraded fire confinement element, would not cause any additional targets be damaged or would impact the credited safe shutdown (SSD) strategy for the exposing fire area.

Cross-Cutting Area: Problem Identification and Resolution

The station failed to take timely corrective actions to address issues that were raised by inspectors multiple times (August 21, August 27, and September 16). This demonstrates shortcomings in promptly evaluating and correcting conditions adverse to quality.

Enforcement:**Violation:**

Turkey Point Unit 3 Subsequent Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-31, License Condition 3.D, "Fire Protection," states, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c). Licensee procedure, 0-ADM-016, "Fire Protection Program," Revision 047, is one of the fire protection program implementing documents. Procedure 0-ADM-016, Section 5.6.5, "Fire Rated Assemblies," requires, that all fire rated assemblies separating fire areas or otherwise protecting specified nuclear safety functions and all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations shall be functional. With one or more of the Group 2 required fire-rated assemblies or sealing devices nonfunctional, the licensee is required to establish a shiftly fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly within 8 hours.

Contrary to the above, from August 21 to September 16, 2026, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in 0-ADM-016. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the penetration between the Unit 3 south electrical penetration room and the personnel hatch access area was maintained functional, first by allowing unapproved foreign material to remain in the opening, and later by leaving the penetration open and uncapped without a fire impairment or required shiftly fire watch. Compliance was restored on September 16, 2026, when the licensee

declared the penetration non-functional and appropriate compensatory measures were implemented (e.g., initiated a fire impairment and shiftly fire watch rove).

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On October 6, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Michael Durbin Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.04	Drawings	5614-M-3022	Emergency Diesel Engine and Oil System DG 4A LO & Cooling Water	10
	Procedures	4-OSP-023.1	Diesel Generator Operability Test	09/19/2023
71111.05	Corrective Action Documents	AR	2554409, 2556747, 2550755	
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	AR	2557599	
	Drawings	5610-A-178	Fire Barrier and Penetrations Zone 020-W	14
	Fire Plans	PFP-4-EDG-18	Unit 4 Emergency Diesel Generator Building	4
		PFP-AB-18	Unit 3 and 4 Auxiliary Building	4
	Procedures	0-ADM-016.2	Fire Brigade Program	16
		0-SFP-016.1	Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection	10
		0-SME-091.2	Fire and Smoke Detection System Annual Test Circuits 16, 45 and Fire Alarm Control C40 Test	0
		4-PME-016.04	EDG 4B and Air Start Skid 4B Rooms	4
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	AR	2551541	
	Procedures	4-OP-023	Emergency Diesel Generator	04/14/2026
		OP-AA-102-1003	Guarded Equipment	49
		WM-AA-100-1000	Work Activity Risk Management	27
	Work Orders	WO	41069732	
71111.15	Calculations	PTN-BOHC-14-001	Evaluation of Stop Logs for Flooding Integrated Assessment	2
	Corrective Action Documents	AR	2538555, 2548998, 2556642, 2556649	
	Drawings	5610-C-1696	Main Plant Flood Protection Stop Log Sections and Details	3

		5613-M-3030-Sh 6	Component Cooling Water System	7
	Miscellaneous	AA550	Vendor Manual: Static Battery Charger SSC, Solid State Controls	9
		CHS-SVX01F-EN	Installation, Operation, Maintenance Temporary Cooling - Flexible Water Hose	December 2024
	Procedures	0-ADM-116	Hurricane Season Readiness	35
		0-ONOP-103.3	Severe Weather Preparations	41
		0-SME-003.5	SCI-400 Amp Frame Battery Charger Maintenance - 18 Month PM	28
	Work Orders	work orders	41069503, 41069504, 41023249	
71111.24	Calculations	PTN-BOHC-14-001	Evaluation of Stop Logs for Flooding Integrated Assessment	2
	Corrective Action Documents	action requests	2546544, 2546546, 2547457, 2547035, 2547004, 2519347, 2551763, 2510848, 2513965, 2548485, 2556052, 2556083, 2553565, 2519453, 2557905	
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	action requests	2548719	
	Drawings	5610-C-1695	Network of Barriers for Main Plant External Flood Protection	10
		5613-M-3022 Sheet 3	Emergency Diesel Engine and Oil System DG 3A Fuel Oil	27
	Miscellaneous	5610-025-DB-001	Control Room Ventilation System Design Basis Document	04/14/2013
		PMR-26-001535	Surveillance Test Interval Change Evaluation for Emergency Containment Cooler - Monthly to Quarterly	08/25/2026
	Procedures	0-ADM-235	Technical Specification Surveillance Frequency Control Program	45
		0-ADM-559	Control Room Habitability Program	10
		3-OP-050	Residual Heat Removal System	36
		4-OP-023	Emergency Diesel Generator	04/14/2026
		4-OSP-023.1	Diesel Generator Operability Test	06/25/2025

		4-OSP-041.1	Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation	24
		4-OSP-055.1	Emergency Containment Cooler Operability Test	26
		4-PMM-022.3	Emergency Diesel Generator 36 Month Preventive Maintenance	08/10/2022
		V000664	Instruction Manual for 6700 Series Low Pressure Liquid Level Indicator	02/29/1996
	Work Orders	work orders	41012269, 41002529, 41014641, 41033610	
71114.06	Corrective Action Documents	action requests	2557591, 2557592, 2557593, 2557594	
	Procedures	3-ARP-097.CR.H	Control Room Response - Panel H	35
		3-EOP-E-0	Reactor Trip or Safety Injection	25
		EP-AA-100	NextEra Common Emergency Plan Nuclear Fleet	7
71130.15	Corrective Action Documents	AR	2555478	
	Procedures	PTN-SY-002	Site Specific Security Equipment Testing	32
71152A	Procedures	0-OSP-059.15	Nuclear Instrument Channel Check and Calibration	16
		0-OSP-059.7	NIS Setpoint and Calibration Predictions for a New Cycle Startup	2
		3-SMI-059.25	Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation N36 Calibration	6
	Work Orders	WO	41014679, 41024783	

Robert Coffey

SUBJECT: TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS 3 AND 4 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
05000250_2026003 AND 05000251_2026003 DATED: October 14, 2026

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