



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

October 13, 2026

Jamie Coleman
Regulatory Affairs Director
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc
3535 Colonnade Parkway
Birmingham AL 35243

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2026003 and 05000425/2026003

Dear Jamie Coleman:


On September 30, 2026, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results of this inspection with Jason Thomas and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,



Signed by Daniel Bacon on 10/13/26

Daniel M. Bacon, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
R2 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000424 and 05000425
License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: GovDelivery Subscriber

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2026003 and 05000425/2026003
DATED OCTOBER 13, 2026

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000424 and 05000425

License Numbers: NPF-68 and NPF-81

Report Numbers: 05000424/2026003 and 05000425/2026003

Enterprise Identifier: I-2026-003-0051

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Waynesboro, GA

Inspection Dates: July 01, 2026 to September 30, 2026

Inspectors: Jack Bell, Senior Health Physicist
Steve Downey, Senior Reactor Engineer
Matthew Edwin, Health Physicist
Brian Griman, Reactor Inspector
Larry Grimes, Resident Inspector
Thomas Morrissey, Senior Resident Inspector
JP Parent, Resident Inspector
Tom Stephens, Senior Reactor Analyst

Approved By: Daniel M. Bacon, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
R2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Maintain Fill and Vent Procedure for Unit 1 Train "B" Component Cooling Water			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Area	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000424/2026003-01 Open/Closed	None (NPP)	71111.15
A self-revealing Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," was identified for the licensee's failure to maintain instructions for filling and venting the Unit 1 train "B" component cooling water (CCW) system which resulted in the inoperability of the "B" train of CCW from March 21, 2026, until July 3, 2026.			

Additional Tracking Items

Type	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
LER	05000424/2026-001-00	Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1, Inoperable Component Cooling Water Train Due to Air Intrusion	71153	Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 50 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On July 3, 2026, the unit was returned to RTP. On September 7, 2026, power was reduced to approximately 92 percent RTP for several hours to perform a planned main turbine valve surveillance. The unit operated at RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at RTP. On August 18, 2026, Unit 2 began a power coast down. On September 13, 2026, the unit was shut down for a refueling outage. The unit was shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling train "A" and Unit 1 SFP cooling trains "A" and "B", including supporting trains of component cooling water (CCW) and nuclear service cooling water (NSCW), with Unit 2 full core offload (refueling outage 2R25) to the SFP, on September 21-30, 2026.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Fire zones 30, 31, 32, 33, and 26B. Unit 2, trains "A" and "B" safety injection (SI) and auxiliary CCW pump rooms; and auxiliary building level "B" pipe penetration area on July 22, 2026

- (2) Fire zones 89, 90, 159, 87, 88, 93, 102, 158. Unit 1 auxiliary building level "A" east and west penetration areas on August 18, 2026
- (3) Fire zones 140A, 140B, 140C, and 140E. Unit 2 containment building on September 21, 2026

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)

The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities in Unit 2 during refueling outage 2R25 from September 16 to September 24, 2026.

Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:

- (1) Ultrasonic Examination
 - 21204-025-27-RB, 6" pipe to branch connection weld, ASME Class 1 (R1.20)
 - 21204-245-31-RB, 1.5" pipe to elbow weld, ASME Class 1 (R1.11)
 - 21302-110-17-RB, 6" valve to pipe weld, ASME Class 2 (R1.11)

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:

- (1)
 - Bare metal visual examination of 21201-V6-CRDM, reactor vessel closure head exterior
 - Magnetic particle examination of 21201-V6-001-W02, closure head torus to flange weld
 - Pre-peening ultrasonic examination of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head Penetrations 11, 12, 21, 30, 31, 42, 55, and 78

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's boric acid control program performance, which included the following activities:

- (1)
 - Boric Acid Walkdown – September 18, 2026
 - Review of the following boric acid evaluation (by technical evaluation number):
 - TE1178226
 - TE1201168

- Review of the following corrective actions performed for evidence of boric acid leaks that were identified (by condition report (CR) number):
 - CR11165993
 - CR11176570
 - CR11273243
 - CR11293008

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Training/Examination Observations (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator simulator annual examination scenario that included a failed nuclear instrumentation detector, loss of a class 1E electrical train, secondary coolant leakage, a manual reactor trip, a large break loss of coolant accident, and a transfer to cold leg recirculation, on August 4, 2026.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) Unit 2 elevated risk with turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump out of service (OOS) for testing and train "B" residual heat removal (RHR) OOS for planned maintenance on August 6, 2026
- (2) Unit 2 yellow risk with train "A" NSCW fan 2 OOS for planned maintenance on August 19-20, 2026
- (3) Unit 1 elevated risk with train "B" NSCW pump 6 (emergent work, August 30 - September 10, 2026) and train "A" NSCW fan 2 (planned and emergent work, September 8 - 9, 2026)
- (4) Unit 2, yellow shutdown risk due to lowered reactor coolant system inventory for planned maintenance on September 15-16, 2026

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) CR 11288294, Unit 1 train "B" CCW to RHR seal cooler heat exchanger relief lifted, on July 9, 2026
- (2) CRs 11295924 and 11299822; 2DD1B and 2AD1B battery corrosion and cracked lids tracking and trending, on August 19, 2026
- (3) CR 11306194, Unit 1, train "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) field ground relay dropped flag, on September 11, 2026

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

- (1) (Partial) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 2R25 activities from September 13 to September 30, 2026.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance and Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

- (1) 14808A-2, "Train A Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check (CCP) Valve IST and Response Time Test", after train "A" CCP system outage; Work Orders (WO) WO SNC2888905 and SNC1699814, on July 15, 2026
- (2) SP-ENG-2026-01, "Unit 1 Train A NSCW Pump 5 Functional Test," and 14802A-1, "Train A NSCW Pump / Check Valve IST and Response Time Test," (pump 5 only) after Unit 1 NSCW pump 5 outage; WOs: SNC452377, SNC3081342, on August 24, 2026
- (3) 28210-C, "Unit 2 Main Steam Line Code Safety Valve Setpoint Verification," during the week of August 31, 2026
- (4) 14802B-1, "Train B NSCW Pump/Check Valve IST and Response Time Test," (Pump 6 IST only), after replacing pump 6 motor; WO SNC3151801, on September 12, 2026
- (5) 14667-2, "Train B Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test," on September 14, 2026

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) 14810-1, "TDAFW Pump & Check Valve IST Response Time Test," on July 30, 2026
- (2) 14721C-2, "ECCS Pump Inservice Test," on September 16-17, 2026

Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) 14379-2, "Containment Penetration No. 79 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Vent and Hydrogen Supply Local Leak Rate Test," on September 21, 2026.

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) WO SNC2715241, SNC2715248, SNC2715251, SNC2715256 and SNC2715257 associated with Unit 2 train "B" EDG digital modification, on September 28, 2026.

SAFEGUARDS

71130.15 - Security Operations

Security Operations (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated security operations during observations of the following activity:

- (1) Routine security personnel activities and compensatory measure implementation, on August 11 - 30, 2026.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71125.02 - Radiological Performance - Remote Inspection

Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.

Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:

- (1) Internal dose assessment related to head peening work beginning on March 2, 2026

Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:

- (1) Use of equivalent dose equivalent methodology for steam generator work on March 17, 2025

71125.03 - Occupational Radiation Safety Onsite Inspection

Permanent Ventilation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:

- (1) Units 1 and 2 control room emergency filtration system (CREFS), trains A and B

SCBA (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensee's use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.

External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry.

Instrumentation Walkdown and Observation (IP Section 03.04) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:

- (1) Survey instruments at the calibration lab including source checks of a telepole

- (2) Survey instruments ready for checkout near the radiological controlled area (RCA) entrance including source checks of an ion chamber
- (3) Exit monitors at the RCA exit including source checks of gamma portal monitors and personal contamination monitors
- (4) Gamma spectroscopy and liquid scintillation counting equipment at the chemistry count room
- (5) Neutron survey instruments available for use including response checks of a rem ball

Occupational Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:

- (1) Containment high range radiation monitors 1RE-0005 and 1RE-0006
- (2) Containment atmosphere process air particulate and radiogas monitors 2RE-2562A and 2RE-2562C
- (3) Ludlum 9-3 ion chamber survey meter #1749

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) • CR 11293008, Unit 2 CCP discharge header flow control valve (2-FV0121) packing leakage, on July 23, 2026
- (2) • Vogtle Units 1 and 2, mid-cycle assessment report and nuclear oversight (NOS) audit of engineering, operations, and radiation protection, on September 28, 2026

71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

- (1) LER 05000424/2026-001-00, "Inoperable Component Cooling Water Train Due to Air Intrusion," (ADAMS Accession No. ML26280A111). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71111.15. This LER is Closed.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

71003 - Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal

The inspectors evaluated the material condition of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2, in the fall of 2026 while the unit was shut down for Refueling Outage 2R25, in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71003, Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal and its guidance associated with Phase I License Renewal Inspections. This period allowed an

opportunity to evaluate inaccessible areas prior to entry into the period of extended operations (PEO) and to evaluate the licensee conducting aging management reviews. The inspectors observed the implementation of the following Unit 2 license renewal activities from September 14 through September 20, 2026:

Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal (1 Sample)

(1) One-Time Inspection Program for ASME Class 1 Small Bore Piping

- Observed Phased Array UT examination on safety injection to cold leg check valve socket welds on loops 3 and 4

One-Time Inspection Program

- Observed Ultrasonic Thickness examination on reactor coolant pump lube oil drain tank

10CFR50, Appendix J Program

- Observed Local Leak Rate Test on Containment Penetration No. 55 – Sludge Lancing/Eddy Current/Spare

External Surfaces Monitoring Program

- Performed a walkdown of the reactor coolant drain tank room and observed the condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs).

Also, the inspectors conducted a general containment walkdown focusing on aging management of in-scope SSCs since this would be the last reasonable opportunity to identify and address aging issues in normally inaccessible areas before Unit 2 enters the PEO. During the containment walkdown, the inspectors assessed for signs of aging, such as corrosion on piping and supports, cracking, water intrusion, and voids in concrete not already captured and evaluated within existing aging management programs.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Maintain Fill and Vent Procedure for Unit 1 Train "B" Component Cooling Water			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Area	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000424/2026003-01 Open/Closed	None (NPP)	71111.15
A self-revealing Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," was identified for the licensee's failure to maintain instructions for filling and venting the Unit 1 train "B" component cooling water (CCW) system which resulted in the inoperability of the "B" train of CCW from March 21, 2026, until July 3, 2026.			
<u>Description:</u> On March 21, 2026, while Unit 1 was shutdown for a refueling outage (1R26), the licensee filled and vented "B" train of CCW in accordance with procedure 13715B-1, "Component Cooling Water System Train B," Version 7.2, after CCW heat exchanger maintenance. The CCW system was declared operable before Unit 1 entered Mode 4 on March 31, 2026. On			

April 28, 2026, the "B" train was placed in service to support residual heat removal (RHR) surveillance testing. Within a few minutes, operators received an alarm from the RHR room leak detection system. The licensee determined that the CCW RHR seal cooler relief (1PSV11825) unexpectedly lifted resulting in a 15 gpm leak from the "B" train. The "B" train was restarted and declared operable approximately 4 hours later with no relief valve leakage. The "B" train was restarted and declared operable approximately 4 hours later with no relief valve leakage. The licensee initiated plans to replace the relief valve because they believed the valve lifted due to setpoint drift.

The licensee discovered that the fill and vent procedures for 1B, 2B and 2A CCW trains did not include a required high point vent valve on the CCW pump discharge header. As a result, a section of the 1B discharge header was not vented since CCW heat exchanger maintenance and air introduced during the maintenance remained in the system until venting on July 3, 2026.

The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to maintain fill and vent procedure, 13715B-1, since Rev. 1 was issued in April 2006, because it did not include the required high point vent valve (1-1203-X4-114) on the 1B train CCW pump discharge header. The licensee's failure to use this valve during the filling and venting of the CCW system resulted in the B train being inoperable from March 21, 2026, until July 3, 2026.

Corrective Actions:

The licensee revised procedures 13715B-1/2, "Component Cooling Water System Train B," and 13715A-2, "Component Cooling Water System Train A," to include venting from a high point CCW discharge header vent.

Corrective Action References: CR 11274455, CR 11271883, CR 11288294

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency:

The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to maintain the filling and venting procedure for the 1B train CCW as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1 was a performance deficiency. The failure to include a required high point vent valve (1-1203-X4-114) on the 1B train CCW pump discharge header resulted in inoperability of the "B" train of CCW and degradation of the long-term heat removal associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone.

Screening and Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors screened the performance deficiency using IMC 0609 Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors screened the performance deficiency using Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609 Appendix A for the mitigating systems cornerstone and determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor and a detailed risk evaluation was required because the failure of the Unit 1 Component Cooling Water (CCW) "B" train due to a relief valve spuriously lifting represented a loss of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) function of at least one train of a multi-train system for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional Senior Reactor Analyst using Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Version 8.2.12 and NRC Vogtle Unit 1 and 2 Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model Version 8.83. A conditional analysis was performed to evaluate the risk increase due to the potential for the CCW train "B" expansion

tank emptying due to the relief valve lifting using a condition exposure period of 94 days. The dominant sequences included the loss of 4160V AC bus 1AA02 coupled with loss of auxiliary feedwater, loss of main feedwater, secondary side cooling removed, and failure to implement high pressure recirculation; and a weather-related loss of offsite power coupled with a loss of auxiliary feedwater, failure to restore offsite power in 6 hours, and a failure to initiate high pressure recirculation. Internal Events initiators were the most significant contributor to the overall risk estimate and were less than 1E-07/year, therefore, external events hazards did not need to be calculated. The change in risk was mitigated by the non-safety automatic makeup to the CCW expansion tank which was credited for all scenarios that did not involve loss of offsite power. The analysis determined that the increase in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) was less than 1E-06/year for delta-CDF and less than 1E-07/year for delta-LERF, representing a finding of very low safety significance (GREEN).

Cross-Cutting Area: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting area was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1, Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978.

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 3.e, requires, in part, that instructions for filling and venting the component cooling water system should be covered by written procedures.

Contrary to the above, since April 2006, the licensee has failed to maintain filling and venting procedures for the component cooling water system. Specifically, station procedures did not include high point vent valve (1-1203-X4-114) on the 1B train CCW pump discharge header required to vent residual air accumulation in Unit 1 train "B" CCW system. As a result, Unit 1 "B" train was inoperable for approximately 91 days, exceeding the 72-hour completion time of TS 3.7.7.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On September 4, 2026, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection exit meeting inspection results to Toni Aiken, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 21, 2026, the inspectors presented the Unit 2 license renewal phase 1 inspection results to Jamaal Merriweather, Licensing Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 24, 2026, the inspectors presented the ISI Exit inspection results to Jamaal Merriweather, Licensing Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 30, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Jason Thomas and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71003	Corrective Action Documents	CR No's 11161156, 11161157, 11161159, 11161161, 11161164	Multiple containment liner indications	0
	Procedures	14355-2	Containment penetration No. 55 Sludge Lancing/Eddy Current/Spare Local Leak Rate Test	12.2
		86011-C	External Surfaces Monitoring Program	1.2
		NMP-ES-018-006	Indication Notification	7.0
		NMP-ES-024-511	Ultrasonic Thickness Examination Procedure	8.0
	Work Orders	SNC1473831	LLRT/PEN 55	0
		SNC2003355	1204-21204-Socket Weld Insp. - 2R25 HHSI Phased Array UT Examination	0
		SNC2980173	1201-21201T4004 - Perform One-time UT Inspection of Lower Tank Head/Piping	0
71111.08P	NDE Reports	F26VNP2M001	Magnetic Particle Examination of 21201-V6-001-W02	09/22/2026
		F26VNP2UT016	Ultrasonic Examination of 21302-110-17-RB	09/23/2026
		F26VNP2UT017	Ultrasonic Examination of 21204-245-31-RB	09/22/2026
		F26VNP2UT026	Ultrasonic Examination of 21204-025-27-RB	09/21/2026
71125.03	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR11304463		
		CR11304468		
		CR11304470		
	Work Orders	SNC1511845		
		SNC1516330		
		SNC1527599		
		SNC1578704		
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	11196633	Unit 1 Charging pump discharge header flow	

			control valve (1-FV0121) packing leakage (July 20, 2025)	
	Self-Assessments	CNOS-25-336	Fleet Ops 2025 Operations Audit Package	12/17/2025
		CNOS-26-067	2025 Fleet Engineering Audit Package	02/24/2026
		CNOS-26-209	Fleet RP Audit 2026	07/16/2026