

September 25, 2026

Docket No.: 52-025

NL-26-0382

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) – Unit 3
Licensee Event Report 2026-001-00
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification
Due to Pressurizer Safety Valves' Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Southern Nuclear Operating Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report for VEGP Unit 3.

This letter contains no regulatory commitments. If you have questions regarding the enclosed information, please contact Will Garrett at (706) 848-7154.

Respectfully submitted,



Eric Loehlein
Site Vice President
Vogtle Units 3 & 4

EL/kjd/cbg

Enclosure: Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 2026-001-00

CC: NRC Regional Administrator, Region II
NRR Project Manager – Vogtle Units 3 & 4
Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle Units 3 & 4

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 3

Licensee Event Report 2026-001-00

Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification
Due to Pressurizer Safety Valves' Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift

Enclosure

Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 2026-001-00



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 3 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by email to Infocollections.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

1. Facility Name

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 3

☐ 050
☒ 052
☐ 053

2. Docket Number

00025

3. Page

1 OF 3

4. Title

Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification Due to Pressurizer Safety Valves' Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift

5. Event Date

Month

Day

Year

08

10

2026

6. LER Number

Year

Sequential Number

Revision No.

2026

- 001 -

00

7. Report Date

Month

Day

Year

09

25

2026

8. Other Facilities Involved

Facility Name

☐ 050

Docket Number

Facility Name

☐ 052

Docket Number

Facility Name

☐ 053

Docket Number

9. Operating Mode

1

10. Power Level

100

11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

☒ 10 CFR Part 20	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☐ 50.69(g)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 73.77(a)(1)(ii)
☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 73.77(a)(2)(i)(A)
☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 73.77(a)(2)(i)(B)
☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	☒ 10 CFR Part 21	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 73.1200(a)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 21.2(c)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(v)	☐ 73.1200(b)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	☒ 10 CFR Part 50	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(vii)(A)	☐ 73.1200(c)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(viii)(A)	☐ 73.1200(d)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	☒ 10 CFR Part 53	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(vii)(B)	☐ 73.1200(e)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(A)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ix)	☐ 73.1200(f)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(B)	☒ 10 CFR Part 73	☐ 73.1200(g)
			☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 73.77(a)(1)(i)	☐ 73.1200(h)

☐ OTHER (Specify here, in abstract, or NRC 366A).

12. Licensee Contact for this LER

Licensee Contact

Will Garrett, Licensing Manager, Vogtle Units 3&4

Phone Number (Include area code)

(706) 848-7154

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (Continued)

13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report

Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to IRIS	Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to IRIS
X	AB	RV	C711	N					

14. Supplemental Report Expected

☒ No ☐ Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date)

15. Expected Submission Date

Month	Day	Year

16. Abstract

In April 2026, during the second Unit 3 Refueling outage (3R02), while the unit was at 0 percent power in Mode 6, two pressurizer safety relief valves (PSVs) were removed as part of the routine Inservice Testing Program and sent to an off-site testing facility. On August 10 and 11, 2026, while the unit was at 100 percent power in Mode 1, the site was notified of the testing results and that the as-found lift set pressures were determined to be outside the Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.6 allowable lift setting limits. When discovered, both valves had already been replaced with pre-tested valves. Setpoint drift is the most likely cause of the PSVs' setpoint failures.

It is likely that these PSVs were outside of the TS limits longer than the allowable completion times for the associated required action statements during the previous operating cycle in applicable modes of operation. Therefore, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by TS. Units 1, 2, and 4 were unaffected by this event.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by email to Infocollections.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

1. FACILITY NAME Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 3	☐ 050	2. DOCKET NUMBER 00025	3. LER NUMBER		
	☒ 052		YEAR 2026	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001	REV NO. 00
	☐ 053				

NARRATIVE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

In April 2026, during the refueling outage (3R02) while Unit 3 was at 0 percent power in Mode 6 and with the reactor coolant system (RCS) [EIIIS: AB] at atmospheric conditions, two pressurizer safety relief valves (PSV) [EIIIS: AB/RV] were removed as part of the routine Inservice Testing Program (IST) and sent to an off-site testing facility. On August 10 and 11, 2026, the site was notified that the as-found lift pressures were discovered to be 2373.8 psig and 2520.4 psig, which are outside the Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.6 allowable lift pressure settings of greater than or equal to 2460 psig and less than or equal to 2510 psig.

EVENT CAUSE ANALYSIS

Setpoint drift was determined to be the most likely cause of the failure of the PSVs (Manufacturer Crosby Model HB-86 BP, serial number N900028-00-014 and serial number N900028-00-016). As described in Vogtle Unit 3 LER 2025-01-00, these two PSVs were installed during the Unit 3 first refueling outage, prior to initial identification of a setpoint drift issue.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND REPORTABILITY

There were no other safety-related structures, systems, or components inoperable at the time that contributed to the event. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by TS. The two PSV lift pressure setpoints were likely outside the TS limits (and therefore inoperable) for presumably longer than the allowed completion times of the associated required action statements during applicable modes of operation. There is no firm evidence prior to the time of discovery at the test facility of when the failures occurred.

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. The as-found lift pressure settings do not affect or challenge the ASME code limitations and safety limit of 110 percent RCS design pressure. There was no impact to the RCS transients that credit pressurizer safety valves for overpressure protection.

There was no loss of safety function for this event. Previous analysis demonstrates the as-found lift setpoints are bounded by the accident analysis event-specific acceptance criteria. Units 1, 2, and 4 were unaffected by this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- The two affected PSVs were replaced with valves having springs that were previously in service having experienced one heat cycle during the Unit 4 first fuel cycle.
- Test procedures were established to ensure spring relaxation requirements are satisfied during initial testing of new or refurbished valves.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

- A similar event was reported for Unit 3 in LER 2025-001-00.
- A similar event occurred during the Unit 4 first refueling outage (4R01), when a single PSV as-found lift pressure exceeded TS limits and documented in the site's corrective action program.