

NRC FORM 361
(08-31-2026)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OPERATIONS CENTER

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0238

EXPIRES: 09/30/2026

REACTOR PLANT EVENT
NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET

Estimated burden per response to comply with this voluntary collection request: 30 minutes. The information provided will be used for evaluation of licensee event description, facility status and for input to the public website. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by email to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0238), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

EN # 58453

NRC OPERATIONS TELEPHONE NUMBERS: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469#, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694#, [2nd] 301-415-0550 and [3rd] 301-415-0553. *Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.
FAX - 301-816-5151, EMAIL - hoo.hoc@nrc.gov

Notification Time 13:37 ESD	Facility or Organization Cook Nuclear Plant	Unit 1 & 2	Name of Caller/Title Amanda Schnipke / Licensing Engineer	Call Back # 269-465-5901 x7735
Event Time & Zone 11:11 ESD	Event Date 9/10/2026	Power/Mode (At Time of Event) Unit 1 100% Mode 1 Unit 2 100% Mode 1		Power/Mode (At Time of Notification) Unit 1 62% Mode 1 Unit 2 100% Mode 1
EVENT CLASSIFICATION		1-HR. NON-EMERGENCY 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)		
☐ GENERAL EMERGENCY	GEN/AAEC	☐ TS Deviation	ADEV	☐ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA
☐ SITE AREA EMERGENCY	SIT/AAEC	4-HR. NON-EMERGENCY 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)		☐ (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB
☐ ALERT	ALE/AAEC	☐ (i) TS Required S/D	ASHU	☐ (v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC
☐ UNUSUAL EVENT	UNU/AAEC	☐ (iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS	ACCS	☐ (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND
☐ 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY	(see next columns)	☐ (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram)	ARPS	☐ (xii) Offsite Medical AMED
☐ 10 CFR 73	D???	☐ (xi) Offsite Notification	APRE	☐ (xiii) Loss Comm/Asmt/Response ACOM
☐ MATERIAL/EXPOSURE	B???	8-HR. NON-EMERGENCY 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)		60-DAY OPTIONAL 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY	HFIT	☐ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition	ADEG	☐ Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV
☐ OTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT.	(see last column)	☐ (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition	AUNA	☒ 21.21(d)(3)(i) NONR
☐ INFORMATION ONLY	NNF	☐ (iv)(A) Specified System Actuation	AESF	☐ NONR

Event Description (Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc.) (Continue on Page 2)

PART 21 - LCR-33 NUC BATTERY CELL

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

This is an initial report notification pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21.21 (d)(3)(i)

On September 10th, 2026, Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) completed a Part 21 evaluation concerning a voltage issue involving 1-BATT-CD Plant Battery Cell 50 in Unit 1. The affected battery was supplied by C&D Technologies Inc., Model: LCR-33 NUC, Manufacturing date: February 2016.

During a quarterly surveillance test of the Unit 1 CD battery, cell 50 was found to have a voltage below the required Technical Specification (TS) limit. In accordance with CNP procedures, an attempt was made to restore the cell voltage to above the TS requirement. However, the cell did not hold its charge and the voltage degraded until it was replaced one week later.

NOTIFICATIONS	YES	NO	WILL BE	Anything Unusual or not understood? ☐ Yes (Explain above) ☒ No
NRC RESIDENT	☒	☐	☐	
STATE(s)	☐	☒	☐	Did all systems function as required? ☒ Yes ☐ No (Explain above)
LOCAL	☐	☒	☐	
OTHER GOV AGENCIES	☐	☒	☐	Mode of operations until corrected (if applicable)
MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE	☐	☒	☐	Additional Information continued on next page? ☐ Yes ☒ No

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REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (Continued)

EN # 58453

RADIOLOGICAL RELEASES: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS (specific details/explanations should be covered in event description)

☐ Liquid Release	☐ Gaseous Release	☐ Unplanned Release	☐ Planned Release	☐ Ongoing	☐ Terminated
☐ Monitored	☐ Unmonitored	☐ Offsite Release	☐ T.S. Exceeded	☐ RM Alarms	☐ Areas Evacuated
☐ Personnel Exposed or Contaminated		☐ Offsite Protection Actions Recommended		*State release path in description	

	Release Rate (Ci/sec)	% T.S. Limit	HOO Guide	Total Activity (Ci)	% T.S. Limit	HOO Guide
Noble Gas			0.1 Ci/sec			1000 Ci
Iodine			10 µCi/sec			0.01 Ci
Particulate			1 µCi/sec			1 mCi
Liquid (excluding tritium and dissolved noble gas)			10 µCi/min			0.1 Ci
Liquid (tritium)			0.2 Ci/min			5 Ci
TOTAL						

	Plant Stack	Condenser/Air Ejector	Main Steam Line	SG Blowdown	Other
RAD Monitor Readings					
Alarm Setpoints					
% T.S. Limit (If applicable)					

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in event description)

Location of the Leak (e.g., SG #, valve, pipe, etc.)

Leak Rate	Units: gpm/gpd	T. S. Limits	Sudden or Long-Term Development
Leak Start Date	Time	Coolant Activity and Units:	Primary Secondary

List of Safety Related Equipment not Operational

Event Description (Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc.) (Continued from Page 1)

If this condition were present in multiple cells simultaneously, it could pose a substantial safety hazard due to the potential loss of required battery capacity or the failure of the battery to maintain its required mission time during a station blackout event.

C&D Technologies Inc. reported that the low-voltage condition was caused by an internal short within the cell. The short prevented the cell from maintaining a stable current during charging. Failure analysis revealed a paste lump that had penetrated the separator and contacted the adjacent negative plate, causing the failure.

This failure mode cannot be visually identified and is detectable only through the routine collection and evaluation of cell voltage data. The defect cannot be detected until the electrical short occurs. CNP is taking weekly battery terminal voltage.

A written notification will be provided within 30 days.

Cook Nuclear Plant is the only facility known to be affected at the time of this report.

The NRC Resident has been notified.

Event #: 58453 Event Type: Power Reactor Site: Cook Unit: 1 2 / Region: 3 / State: MI Facility: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP Containment Type: ICE COND ICE COND						
Notify Date/Time: 2026-09-17 13:37 (EDT) Event Date/Time: 2026-09-10 11:11 (EDT) Modify Date/Time: 2026-09-17 13:45						
Notified by: Amanda Schnipke HOO: Karen Cotton Emergency Class: Non Emergency 10 CFR Sections: 21.21(d)(3)(i) Defects And Noncompliance						
Notifications: Part 21/50.55 Reactors EMAIL R3_Reactor Events EMAIL						
Unit	Scram Code	Rx Crit	Init Power	Init RX Mode	Curr Power	Current RX Mode
1	N	Yes	100	Power Operation	62	Power Operation
2	N	Yes	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

PART 21 - BATTERY CELL VOLTAGE ISSUE

The following information was provided by the Cook Nuclear Plant via phone and email:

This is an initial report notification pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21.21 (d)(3)(i)

"On September 10th, 2026, Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) completed a Part 21 evaluation concerning a voltage issue involving 1-BATT-CD plant battery cell 50 in Unit 1. The affected battery was supplied by C&D; Technologies Inc., model: LCR-33 NUC, manufacturing date: February 2016.

"During a quarterly surveillance test of the Unit 1 CD battery, cell 50 was found to have a voltage below the required technical specification (TS) limit. In accordance with CNP procedures, an attempt was made to restore the cell voltage to above the TS requirement. However, the cell did not hold its charge and the voltage degraded until it was replaced one week later.

"If this condition were present in multiple cells simultaneously, it could pose a substantial safety hazard due to the potential loss of required battery capacity or the failure of the battery to maintain its required mission time during a station blackout event. C&D; Technologies Inc. reported that the low-voltage condition was caused by an internal short within the cell. The short prevented the cell from maintaining a stable current during charging. Failure analysis revealed a paste lump that had penetrated the separator and contacted the adjacent negative plate, causing the failure.

"This failure mode cannot be visually identified and is detectable only through the routine collection and evaluation of cell voltage data. The defect cannot be detected until the electrical short occurs. CNP is taking weekly battery terminal voltage.

"A written notification will be provided within 30 days.

"Cook Nuclear Plant is the only facility known to be affected at the time of this report.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Event #: 58453 Event Type: Power Reactor Site: Cook Unit: 1 2 / Region: 3 / State: MI Facility: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP Containment Type: ICE COND ICE COND						
Notify Date/Time: 2026-09-17 13:37 (EDT) Event Date/Time: 2026-09-10 11:11 (EDT) Modify Date/Time: 2026-09-17 13:45						
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Unit	Scram Code	Rx Crit	Init Power	Init RX Mode	Curr Power	Current RX Mode
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PART 21 - BATTERY CELL VOLTAGE ISSUE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"On September 10th, 2026, Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) completed a Part 21 evaluation concerning a voltage issue involving 1-BATT-CD plant battery, cell 50, in Unit 1. The affected [battery cell] is a C&D; Technologies Inc. model LCR-33 NUC, manufactured in February 2016.

"During a quarterly surveillance test of the Unit 1 'CD' battery, cell 50 was found to have a voltage below the required technical specification (TS) limit. In accordance with CNP procedures, an attempt was made to restore the cell voltage to above the TS requirement. However, the cell did not hold its charge and the voltage degraded; it was replaced one week later.

"If this condition were present in multiple cells simultaneously, it could pose a substantial safety hazard due to the potential loss of required battery capacity or the failure of the battery to maintain its required mission time during a station blackout event. C&D; Technologies Inc. reported that the low-voltage condition was caused by an internal short within the cell. The short prevented the cell from maintaining a stable current during charging. Failure analysis revealed a paste lump that had penetrated the separator and contacted the adjacent negative plate, causing the failure.

"This failure mode cannot be visually identified and is detectable only through the routine collection and evaluation of cell voltage data. The defect cannot be detected until the electrical short occurs. CNP is taking weekly battery terminal voltage [readings].

"A written notification will be provided within 30 days.

"Cook Nuclear Plant is the only facility known to be affected at the time of this report.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."