**Entergy Operations, Inc.**
P.O. Box 756
Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

**Jeffery A. Hardy**
Director Regulatory & Emergency Preparedness
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Tel: 802-380-5124

10 CFR 50.73

GNRO2026-00024

July 13, 2026

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2026-004-00, Manual Actuation of Standby Service Water System Due to an Open Safety Relief Valve

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
Renewed License No. NPF-29

Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2026-004-00, Manual Actuation of Standby Service Water System Due to an Open Safety Relief Valve. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for any event that resulted in manual actuation of emergency service water systems that do not normally run and serve as the ultimate heat sinks.

This letter contains no new Regulatory Commitments. Should you have any questions concerning the content of this letter, please contact me at 802-380-5124.

Sincerely,

Digitally signed by Jeff Signature
DN: cn=Jeff Signature, c=US, email=jhardy@entergy.com
Date: 2026.07.09 14:38:19 -05'00'

JAH/der

Attachments: Licensee Event Report 2026-004-00

cc: NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Port Gibson, MS 39150

U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

**Attachment**
**Licensee Event Report 2026-004-00**

NRC FORM 366 (05-05-2026) | U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

**(See Page 3 for required number of digits/characters for each block)**

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 | EXPIRES: 04/30/2027



| 1. Facility Name | | 2. Docket Number | 3. Page |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 | ■ 050<br>☐ 052<br>☐ 053 | 00416 | 1 OF 2 |

**4. Title**

Manual Actuation of Standby Service Water System Due to an Open Safety Relief Valve

| 5. Event Date | | | 6. LER Number | | | 7. Report Date | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Day | Year | Year | Sequential Number | Revision No. | Month | Day | Year |
| 05 | 12 | 2026 | 2026 | - 004 - | 00 | 07 | 13 | 2026 |

**8. Other Facilities Involved**

| Facility Name | | Docket Number |
|---|---|---|
| N/A | ☐ 050 | |
| N/A | ☐ 052 | |
| N/A | ☐ 053 | |

| 9. Operating Mode | 10. Power Level |
|---|---|
| 1 | 100 |

**11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: *(Check all that apply)***

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **10 CFR Part 20** | ☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i) | ☐ 50.69(g) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ii)(A) | ☐ 73.77(a)(1)(ii) |
| ☐ 20.2201(b) | ☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ii)(B) | ☐ 73.77(a)(2)(i)(A) |
| ☐ 20.2201(d) | ☐ 20.2203(a)(4) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(iii) | ☐ 73.77(a)(2)(i)(B) |
| ☐ 20.2203(a)(1) | **10 CFR Part 21** | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(iv) | ☐ 73.1200(a) |
| ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) | ☐ 21.2(c) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(v) | ☐ 73.1200(b) |
| ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) | **10 CFR Part 50** | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(vii)(A) | ☐ 73.1200(c) |
| ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) | ☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(viii)(A) | ☐ 73.1200(d) |
| ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) | ☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) | ✔ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) | **10 CFR Part 53** | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(viii)(B) | ☐ 73.1200(e) |
| ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v) | ☐ 50.36(c)(2) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(A) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(ix) | ☐ 73.1200(f) |
| ☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) | ☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii) | ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(B) | **10 CFR Part 73** | ☐ 73.1200(g) |
| | | | ☐ 53.1640(a)(2)(i)(C) | ☐ 73.77(a)(1)(i) | ☐ 73.1200(h) |

☐ **OTHER** (Specify here, in abstract, or NRC 366A).

**12. Licensee Contact for this LER**

| Licensee Contact | Phone Number (Include area code) |
|---|---|
| Jeff Hardy, Director of Regulatory and Emergency Preparedness | 802-380-5124 |

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (Continued)

**13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report**

| Cause | System | Component | Manufacturer | Reportable to IRIS | | Cause | System | Component | Manufacturer | Reportable to IRIS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | |

| 14. Supplemental Report Expected | | 15. Expected Submission Date | Month | Day | Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ☑ No | ☐ Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date) | | | | |

**16. Abstract**

On May 12, 2026, at 1940 CDT, the Control Room received alarm 1H13-P601-18A-G2 ADS/SRV LEAK. The operators observed indications of Safety Relief Valve (SRV) chattering and fluctuations in Suppression Pool levels. SRV 1B21F041B showed an elevated tailpipe temperature. At 1948 CDT, SRV 1B21F041B indicated fully open and the tailpipe temperature continued to increase. The operators entered an Off-Normal Event procedure, that directed them to reduce Core Flow and lower reactor power. Reactor power was stabilized at 58 percent. At 1953 CDT, Standby Service Water A and B trains were activated in conjunction with Residual Heat Removal A and B trains using the manual initiation pushbuttons in order to lower suppression pool temperatures. At 1959 CDT, SRV 1B21F041B closed after maintenance technicians pulled Division 1 fuses.

This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for any event that resulted in manual actuation of emergency service water systems that do not normally run and serve as the ultimate heat sinks.

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 04/30/2027



| 1. FACILITY NAME | | 2. DOCKET NUMBER | 3. LER NUMBER | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REV NO. |
| Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 | ■ 050<br>☐ 052<br>☐ 053 | 00416 | 2026 | - 004 | - 00 |

**NARRATIVE**

Plant Conditions:
At the time of the event, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), Unit 1 was in MODE 1 at 100 percent power and all safety systems were operable.

Description of Event:
On May 12, 2026, at 1940 CDT, the Control Room received alarm 1H13-P601-18A-G2 ADS/SRV LEAK. The operators observed indications of Safety Relief Valve (SRV) [RV] chattering and fluctuations in Suppression Pool levels. SRV 1B21F041B showed an elevated tailpipe temperature. At 1948 CDT, SRV 1B21F041B indicated fully open and the tailpipe temperature continued to increase. The operators entered an Off-Normal Event procedure, that directed them to reduce Core Flow and lower reactor power. Reactor power was stabilized at 58 percent. At 1953 CDT, Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition of Operations (LCO) 3.6.2.1 for suppression pool temperature was entered, and Standby Service Water (SSW) A and B trains were activated in conjunction with Residual Heat Removal (RHR) A and B trains using the manual initiation pushbuttons in order to lower suppression pool temperatures. At 1954 CDT, T.S LCO 3.6.2.2 for suppression pool water level was entered. At 1959 CDT, SRV 1B21F041B closed after maintenance technicians pulled Division 1 fuses. TS LCO 3.6.2.1 was exited at 2021 CDT, and LCO 3.6.2.2 was exited at 2131 CDT

Reportability:
This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for any event that resulted in manual actuation of emergency service water systems that do not normally run and serve as the ultimate heat sinks.

Cause(s):
SRV 1B21F041B failed open due to the presence of simultaneous Division 1 DC grounds that energized the SRV solenoid and caused the valve actuation. The failure involved wiring degradation and was not a result of human error, programmatic weakness, or procedural deficiency. The wiring degradation was most likely caused by elevated temperatures and humidity in area.

Corrective Actions:
Completed Action: Located and isolated the ground on the Division 1 battery bus which caused SRV 1B21F041B to open
Scheduled Action: Benchmark the industry to determine if our threshold for action in response to our ground monitoring system parameters is appropriate.

Safety Significance:
The SSW system is an essential auxiliary supporting system which provides a reliable source of cooling for plant auxiliaries that are essential to a safe reactor shutdown following a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The ultimate heat sink, consisting of the SSW system cooling towers and makeup basins, provides heat rejection and makeup water required for the dissipation of heat to permit the safe shutdown and cooldown of the plant and to maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

There were no actual safety consequences associated with this condition.

Previous Similar Events:
There have been no previous Licensee Event Reports at GGNS within the last three years involving a ground fault on an SRV requiring actuation of emergency service water systems that do not normally run and serve as ultimate heat sinks.