

POLICY ISSUE
NOTATION VOTE

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Carrie M. Safford, Secretary
FROM: Commissioner Weaver
SUBJECT: SECY-26-0062: Recommendation Regarding the
Future of the Replenishment of Potassium Iodide

Approved X Disapproved Abstain Not Participating

COMMENTS: Below Attached X None

Entered in STAR

Yes X
No

DOUGLAS
WEAVER

Signature

Digitally signed by
DOUGLAS WEAVER
Date: 2026.05.27 20:41:46
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Commissioner Weaver's Comments on SECY-26-0062 - Recommendation Regarding the Future of the Replenishment of Potassium Iodide

The Chairman has articulated a sound rationale as to why the NRC does not need to be, nor should it be, in the KI supply business. I agree with his reasoning.

To achieve this desired outcome, I approve the staff's request to: (1) establish a policy not to fund initial and replenishment stockpiles of KI beginning in FY 2028, and (2) pursue, in parallel, actions 2(a) through 2(c) recommended by the staff in the paper, with the initial focus on the action to establish an agreement with HHS or another Federal agency such that KI is not requested through the provisions of the Bioterrorism Act

My desire in approving these requests is that the staff will expeditiously achieve a stable end state where NRC does not need to be involved in the procurement and distribution of KI. While I support Chairman Nieh in prioritizing an agreement with HHS or another Federal agency over the other options, I am not confident this option will succeed in practice. One challenge is that we need a government entity to not only accept this obligation for FY 28, but in perpetuity. To avoid expending unnecessary resources, the staff should stop pursuing action 2(b) in the paper if there is no clear success path by the time of the first bi-annual CA note. To facilitate a waiver to the requirements in sections 127(a) and 127(d) of the Bioterrorism Act, the staff should develop and offer the technical basis to the Director of OSTP proactively rather than await a request; this should be done through the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC).

While I would like to see one of these first two actions succeed, I recognize that the outcome is uncertain and not within the staff's control. Therefore, the staff still needs to pursue action 2(a) in the paper.

Further, I am aligned with the Chairman on the staff returning to the Commission with options if it becomes clear that none of the currently proposed actions are expected to be successful before the November 2027 procurement deadline.