From:	Shawn Williams
To:	Treadway, Ryan I
Cc:	Felder, Terrell A; ext_Jordan_Vaughan; Michael Markley
Subject:	Catawba, Unit 2 – Request for Additional Information RE: Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (RA-26-0074) (EPID L-2026-LRO-0015)
Date:	Monday, June 1, 2026 2:18:54 PM

Dear Mr. Treadway,

By letter dated March 31, 2026 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML26090A450), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, submitted information summarizing the results of the fall 2025 steam generator (SG) tube inspections performed at Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2, during refueling outage 27 (2R27).

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has determined that additional information is needed to complete its review of the submitted inspection report, as discussed in the enclosure.

A clarification call to ensure mutual understanding of these requests was conducted on June 1, 2026. As agreed during the clarification call, please respond within 30 days of the date of this e-mail.

Please note that the NRC staff's review is continuing and further requests for information may be developed. If you have any questions, please contact me.

Request for Additional Information

Regulatory Basis

Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.8 for Catawba Unit 2 requires that a report be submitted within 180 days after initial entry into hot shutdown (MODE 4) following completion of a steam generator (SG) inspection performed in accordance with TS 5.5.9. TS 5.5.9 requires that a SG Program be established and implemented to ensure SG tube integrity is maintained.

To complete its review of the inspection report, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff requests the additional information described below.

RAI-1: Clarification of Circumferential ODSCC Indication Details
Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.8.c.2 requires reporting of the indication location, size (if available), and voltage response. The report identifies one eddy current indication of circumferential outside diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC) in Steam Generator (SG) B, row 32, column 69 (R32C69).

Page 21 of the report, which includes the table of service-induced indications, provides information regarding the single circumferential crack indication (SCI) on tube R32C69. Based on the information in the table, the NRC staff understands that the indication is located 0.12 inches below the top of the tubesheet on the hot leg side, has a maximum depth of 53 percent through-wall, an axial extent of 0.27 inches, a circumferential angular

extent of 77 degrees, and a circumferential width of 0.5 inches.

Please confirm or correct the staff's understanding of these parameters.

RAI-2: Operational Assessment Summary for All SCC Mechanisms

TS 5.6.8.d requires reporting of an analysis summary of the tube integrity conditions predicted to exist at the next scheduled inspection (i.e., operational assessment – OA). The report provides the OA summary for the newly detected SCC mechanism (circumferential ODSCC at the expansion transition) but not for the other existing SCC mechanisms.

Please provide the OA summary for the existing SCC mechanisms not included in the report.

RAI-3: Missing Figures and Referenced Information

Section f on page 8 states that Figure 9-1 provides visual comparisons of deposits on tubes, tube support plates (TSPs), and TSP broached openings, but the figure is not included in the report.
Please provide Figure 9-1.

The NRC staff notes that the report contains other references to information not in the report, such as: Section 9.4, Table 10-1, Reference [5.d], [2.a, Section 10.3.3], [2.a], [2.a, Section 7.7], [3.a], [3.i], [3.a, Table 3], [5f], [5g], [5i]. Please provide any such information that was referenced but not included in the report.

RAI-4: Clarification of Backing Bar Origin and Waterbox Modifications

Section f, starting on page 9, includes a summary of category 1 objects removed from the SGs. The second paragraph discusses objects attributed to backing bars used during waterbox cap plate modification for SGs B, C, and D.

Please clarify the following:

A large metallic bar in the T-slot of SG C was confirmed to be a shell-side backing bar used during waterbox cap plate modification to SG D during fabrication. Please confirm that the backing bar was originally from SG C.

Following the discussion of the backing bar removed from SG C, the paragraph ends with a statement that similar waterbox modifications were performed on SG B and SG C (not SG A) during fabrication. Please confirm that the statement refers to similar waterbox modifications to SG B and SG D.

Sincerely,
Shawn Williams, Senior Project Manager
Plant Licensing Branch 2-1
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-414

cc: Listserv