NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE SUMMARY

Licensee: Vistra Operations Company LLC

Facility: Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2

License No. NPF-89

Docket No. 05000446

Date of Conference: May 19, 2026

EAF-RIV-2026-0031

NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE MEETING SUMMARY

On May 19, 2026, representatives of Vistra Operations Company LLC and Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, met with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) personnel to discuss the apparent violation identified in NRC Inspection Report Number 05000446/2026090, dated April 10, 2026 (NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System [ADAMS] Accession No. ML26096A393). The regulatory conference was held at the request of the licensee and was characterized as an NRC public meeting. The meeting was held in the NRC Region IV office via Microsoft Teams Meeting and with an associated bridge line for audio. The list of attendees is provided as an enclosure to this summary (Enclosure 3).

The NRC representatives opened the regulatory conference by discussing the preliminary White (i.e., low safety significance) finding identified in the subject inspection report. They also provided an overview of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) for significance determination, as outlined in the NRC presentation (Enclosure 1). At the start of the meeting, NRC staff experienced technical difficulties with the bridge line used for audio, which remained unavailable for the entirety of the session.

Vistra and Comanche Peak senior staff led the licensee’s presentation, supported by engineering consultants from MPR and Westinghouse. They presented their response to the preliminary White findings, as documented in their presentation (Enclosure 2). The licensee acknowledged the performance deficiency associated with failing to restore Safety Chiller 206 to operable status in accordance with technical specifications. Specifically, they did not identify and correct the cause of the refrigerant leak when the chiller originally tripped, resulting in extended inoperability due to an undetected leak at the foulgas check valve inlet fitting. The licensee asserted that the apparent White violation of Technical Specifications 3.7.19 and 5.4.1 should be characterized as no more than Green, very low safety significance under the NRC’s ROP, based on data showing the B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump would remain functional for 24 hours following an event.

During the business portion of the meeting, NRC staff reiterated that the primary objectives of the conference were to gather information to support the Significance Determination Process (SDP) and to understand the licensee’s perspective on the apparent violations. The staff emphasized that no final regulatory decisions would be made during the meeting. All information presented both before and during the conference will be evaluated, and the final determination will be communicated to the licensee as soon as it is completed. The NRC also reminded the licensee of its right to appeal any final decisions.

At the close of the business portion of the meeting, members of the public were offered the opportunity to ask any relevant questions and interact with NRC participants. There were no questions from the public or the other NRC conference participants on the Teams Meeting. NRC then thanked all participants and adjourned the meeting.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this conference summary and enclosures (Enclosure 1, 2, and 3) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document room or in the NRC's Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System, accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Enclosures:

1. NRC Presentation - Public
2. Licensee Presentation - Public
3. Attendance List - Public

NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE MEETING SUMMARY, VISTRA OPERATIONS COMPANY LLC AND COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2, MAY 19, 2026 – DATED MAY 29, 2026

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ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: **ML26149A032**
PACKAGE NUMBER: **ML26149A034**
ECCONCURRENCE NUMBER: **20260529-90029**

ENCLOSURE 1

U.S.NRC
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Protecting People and the Environment

Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regulatory Conference

Vistra Operations Company, LLC
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2
EAF-23-0031

USNRC Region IV

Tuesday, May 19, 2026

To call in to hear this Teams Meeting presentation by phone, dial 1-301-576-2978 and enter participant code 481 905 78#.

Meeting Logistics

- Operation of Microsoft Teams Meeting call
- Ensure all phones and background noises are **MUTED**
- Scheduled break (15-minute)
- NRC caucus (Teams Meeting)
- Public Question Session (if you called in, please Press ***5** on phone to “raise hand,” then wait for the Moderator to acknowledge you. Press ***6** to UNMUTE, and ***5** to lower hand.)

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MEETING AGENDA

Topic	Participants
NRC Opening Remarks and Introductions	Patricia Vossmar, RIV
Licensee Opening Remarks and Introductions	Vistra / Comanche Peak
Regulatory Conference Process	Patricia Vossmar, RIV
Background and Summary of the Preliminary White Violation	Ami Agrawal, RIV
NRC's Dispositioning Process via the Mitigating Systems (MS) Cornerstone	Ami Agrawal, RIV
Summary of Violation and Cross-Cutting Aspect	Ami Agrawal, RIV
Possible Outcomes and Licensee Appeal Rights	Patricia Vossmar, RIV
Licensee Presentation	Vistra / Comanche Peak
Questions and Discussion	NRC and Vistra
Break and NRC Caucus	NRC and Vistra
Questions and Discussion	NRC and Vistra
Licensee Closing Remarks	Vistra / Comanche Peak
NRC Closing Remarks	Patricia Vossmar, RIV
Public Question and Answer	Public Attendees

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NRC Principal Participants

John Monninger
RIV Regional Administrator

Patricia Vossmar
RIV DORS Director

Ami Agrawal
DORS PBC Branch Chief

Cale Young
DORS SRA



Dustin Reinert
DORS SRA

Casey Alldredge
ACES Specialist

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Vistra Operations Company, LLC / CP
Opening Remarks / Introductions

Greg Gugle
SVP & Chief Nuclear Operating Officer

John Dreyfuss
VP, Nuclear Support

Hunter Schill
CPNPP Plant Manager

Deborah Farnsworth
Fleet, Director of Licensing & Reg Affairs



Ben Martin
Fleet Manager, Design Engineering

Sean Woods
CPNPP Sr. Manager, Ops Support

Dan Tirsun
PRA Engineer Westinghouse

Kris Brigman
CPNPP Manager, Nuc Reg Compliance

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Purpose of this Regulatory Conference

- The NRC normally provides an opportunity for a licensee to address apparent violations before the NRC takes escalated enforcement action or makes a final decision on the significance.
- The primary purpose of a Regulatory Conference is to get information from the licensee on the significance of findings evaluated through the Significance Determination Process (SDP) and gain their perspective on the apparent violations.
- The significance assessment determines whether an escalated enforcement action will be considered (i.e., a Notice of Violation associated with a white, yellow, or red SDP finding). Licensee input during this conference is also considered in making a final NRC decision.

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Today's Meeting

- No Final Decision on safety significance or enforcement action will be made today.
- Our NRC Inspection Report (05000446/2026090) provided our *current* understanding and perspective on the issue.
- We want **your, the licensee's, perspective**
  - Any additional details NRC should consider
  - Whether finding/violation occurred
  - Perceived significance of the finding/violation
  - Corrective actions implemented and/or planned

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Public Meeting Disclaimer

- The public is invited to observe the meeting and will have one or more opportunities to communicate with the NRC *after* the business portion, but before the meeting is adjourned.

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Discussion of Apparent White (Low Safety Significance) Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V

NRC issued Choice Letter on April 10, 2026 (ML26096A393, EAF-RIV-2026-0031)

Performance Deficiency

The failure to restore safety chiller 2-06 to operable status in accordance with technical specifications is a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify the cause of the refrigeration leak when the safety chiller initially tripped. This failure caused the safety chiller to remain inoperable beyond technical specification limits.

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Background Information – *How long? What Specifically Happened?*

Event Overview

- On August 14, 2025, at 9:45 p.m., Safety Chiller 2-06 (Unit 2, Train B) automatically tripped on low refrigerant pressure.
- The licensee entered LCO 3.7.19, Condition A, for one train of safety chilled water inoperable (72-hr completion time).
- Initial investigation found a less than fully torqued valve packing and a hand-tight purge gas pipe cap. Both were tightened, and the refrigerant charge restored.
- Chiller restarted with stabilized refrigerant pressure (10 in. Hg) within monitoring limits.

Restoration Attempt

- On August 15 at 11:51 p.m., chiller declared operable and LCO exited.
- Work Order WO 25-736588 for troubleshooting/repair did not identify the actual leak at the foul gas check valve, leaving the underlying failure mechanism unresolved.
- Increased monitoring was implemented following restart.

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Background Information – *How long? What Specifically Happened?*

Event Overview – Additional Information

- On August 23, refrigerant pressure again trended downward (12 in. Hg), with rising outlet temperature (56.5°F), indicating a repeat low-refrigerant condition.
- On August 24, the licensee secured the chiller and reentered LCO 3.7.19, Condition A.
- Leak testing (evacuation and nitrogen test) identified leakage at the foul gas check valve inlet fitting.

Final Restoration & Reporting

- On August 27, the degraded fitting was replaced; chiller successfully retested and declared operable at 1:38 a.m.; LCO exited.
- Past operability evaluation concluded the fitting caused both the August 14 and August 23 events.
- Licensee reported extended inoperability under Technical Specification 3.7.19 in LER 05000446/2025-002-00, with 278 hours of inoperability while Unit 2 was in Mode 1.

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Dispositioning the Issue via the Mitigating Systems SDP: MTM and White - Low Safety Significance

- The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.” The inspectors determined the finding adversely affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and used Exhibit 2 to evaluate the condition.

- The inspectors determined the finding represented a loss of PRA function of one train of a multi-train technical specification system for greater than its allowed outage time. Therefore, a detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst.

- The senior reactor analyst’s key assumptions included: 1) Before the second outage, the chiller could be recovered by manually recharging refrigerant; 2) Recovery during the second maintenance outage should not be credited; 3) The licensee’s interference theory-based failure rates for equipment cooled by the safety chillers represented the best available information.

- Based on the results of this evaluation, the finding was determined to have a preliminary significance of low safety significance (White).

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<u>Apparent Violation:</u> Technical Specification 3.7.19 – Failure to Restore Safety Chiller 2-06 Within Allowed Outage Time

Technical Specification 3.7.19 states, in part, two safety chilled water trains shall be operable. Condition A of Technical Specification 3.7.19 states, if one safety chilled water train is inoperable then restore safety chilled water train to operable status within 72 hours. Condition B states that if the required action and associated completion time of Condition A is not met, to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours.

Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that the licensee shall establish, implement, and maintain written procedures covering the activities recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9 states, in part, “Maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.”

<u>Apparent Violation:</u> Technical Specification 3.7.19 – Failure to Restore Safety Chiller 2-06 Within Allowed Outage Time

Contrary to the above, on August 15, 2025, the licensee failed to establish and implement procedures appropriate to the maintenance of safety-related equipment, as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 9. Specifically, maintenance on Unit 2 safety chiller 2-06 (train B) was not properly preplanned or performed in accordance with adequate written procedures or instructions. As a result, a refrigerant leak was not effectively addressed, causing the chiller to remain inoperable following repair activities on August 15. The equipment was not restored to an operable status until August 27 exceeding the 72-hour completion time allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.19, Condition B. During this period of inoperability, the licensee did not enter Mode 3 as required by Technical Specification 3.7.19, Condition B.

Cross-Cutting Area via IMC 0310

Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0310, “Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas,” NRC inspectors determined that the Cross-Cutting Area of Problem Identification and Resolution was most appropriate for this finding.

The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance.

Specifically, the licensee failed to identify the cause of the refrigeration leak when the safety chiller initially tripped n August 14, 2026, on low refrigerant pressure.

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Possible Outcomes

- The NRC determines there is no violation resulting in no enforcement action.
- The NRC determines the apparent violation is of very low safety significance resulting in non-escalated enforcement (Green Non-Cited Violation).
- The NRC determines the apparent violation is of low safety significance resulting in escalated enforcement (a White Finding and an associated Notice of Violation).

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Licensee's Appeal Rights

A licensee has the right to challenge any NRC determination or action that may be presented.

Instructions for challenging an NRC enforcement action are included in our transmittal letter and the action itself.

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Any questions in the room …

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Vistra Operations Company, LLC / Comanche Peak Presentation

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NRC and Vistra / Comanche Peak Staff Q&A Session

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NRC Regulatory Conference
with
Vistra / Comanche Peak

NRC Caucus in Session

… Returning Shortly

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NRC and Vistra / Comanche Peak Staff Q&A Session

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Regulatory Conference Closing Remarks

- Vistra / Comanche Peak's Closing Remarks
- NRC's Closing Remarks and Next Steps / Expectations
- Conclusion of the business portion of today's Regulatory Conference

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Are there any questions from the public attendees?

(Please press *5 on your phone to raise your hand, then await the Moderator, *6 to UNMUTE)

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ENCLOSURE 2

Safety Chiller 2-06 Regulatory Conference

Inspection Report 05000446/2026090

LER 2025-002-00

Introductions

- Greg Gugle SVP and Chief Operating Officer, Vistra
- John Dreyfuss VP Nuclear Support, Vistra
- Hunter Schill Plant Manager, Vistra
- Deborah Farnsworth Director Fleet Licensing, Vistra
- Sean Woods Sr. Manager of Operations Support, Vistra
- Ben Martin Manager Design Engineering, Vistra
- Brian Guthrie Reactor Engineer, Vistra
- Dan Tirsun PRA Engineer, Westinghouse
- Justin Fuller Consulting Engineer, MPR
- Amol Limaye Consulting Engineer, MPR
- Bob Carritte Consulting Engineer, MPR

Introductory Remarks

Hunter Schill, Plant Manager

Purpose

- Achieve a common understanding of AFW impact to PRA
- Provide new information regarding impact of MDAFW to risk analysis.

Safety Chiller 2-06 Timeline

Safety Chiller trip on low suction pressure inoperable 8/14/25 at 2125 to 8/15/25 at 1151

- Troubleshooting work order identified leaking valve packing and pipe cap
- 280lbs of refrigerant added
- Safety chiller 2-06 suction pressure stabilized following restart with all parameters normal

Increased monitoring with tightened bands

Degrading suction pressure trend identified 8/23/25 at 1630

Site declared safety chiller 2-06 inoperable 8/24/25 at 1600 for investigation

- Robust troubleshooting plan
- Replacement of valve inlet fitting
- Safety chiller 2-06 operable 8/27/25 at 0138

Casual Analysis

Cause

- Vibration and work hardening
- Graduated replacement of copper tubing with stainless steel per the life cycle management process
- Wide bands set for operator rounds

Corrective Actions

- Update operator rounds to tighten allowable bands (complete)
- Direct actions from safety chiller equipment reliability task team to improve safety chiller performance (ongoing enhancements)
- Complete actions derived from lessons learned for work instruction quality and PM strategy for safety related equipment (CR-2026-0800 due 6/11/26)

Use of PRA Mission Time and Results in SDP Assessment

- PRA Mission Time is 24 hours vs Design Basis Mission Time of 30 days.
  - PRA results used to determine significance (was identified as Very Low Safety Significance (GREEN)).

- PRA Mission Time supports placing the plant in a safe and stable condition where additional/alternate equipment can be used to remove decay heat.

- The PRA results provides the importance of PRA modeled equipment with the loss of CHS 2-06 chiller. These results focused the engineering assessment on the viability of the MDAFW pumps to continue to perform their function given a loss of room cooling.

ABN-503 Safety Chilled Water System Malfunction

2 MONITOR affected area temperatures per Attachment 2.

☐ a. VERIFY area temperatures do NOT exceed- ABNORMAL LIMIT

a. Perform the following:

1) STOP non-essential equipment on the affected train:

- RHR Pump
- Containment Spray Pumps
- Motor Driven AFW Pump
- SI Pump
- CCW Pump
- CCP
- SFP Cooling Water Pump

2) ASSESS alternating essential Pumps to provide function AND to control pump room temperatures to < 131°F.

3) IF continued operation of equipment is necessary,
THEN
Perform the following:

a. INITIATE a local equipment monitoring.

b. ENSURE room cooler NOT supported by Safety Chilled Water is OFF.

c. Supply temporary room cooling, as necessary:

- OPEN doors.
- INSTALL portable fans.
- TURN OFF lights.

Section 3.0 Loss of All Safety Chilled Water Cooling

- Allowance to run equipment as necessary

FRH-0.1B Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink



Functional Response Guideline entered using critical safety function status tree red.

FRH-0.1B Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink cont.

5 Establish AFW Flow To At Least One SG:

a. Check SG Blowdown Isolation — a. Manually close valves.

- SG Blowdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED
- SG Sample Isolation Valves - CLOSED

b. Check control room indications for cause of AFW failure:

- AFW pump suction supply.
- AFW pump power supply.
- AFW valve alignment.

c. Restore AFW flow:

- Restore level in CST and start AFW pumps.
- Restore power to MDAFW pumps and start MDAFW pumps.
- Start TDAFW pump.
- Align AFW valves as necessary.

Steps within FRH-0.1B direct restarting MDAFW pumps to maintain a heat sink.

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EOS-0.1B Reactor Trip Response

* 2	d. Verify total AFW flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 460 GPM	d. Perform ONE of the following to establish feed flow to SGs: 1) Establish AFW flow to SGs. 2) Manually establish MFW flow to SGs: A) Verify MFW pump(s) - RUNNING B) Place FW control and bypass valve controllers in manual and 0% demand. C) Place FW isolation valve hand switches in auto after close position. D) Ensure ALL reactor trip signals clear. E) IF P-14 signal is sealed-in, THEN reset P-14 by cycling reactor trip breakers. F) Reset FW Isolation. G) Manually open FW isolation bypass valve(s). H) Manually throttle open FW control bypass valve(s) to establish feed flow.

Steps within EOS-0.1B direct restarting MDAFW pumps to maintain a heat sink.

Operations Personnel Actions

- During the postulated initiating event combined with loss of pump room cooling operations personnel would be presented with a decision point to maintain a heat sink utilizing and MDAFWP without room cooling.
- In order to safeguard the core, operations would run the MDAFW pump 2-02 while using guidance of ABN-503 Section to manage room temperatures.
- Standards of operator training were evaluated and determined to consistently reinforced nuclear safety in loss of safety chilled water events.

Goals of MDAFW Room Cooling Analysis

Demonstrate PRA mission time of 24-hours for initiating events that cause a loss of power to the A train of safety related AC power

- Determine temperature in MDAFWP 2-02 room over 24 hours using appropriate conditions during the period of chiller inoperability, while still maintaining conservatisms.
- Evaluate the ability of components critical to the safety function of MDAFWP 2-02 to operate at the calculated temperatures.

Heat Load Profile



Pump Flow as a Function of Time



Heat Load as a Function of Time

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Transient Analysis Results



Temperature Transient

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Transient Analysis Conservatisms

- Neglected metal mass in the room
- Did not credit cooling airflow through the openings in the south wall
- Did not credit opening doors per the abnormal operating procedure

NOTE: If these elements were included the expected impact would lower final room temperature by tens of degrees.

Limiting Component Analysis

- All components supporting MDAFW 2-02 within room 2-073 were evaluated
- The most limiting components were identified as:
  - Pump Bearings
  - Motor Bearings
  - Pump Packing
  - Coupling
  - Motor
  - Cables

Limiting Component Analysis cont.

It was determined that the required equipment is capable of supporting MDAFW pump operation throughout the 24-hour period evaluated. Specifically, it was determined that:

- The pump and motor bearings would receive adequate oil supply to maintain acceptable temperatures and sustain adequate oil film thickness to avoid contact between rotating and stationary parts.
- The pump shaft packing would not overheat because it is in contact with cool water inside the casing.
- The pump coupling's non-metallic components have temperature ratings exceeding the maximum temperature in the room.
- The maximum temperature rise in the motor and cables is well below the temperatures they were subjected to during environmental qualification type testing.

It was also concluded that the impact of elevated ambient temperatures has only an impact on long term aging of the components versus a rapid, precipitous cessation of operation.

Transient Analysis Conclusion

- Transient analysis determined maximum room temperature of 198F at 24hrs with conservatisms built into the calculation.
- Evaluation of component capabilities has determined that MDAFWP will perform its safety function with loss of room cooling.
- Evaluation of component capabilities has determined that MDAFWP would have been available to perform its safety function with loss of room cooling.

Quantitative Analysis of PRA

No Room Cooling Dependency-MDAFWP		
Description	**All-Hazards**	
	Delta CDF	**Delta LERF**
CHS was PRA available (degraded condition= FTR & CCF values increased) from the end of the 1st LCO, until the starts of the 2nd LCO and unavailable during the 2nd LCO. **With** CHS Dependency for MDAFW	1.79E-06	8.38E-08
CHS was PRA available (degraded condition= FTR & CCF values increased) from the end of the 1st LCO, until the starts of the 2nd LCO and unavailable during the 2nd LCO. CHS Dependency **removed** for MDAFW	3.47E-07	2.50E-08

Note: Sensitivity cases increasing CCF values were performed and continued to reflect a Very Low Safety Significance (GREEN) IAW IMC-0609, Appendix A

Results

Conclusions

- Transient Analysis of MDAFW pump with loss of room cooling supports removal from PRA analysis during the identified window.

Closing Remarks

Hunter Schill, Plant Manager

ENCLOSURE 3

NRC Attendees

John Monninger, Regional Administrator
Patricia Vossmar, Division Director DORS
Jeffrey Josey, Deputy Division Director DORS
Ami Agrawal, Branch Chief PBB
Michael Bloodgood, Senior Project Engineer
John Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector
Cale Young, Senior Reactor Analyst
Dustin Reinert, Senior Reactor Analyst
James Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector
Casey Alldredge, Senior Enforcement Specialist ACES
Austin Roberts, Senior Enforcement Specialist ACES
David M. Cylkowski, Regional Counsel
Ryan Alexander, Regional State Liaison Officer
Eric McManus, Project Engineer, RIDP
Myla Ruffin, Reactor Inspector

Vistra/Comanche Peak Attendees

Greg Gugle, SVP and Chief Operating Officer, Vistra
John Dreyfuss, VP Nuclear Support, Vistra
Hunter Schill, Plant Manager, Vistra
Deborah Farnsworth, Director Fleet Licensing, Vistra
Sean Woods Sr., Manager of Operations Support, Vistra
Ben Martin, Manager Design Engineering, Vistra
Brian Guthrie, Reactor Engineer, Vistra
Dan Tirsun, PRA Engineer, Westinghouse
Amol Limaye, Consulting Engineer, MPR
Bob Carritte, Consulting Engineer, MPR
Brian Mitchell, CPNPP Director Engineering, Vistra
Kris Brigman, CPNPP Manager Regulatory Compliance

Virtual Attendees

Alex Garmoe
Alexander Garza
Alfred Sanchez
Andrew Saunders
Andy Patz
April Kellum
Arturo Escamilla
Austin Roberts
Beatrice Nwafor
Brandon Pannabecker
Brian Christopher Senter
Casey Smith
Chris Carver
Christine Saah Nazer
Christopher Henderson
Christopher Litalien
Danny Bradford
Dawn Yancey
Dev Ray
Devin Bradshaw
Doug Brown
Edwin Lyman
Eric Brothman
Eric Lantz
Fabian Thomas
Fred Madden
Gerald Gulla
Gerald Wolf
Grover Wilson IV
Heather Jones
Isaac Johnston
Jack Hicks
Jay Lloyd
Jazmine Copeland
Justin Fuller (MPR)
Justin W Knowles(Constellation Nuclear)
Kassie Mandrell
Kevin Hsueh
Lori Grusecki
Mahdi Hayes
Marc Harron
Marianne Burnett
Matthew Leech
Matthew Rossi (Constellation Nuclear)
Mike Hein
Mike Maiuro (PSEG)
Mike Ordoyne
Nick Armstrong
Nnaerika Okonkwo
Patrick Allen
Richard Easter
Robert Drsek
Ron Margerum
Stephanie Anderson
Susan Galemore
Susan Harp (MPR)
Tony Nakanishi