



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION I  
475 ALLENDALE RD, STE 102  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415

April 30, 2026

Eric S. Carr  
Chief Nuclear Officer and  
President – Nuclear Operations  
and Contracted Energy  
Dominion Energy, Inc.  
Innsbrook Technical Center  
5000 Dominion Blvd.  
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

**SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000336/2026001 AND 05000423/2026001**

Dear Eric Carr:

On March 31, 2026, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3. On April 8, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with James Petty, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting area assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

Glenn T. Dentel, Acting Chief  
Projects Branch 2  
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000336 and 05000423  
License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49

Enclosure:  
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via GovDelivery

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000336/2026001 AND 05000423/2026001 DATED APRIL 30, 2026

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000336 and 05000423

License Numbers: DPR-65 and NPF-49

Report Numbers: 05000336/2026001 and 05000423/2026001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2026-001-0072

Licensee: Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Facility: Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3

Location: Waterford, CT

Inspection Dates: January 1, 2026 to March 31, 2026

Inspectors: B. Pinson, Senior Resident Inspector  
D. Antonangeli, Resident Inspector  
E. Bousquet, Resident Inspector

Approved By: Glenn T. Dentel, Acting Chief  
Projects Branch 2  
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

## SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee’s performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation (NCV) is documented in report section: 71111.15.

### List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Properly Store Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Governor to Prevent Damage or Deterioration			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Area	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000423/2026001-01 Open/Closed	Problem Identification and Resolution	71152A
A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of Title 10 of <i>The Code of Federal Regulations</i> (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, “Handling, Storage, and Shipping”, was identified for failure to properly store the Unit 3 safety-related turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump governor in accordance with work instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. Specifically, the licensee failed to store these governors filled with oil, as recommended by the vendor technical manual.			

### Additional Tracking Items

None.

## PLANT STATUS

Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 3 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

## INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

## REACTOR SAFETY

### 71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

#### Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather including heavy snow and low temperatures on January 23, 2026.

### 71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

#### Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Unit 3, turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump partial system walkdown, January 15, 2026

### 71111.05 - Fire Protection

#### Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Unit 3, east service water room (fire area CSW-30, January 29, 2026
- (2) Unit 3, emergency diesel generator 'B' enclosure (fire area EG-4A), January 29, 2026
- (3) Units 2 and 3, fire pump houses (fire areas FP-1 and FP-2), February 27, 2026

- (4) Unit 3, service building north cable tunnel (fire are SB-2), March 25, 2026

#### 71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

##### Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 3 licensed operator requalification training in the simulator on March 18, 2026.

#### 71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

##### Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) Unit 3, emergent downpower and associated work in response to removal of 15G-13T-2 and 15G-15T-8, February 26, 2026
- (2) Unit 3, emergency diesel maintenance outage medium risk plans during the week of March 1, 2026
- (3) Units 2 and 3, high risk plan for switchyard south bus maintenance outage, March 20, 2026

#### 71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

##### Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Unit 3, emergency diesel generator 'B' jacket water valve found mispositioned, January 20, 2026 (Condition Report 1311817)
- (2) Unit 2, reactor building component cooling water pump 'B' elevated bearing temperature, January 26, 2026 (Condition Report 1312051)
- (3) Unit 2, reactor building component coolant water system leakage requiring compensatory actions and medium risk plan for troubleshooting, February 6, 2026 (Condition Report 1312846)
- (4) Unit 3, reserve station service transformer 'B' hydrogen concentration increasing on February 8, 2026 (Condition Report 1313595)
- (5) Unit 3, emergency diesel generator 'A' intelligence potential transformer data outside of desired acceptance criteria, March 2, 2026 (Condition Report 1315673)

#### 71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

##### Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

- (1) Unit 3, control building chiller ventilation system 'B' PMT following maintenance outage, January 14, 2026
- (2) Unit 3, residual heat removal pump 'B' 4160 volt breaker PMT, January 15, 2026
- (3) Unit 3, emergency diesel generator 'A' operability run following maintenance outage, March 10, 2026
- (4) Unit 3, emergency diesel generator 'B' operability run following maintenance outage, March 18, 2026

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 3, emergency diesel generator 'A' 24 hour operability run, February 25–26, 2026

**OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE**

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) Unit 3, follow-up of the December 2025 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater governor failure, including a review of corrective actions from November 2023 failure (Condition Report 1310278)

**INSPECTION RESULTS**

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation	71111.15
<p>This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.</p>	
<p>Violation: Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that "Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2." Specifically, Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, requires, in part, that procedures are established and implemented for "Hot Standby to Minimum Load" operations as well as instructions for the startup of the "Main Steam System."</p>	
<p>Dominion procedure OP 3203, "Plant Startup," Revision 42, step 4.1.17 required that steam dump isolation valves were confirmed to be open. On December 19, 2025, an operator reported to the control room that six of nine condenser steam dump isolation valves were closed, contrary to the expected position during normal power operations. The licensee took immediate action to open the valves and verified correct system configuration.</p>	
<p>Contrary to the above, from October 26, 2025, until December 19, 2025, the licensee failed to implement procedure OP 3203, "Plant Startup," which had specific steps to ensure that condenser steam bypass isolation valves are opened prior to increasing power to greater than 5% (Mode 1). Specifically, six of nine condenser steam dump isolation valves were found closed contrary to step 4.1.17 of the above procedure.</p>	

Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green), by using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions." The finding was not a design deficiency, and it did not represent a loss of probabilistic risk assessment function because three of the steam dumps were still available to provide a pathway for decay heat following a reactor trip.

Corrective Action References: Condition Report 1309651

Failure to Properly Store Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Governor to Prevent Damage or Deterioration

Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Area	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000423/2026001-01 Open/Closed	Problem Identification and Resolution	71152A

A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, "Handling, Storage, and Shipping," was identified for failure to properly store the Unit 3 safety-related turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump governor in accordance with work instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. Specifically, the licensee failed to store these governors filled with oil, as recommended by the vendor technical manual.

Description: On November 29, 2023, the Unit 3 turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump failed its PMT because it did not reach the required pump speed within the specified time frame. This failure was attributed to the governor, which had been replaced during routine preventative maintenance. After the test failure, the licensee reinstalled the previously installed governor, which subsequently passed all operability surveillance tests. The governor that failed the PMT was sent to a vendor for troubleshooting to determine the cause of the PMT failure.

During the refueling outage on April 18, 2025, maintenance was performed again to replace the governor, and it successfully passed its PMT at that time. Approximately eight months later, in December 2025, the turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump was declared inoperable after it failed its quarterly surveillance due to failure to reach the required pump speed within the required time.

Vendor reports on the November 2023 failure attributed one of the two causes for the failure to be corrosion found on the shutdown plunger of the governor. The second cause was found to be issues with the stack-up tolerances of the speed setting components. These led to the impaired governor's ability to ramp up speed within the required time frame. During preliminary troubleshooting activities for the 2025 event, the licensee identified the most likely cause of the failure was foreign material in the governor oil. However, due to not finding any foreign material during inspection, the licensee did not perform any oil sample analysis to confirm if foreign material was the cause. One of the other possible causes identified was corrosion within the shutdown solenoid of the governor. The licensee's evaluation of the 2023 failure concluded that the corrosion was likely developed internally within the governor prior to receipt from the vendor, as it had remained in quality assurance storage since it arrived on site. Both governors were received and stored on site starting in June 2018 until their respective date of failures. Both were kept in level B storage, which provides some level of environmental protection, but

does not regulate humidity. The governors received from the vendor were drained of oil and contained desiccant inside the wrapping to control humidity.

The vendor's technical manual states, in part, that "for long-term storage, storage in a hostile environment (large temperature changes, humid, or corrosive atmosphere) or if the governor is installed on a prime mover for storage, fill the governor with oil and follow preservation packing instructions in Woodward bulletin 25075...". However, the licensee did not fill the governors with oil, and there was no recurring task to evaluate or replace the desiccant while they were in long term storage.

Based on the above, it is reasonable to conclude that improper storage practices led to potential corrosion build up within the governor, which was later identified by the licensee as a potential failure mechanism regarding the 2023 and 2025 governor failures.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program to evaluate storage practices and align with vendor recommendations. The currently installed governor was confirmed not to have been in long term storage prior to installation and has successfully passed all testing since being installed in January 2026.

Corrective Action References: Condition Report 1318930

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to properly store the safety-related governor in a manner that prevents damage or deterioration was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee did not fill the governor with oil while in long term storage as described in the vendor technical manual in order to protect the governor from damage caused by rust or corrosion.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the improper storage of the governor installed in 2025 could have resulted in corrosion buildup on internal governor components, which was identified as a potential failure mechanism in the November 2023 and December 2025 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater governor failures. In addition, the finding was similar to example 13.a of IMC 0612, Appendix E.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." Specifically, although the pump did not meet the surveillance-required startup time, the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump achieved rated conditions within the 300-second timeframe assumed in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Therefore, it was determined to have maintained its Probabilistic Risk Assessment functionality and determined to be Green.

Cross-Cutting Area: Problem Identification and Resolution - The licensee did not verify the adequacy of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump governor storage practices because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the issue to ensure resolutions address causes commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the evaluation following the 2023

governor failure did not fully assess the adequacy of the storage practices to ensure that the governors were being stored to prevent damage and deterioration.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XIII, "Handling, Storage, and Shipping" require, in part, that "Measures shall be established to control the handling, storage, shipping, cleaning and preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deterioration."

Contrary to the above, from June 2018 to present, the licensee failed to properly store the safety-related governor in a manner that prevents damage or deterioration. Specifically, the governor was in long term storage without being filled with oil, which allowed buildup of corrosion products.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

## **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On April 8, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to James Petty, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

**DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152A	Corrective Action Documents	1244946		
		1310200		
	Miscellaneous		Vendor technical manual 25212-041-003	19