



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION IV
1600 EAST LAMAR BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511

April 30, 2026

EAF-RIV-2026-0016

Brad Kapellas, Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
P.O. Box 756
Port Gibson, MS 39150

**SUBJECT: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION – FINAL SIGNIFICANCE
DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND
FOLLOW-UP ASSESSMENT LETTER; NRC INSPECTION REPORT
05000416/2026091**

Dear Brad Kapellas:

This letter provides you the final significance determination of the preliminary White finding discussed in our previous communication dated March 9, 2026, which included U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 05000416/2026090, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML26063A304.

The finding involved the failure to maintain design control of the division II diesel generator. Specifically, procedure EN-DC-105, "Configuration Management," Revision 9 requires, in part, that proposed design changes, plant modifications, temporary alterations, and setpoint changes shall be reviewed to identify impact. However, neither an engineering change nor other impact review was completed, and Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) did not maintain configuration control of the division II diesel generator's design when enlarging the diameter of a hole in the permanently installed barring device pivot rod from 1/8 inch to 3/16 inch on February 17, 2025.

The NRC letter issued on March 9, 2026, included an offer for Entergy to attend a regulatory conference or reply in writing to provide its position on the facts and assumptions the NRC used to arrive at the finding and its safety significance. In your letter dated April 20, 2026, (ML26110A348), Entergy provided a written response to the NRC staff preliminary determination regarding the finding, and Entergy acknowledged the performance deficiency and operational consequence and described corrective actions. Additionally, your staff noted that Entergy is not aligned with the regulatory basis used to characterize the condition as a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. A summary of the information provided in your April 20, 2026, letter and the NRC response are provided in Enclosure 2.

After carefully considering the information developed during the inspection and the information presented in your letter dated April 20, 2026, the NRC has concluded that the issue is appropriately characterized as a 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III violation, and the finding is appropriately characterized as White, a finding of low safety significance, which is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone.

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff's determination of significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2 (ML24156A064). An appeal must be sent in writing to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 1600 East Lamar Blvd., Arlington, Texas 76011-4511.

The NRC has also determined that the field change to the division II diesel generator modifying the division II diesel generator barring device pivot rod, without implementing measures commensurate with the original design and in accordance with the requirements of site Procedure EN-DC-105, "Configuration Management," Revision 9 was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," as cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), Enclosure 1. The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in detail in Inspection Report 05000416/2026090. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered an escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding: (1) the reason for the violation; (2) the corrective actions that have been taken and the results achieved; and (3) the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in Inspection Report 05000416/2026090 and your response dated April 20, 2026. Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.

As a result of our review of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station's performance, including this White finding, we have assessed the performance of Grand Gulf Nuclear Station to be in the Regulatory Response column of the NRC's Action Matrix, effective the first quarter of 2026. Therefore, we plan to conduct a supplemental inspection using Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection Response to Action Matrix Column 2 (Regulatory Response) Inputs," when your staff has notified us of your readiness for this inspection. This inspection procedure is conducted to provide assurance that the root cause and contributing causes of risk significant performance issues are understood, the extent of condition and the extent of cause are identified, and the corrective actions are sufficient to preclude repetition.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter, the enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or in the NRC's ADAMS, accessible from the NRC website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Douglas E. Dodson II, of my staff at (817) 200-1148.

Sincerely,



Signed by Monninger, John
on 04/30/26

John D. Monninger
Regional Administrator

Docket No. 05000416

License No. NPF-29

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation
2. NRC Response to Information
Provided in the Licensee Response Letter
Dated April 20, 2026

cc w/ encl: GovDelivery Subscriber

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION – FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND FOLLOW-UP ASSESSMENT LETTER; NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2026091 – DATED APRIL 30, 2026

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ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER:
ML26113A355

PACKAGE NUMBER:
ML26113A368

E-CONCURRENCE CASE:
20260423-10017

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Entergy Operations Inc.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Docket No. 05000416
License No. NFP-29
EAF-RIV-2026-0016

During an NRC inspection conducted from February 17 through March 3, 2026, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below:

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," states, in part, that design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design.

Contrary to the above, from February 2025 until July 2025, design changes, including field changes, were not subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Specifically, the licensee made a field change to the division II diesel generator modifying the barring device pivot rod without implementing measures commensurate with the original design and in accordance with procedure EN-DC-105, "Configuration Management," Revision 9, requirements, which resulted in diesel generator inoperability.

This violation is associated with a White significance determination process finding.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved, is already addressed on the docket in Inspection Report 05000416/2026090 and your letter dated April 20, 2026. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation, EAF-RIV-2026-0016" and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 1600 East Lamar Blvd., Arlington, Texas 760114511, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, and email it to R4Enforcement@nrc.gov within 30 days of the issuance of this Notice of Violation (Notice). If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

If you choose to respond, your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. Therefore, to the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days of receipt.

Dated this 30th day of April 2026

NRC RESPONSE TO INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE
LICENSEE RESPONSE LETTER DATED APRIL 20, 2026

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY ENTERGY

Entergy provided a written response to the NRC by letter dated April 20, 2026 (ML26110A348) in response to the staff's preliminary determination. The letter acknowledged the performance deficiency and operational consequence and described corrective actions. Additionally, the letter described Entergy's views on the applicability of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B to certain components, including the division II diesel generator barring device pivot rod (referred to as the "lock rod" in the Entergy response and "lock pin" in other Entergy documents). The letter stated, "Entergy is not aligned with the regulatory basis used to characterize the condition as a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III." The letter also states that the division II diesel generator barring device is not a component that is subject to the quality assurance criteria established by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B because (1) the division II diesel generator barring device does not perform a function to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident and is a maintenance tool, and (2) the division II diesel generator barring device and its sub-components, when properly disengaged, are physically separated from all safety-related components and installed outside of the safety-related boundary of the division II diesel generator, and "the barring device is also not described in the GGNS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report."

NRC RESPONSE

The NRC carefully considered the information provided by Entergy in its April 20, 2026, response. With respect to Entergy's noted disagreement that the division II diesel generator barring device is a component that is subject to the quality assurance criteria established by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, the NRC staff noted that the preliminary White finding and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III violation was silent on the safety classification of the division II diesel generator barring device and barring device pivot rod. Rather, the violation was focused on the design control impacts to the division II diesel generator, which is a safety related quality component subject to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. Specifically, the division II diesel generator barring device pivot rod, which is permanently installed, was changed materially, and that material change directly impacted the operation of the safety related division II diesel generator, which is a quality component.

Relative to Entergy's basis associated with the division II diesel generator barring device not performing a function to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident, the staff does not disagree that the barring device performs no function to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident. However, the staff noted that the division II diesel generator barring device pivot rod, regardless of prior classification by Entergy, was required to be in place when the barring device is stowed. Specifically, the division II diesel generator barring device pivot rod needed to be in contact with the barring device interlock valve (referred to as the interlock switch in inspection report 2026090, and referred to as the "barring device engaged pressure switch," "interlock valve," and "barring device pneumatic interlock switch" in various Entergy documents) with the barring device stowed to prevent diesel generator inoperability. The barring device interlock valve is safety related and a quality component.

Finally, relative to Entergy's note that the division II diesel generator barring device and its sub-components, when properly disengaged, are physically separated from all safety-related components and installed outside of the safety-related boundary of the division II diesel generator, the staff notes that the division II diesel generator barring device pivot rod is not physically separated from the diesel generator. Specifically, the division II diesel generator barring device pivot rod must be in physical contact with the previously mentioned division II barring device interlock valve when the barring device is properly disengaged from the flywheel and the division II diesel generator needs to be operable. At the time of the failure on July 13, 2025, the division II diesel generator became inoperable when the division II barring device pivot rod shifted and allowed the barring device interlock valve to open as a result of the material change to the pivot rod. Opening the barring device interlock valve allowed air to vent and caused the division II diesel generator to enter maintenance mode.

Regardless of the safety classification Entergy applies to the barring device pivot rod, the staff position remains that the modification of the barring device pivot rod was a change that affected diesel generator operability because the diesel generator barring device pivot rod, as designed, was capable of preventing the division II diesel generator from fulfilling its safety function, as demonstrated by the events of July 13, 2025. The materials, parts, equipment, and processes associated with the barring device's interface with the diesel generator are essential to the diesel generator's safety related function. The staff notes that Entergy's response indicated that the station intends to modify the diesel generator so that a barring device failure will not cause a loss of safety function, which further indicates that the current configuration (and the configuration in place during the period of the violation) is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.