

## **U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Meeting Summary**

August 12, 2025

**Title:** Public Meeting: Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Low Consequence Reactors Rulemaking

**Meeting Identifiers:** [20250884](#) / [20250886](#)

**Dates of Meetings:** July 14, 2025 / July 17, 2025 / July 18, 2025

**Location:** Hybrid (via Microsoft Teams, Commission Hearing Room)

**Type of Meeting:** Comment-Gathering

### **Purpose of Meeting:**

Executive Order (EO) 14300 Section 5(e) directs the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to establish a process for high-volume licensing of microreactors and modular reactors, including by allowing for standardized applications and approvals and by considering to what extent such reactors or components thereof should be regulated through general licenses. The NRC is developing a proposed rule to address licensing requirements for microreactors and other low consequence reactors. The NRC held these public meetings to obtain stakeholder feedback.

### **Related Documents:**

- [ML25192A134](#) – 07/14/2025 Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Low Consequence Reactors Rulemaking – Meeting Notice
- [ML25192A037](#) – 7-14-2025 Slides NRC Public Mtng-Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Low Consequence Reactors Rulemaking
- [ML25196A417](#) – 07/17/2025 Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Low Consequence Reactors Rulemaking – Meeting Notice
- [ML25196A357](#) – 7/17/2025 7/18/2025 NRC Public Meeting: Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Low Consequence Reactors Rulemaking - Meeting Slides

## **Summary of meeting:**

### **July 14, 2025 Meeting:**

#### **Meeting Opening**

George Tartal of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) opened the meeting, introduced himself as the lead Rulemaking Project Manager for this rule and acted as the meeting's facilitator. George explained that the meetings throughout the week were to get feedback from the public on the various topics related to the subject rulemaking, and that the project is on a very aggressive schedule. Cinthya Roman of the NRC made opening remarks.

George then stated that the purpose of the meetings is to discuss the background and drivers for new regulations for licensing microreactors and other low consequence reactors, and discuss high-level concepts that the rule would address.

#### **Rule Background**

Elijah Dickson of the NRC discussed the background for this rule. There is growing interest in microreactors to support the electric grid, serve as an independent power source, and provide thermal energy for industrial applications. The staff is aware of over 15 potential microreactor design applications. The staff and stakeholders agree that a more efficient, streamlined licensing process is needed to support microreactors. There are three fundamental regulatory enhancements that the staff is seeking: 1) to adopt a regulatory approach for technologies with similar potential consequences; 2) create a rapid, efficient and repeatable licensing process; and 3) establish performance-based and graded approaches for the requirements. In developing this rule, the staff is remaining consistent with the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act (ADVANCE Act) (section 208 requires the NRC to develop "risk-informed and performance-based strategies and guidance to license and regulate microreactors) as well as recently issued executive orders (EOs 14154, 14156, and 14300). A May 15, 2025 letter from ClearPath, Veriten, and the Clean Air Task Force (ML25136A333) advocates for a regulatory framework similar to non-power utilization facilities (NPUFs).

#### **Rule Goals**

Elijah Dickson explained the rule goals. The staff aims to create a licensing process for microreactors to protect public health and safety, promote common defense and security, and protect the environment. The licensing process would complete, as much as possible, the safety and environmental reviews with public engagement at one time, prior to the identification of a site. Site license reviews would verify that the site characteristics are within the reactor design envelope where pre-existing generic data can be leveraged as much as possible. The reactor design envelope would need to meet three entry criteria to justify an alternative risk-informed and performance-based regulatory framework for various requirements and operational programs (e.g., safety, security, operational programs, environmental).

#### **Rule Fundamentals**

Elijah Dickson explained the rule fundamentals. For entry criteria, staff is considering dose acceptance criteria, maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) approach, and special nuclear material (SNM) limit (metric tons uranium and plutonium). For design criteria, staff are considering reactivity control, providing heat removal, retaining fission products, providing shielding, and radioactive effluent control. Furthermore, the staff is looking into environmental review consideration, the extension and use of plant parameter envelopes and site parameter envelopes, and general licensing considerations.

An attendee asked if the NRC is indicating that it is considering all three entry criteria into the rule. Elijah answered that it would be all three combined in the rule, and that from an analysis point of view, they would feed into one another. Another attendee stated that the NRC should have only one entry criteria that would be based on a dose limit, and that the NRC could further establish voluntary criteria for designs that would seek to be defined as non-utilization reactors, such as the MHA or the special nuclear materials limits.

#### Additional Rule Details

Elijah Dickson discussed additional details that the staff is considering addressing in the rule, such as manufacturing, fuel possession, transportation, construction, operation, onsite storage, inspection, security, various methods of risk analysis, staffing, oversight, decommissioning, and financial insurance, among other items. The staff is also looking to streamline some areas that traditionally require longer review times, such as environmental reviews citing the hearing process and engagement with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

An attendee pointed out that the list of considerations did not include quality requirements, and asked how the staff would handle this. Elijah responded that the NRC is assessing requirements for quality.

#### Entry Criteria

Elijah Dickson discussed the NRC's plan to consider three entry criteria. The first is a dose-acceptance criteria that ensures adequate protection of the public in the event of credible accidents and is technology neutral. The second is an MHA approach, which is a siting analysis to assess if a generic or specific site can accommodate a reactor design while meeting the dose-acceptance criteria. The third is a SNM limit, and the staff is assessing amounts of SNM at other low consequence nuclear facilities and stakeholder recommendations.

An attendee reiterated that they support encouraging the NRC to consider the dose-acceptance criterion as a single entry criterion. They also pointed out that they did not think a prescriptive limit on SNM is meaningful, and that meeting the dose criteria would be good enough. Other attendees throughout the meeting supported not including an SNM limit as an entry criterion.

An attendee asked if the approach to dose acceptance criteria would be similar to the approach considered in the Part 53 rulemaking. Elijah answered that the staff's thought was to use a classic radiological consequence approach that has been done for reactors designed and licensed under 10 CFR Part 100.

An attendee asked if the staff planned to use an MHA approach because it is the way it's done with NPUFs currently, or to also have a simpler approach for more rapid licensing. Elijah responded that the MHA approach is less complicated and would be sufficient for the reactor designs in this rulemaking.

An attendee suggested that the SNM limit should be sufficient to cover whatever would fall under the definition of a microreactor, because there are indications in the ADVANCE Act and EOs that expressly specify that the rules are made with microreactors in mind.

An attendee asked if there were any factors related to common defense with respect to the SNM limit. Elijah and Tony Ulses of the NRC answered that there were no considerations.

An attendee asked for the staff's thoughts on endorsing what the NRC finds acceptable regarding the MHA approach in a Regulatory Guide and how would that align with a NUREG-1537 approach. Elijah answered that the NRC is open to review any document submitted for NRC approval. Elijah later followed up with some historical documents that still apply the MHA approach (TID-14844) and clarified that the staff is not looking to define MHA source terms for applicants.

An attendee asked to clarify what was meant by alternative risk-informed regulatory framework relating to the MHA approach. Elijah clarified that it is not an alternative to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), and that the staff would be designing a rule where there will be several performance-based regulations, similar to Parts 50 and 52, and that this entry criteria would allow use of those risk-informed performance-based rules.

An attendee asked if the SNM limit was intended to be an analog to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) definition of a utilization facility as one that has the potential to affect public health and safety or common defense and security. Elijah answered that this was not the case.

An attendee stated that many microreactor designs are already going through pre-application engagement using a different framework and did not consider the use of MHA, asking that the NRC remain open about not limiting to one specific type of accident analysis or safety case approach.

An attendee asked if there were additional elements to the decision to include SNM limit as an entry criterion. Elijah responded that the SNM limit came from previous experience with NPUFs. The attendee responded that the staff should not consider an SNM limit similar to how the staff is not considering a megawatt (MW) thermal power level limit.

#### Design Criteria Attributes

Elijah Dickson explained the design criteria attributes that the staff is considering. Design criteria attributes ensure safety and provide resilience to potential accidents or upsets from any hazards. The staff is considering reactivity control, providing heat removal, retaining fission products, providing shielding, and radioactive effluents control. Elements of the design criteria attributes would be used to demonstrate compliance with the entry criteria.

An attendee asked for clarification on leveraging and using these design criteria as entry conditions with respect to 10 CFR Part 20. Elijah responded that, in terms of providing shielding, operators should be able to do things around an operating reactor, and dose analyses and dose curves should help understand where operators can be. For radioactive effluent controls, it would consider meeting the offsite dose limit type values in 10 CFR Part 20.

An attendee said that the design criteria attributes appear to fall into two high level outcome objectives (to protect the reactor, or to protect the people), and asked if there would be a third high level attribute related to safeguards and physical security. Elijah answered that that would be in the rule itself, and that it could be addressed by utilizing risk-informed and performance-based approaches once meeting acceptance criteria.

An attendee asked if the staff was building off of the security parts proposed in the Part 53 rule. Elijah answered that the staff is currently crafting that rule and cannot answer the question fully.

An attendee asked how this rulemaking relates to the requirements from the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) and why this rulemaking was being done alongside Part 53. Cinthya explained that this rule is not meant to recreate the Part 53 rule, but rather is responding to EO 14300 which was specific to microreactors, and is a separate technology-inclusive framework.

An attendee asked what time period and what category of licensing basis events the exclusionary boundary applies to. Elijah answered that it would apply to the MHA, and it would encompass a range of design-basis accidents.

An attendee asked if reactivity control, heat removal, and retaining fission products are in the framework of the MHA. Elijah said that was correct and that those attributes feed into how MHA is defined.

### Environmental Review Considerations

Elijah Dickson presented the staff's environmental review considerations and how the staff is approaching the appropriate level of environmental review (Environmental Assessment (EA) vs Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) vs Categorical Exclusion (CatEx)), and if staff can leverage a generic environmental impact statement (GEIS). Furthermore, the ADVANCE act asks the staff to look at brownfield sites, combined licenses, and the use of plant and site parameter envelopes.

An attendee asked if the staff considered a recent decision in its environmental review characterization consideration (Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County). Donald Palmrose of the NRC noted that it was a fairly recent decision and its effects on this rule was not known at the time.

Multiple attendees urged the NRC to consider to the maximum extent use of CatExs for licensing low consequence reactors, based on operating experience and positive/minimal environmental impact, and to avoid duplicative and unnecessary actions. Another attendee noted that CatExs should only be used as necessary to avoid legal challenges.

An attendee asked if the staff was considering siting considerations for floating power barges or maritime nuclear propulsions. Duke Kennedy of the NRC responded that the staff was considering it, noting the interest in the community.

An attendee asked if the staff had an idea for what kind of number is being considered when discussing "high volume reactor approvals." Duke responded that there is no exact number, and that there wouldn't be a limit on the number of reactors that could be authorized to be produced under a manufacturing license/construction permit. The licensee would have to meet AEA requirements and specify number of reactors in their application.

### Plant Parameter Envelopes

Elijah Dickson discussed the staff's consideration on plant parameter envelopes (PPEs) and site parameter envelopes, which are used to establish bounding values for reactor designs and site characteristics. The staff aims to provide a technology-neutral rule that allows for licensing flexibility and gains public and stakeholder confidence.

### General License Considerations

Elijah Dickson talked about general licensing considerations and how the staff are assessing EO 14300 to consider to what extent high-volume licensing of microreactors and modular reactors or components should be regulated through general licenses.

An attendee asked if the staff intended to propose changes to the AEA, pointing to SRM-SECY-24-0008 which included a statement that the staff should analyze what changes should be made to the AEA to better accommodate production/deployment considerations. Duke acknowledged that there is an interest in revisions to the AEA but could not provide further details. The staff did not discuss topics related to any legislative changes.

An attendee recommended the staff to consider a white paper from Helion discussing design specific licenses, and consider other applicable regulatory frameworks.

An attendee asked how the title to spent nuclear fuel is being considered in this rulemaking, what are the implications for multiple deployments, and who would own the title and work with the Department of Energy (DOE). Duke responded that spent fuel can be stored under a Part 72 license. Don acknowledged the comment, noting the connection with DOE and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

An attendee asked if the staff is considering a service provider license for rapid high-volume deployment of reactors. Duke explained that the NRC is receiving and reviewing all public input on how to go about licensing these reactors, and considering different ways to streamline processes that would help cover high volumes of reactors.

An attendee asked to clarify how the general license would fit into the other aspects of the traditional licensing process. Elijah answered that this rule would be a “one-stop shop” for any design that could meet the entry criteria.

An attendee asked under a general license what room remains for site-specific considerations and state’s involvement in siting. Cinthya responded that it was too early in the rule process to answer. The attendee provided feedback that the staff should consider state involvement in siting of any reactor.

An attendee asked if population siting requirements are under consideration for these reactors. Elijah responded that this may not be the case, similar to NPUF-type reactors and other small power facilities.

An attendee asked if the staff would work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to be prepared for any type of disaster. Elijah answered that this would be considered under emergency preparedness.

#### Additional Considerations

Elijah Dickson explained that the staff is trying to address all phases of deployment and be inclusive of all future applications and technologies, and provided additional staff consideration. Technology-specific information should be provided in guidance and not in regulations. The rule should address licensing, administrative, procedural, and reporting matters for microreactor applications. The rule should clarify how oversight and inspection will be done. The rule should provide ways of meeting decommissioning requirements.

An attendee asked if the staff is considering delegation of inspection authorities to a third party. Duke responded that the staff is considering this.

An attendee urged the NRC to consider performance monitoring using technology in lieu of inspection where possible.

An attendee asked if the decommissioning process would consider the ability to decommission modules that are swapped out more frequently separate from the full site decommissioning. Duke responded that the NRC recognizes there are multiple decommissioning strategies and the staff is considering all options to provide greater flexibility.

An attendee commented that the NRC should consider a release-based approach to decommissioning regulation.

Elijah Dickson presented further staff considerations. The staff is assessing several licensing framework options, such as a new part, building upon DOE regulations, and amending existing rules. The staff seeks to understand the business models and needs for several licensing pathways and is looking for thoughts on providing guidance.

An attendee suggested that the staff look at more performance-based criteria related to 10 CFR Part 71 and making sure that it is a part of the rule. Cinthya responded that the staff was looking into Part 71 as an option but also considering other options.

An attendee asked if the staff is still deciding if this rule would be a new part or an amendment to 10 CFR Part 50. They also asked if the staff envisioned the same licensing pathway that exists today, or if it would be different. Elijah reiterated the staff’s goal to have a “one-stop shop” framework where an applicant that meets the entry criteria could use what this rule creates.

Duke emphasized that this was an area where the staff was looking for public feedback and what the public is interested in seeing.

An attendee asked if the staff was considering including the provisions of this rule as a part of the Part 53 rule, since that rule was close to being a final rule. George answered that the timing for this rule is tied to recent executive orders, and so this would not be possible.

An attendee commented that guidance may unnecessarily constrain developers and overburden staff, and that guidance should be used as a way to preserve knowledge and learnings.

An attendee asked if there is any consideration to allow a state to modify its agreement to site NRC-approved designs. Cinthya responded that this is still being discussed within the NRC staff.

An attendee asked if the staff is considering the transfer of a microreactor from one operating site to another. Duke answered that this was under consideration, acknowledging that there are many situations to address in the rule.

An attendee asked if the staff is considering leveraging the design-centered review approach, and formalizing or maintaining that in current regulations and guidance. Duke answered that the staff is looking at ways to effectively use that model and to rely on previous approvals.

An attendee asked if any reactor that met all requirements would fall under this rule, including high rated reactors. Elijah answered that there were not expectations that the NRC would be licensing these types of reactors, and that the SNM limit would effectively exclude high rated reactors.

Multiple attendees commented that they would plan to submit papers to support development of this rulemaking.

An attendee commented that the staff should ensure the entry criteria are not unnecessarily restrictive to the point that it affects the usefulness of the rule and contradicts with the goal to have the rule be applicable to all future applications and technologies.

#### *Rule Schedule and Stakeholder Feedback*

George Tartal discussed the schedule for the rulemaking. The staff plans to publish the proposed rule within 9 months of EO 14300 (February 2026) and the final rule within 18 months of the EO (November 2026). The rulemaking is also required to undergo a review from OMB/OIRA under EO 12866.

George displayed a slide with the rule's [www.regulations.gov](https://www.regulations.gov) Docket ID number (NRC-2025-0379), the public repository for key documents related to the development of this rulemaking, as well as contact information. George asked for the attendees to continue providing feedback throughout the week.

Cinthya Roman provided closing remarks thanking everyone for attending and explaining that nothing discussed today was final, and asked for the public's continued engagement with the staff.

#### *Final Comments and Closing of Meeting*

An attendee asked for clarification on how the SNM limit would work for multiple reactors on a site. Elijah clarified that the staff is not planning to limit the amount of SNM at a site, but rather just the reactor design.

An attendee pointed out that security-related SNM limits should be considered.

An attendee asked, in the case of multi-reactor sites, if the staff was considering external events that could potentially impact multiple reactors simultaneously, and if the standard design certification is intended to encompass this scenario. Elijah answered that this was not the case, and that the staff was not looking at cumulative effects because the individual design certifications would cover external hazards for each design.

An attendee asked if the staff has made a determination on the exact dose-based criteria. Elijah answered that this was not established and asked for the public's input in this consideration.

The meeting was adjourned for the day.

### **July 17, 2025 Meeting:**

#### **Meeting Opening**

George Tartal of the NRC opened the meeting, explaining that this was a continuation of the series of public meetings on the subject. Tara Inverso of the NRC provided opening remarks, emphasizing the high priority of this subject and its relationship to recent executive orders and the ADVANCE Act.

#### **Entry Criteria**

Elijah Dickson of the NRC discussed proposed entry criteria to the rule. The staff is considering three entry criteria: a dose-acceptance criteria to ensure adequate protection of the public in the event of credible accidents, an MHA analysis to assess if a site can accommodate a reactor design while meeting acceptance dose criteria, and a SNM limit to limit the amount of radionuclides that could be available for release to the environment. Elijah explained that that staff was looking at how similar criteria is handled for NPUFs and at other agencies such as DOE.

An attendee expressed support for the three entry criteria presented by the NRC, noting that they did not feel it was imposing unnecessary restrictions and would satisfy the direction provided to the NRC through the ADVANCE Act and recent executive orders.

An attendee asked for more detail on the SNM limit and if it was based on safeguards and security or on material limits and dose consequences. Elijah answered that it was not based on security considerations and more on the staff's consequence-based approach.

An attendee asked why beyond-design-basis and hazard design was not considered for MHA. Elijah answered that the staff is looking at the licensing of these reactors as similar to NPUFs, where certain severe accidents are also not considered.

An attendee asked how the staff is planning to come up with quantitative values for dose-acceptance criteria and MHA analysis, noting that this was a challenge in the Part 53 rule. Elijah answered that the staff would be defining dose acceptance criteria using a similar process to NPUFs, and that the NRC would not define MHA source terms but rather would ask the applicant to define them.

An attendee asked if the staff had thought about making microreactors a subset of low consequence reactors, and having additional criteria for what might be defined as a microreactor. Elijah answered that there was some thought about this, especially in regards to how this might relate to general license criteria. Duke Kennedy of the NRC added on to clarify that there is no definition of microreactor, and that the staff's work is more focused on the characteristics of facilities that may consider using this framework.

An attendee asked how SNM would be differentiated between different reactor types. Elijah responded that the staff would not need to make the differentiation and it would just depend on the business case of the specific reactors, how long they want to run, and how they plan to be designed.

An attendee asked how the staff was coordinating with regulation review on “as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and linear no-threshold model (LNT) to come up with dose acceptance criteria, and expressed concern about using the 1 rem limit from EPA PAG as a dose acceptance criteria. Elijah answered that staff is working with the staff working closely with ALARA and LNT regulation, and that the staff was still open to considering what the numerical value should be for the dose acceptance limit.

An attendee commented that they did not believe there was a performance basis regarding the SNM limit and asked the staff to consider that while moving forward with writing the new rules.

An attendee questioned if a wholesale rulemaking is the most effective pathway to consider to meet the goals of this task. They pointed out that smaller companies will have limited capacity to support and provide input in the rulemaking process. The organization they represented did not call specifically for a new rulemaking when establishing an efficient regulatory framework.

Rather than rulemaking, the attendee advocated for pilot programs tied to the NPUF rulemaking to demonstrate how the staff could achieve the desired outcomes being discussed.

#### Design Criteria Attributes

Elijah Dickson presented a slide on the staff’s proposed design criteria attributes: reactivity control, providing heat removal, retaining fission products, providing shielding, and radioactive effluent control.

An attendee asked how these design criteria attributes would be used in supporting entry into the rule. Elijah answered with examples on how the attributes help with considerations when designing the reactor, and that they are qualitative attributes to consider.

Multiple attendees suggested that the staff consider non-radiological hazards and security as additional design criteria attributes.

An attendee commented that it would be beneficial to the reactivity control design criteria if the reactor shut down wasn’t prescriptively required, noting that there are designs that can maintain a safe and stable configuration without being subcritical.

#### Price-Anderson Coverage, Financial Qualifications, and Decommissioning Financial Assurance

Sean Harwell of the NRC discussed the Price-Anderson considerations, covered under 10 CFR Part 140, which covers liability claims from the public caused by commercial nuclear reactor accidents. For small modular reactors (SMRs), requirements are based principally around power output. Sean provided a summary of current requirements under 10 CFR 140.11 and 140.12. Sean mentioned that applicants would have to meet financial qualification requirements for construction and operation. Lastly, Sean mentioned that applicants would need to provide certification of financial assurance for decommissioning. The current approach in 10 CFR 50.75 likely would not apply to the reactors being addressed in this rulemaking based on anticipated reactor size. What is envisioned is site-specific decommissioning cost estimates and plan for funding at the time of application. Reactor deployment models may involve transport of reactor away from an original deployment site to a facility at a different location for decommissioning.

An attendee asked how the staff will address financial assurance for different kinds of business models, such as a large manufacturer site designed to support a number of modules. Duke clarified that under a manufacturing license itself, there would not be a decommissioning funding assurance associated. The attendee asked how the staff would get decommissioning

assurance if the financial basis is not based on a single facility, but rather a more expansive model where profit might be more speculative and could potentially go bankrupt. Sean clarified that financial assurance is not dependent on profitability, and that the business model ultimately does not change the decommissioning funding assurance requirements.

An attendee asked the staff to consider, when looking at the use of the external sinking fund mechanism, not to limit that to utility licensees specifically, but also to look at new business models that may have defined funding coming through that they can also depend on.

An attendee asked if the staff was considering changes to 10 CFR Part 140 to address reactors under the new framework. Sean responded that that is something the staff is exploring.

An attendee asked if the staff was reexamining financial qualification standards related to SECY-18-0026 and the Part 53 rulemaking. Sean responded that the staff was considering them.

An attendee noted that financial assurance limits were based on MW electric, and asked if the staff intended to change that, given that some reactors may not be in the electric producing range and go to MW thermal or other criteria for financial assurance. Sean answered that the staff was considering this.

An attendee asked how the staff will consider non-radiological environmental hazards for decommissioning requirements. Sean answered that the staff was looking into changing decommissioning cost formulas given different technologies currently being considered.

An attendee asked the staff to consider allowing States to take the authority for financial assurance.

An attendee asked how the staff envisioned financial qualification requirements to apply to general license holders. Sean answered that the staff was still trying to work out this area and encouraged comments on this topic.

An attendee asked if decommissioning cost estimates would include the cost of long term spent fuel storage. Sean answered that a site-specific cost estimate would include all aspects of the decommissioning project.

#### Environmental Review Considerations

Don Palmrose of the NRC presented the staff's environmental review considerations. He explained several ongoing initiatives to streamline environmental reviews for microreactors, and discussed creation of an online portal consistent with the Council on Environmental Quality's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Permitting Data and Technology Standard.

Michelle Rome of the NRC discussed the staff's planned wholesale update to 10 CFR Part 51 to streamline the NRC's environmental regulations implementing NEPA, and what more can be considered for this effort, including expanding the categorical exclusion list and reducing unnecessary burden with environmental reviews.

An attendee asked if the staff is currently developing categorical exclusions to these low consequence reactors, citing related work that has already been done with similar types of reactors. Michelle responded that the staff is considering what licensing actions could potentially fit as a categorical exclusion. The attendee also commented that the staff should consolidate guidance related to environmental reports for better understanding of what the staff expects the licensees to provide them when applying for a license.

An attendee asked if the NRC is considering adopting an applicant submitted environmental report as the EA or EIS. Michelle responded that the staff is considering this as part of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023.

An attendee asked if the categorical exclusions considered would be based on the entry criteria discussed earlier. Don clarified that entry criteria were for the safety analysis, and would not necessarily be tied to environmental requirements. The attendee further commented that using criteria and/or technological classifications would not necessarily identify what the environmental impact of the reactor would be.

An attendee asked a broader question about how environmental review considerations and 10 CFR Part 51 requirements relate to the current administration's direction. Michelle reiterated the wholesale assessment of the NRC's environmental review process and encouraged these comments on other related projects with the NRC.

An attendee asked if the staff is considering categorical exclusions related to limiting fuel or dose consequence. Don responded that those are more looked at on the safety side than environmental.

An attendee asked the staff to keep in mind future industrial users and licensees (such as coal plants, chemical plants) who may have some experience with environmental reviews and have the resources to comply but may not be familiar with working with the NRC. The staff should keep this in mind especially when drafting guidance. Furthermore, consider lighter regulations in areas where environmental aspects are already being analyzed for other regulations or requirements.

An attendee asked if the staff is considering categorical exclusions for brownfield or existing nuclear sites. Michelle said the staff would look into it. The attendee also asked what role the States might have, such as reusing state EAs and EISs to avoid reproducing reports. Michelle answered that this is a consideration as the staff is writing guidance.

An attendee asked if the staff is planning to align with a recently published DOE interim final rule associated with NEPA regulations. Don answered that the staff is aware of the interim final rule and will be looking for ways to align.

An attendee asked how the desire for high-volume licensing is being factored into environmental considerations, such as other similar Department of Defense programs. Don and Michelle answered that this is something the staff is thinking about and reaching out to other agencies and current work to gain ideas. Other attendees expressed interest in further staff consideration in this area.

An attendee commented that early site permitting would likely not be a high priority item. Don answered that they might be able to result in faster deployment of reactors by going through safety and environmental reviews, and may also save time in consultation, but asked for further feedback to be provided. Other attendees expressed interest in further consideration, noting that certain applicants may look to use early site permits to accelerate the licensing process.

An attendee asked for further elaboration on applicable environmental envelopes. Don explained that the environmental analysis would be different from the safety analysis, and the focus on envelopes would be more on parameter and site envelopes.

An attendee asked how local community input would fit in with environmental reports, categorical exclusions, and the siting and decommissioning of these reactors. Michelle pointed to current regulations and the requirements for interaction with the community, gathering input and reaching out as needed. Don mentioned that the applicant would continue to have to meet any local laws and regulations as well.

An attendee asked how the staff will address the continued storage rulemaking, given that these reactors will probably not be covered by it. Don responded that although the continued storage

GEIS is not applicable to advanced reactors, it does note that the staff would take a look at newly developed reactors to see if they would fit.

### Plant Parameter Envelopes

Elijah Dickson discussed the topic of plant parameter envelopes (PPEs), which are used to establish a set of bounding values for both key reactor designs and site characteristics. Elijah highlighted that this was similar to what is used in current early site permits and the new reactor GEIS, and can be handy when assessing sites without necessarily having a final design. Elijah highlighted a report (PNNL-30992) which presents advanced nuclear reactor PPEs and guidance.

An attendee asked if the staff is thinking about PPEs from the environmental side or safety side. Elijah answered that this was on the safety side.

An attendee emphasized appropriate implementation of PPEs to help with efficiency, and suggested caution in designing a fully bounding approach. Elijah answered that the intent was not to define what these bounding values are, but rather have the applicant present them to the staff. The applicant questioned if this would then provide efficiency, especially for the first applicant of these types of reactors, if the envelope is not defined.

An attendee asked if the staff would reassess established hazard frequency values. Elijah responded that this was outside of the scope of this rulemaking, but could be considered within the plant parameter envelope.

An attendee asked if the entry criteria could be thought of as backstops/limits to the PPEs, and what are the limits of things that reactor designers need to be aware of. Elijah gave an example of how one could design a reactor to meet all seismic location requirements, to then set that as their own parameter and use it as a selling point to show that it would be safe for all seismic conditions. It would be a reflection of the design of the reactor itself and its applicability to where it can be sited.

An attendee asked the staff to clarify that the entry criteria are mutually exclusive from PPEs. Elijah said that this was correct, that the entry criteria gets you into the rule, and the way that you can communicate from one licensing process to another would be how the PPEs are used. Jeremy Tapp of the NRC gave an example of how spent fuel storage requirements currently use these envelopes.

An attendee asked if it would be more practical for these requirements to be added into regulations as high-level broad requirements rather than in guidance. Elijah agreed that high-level language would be more appropriate given the large range of reactors and business models. Another attendee commented that developing guidance puts a burden on staff, and that guidance should be used to preserve knowledge and lessons rather than focused on new regulations that might cause constraints on users.

An attendee wanted to clarify that the staff wasn't proposing to develop a uniform overarching plant parameter envelope to be codified in the regulations, but rather are creating the option for applicant to come up with these envelopes for specific designs. Elijah said that this was correct. The attendee noted that what was being suggested was similar to a report from Idaho National Laboratory.

### Fuel Possession, Storage, Material Control & Accounting

Jason Piotter of the NRC presented slides on fuel possession, storage, material control and accounting (MC&A), transportation, and decommissioning. Jason explained that the staff is actively considering different approaches for all of these areas, and that the staff is considering

provide pointers and make conforming changes to existing regulations rather than developing standalone or duplicative rule language.

An attendee asked if the staff was planning to add certain new requirements for fuel possession, such as criticality protection in the Part 53 rule, noting that they thought these requirements would be overly restrictive. Jason answered that there is no final determination on this at this time.

Jason provided several scenarios about fresh fuel at a microreactor or low consequence reactor factory and asked if anything would be considered differently regarding 10 CFR Part 70. There were no comments made about this.

Jason discussed MC&A, noting that requirements are generally going to be subject to 10 CFR Part 74. HALEU may increase required physical inventory periodicity. An attendee asked the staff to clarify the increased required physical inventory periodicity. John Russell of the NRC explained that pieces of 10 CFR Part 74 don't fit readily into these types of reactors, and so more comments on how these reactors could work into 10 CFR Part 74 would be appreciated.

An attendee asked if an applicant could request an exemption from 10 CFR Parts 70 or 74 if they don't think it applies, and the staff could evaluate that. Jason answered that this is an option being considered.

An attendee asked if the staff felt that current rules are adequate regarding physical inventory and item accounting at a reactor site, noting different fuel types and shipping processes. John noted this topic for further consideration.

Jason discussed storage of spent fuel and other irradiated contents. He said that the staff does not plan to deviate from the current model of using 10 CFR Part 72 when the fuel is unloaded from the reactor. However, the staff is still considering if areas of 10 CFR Part 72 could be enhanced to support these types of reactors.

An attendee asked how the staff is considering liquid fuel storage. Jason answered that this was something being considered, with the overall goal to be able to address different types of fuel regardless of the final waste form.

An attendee asked how the staff will handle scenarios where the spent fuel loses its self-protecting radiation barrier. Jason said that he would be further considering these scenarios.

An attendee pointed out that a framework for adjusting 10 CFR Part 72 regulations exists within the licensing modernization project.

An attendee asked if 10 CFR Part 72 could be revised to say that the fuel doesn't have to be removed from the reactor to be considered spent fuel, and the reactor could go back to the manufacturing facility under a Part 72 license to unload and store. Jason answered that the staff is having discussions on this topic.

### Transportation

Jason Piotter discussed transportation requirements and asked if there were any areas of 10 CFR Part 71 that the staff could consider enhancing for these reactors.

An attendee asked if the goal of the staff was to create a new license type that would include design certification, a manufacturing license, an operating license, and 10 CFR Parts 71, 72, and 74 consideration. Jason answered that this was not the staff's intent and would be a challenge to do so. Duke questioned if attendees think applicants wanted to see a single license or to continue the practice of various licenses, noting the difficulties of the former. An attendee noted that if everything was in a single license, rather than appropriate revisions made to 10

CFR Part 71, an applicant who did not meet the entry criteria for these reactors would not be able to use the revised transportation regulations.

An attendee commented that the staff should look at the licensing process as lots of connected licenses moving through approval rather than independent licenses, and that the staff should look at the licensing process more holistically. Jason agreed and suggested that this will likely be the approach that everything heads towards, but there are still details to work out.

### Decommissioning

Amy Snyder of the NRC discussed the staff's approach to decommissioning being considered in this rulemaking. She explained that the staff is looking to understand if anything should be considered differently with these reactors in terms of decommissioning. The current decommissioning proposed rule did not take much into consideration the types of reactors being discussed here. She also asked for input on how to consider reactors that may be returned to be refurbished and then sent back out to operate.

An attendee asked how the staff is considering allowing a reactor with a long useful life, but short refueling cycles, to be requalified, and what process one would have to follow for such a reactor during the refueling cycle. Amy clarified that the discussion is targeted towards the permanent cessation of a reactor operating, rather than in between refueling cycles. The attendee expressed support on treating the fuel and reactor vessel as one in relation to a transport and storage package.

An attendee asked if the staff is considering a release-based regulation as part of the decommissioning process, and that given no hazardous release, one would not have to do a full site decommissioning survey. Amy answered that the staff would consider this, but pointed out that there are existing regulations for non-impacted areas in guidance, and that the staff is still seeking further input on what might be appropriate for various scenarios. The staff is looking for ways to simplify the process to release sites previously used by these reactors and how to verify that there was no hazardous release.

An attendee questioned how the NRC is looking to simplify the decommissioning process given that there will be a possibility for high volume decommissioning for certain types of reactors. Amy answered that the staff would first need an understanding of how high that volume would be and how often each reactor would have to go through the process. The staff seeks ways to make the process efficient for all.

An attendee asked if it would be considered permanent cessation and decommissioning of a reactor if that reactor stops operations for one operator and is transferred to a different operator. Amy explained that this would not be decommissioning, and pointed to current examples where companies that wanted to cease operations changed owners without going through the decommissioning process.

Amy raised the question of how to handle timing of post-shutdown decommissioning activities. Currently, the regulations require a post-shutdown activities report 2 years after permanent cessation of operations. She asked if it made sense to have a report, a public meeting, and a license termination plan submitted two years before termination of license. It is possible that high volume decommissioning would impose a heavy burden on the staff and licensee.

### Final Comments and Closing of Meeting

George Tartal ended the meeting for the day and clarified that the staff is listening to feedback during these meetings, but will not be issuing formal responses. Furthermore, after these meetings, the next time that the public will hear updates on the rule is in February 2026, when the staff expects to publish the proposed rule. The meeting was adjourned for the day.

## **July 18, 2025 Meeting:**

### **Meeting Opening**

George Tartal of the NRC opened the meeting, explaining that this was the final day of the series of public meetings on the topic. Christian Araguas of the NRC provided opening remarks thanking everyone for providing feedback and highlighting the speed at which the staff is working to complete this rule.

### **Manufacturing**

Duke Kennedy of the NRC discussed manufacturing, construction, and inspection, tests, analysis, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC)/pre-operational testing for reactors under this rulemaking, and opened the floor for discussion on what the public opinion was on a manufacturing license and standard design approvals and if there are any adjustments that could be made to current manufacturing license regulations.

An attendee commented that there should be clear distinction between what's covered in a manufacturing license versus a standard design approval. Duke explained that a manufacturing license would allow one to fabricate the reactor in a factory to be eventually transported to a place with a construction permit and operating license.

An attendee asked about reactor component classification for transportation, and if the staff's thought was to classify the reactor components and package component, and use the bounding one for quality assurance. Duke said he would further look into this.

### **Construction**

Duke Kennedy discussed construction, noting the staff is looking to authorize certain construction activities concurrent with acceptance and docketing of deployment site license application. He noted that currently, a construction permit is required for activities defined as construction in the regulations, and that comments suggest certain activities performed by these facilities should not be considered construction.

An attendee commented that with advances in technology for these types of reactors, the activities could be seen as installation rather than construction, and if the staff would consider deferring to the license holder to verify that installation and assembly are performed appropriately. Duke answered that he would take this for further consideration. The attendee noted that the NRC should consider shifting responsibility of safe construction to the licensee holder, and that the NRC's role should be to ensure quality programs and processes. Phil O'Bryan of the NRC responded that the staff has developed a new program for the oversight of construction and manufacturing.

An attendee commented that the staff should not consider all construction activities to be necessary for these reactors, and that the staff should just generally assume that there is no traditional on-site construction process. There should be a more lenient approach to construction oversight. Another attendee agreed with this, saying that the staff should consider different types of construction or scenarios where there may be no construction.

Several attendees commented that the staff should consider fewer inspections if the manufacturer is able to prove their quality during the first few inspections and that they were supportive of rightsizing the risk inspection while keeping in mind public health and safety. Phil explained that, in the current model, earlier inspections are done to build confidence in quality, and the confidence and reasonable assurance that is built is applied going forward.

An attendee asked for the staff to consider endorsing Code Case N-883.

An attendee commented that any proposal being discussed and considered, such as the construction and manufacturing inspection process, needs to keep in mind public confidence.

#### ITAAC/Pre-Op Testing

Duke Kennedy discussed ITAAC and pre-operational testing. ITAAC would be necessary to verify that acceptance criteria have been met before a reactor can be operated, and pre-operational testing would allow the NRC to verify that the reactor has been constructed correctly.

An attendee noted a lack of discussion on performance monitoring using performance indicators, which seems to be a more efficient way for the NRC to assure safety before deployment. Duke commented that since a manufacturing license wouldn't allow operation, there would not be data until the reactor is operating. The attendee commented that the NRC should look at novel ways to go through the licensing process, given the opportunity at the moment to create a new regulation.

An attendee gave a deployment model example where a manufacturer would perform testing prior to shipping, collect real-time data during shipping, and re-test at the deployment site to verify that it was built and operating as expected. A person would still have to review the data, but this would cut down on the number of people needed for inspections.

An attendee suggested that these low consequence reactors could be benchmarked with other industrial facilities to determine requirements, noting that these reactors would probably be safer than other industrial facilities and comparing their transportation to that of hazardous materials.

An attendee asked the staff to consider relaxations in scenarios where construction activities would be done earlier on site, and making improvements such as modifying the definition of construction in 10 CFR 50.10. Duke answered that this is under consideration.

An attendee expressed concern about the unclarity in what a manufacturer is able to do when testing a reactor, noting inaccuracies in tests that don't reach criticality, and how despite these being low consequence reactors, there needs to be a way for the manufacturer to ensure that they are safe for use.

#### Operational Programs and Security

Todd Smith and Tony Ulses of the NRC began the discussion on operational programs and security. Todd explained that the NRC takes a risk-informed graded approach, which sets the level of planning commensurate to the risks and hazards of the facility. Tony explained that the staff was looking to implement such an approach for security concerning these reactors.

An attendee said that the staff should reassess attributes of the current design basis threats that could be modified to support low consequence reactors.

An attendee focused on sabotage of these reactors and theft during transportation and asked how it would be addressed in this rule, noting the factors of high-volume manufacturing and significant quantities of targeted material. Tony answered that the staff is considering how to address these issues and more details would be shared later in the rulemaking process.

An attendee asked if the staff was considering security by design credit in deployment and security plans, pointing out efforts by other government agencies to consider this. Tony answered that the staff is considering this.

An attendee asked if the staff would be considering industry comments from the Alternative Physical Security and the Part 53 rulemakings. Tony answered that the staff is considering those comments.

An attendee asked if the staff would use other ongoing rules as a starting point for emergency planning (EP) considerations. Todd answered that the staff was considering all approaches, and that the starting point for EP would be protective actions.

An attendee asked if the staff is considering scenarios where risk of radiation is low enough that an emergency plan would not be needed. Todd answered that this is under consideration and the staff is taking a new look at how it thinks about accidents.

An attendee asked if the staff would consider no need for physical protection in scenarios where the targeted material is not an attractive target. Tony answered that he would take that under consideration.

An attendee commented that other facilities near these types of reactors should be kept informed of the security risks of those reactors, as security events could affect them, such as a sabotage nearby denying access to that facility.

An attendee asked what the staff meant by NRC embracing the whole community approach as it related to security. Todd explained that, related to the national preparedness goal, this meant that the responsibility to respond to an emergency is everyone's responsibility, starting with the local level. The licensee will have capabilities to deal with some events, and when they are exceeded, they will call on resources from higher levels.

An attendee commented that this would be a good opportunity for the staff to launch a pilot exercise to determine appropriate security requirements for these types of reactors, noting that there are clear differences in requirements between power reactors and non-power reactors which could be seen as low consequence. Another attendee recommended a graded design basis threat approach to determine appropriate requirement levels.

An attendee noted that some work on EP for SMRs and other technologies was already done in the Alternative Physical Security rule, and recommended that the staff look at how EP would be done for mobile reactors, such as ones deployed in emergency scenarios to provide local power.

An attendee raised a point that the discussion on EP and community response does not take into consideration the role that FEMA may play, and that the staff should reconsider seemingly placing more burden on offsite response rather than the licensee.

An attendee asked, given these reactors may be portable, if operators or licensees would be required to educate the local population about emergency procedures specific to each site, and in the event of a radiological emergency requiring expertise, is it assumed that the state's response organization for EP at commercial nuclear power plants would also be responsible for this response? Todd answered that the staff would be considering these scenarios moving forward.

### Oversight and Inspection

Duke Kennedy continued the conversation on oversight and inspection of these reactors, noting that the staff is considering ways that the staff can look at inspection and operation methods differently considering the different characteristics for these reactors.

An attendee noted that inspections usually tend to focus more on compliance than performance, and encouraged the staff to look into a performance-based approach in a risk-informed manner, to reward and incentivize positive safety outcomes.

An attendee asked what the staff was thinking in terms of an inspection program in scenarios where there are multiple identical reactors deployed in various sites, and recommended the staff to really step back and think about flexibilities in inspection.

An attendee noted that there was no discussion of the statutory requirement for force-on-force inspection. Tony said that the staff would consider this topic. The attendee noted that these reactors should not be exempt from this inspection. Another attendee disagreed and said that it could be exempt under certain circumstances.

### Risk Analysis

Elijah Dickson of the NRC discussed risk analysis and leveraging graded hazard analysis techniques suitable for the complexity of the designs of these reactors. Risk analysis can be used as part of the licensing basis, assessing radiological consequences, safety classification, quality assurance, system vulnerabilities, and more.

An attendee stated that they would prefer to see language around having a risk evaluation and clear performance goals in the rule, while methodologies would be provided in guidance.

An attendee stated that the staff should not lean into risk-based and PRA approaches, and envisioned something simple like a failure modes and effects analysis for low consequence designs.

An attendee asked how the staff would ensure there's going to be a consistent level of protection and consistent quality of risk analysis if the staff allows licensees or applicants to propose a large variety of different risk analysis methods. Elijah pointed to Regulatory Guide 1.200 as an example of a guidance document that contains a more rigorous acceptable PRA method to maintain risk analysis quality and said that the staff is further considering how to maintain consistent quality. However, the staff expect licensee would be able to assess several risk analysis methodologies and techniques used to identify facility vulnerabilities based on the complexity of their design. These methodologies and techniques range from simple checklists to complex techniques such as Hazard and Operability Studies or integrated fault trees and event trees. The analysis technique should be selected on the basis of the significance of the potential hazards of the facility and the complexity of the processes which could affect the hazard.

An attendee stated that in regards to applicability of PRAs for new microreactors or SMRs which have low operational experience, probabilities could be assigned to the PRA. The attendee also noted that the NRC is using risk only to apply to health and safety risk, and asked what the NRC's position was on using it to look at designs subject to instabilities or frequent inadvertent scrams. Elijah answered that typically when the staff reviews an application, the applicant presents a series of design basis accidents that cover a broad spectrum of accidents, which is assessed and helps the staff determine if the accident analysis is appropriate.

An attendee stated that they disagreed with the assumption that something credited in the MHA is presumed to be safety related, and that one shouldn't operate with this assumption. Another attendee noted that it is still Commission policy that new reactors have to have a consistent level of safety with the existing fleet; over time you can apply existing tools, but in the initial licensing, there has to be consistency.

An attendee commented that NUREG-1513, the integrated safety analysis guidance document that certain facilities use to do their risk analysis, is a potential pathway to think about addressing risk.

An attendee commented that they did not believe the reliability of the reactor system in certain situations is the responsibility of the NRC, and more of a concern for the customer of the reactor system.

An attendee asked about the status of the NRC's consideration of new risk metrics, noting that some advanced reactors could not effectively use a core damage frequency. Elijah answered that this was not within the scope of this rule.

An attendee commented that while there are many benefits to using risk analysis, they would not contemplate using it to change any entry criteria that would move from a conditional consequence to a quantified risk.

### General License Considerations

Elijah Dickson explained that the staff is assessing EO 14300, Section 5(e), to consider to what extent high-volume licensing of microreactors and modular reactors or components should be regulated through general licenses.

An attendee commented that their organization was working on comments related to a general license versus a proposed combining of a combined operating license and manufacturing license, and would submit them to the NRC soon.

An attendee asked if the MHA plus consideration of common defense and security could be a pathway to removing the SNM entry criteria. Elijah said the staff would consider this.

An attendee commented that it was good that the staff was looking at the AEA as part of the rulemaking effort, and agreed with another attendee's comment to see how the DOE handles their mandate to achieve criticality for a handful of units, which the NRC could analyze for insights. The attendee said that there may be an advantage for the staff to soon describe the scope of the general license and who could qualify.

An attendee expressed support for the staff to consider a new definition of utilization facility, as defined in the AEA, that would exclude low consequence small reactors, which would streamline approval of these reactors and lead to efficiency.

An attendee asked if the staff had plans for further public meetings on the topic. George Tartal answered that there will not be any further public interactions until the proposed rule is published.

An attendee asked if the staff was working with the Fusion rulemaking team, noting overlap in developing a licensing model. Elijah confirmed that this was happening.

An attendee emphasized the need for notification of state authority for deployment of general licenses in the states.

### Final Comments and Closing of Meeting

George Tartal presented a slide with contact information. Christian Araguas gave closing remarks thanking the attendees for attending the public meetings and providing their input.

## In-person attendees

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George Tartal	NRC
Aaron Kwok	NRC
Elijah Dickson	NRC
William Kennedy	NRC
Cinthya Roman	NRC
Tara Inverso	NRC
Luis Betancourt	NRC
Brian Wagner	NRC
James Downs	NRC
Jason Piotter	NRC
Todd Smith	NRC
Anthony Ulises	NRC
Christian Araguas	NRC
Jackey Harvey	NRC
Donald Palmrose	NRC
Michelle Rome	NRC
Sean Harwell	NRC
Shaun Anderson	NRC
Rani Franovich	Deep Fission
Sam Gibson	Hadron Energy, Inc.
Ryan Mott	Hadron Energy, Inc.
Jason Christensen	INL
Scott Ferrara	INL
Jon Facemire	NEI
Tim Williamson	NOV Shepherd Power
William Jessup	NOV Shepherd Power
Ross Moore	Oklo
Kenneth Thomas	PNNL
Cyril Draffin	US Nuclear Industry Council

## Online attendees

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Baek, Inseok	NRC
Bajwa, Chris	NRC
Balazik, Michael	NRC
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Barvitskie, Tim	NRC
Bauer, Laurel	NRC
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Beck, Tyler	NuScale Power
Becker, Gary	-
Benton, Catherine	-
Bergman, Jana	Curtiss-Wright
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Rad, Zackary	TerraPraxis
Rady, Jeff	NRC
Rahimi, Meraj	NRC
Rampal, Brett	Veriten
Rauffer, Carolyn	Enercon
Raunika, Ronald	NRC
Redfoot, Emma	MRPW
Reid, Cristina	-
Reid, Wendy	NuScale Power
Reinert, Klaudia	PAA
Renner, Alex	MRPW
Rhyne, Steve	-
Rivera, Tammie	NRC
Rivers, Joseph	-
Robinson, Edward	NRC
Roche, Kevin	NRC
Rodriguez, Hector	NRC
Rodriguez-Jimenez, Sergio	Gov NT
Rose, Adam	Deep Fission
Rothhaas, Rebecca	DOT
Roubi, Said	Westinghouse
Russell, John	NRC
Russell, Travis	Enercon
Saenz, Diego	Oklo
Sallam, Nadine	NRCan
Salvador, Jayson	NJ DEP
Sanabria, Yaira Diaz	NRC
Sandre, Victoria	NRCan
Santee, George	-
Santos, Norma Garcia	NRC

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
Sayampanathan, Sam	NRC
Sayoc, Manny	NRC
Schaub, Sean	-
Schiller, Alina	NRC
Schrader, Eric	NRC
Scroggins, Brian	-
Seel, PJ	BTI
Segala, John	-
Semancik, Jeffrey	State of CT/ CRCPD
Shahrokhi, Farshid	Framatome
Shams, Mo	-
Sharma, Naina	CTC
Siefer, Tim	AEP
Sierra, Tony	NRC
Simmons, Delaney	Kairos Power
Simmons, Lloyd Hugh	Entergy
Sircar, Madhumita	NRC
Smith, Casey	NRC
Smith, Janine	NRC
Smith, Steve	-
Smith, Ted	NRC
Snyder, Amy	NRC
Snyder, Melanie	Western Energy Board
Spalding, Amanda J	Westinghouse
Spellane, Bill	Maximum Pascal
Stakich, Jen	Deep Fission
Starc, Bill	-
Steh, Wesley	X-energy
Stein, Adam	-
Stroud, Heath	NRC
Studer, Kaci	DHS
Stumbo, Emmie E	UT Austin
Tabakov, Emil	NRC

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
Tabikh, Tarek	CNSC
Tapp, Jeremy	NRC
Tappert, John	NRC
Teagarden, Grant	Jensen Hughes
Tello, Daniel	CNSC
Teolis, Carmen	-
Tervo, Paul	ITTA
Tesfaye, Getachew	NRC
Tharakan, Binesh	NRC
Theis, Brittany Flaherty	Robbins-Schwartz
Thomas, Matt	X-energy
Thompson, Jenise	NRC
Thornsbury, Eric	EPRI
Thurgood, Jared	NNSA
Tilson, Deric	BTI
Tomkins, James	-
Tomon, John	NRC
Toohill, Spencer	-
Tuccillo, Karen	NJ DEP
Turney-Work, Rachel	Enercon
Turtill, Richard	NRC
Unger-Harquail, Evangeline	SAF/IEE
Valaitis, Sonata	-
VanGundy, Maria	CalOES
Vierling, Ryan	DOT
W, Ed	-
W, Jared	-
Wagner, Katie	NRC
Wai, Khaing Hsu	NRC
Wallace, Christine	Everstar
Waller, Rikki	DHW Idaho
Walters, Jon T	NOV
Weaver, Katie	-

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
Weaver, Thomas	NRC
Weil, Jenny	NRC
Weitzberg, Abe	-
Wentzel, Michael Vega	NRC
Wessel, Caitlin C	PNNL
White, Bernard	Westinghouse
White, Duncan	NRC
Widmayer, Derek	NRC
Williams, Donna	NRC
Williams, Edith	FEMA

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
Wise, Brandon	NRC
Wolf, Carolyn	NRC
Wong, Paul	CNSC
Wood, Jeffery	NRC
Yang, Chanson	Radiant
Young, David	NEI
Youngblood III, Robert Walker	INL
Zach, Andrew	EPW
Zalesny, Sean	NEI
Zeitz, Jonathan	NJ DEP
Zellhart, James	-