UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

September 16, 1976

Honorable Marcus A. Rowden
Chairman
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

CLARIFICATION OF AUGUST 17, 1976 ACRS REPORT ON DESIGN PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE

Dear Mr. Rowden:

In order to provide clarification of its report of August 17, 1976, on Design Provisions for Protection Against Sabotage, the ACRS offers the following additional information.

Project reports in which the ACRS has recently commented on the need for studies of design provisions to protect against sabotage are listed in Attachment A. In these reports the Committee has recommended that the NRC Staff and the Applicants review the proposed plants for design features that could reduce the possibility and consequences of sabotage.

In its report of October 14, 1975, on industrial sabotage the Committee noted:

"The NRC Staff has taken steps to reduce the possibility of industrial sabotage at nuclear power plants, particularly with regard to control of unauthorized access, although detailed criteria have not yet been developed and a considerable variation exists among plants currently proposed for construction permits. The Office of Regulatory Research has also funded useful studies concerning possible modes of sabotage by individuals or groups external to the operating organization. Some recommendations regarding possible design changes resulted from these studies.

The ACRS has recommended in several project reports that deliberate attention be given to aspects of design that could improve plant security. The Committee believes that, at this time when emphasis is being placed on standardized plant designs, increased attention should be given to design measures which would further protect against industrial sabotage or mitigate the consequences thereof. The ACRS would be willing to cooperate actively with any special NRC-sponsored working group in order to accelerate achievement of these objectives."

The studies made by and for the NRC Staff to which the ACRS was referring are those recently made by the Sandia Laboratories on the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to sabotage.

The phrase, "bunkered, dedicated systems," means systems whose sole function would be to assure decay heat removal under emergency conditions. These systems would be physically secured against unauthorized access and would include all necessary instrumentation, control, power, and complete cooling capability.

By "spatial redundancy," the Committee intended to convey a degree of physical separation which would make difficult and unlikely the complete loss of a capability currently provided by physically redundant, although not necessarily adequately separated, systems.

Sincerely yours,

Dade W. Moeller

Dade W. Moeller
Chairman

Attachment: A

Attachment A

January 13, 1976	Interim Report on Koshkonong Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
February 11, 1976	Interim Report on Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
February 11, 1976	Report on SWESSAR-P1, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation Balance-of-Plant Design
April 16, 1976	Report on Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Projects No. 3 and No. 5
May 12, 1976	Report on Koshkonong Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
May 13, 1976	Report on Hartsville Nuclear Plants, Units A-1, A-2, B-1 and B-2
June 11, 1976	Report on SWESSAR-P1, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation Balance-of-Plant Design as Applied to Combustion Engineering, Inc. CESSAR-80
July 14, 1976	Report on Westinghouse Electric Corporation Reference Safety Analysis Report, RESAR-3S
August 18, 1976	Report on SWESSAR-P1, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation Balance-of-Plant Design as Applied to the Westinghouse Electric Corporation RESAR-3S NSSS Design
September 15, 1976	Interim Report on Montague Power Station, Units 1 and 2