

June 20, 2025 L-2025-121 10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Re:

Turkey Point Unit 4

Docket No. 50-251

Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-41

Reportable Event: 2025-02-01 Date of Event: March 13, 2025

### **Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation**

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER), Turkey Point Unit 4 LER 2025-02-01, Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation, is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation.

This event did not have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.

Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact Maribel Valdez, Fleet Licensing Manager, at 561-904-5164.

This letter contains no new or modified regulatory commitments.

Sincerely,

Kenneth A. Mack

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Director, Licensing and Regulatory Compliance

Florida Power & Light Company

Attachment: Turkey Point Unit 4 LER 2025-02-00, Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation

CC:

USNRC Regional Administrator, Region II

USNRC Project Manager, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

Mr. Clark Eldredge, Florida Department of Health

Florida Power & Light Company

## **Attachment**

## Turkey Point Unit 4 LER 2025-02-01

Turkey Point Unit 4 LER 2025-02-01, Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation

#### EXPIRES: 04/30/2027 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 NRC FORM 366 (04-02-2024) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by email to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/) displays a currently valid OMB control number 3. Page 2. Docket Number 1. Facility Name 050 Turkey Point Unit 4 2 00251 1 OF 052 4. Title **Emergency Diesel Generator Actuation** 8. Other Facilities Involved 6. LER Number 7. Report Date 5. Event Date Docket Number **Facility Name** Sequential Revision Year Month Year Year Month Day 050 N/A **Docket Number Facility Name** 06 20 2025 2025 2025 02 01 03 13 052 N/A 10. Power Level 9. Operating Mode 0 6 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 10 CFR Part 50 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 73.1200(a) 10 CFR Part 20 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 73.1200(b) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 73.1200(c) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 73.1200(d) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 20.2203(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(1) 10 CFR Part 73 73.1200(e) 10 CFR Part 21 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 73.1200(f) 73.77(a)(1) 50.69(g) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 21.2(c) 73.77(a)(2)(i) 73.1200(g) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 73.1200(h) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) OTHER (Specify here, in abstract, or NRC 366A). 12. Licensee Contact for this LER Phone Number (Include area code) Licensee Contact 319-651-9496 **Bob Murrell** 13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report Manufacturer Reportable to IRIS Manufacturer Reportable to IRIS Cause System Component Component Cause System GE Y X FA RLY Year Month Dav 14. Supplemental Report Expected 15. Expected Submission Date Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date) No 16. Abstract (Limit to 1326 spaces, i.e., approximately 13 single-spaced typewritten lines)

At 1847 EDT on March 13, 2025, while at zero percent power and in Mode 6, Turkey Point Unit 4 Startup Transformer (SUT) [EIIS: EA] feeder breaker, 4AB05 [EIIS: EB], tripped while supplying power to the 4B 4kV Switchgear. At the time of the breaker trip, the unit was in a planned refueling outage with the 4A 4kV Switchgear out-of-service for planned breaker replacements. The breaker trip was caused by a spurious trip signal from the bus differential current interposing protective relay, 94/HFA53K91H [EIIS: FA] which caused the breaker to open. This resulted in a momentary de-energization of the 4B 4kV Bus. As designed, the 4B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) [EIIS: EK] and 4B Sequencer responded automatically to restore power to the 4B 4kV Bus. At the time of the feeder breaker trip, the site inaccurately classified the event as an Unusual Event under the loss of offsite power criteria, which was later retracted under Event Notification (EN) 57603. Due to the automatic start of the 4B EDG, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation.

#### NRC FORM 366A (04-02-2024)

#### U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/">http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/</a>)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 04/30/2027

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Library, and Information Collections Branch (T-6 A10M), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by email to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

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1. FACILITY NAME Turkey Point Unit 4			00251	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	Ι.	REV NO.	
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#### **NARRATIVE**

Description of Event:

At 1847 EDT on March 13, 2025, while at zero percent power and in Mode 6, Turkey Point Unit 4 Startup Transformer (SUT) [EIIS: EA] feeder breaker, 4AB05 [EB], tripped while supplying power to the 4B 4kV Switchgear. At the time of the breaker trip, the unit was in a planned refueling outage with the 4A 4kV Switchgear out-of-service for planned breaker replacements. The breaker trip was caused by a spurious trip signal from the bus differential current interposing protective relay, 94/HFA53K91H [EIIS: FA] which caused the breaker to open. This resulted in a momentary de-energization of the 4B 4kV Bus. As designed, the 4B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) [EIIS: EK] and 4B Sequencer responded automatically to restore power to the 4B 4kV Bus.

There were no structures, systems, or components inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event other than the 4A 4kV bus.

Cause of Event:

An interposing relay (94/HFA53K91H) in the Unit 4 SUT feeder breaker, 4AB05 trip circuit scheme spuriously actuated causing breaker 4AB05 to open. The spurious actuation was caused by a cable short-circuit between switchyard lock-out relays and interposing relay 94/HFA53K91H.

Analysis of Event:

The safety significance of this event is minimal based on having more than one emergency power source available (4B EDG and D bus station blackout tie) to perform the safety function of providing emergency power to the 4B 4 kV bus. This event did not challenge maintaining safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation.

This event did not result in a Safety System Functional Failure.

Corrective Actions:

The issue was corrected by lifting leads and electrically isolating relay 94/HFA53K91H from breaker 4AB05 protection scheme which removed the locked-in trip signal.

**Actions Planned:** 

Actions are planned to replace the cable from the switchyard to relay 94/HFA53K91H to reduce the probability of future events. In addition, actions are planned to address any potential extent of condition issues.

Similar Events:

A review of events over the past 5 years did not identify any similar events with the same cause as this event.