



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

September 6, 1983

Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino
Chairman
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Dr. Palladino:

SUBJECT: ACRS REPORT ON THE PROPOSED INSIDER SAFEGUARDS RULES

During its 281st meeting, August 31-September 1, 1983, the Committee was briefed by the NRC Staff on the contents of SECY-83-311: Proposed Insider Safeguards Rules. This matter was also discussed with the NRC Staff on August 30, 1983 during a meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Safeguards and Security.

The general subject of the proposed rules -- the safeguarding of nuclear power plants against sabotage by insiders and assurance of the good intentions and trustworthiness of persons allowed access to vital equipment in these plants -- has long been a matter of interest and concern to the Committee. We are pleased that rules bearing on these matters are nearing completion. In general, we approve of the approach being taken.

In the course of our discussions, however, the following points were raised by the Committee. We believe that these warrant further consideration by the Commission, or further attention on the part of the Staff.

1. Preemployment psychological screening

This requirement was originally recommended by an NRC Hearing Board convened to consider access to special nuclear material in 1979 and was considered for inclusion in the Access Authorization Rule initially. It has not been included in the current proposal. Although none of us supposes that such a provision could, of itself, be effective in a high degree -- any more than behavioral observation is likely to be -- it ought to be considered as providing an additional tool for dealing with an extremely difficult matter, and it ought to be included in order to strengthen the selection process.


2. Background check

In general, a five-year history is required for a background check. Nothing very specific appears to be said concerning cases when it may

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Additional comments by ACRS Members William Kerr and J. Carson Mark are presented below.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. J. Ray". The signature is stylized with large loops and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

J. J. Ray
Chairman

Additional Comments by ACRS Members William Kerr and J. Carson Mark

We have seen no convincing evidence that a method of psychological screening exists which is capable of identifying saboteurs. Under the circumstances, the use of some psychological test is likely to provide a false sense of security with no positive benefit.

be impossible for the employer to develop such information -- as might apply, for example, to a new immigrant. We think there should be a more definitive statement on this point which could, for example, require that a person for whom a full five-year history is not available should not be granted unescorted access.

3. Grandfathering

As proposed, those persons now having access authorization would retain it and such authorizations would appear to be transferable to other employers. However, such authorizations are granted on different bases by different employers and, in some cases, on bases not equivalent to those proposed in the Access Authorization Rule. For this reason, we believe that grandfathering and transferability should be limited to those personnel whose initial employment was subject to a screening program substantially equivalent to that required by the Access Authorization Rule or whose reliability has been established by behavioral observation or other reasonable means over a period of at least five years. Criteria for grandfathering within this context should be developed by the NRC Staff and a suitable grace period should be allowed to permit continued operation with existing personnel.

4. Temporary devitalization

In the case of nuclear power plants in cold shutdown, the Access Authorization Rule would permit workers for whom no access authorizations or checks may have been made to enter a temporarily devitalized area. Though shut down, such plants are capable of suffering serious accidents and may be particularly vulnerable to mischief. We understand that a study of the vulnerability of plants in cold shutdown is in progress and the results of this study may assist in defining areas to be devitalized.

5. Vital area concept

The present application of this concept does not appear to provide for the protection of the vital interties between the vital areas. This could be a serious deficiency. Sabotage or access protection appropriate to the importance and vulnerability of these coupling systems should be provided.