UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

June 20, 2025

Jamie Coleman
Regulatory Affairs Director
Southern Nuclear Operation Company, Inc.
3535 Colonnade Parkway
Birmingham, AL 35243

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2025010 AND 05000425/2025010

Dear Jamie Coleman:

On June 18, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Jamaal Mayweather and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight process can continue to be implemented.

The team also evaluated the station's effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.

Finally, the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

Signed by Blamey, Alan
on 06/20/25

Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000424 and 05000425
License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2025010 AND 05000425/2025010 DATED JUNE 20, 2025

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:	05000424 and 05000425
License Numbers:	NPF-68 and NPF-81
Report Numbers:	05000424/2025010 and 05000425/2025010
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2025-010-0049
Licensee:	Southern Nuclear Operation Company, Inc.
Facility:	Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:	Waynesboro, GA
Inspection Dates:	April 21, 2025 to May 08, 2025
Inspectors:	T. Fanelli, Senior Resident Inspector M. Kay, Resident Inspector C. Scott, Senior Project Engineer B. Truss, Resident Inspector
Approved By:	Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Maintain Qualification of Digital Governors for Emergency Diesel Generators			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000424,05000425/2025010-01 Open/Closed	[H.6] - Design Margins	71152B
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to verify that modifications to the qualified configuration of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) governor would continue to assure acceptable performance when exposed to electromagnetic interference (EMI).			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution

Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.

- Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the diesel generators, nuclear service cooling water, and safety injection. Also, as part of the assessment, the inspectors reviewed corrective actions for the following non-cited violations (NCVs), findings (FIN), and licensee-identified violations (LIVs):
  - 2023002-01. Failure to Maintain Assessment Capability of Containment Hydrogen Monitors.
  - 2023002-02. Emergency Diesel Generator Control Air Pressure Gauge not Calibrated.
  - 2023011-01. Failure to Implement Maintenance Instructions for Component Cooling Water Pump.
  - 2023011-02. Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Chillers Performance Data Not Considered During § 50.69 Periodic Review.
  - 2023011-03. Performance Data for RISC-3 Structures, Systems, and Components Scoped-Out of the Maintenance Rule (§ 50.65) not considered during § 50.69 Periodic Reviews.
  - 2023004-01. Unit 1 Design Control: Inadequate Equivalency Evaluation.
  - 2024403-01. Failure to Review Audit Logs on Badging Workstations.
  - 2024401-01. Safeguards Information (SGI) Laptop Left Unattended in the Protected Area.
  - 2024004-02. Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality. Resulted in Premature Failures of Regulating Transformers.
  - 2024004-01. Failure to Identify a Condition Adverse to Quality on 1E Safety-Related 125 VDC Emergency Battery.

- Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's processes for use of operating experience.

- Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.

- Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment	71152B

Assessment

1) Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

Problem Identification: The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective in identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) and that there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating condition reports as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program," version 19.0, and management's expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate condition reports. Additionally, site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.

Problem Prioritization and Evaluation: The inspectors reviewed condition reports (CRs), technical evaluations, and completed and/or planned work orders. With the exception noted below, the inspectors concluded that problems were, generally, prioritized and evaluated in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions," version 55.0. The inspectors determined that adequate consideration was given to structures, systems, and/or component's operability and associated plant risk. The inspectors determined that, in general, plant personnel had conducted cause evaluations in accordance with licensee's CAP procedures, as described in NMP-GM-002-GL03, "Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions Guidelines," version 37.0, and cause determinations were appropriate, and considered the significance of the issues being evaluated.

Corrective Actions: The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, interviewed licensee staff, and verified completion of corrective actions. With the exception noted below, the inspectors determined that, generally, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality (CAQ) were corrected. The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in developing corrective actions that were appropriately focused. The inspectors reviewed CRs and effectiveness reviews, as applicable, to verify that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to preclude repetition were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective. The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents for NRC findings issued since the last problem, identification, and resolution biennial inspection.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's CAP complied with regulatory requirements and self-imposed standards. The licensee's implementation of the CAP adequately supported nuclear safety.

2) Operating Experience

The team determined that the licensee's processes for the use of industry and NRC operating experience information were effective and complied with regulatory requirements and licensee standards. The implementation of these programs adequately supported nuclear safety. The team concluded that operating experience was adequately evaluated for applicability and that appropriate actions were implemented in accordance with applicable

procedures.

3) Self-Assessments and Audits

The inspectors reviewed a sample of completed self-assessments and audits conducted by both plant and nuclear oversight personnel. The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective at performing self-assessments and audits to identify issues at a low level, properly evaluated those issues, and resolved them commensurate with their safety significance. The self-assessments and audits were adequately self-critical and performance-related issues were being appropriately identified. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations.

4) Safety Conscious Work Environment

The inspectors interviewed a sample of plant employees from various departments and with varying roles/responsibilities within the organization. The inspectors determined that employees (1) were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervisor/manager or though the CAP, (2) were aware of alternative avenues for raising concerns such as the Employee Concern Program (ECP), and (3) had not experienced retaliation for raising safety concerns. Specifically, all individuals interviewed indicated that they would feel comfortable in raising safety concerns. All individuals felt that their management was receptive to receiving safety concerns and generally addressed them promptly and commensurate with the significance of the concern. Most interviewees were aware of the licensee's ECP and stated they would use the program, if necessary. When asked whether there have been any instances where individuals experienced retaliation or other negative reaction for raising safety concerns, all individuals interviewed stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of an instance of retaliation at the site. To supplement these discussions, the team reviewed the ECP case log and interviewed the ECP Coordinator to assess their perception of the site employees' willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns. Also, the team reviewed a sample of the most recent Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel meeting reports as well as the results from the most recent biennial safety culture survey and self-assessment from June 2024. The team determined that the processes in place to mitigate potential safety culture issues were adequately implemented.

Failure to Maintain Qualification of Digital Governors for Emergency Diesel Generators			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green NCV 05000424,05000425/2025010-01 Open/Closed	[H.6] - Design Margins	71152B
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” for the failure to verify that modifications to the qualified configuration of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) governor would continue to assure acceptable performance when exposed to electromagnetic interference (EMI).			
Description: The team reviewed condition report (CR)10984893, “Unit 2 Diesel Generator B uncontrolled loading while performing Monthly Operability Test,” and technical evaluation (TE) 1132077, “Past Operability Review: Unit 2 Diesel Generator B uncontrolled loading during Operability Test.” The TE documented an uncontrolled loading event during testing of the emergency diesel generators in July of 2023. The event occurred after the installation of a			

digital governor modification in March 2023.

Vogtle units 1 and 2 licensing basis requires the diesel governor components to be qualified; “to the range of voltage, frequency, load, electromagnetic interference, and other electrical characteristics” and installed in accordance with IEEE 323-1974, “IEEE Standard-for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” Licensee procedure, SN9604 “Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Qualification Requirements for Southern Nuclear Power Plant Equipment” states that Section 5 of Electric Power and Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Report (TR)-102323, Rev. 3, “Guidelines for Electromagnetic Interference Testing of Power Plant Equipment” should be used to determine required test, ranges, and testing level. Vogtle received the digital governor from Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) and ESI contracted Analysis and Measurement Services (AMS) to qualify the governor for EMI capabilities in accordance with EPRI TR-102323.

The qualification report documented that “Initially, the controls did not pass [tests] CE102, RE102, or [International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards] 61000-4-4, 61000-4-12, and 61000-4-2 tests. Troubleshooting was performed by AMS as requested by ESI and mitigations were applied to the controls to pass testing.” Specifically, capacitors, ferrite beads, line filters, and snubbers were installed to reduce the as found measured emissions to acceptable levels (i.e., within the EPRI equipment emissions limits) and qualify the configuration for EMI. The team conducted walkdowns of the EDG control cabinets and identified several of the components needed for electromagnetic interference and radio frequency interference (EMI/RFI) mitigation were not installed. The team also reviewed DOEJ-VDSNC953976-J001 “Electromagnetic Compatibility Evaluation for Plant Use of Woodward 2301A Speed Control System” which provided justification for the removal of several EMI mitigation devices, including capacitors, that were added to the governor during the qualification test to meet the EPRI TR-102323 equipment emission limits. SN9604, Section 4.1.3, “Review and Acceptance or an Existing Test Report” states that "differences that are not conservative may require additional testing. All new testing specified should conform to the requirements of this specification (SN9604). However, an evaluation of differences may be acceptable as long as it can be shown that an adequate electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) margin exists.”

The licensee determined that the removal of the capacitors was acceptable because the “as found” radiated emissions were still below the plant composite limit even though the EPRI TR-102323 limits were exceeded. The licensee anticipated that the location of the governor panel and it’s construction would provide shielding. However, the licensee has not demonstrated this through testing, nor do they have an evaluation that has quantified the impact to the overall plant emissions level after installation. EPRI TR-102323 states that the equipment emissions testing limits must be sufficiently below the highest composite plant emissions levels to ensure that installation of new equipment does not result in an increase of the overall plant emissions levels. Additionally, it stated that the equipment susceptibility testing levels bound the highest composite plant emissions levels and that the margin between the equipment susceptibility testing levels and the highest composite plant emissions must be adequate to address uncertainties. The licensee’s evaluation did not verify that installation of EDG governor components in a configuration different from the EMI qualification test did not increase the overall plant emissions level to demonstrate adequate EMC margin and provide reasonable assurance of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC.) The inspectors concluded that because these components were removed, the site exposed the EDGs to intermittent EMI influences as seen during testing, which affected EDG reliability.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the violation into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 11176666.

Corrective Action References: CR 11176666

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to verify that modifications to the qualified configuration of the EDG governor would continue to assure acceptable performance when exposed to EMI was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to install the EDG governor components in the qualified configuration exposed the EDGs to failures due to electromagnetic interferences and affected EDG reliability.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.” The finding screened to be of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC and the SSC maintained its operability or PRA functionality.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.6 - Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety related equipment. The licensee failed to install the EDG governor components in a configuration that maintained the design margins of the EMI qualification and exposed the EDG to failures due to electromagnetic interferences.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, to 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion III, “Design Control,” requires, in part, that design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, using alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.

USAR Section 8.1.4.3 “Design Criteria, Regulatory Guides, and IEEE Standards,” establishes that the design of the offsite power and onsite Class 1E electric systems conforms with IEEE 323-1974, Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

IEEE 323-1974, Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations specified that qualification must demonstrate the acceptable performance of Class 1E components; “to the range of voltage, frequency, load, electromagnetic interference, and other electrical characteristics.”

Licensee Procedure SN9604 “SNC - Standard Specification Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Qualification Requirements for Southern Nuclear Power Plant Equipment,” Section 4.1.3, states in part that "differences that are not conservative may require additional testing. All new testing specified should conform to the requirements of this specification (SN9604).

However, an evaluation of differences may be acceptable as long as it can be shown that an adequate EMC margin exists."

Contrary to the above, since March 2023, the licensee's design control measures failed to verify that the installation of EDG governor components in a configuration different from the EMI qualification test was acceptable. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify that adequate EMC margin was maintained, as required by SN9604, after EDG governor components were installed without mitigating devices used to qualify the EDG governor. This impacted the EDG's reliability and exposed the EDGs to failures due to electromagnetic interferences.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Minor Violation	71152B

Minor Violation: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states, in part, activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings. Licensee procedure, NMP-GM-002-001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions," Attachment 1, states that an equipment reliability checklist is required for "Equipment failure which results in Unplanned Entry into Technical Specification (TS) Shutdown RAS < 72 hours, regardless of whether a Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) is available or used. Apply this classification even IF the unit operating mode at the time of condition discovery DOES NOT require operability, and regardless of how the condition was discovered." Contrary to the above, since December 2023, the licensee failed to accomplish safety-related procedure NMP-GM-002-001 following equipment failures of the engineered safety feature (ESF) chillers that resulted in unplanned entries into TS shutdown RAS < 72 hours. Inspectors identified four condition reports for failures of the ESF chillers that the licensee did not perform an equipment reliability checklist.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Specifically, the failure to perform the equipment reliability checklist evaluations did not impact the corrective actions for the ESF chiller failures.

Enforcement: This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as condition report (CR) 11175615.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On May 8, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Robert Norris and other members of the licensee staff.
- On June 18, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Jamaal Mayweather.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Corrective Action Documents	Condition Reports (CR)	10984893, 11012191, 11004677, 11020598, 11041870, 11166342, 11131136, 11109611, 11130060, 11131453, 11127703, 10997871, 11107574, 11102441, 10955463, 10914526, 10894283, 10845558, 10834111, 10833225, 10847097, 11056293, 11056920, 11164921, 11134034, 11115752, 11111785, 11060144, 11057711, 11038391, 11007390, 10993768, 10827428, 10997768, 11063005, 11064269, 11076195, 11062998, 11009968, 11035633, 10984389	
71152B	Corrective Action Documents	Corrective Action Reports (CAR)	289796, 740078, 322420, 680433, 643431, 280456	
71152B	Drawings	1X3D-BH-G03R-2	Elementary Diagram EDG Control Sheet 2	Version 9
71152B	Drawings	1X4AK01 -00445	Generator Control Panel Connection Diagram	Version 14
71152B	Drawings	1X4AK01 -00446	Generator Control Panel Connection Diagram	Version 14
71152B	Drawings	1X4AK01 -00448	Generator Control Panel Connection Diagram	Version 10
71152B	Drawings	1X4AK01 -00449	Generator Control Panel Connection Diagram	Version 13
71152B	Drawings	1X4AK01 -00450	Generator Control Panel Connection Diagram	Version 10
71152B	Drawings	1X4AK01 -00451	Generator Control Panel Connection Diagram	Version 8
71152B	Engineering Changes	DCP SNC953976	10 CFR 50.59 Screening	Version 4.0
71152B	Engineering Evaluations	AX4AK01A-00014	EMI/RFI Qualification of Governor Speed Control System	Version 1.0
71152B	Engineering Evaluations	DOEJ-VDSNC953976-E001	Evaluation of Electromagnetic Interference and Radio-Frequency Interference	Version 1
71152B	Engineering Evaluations	DOEJ-VDSNC953976-J001	Documentation of Engineering Judgment, Electromagnetic Compatibility Evaluation for Plant Use of Woodward 2301A Speed Control System	Version 2
71152B	Engineering Evaluations	TE1132077	Past Operability Review: Unit 2 Diesel Generator B uncontrolled loading during Operability Test, evaluate effects of condition, including potential failure modes.	07/07/2023
71152B	Engineering Evaluations	TE1140435	PAST OPERABILITY REVIEW - 2B EDG GCP Seismic Qualification with Recorder Installed	11/03/2023

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152B	Engineering Evaluations	TE1146399	PAST OPERABILITY REVIEW: 1B EDG uncontrolled Loading during run	01/31/2024
71152B	Engineering Evaluations	Technical Evaluations (TE)	1176088, 1166659, 1161980, 1161649, 1124663, 1107999, 1149782, 1150142, 1150427, 1159944, 1165119, 1160168, 1136207, 1095170, 1154229, 1157132, 1157921, 1132077, 1136207, 1137272, 1137285, 1132077, 1136207, 1137272, 1137285, 1139867, 1140435, 1142929, 1143906, 1144223, 1146399, 1148090, 1155766, 1159944, 1160168, 1165119	
71152B	Miscellaneous	IEEE 323	IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations	1974
71152B	Miscellaneous	Post Maintenance Record	Daily turnover from NS to DS	3/19/23
71152B	Miscellaneous	SNC953976CAP	Removal of Capacitors – 2301A (21) to ground and DRU (11) to ground	3/19/2023
71152B	Miscellaneous	SNC953976SNUBBER	Vogtle RC Snubber Evaluation	3/17/2023
71152B	Miscellaneous	VEGP Design Criteria Control No. DC-2403	Emergency Diesel Generator Systems (Design Bases for EDGs)	Version 10
71152B	Operability Evaluations	Condition Report (CR)	11006065, 11012191, 11039992, 11056920	
71152B	Procedures		NMP-GM-014-010, NMP-ES-095, NMP-MA-054, MP-ES-065-004, NMP-ES-065, NMP-ES-027, NMP-ES-065-006, NMP-GM-002-F22, NMP-MA-060	
71152B	Procedures	SN9604	Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Qualification Requirements for Southern Nuclear Power Plant Equipment	Version 2
71152B	Work Orders	SNC	2437005, 1527546, 1627209, 1747060, 1182787, 1204290, 1335096, 1472802, 1736122, 1736882, 2403571, 2044093, 1503688, 1665936	